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This dissertation investigates the ways in which early Christian authors produced 
ethnography and articulated their ethnographic interests. I analyze the paradigms and 
techniques Christian writers (150-450 C.E.) used to array, historicize, and polemicize 
ethnographic “data.” A study of late antique heresiological literature (orthodox treatises about 
heretics) demonstrates how the rituals, doctrinal beliefs, customs, and historical origins of 
heretics functioned to map and delimit the composition of the Christian world and the world 
at large. In a late antique world, polemical and didactic ethnography evidences the coincident 
attraction and repulsion of discovery and exploration. Oscillating between ancient 
ethnographic precedents and contemporary ethnographic theory, I argue that the 
Christianization of ethnography and ethnographic paradigms evidences not totalizing 
aspirations of authority but a far less secure epistemological and textual timidity: writing and 
knowing heretics was an endeavor fraught with conceptual incertitude. The heresiologists 
explicitly ponder the effects and implications of the epistemological limits of ethnographic 
investigation, the representative capacity and permanence of language, and the 
unmanageability of ethnographic knowledge.  
In a late antique world defined by remarkable religious and political change, polemical 
and didactic ethnography evidences the coincident attraction and repulsion of discovery and 
exploration. Oscillating between ancient ethnographic precedents and contemporary 
ethnographic theory, I argue that the Christianization of ethnography and ethnographic 
paradigms evidences not totalizing aspirations of authority but a far less secure 
epistemological and textual timidity: writing and knowing heretics and monks was an 
endeavor fraught with conceptual incertitude. The heresiologists and monastic writers 
explicitly ponder the effects and implications of the epistemological limits of ethnographic 
investigation, the representative capacity and permanence of language, and the 
unmanageability of ethnographic knowledge. My contribution to the burgeoning field of 
ancient ethnography not only points toward the enduring and potent legacy of Christianity in 
shaping the language and themes of centuries of ethnographic investigation—opening new 
lines of inquiry between anthropology and religious studies—but it also demonstrates how 
Christian authors actively contemplated the limits and danger of investigations of the natural 
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The author Nicander too gave an account of the nature of beasts and reptiles. And other 
authors <described> the qualities of roots and plants—Dioscurides the Wood-Cutter, 
Pamphilus, King Mithridates, Callisthenes, Philo, Iolaus of Bithynia, Heraclidas of 
Tarentum, Cratenus the Root-Collector, Andrew, Bassus the Tulian, Niceratus, Petronius, 
Niger, Diodotus, and certain others. In the same way I, in trying to reveal the roots and 
beliefs of the sects, am not <describing them> in order to harm those who care to read 
(my description). Those authors made a diligent effort, not to point evil out, but to 
frighten people and ensure their safety, so that they would recognize the dreadful, 
dangerous beasts and be safe and escape them by God’s power, by taking care not to 
engage with such deadly creatures if they encountered them, and were menaced by their 
breath or bite, or by the sight of them. And <at the same time>, from the same concern, 
the same authors prescribed remedies made from roots and plants, to counteract the evil 
of these serpents. 
 
-Epiphanius of Salamis1 
 
For those of us who study the ancient world, ethnography is an enticing yet elusive 
subject.2 In contrast to the modern concept, which denotes both a practice (fieldwork) and a 
                                                        
1 Epiphanius, Panarion, Prooemium II.3.1-3, ed. Karl Holl, GCS 25 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1915), 1:171. Translation 
from Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis, 2 vols., NHS 35–36 [Leiden: Brill, 1987, 1994]. 
 
2 See, for example, Greg Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011); Joseph E. Skinner, The Invention of Greek Ethnography: From Homer to Herodotus (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Kurt A. Raaflaub and Richard J.A. Talbert, eds., Geography and Ethnography: Perceptions of the 
World in Pre-Modern Societies (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); Allan A. Lund, Zum Germanenbild der Römer: Eine 
Einführung in die antike Ethnographie (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1990); Christian Jacob, Géographie et ethnographie en 
Grèce ancienne (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991); Bezalel Bar-Kochva, Pseudo-Hecataeus “On the Jews:” Legitimizing the 
Jewish Diaspora (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Eram Almagor and Joseph Skinner, eds., Ancient 
Ethnography: New Approaches (London: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2013); Rosalind Thomas, Herodotus in Context: 
Ethnography, Science, and the Art of Persuasion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Carol Dougherty, The 
Raft of Odysseus: The Ethnographic Imagination of Homer’s Odyssey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Richard 
F. Thomas, Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological 
Society, 1982); Mark Vessey, Sharon V. Betcher, Robert A. Daum, and Harry O. Maier, The Calling of the Nations: 
Exegesis, Ethnography, and Empire in a Biblical-Historic Present (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); Guy G. 
Stroumsa, “Philosophy of the Barbarians: On Early Christian Ethnological Representations,” in Barbarian 
Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity, ed. Guy G. Stroumsa (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 57-84; 
and Michael Maas, “‘Delivered from their Ancient Customs’: Christianity and the Question of Cultural Change in 
Early Byzantine Ethnography," in Conversion in Late Antiquity, ed. Anthony Grafton and Kenneth Mills (Princeton: 
  
2 
genre of writing, in the ancient Mediterranean no conventions governed the discipline or 
genre. Indeed, few ancient authors undertook anything approximating modern fieldwork. 
While Greeks and Romans wrote endlessly about foreign dress, myths, dietary habits, histories, 
cosmologies, and religious customs, they “wrote peoples” in counterpoint (both positively and 
negatively) to their own cultural norms and conventions. Building upon the work of myriad 
classicists, ancient historians, religionists, and anthropologists, my project posits that ancient 
ethnography, and even ethnographic stereotyping, attests a complex set of negotiations 
between the process of understanding the surrounding world, inventorying its contents, and 
articulating a position within it. Discovery and travel were not singularly triumphant 
endeavors, but rather highly perilous and disruptive efforts. Because ancient ethnography 
primarily functioned descriptively, through chronicling, stylizing, and essentializing foreign 
customs, it moved to study the world as it underwent change, to orient a people within their 
evolving social and cultural surroundings. This dissertation aims to assess the conceptual 
paradigms and epistemological implications of ancient ethnography within the context of late 
antique Christianity. I investigate the ways in which early Christian authors produced 
ethnography and articulated their ethnographic interests. I analyze the paradigms and 
techniques Christian writers (150-450 C.E.) used to array, historicize, and polemicize Christian 
ethnographic “data.” A study of late antique heresiological literature (orthodox treatises about 
heretics) demonstrates how the rituals, doctrinal beliefs, customs, and historical origins of 
heretics functioned to map and delimit the composition of the Christian world and the world 
at large. Heretics were invaluable yet highly unstable theoretical playthings through which 
Christian authors navigated and systematized the diversity of the human world. Just as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Princeton University Press, 2009), 152-188. 
  
3 
Christian ethnographic gaze contemplates the differences of the peoples of the world, 
Christian ethnographic turn is not just ethnography by Christians but ethnography of 
Christians. 
I further argue that ancient ethnography entails far more (and it does so far more 
complexly) than an anachronistic repackaging or reframing of the discourse on self and other 
(all in service of exploring the process by which identifies were formed). This is not to deny 
that identity formation lies at the core of much of ethnographic writing—that is undoubtedly 
true—but merely to suggest that ethnography cannot simply be reduced to the charge of 
anachronism or as yet another study, albeit from a different perspective, of “the other.”  To 
the extent that ancient writers enveloped the persona of an ethnographer, whether armchair 
or fieldworker, they did more, as I hope to demonstrate with the case of late antique Christian 
authors, than simply regurgitate stereotypes, provide moral warnings, or parrot imperial 
propaganda. In thinking about heresiology ethnographically, we are compelled to ask how 
ancient writers reflect about the textualization of peoples, both foreign and domestic; how 
they distill and essentialize communities into textual form; how the writing and the editing 
processes impose not only a self-reflexivity, but also an epistemological showdown, in which 
the capacity to know the world of Christianity and the architect of the world of Christianity 
become fleeting possibilities. The contemplative and theoretical impact of the ethnographic 
disposition ponders the effects, consequences, and parameters of lived and stylized human 
behavior in the context of writing communities of people. The two lines of implicit inquiry I 
shall reference throughout the body of this dissertation track relatedly to matters of textual 
representation and epistemological potentiality. How do ancient ethnographic texts—and in 
particular Christian ethnographic works—maneuver fissures within their scholastic and 
  
4 
“scientific” edifices and how do their authors contemplate their capacities to comprehend the 
natural and unnatural world? What are the epistemological limits of Christian ethnography? 
To think with and through ethnography is to invite a scrutiny not simply of another or even 
oneself, but to contemplate openly about the representative capacity of language and texts. It 
is the functional application and usage of this ethnographic knowledge of—what work it 
achieves conceptually and practically for the authors who use it—that I wish to unpack: what, 
in essence, are the effects, both stated and unstated, of writing ethnographically? 
 
Ethnicity, Ethnography, and Early Christianity 
 
Jonathan Hall’s pioneering work, Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity, harnessed the 
contributions of modern anthropology to argue that ancient Greek notions of ethnicity were 
not ultimately essentialist, racial, or biological categorizations, but rather emerged out of 
dynamic processes of engagement with ethnography, geography, material culture, and 
language.3 Arguing against both primordialists who contend that ethnicity is a natural unit of 
human history and instrumentalists who hold that the symbolic universe engendered through 
claims of shared ethnicity serves to further economic or political ends, Hall argues that, 
                                                        
3 Jonathan M. Hall, Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 17-33. Among 
his interlocutors: Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986) and his Myths and 
Memories of the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and his “Ethnic Identity,” in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. 
Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 111-140; Ernst 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983); Thomas Hylland Eriksen, 
Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. 2nd ed. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002), Fredrik Barth, Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998); and G.Carter 




“ethnic identity is socially constructed and subjectively perceived” (Hall’s emphasis).4 In order to 
parse the distinction between a definition of ethnicity and the experiential aspects of 
ethnicity, Hall enumerates two related, though different facets of ethnicity: criteria and indicia. 
He explains: 
The criteria of ethnicity are the definitional set of attributes by which 
membership in an ethnic group is ultimately determined. They are the result of 
a series of conscious and socially embedded choices, which attach significance 
to certain criteria from a universal set while ignoring others (though in practice 
this will usually concern a putative notion of descent, as will be seen). The 
indicia, on the other hand, are the operational set of distinguishing attributes 
which people tend to associate with particular ethnic groups once the criteria 
have been established.5  
 
The definition of ethnic identity, then, is not correlated with physical attributes, religious 
customs, or dietary habits; rather it is a function of conceptual and ascriptive boundaries.6 
Hall’s reading of the evidence leads him to conclude that there are three criteria of ethnicity: 
they are “a putative subscription to a myth of common descent and kinship, an association 
with a specific territory and a sense of shared history.”7 Taken together, territory, kinship, and 
history were used to construct a tradition of shared ethnic heritage: the discourse of ἔθνος 
signified these constituitive elements of Greekness.8  
                                                        
4 Hall, Ethnic Identity, 19.  
 
5 Hall, Ethnic Identity, 20-21.  
 
6 Although indicia may appear to be the hallmarks (i.e. criteria) of ethnicity, they are, in fact, the outward 
signifiers of an already established definition of ethnic identity. Indicia become associated with ethnic identity 
only insofar as they are more readily identifiable. 
 
7 Jonathan M Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 9.  
 
8 Greekness, as Hall explains in Hellenicity, which began as an ethnic designation in the seventh and eighth 
centuries B.C.E., “shifted from an ethnic to broader cultural criteria in the course of the fifth century” (7). In the 
wake of the Persian Wars, the reinvention of Hellenicity in cultural terms, a principally Athenian endeavor, 
enabled cultural movement and shifting: “the figure of the barbarian in Attic tragedy articulates a discourse of 
alterity that invites self-speculation among the spectators as to the nature of Hellenicity” (176). Dichotomies 
provoke self-conceptualization.  
  
6 
 In the study of early Christianity, Adolf von Harnack famously argued that Tertullian 
and Pseudo-Cyprian’s deployment of the locution tertium genus compelled him to ask “whether 
Christianity was a new genus of religion in a theological or philosophical dialectic with 
paganism.”9 David Olster, writing almost a century later, reframes the question to wonder, 
“whether early Christians thought of themselves as a new genus or genos or ethnos in an 
ethnographic dialogue with classical assumptions about nation or…race, which better renders 
the classical connotations.”10 Olster’s effort to recast the implications of the Christian 
invocation of “third race,” however, collapses the distinction between race/nation/ethnicity 
and ethnography. The latter, he notes, is a generic formulation of everything related to the 
former: “the rhetoric of ‘third race’ was drawn from ethnography, a common and much 
employed genre within classical literature, whose topoi were common throughout 
contemporary, non-Christian literature.”11 While Olster does offer his own criteria of race, 
however briefly, they are immaterial to my point here. I wish to stress that theorizations about 
race or determinations of ethnic criteria are not, as I will explain below, equivalent to 
ethnography or ethnographic writing.12 Ethnography is not the generic form of ethnic 
reasoning (or conversely, ethnic reasoning is not the content of ethnography).  
                                                        
9 Adolf von Harnack, The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries, trans. and ed. James Moffat (New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904-5), 1:336-52. 
 
10 David M. Olster, “Classical Ethnography and Early Christianity,” in The Formulation of Christianity by Conflict 
through the Ages, ed. Katherine B. Free (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), 9-31, at 12. 
 
11 Olster, “Classical Ethnogaphy,” 11.  
 
12 Olster’s stable genre of classical ethnography, as we shall see below, necessitates myriad qualification. Written 
before the publication of Hall’s groundbreaking research, Olster assumes that ethnography investigates or depicts 
the constituitive facets of race: “from Herodotus to Strabo to Tacitus, classical ethnographers identifies a race by 
language, geographic location, cult center, and those idiosyncratic laws and customs (including religion) that the 




The abundant work on ethnicity and race in early Christian literature—from Denise 
Buell, Caroline Johnson-Hodges, Philippa Townsend, Gay Byron, and Aaron Johnson, among 
others—has largely championed the concepts of ethnic reasoning and ethnic argumentation.13 
This terminological emphasis evidences, I think, Hall’s rightful influence over the terms of 
scholastic analysis. In identifying criteria of ethnicity, Hall’s work has expanded the capacity of 
scholars to identify moments in which ancient authors embraced, modified, and interpreted 
anew the vocabulary and elements of ethnic identity.14 Aaron Johnson, for instance, in his 
                                                        
13 Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005); Caroline Johnson-Hodges, If Sons, Then Heirs: A Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Letters of Paul (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Aaron Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius’ Praeparatio evangelica 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Gay L. Byron, Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian 
Literature (New York: Routledge, 2002). See also, Philippa Lois Townsend, “Another Race? Ethnicity, Universalism, 
and the Emergence of Christianity” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2009); Laura Nasrallah and Elisabeth 
Schüssler‐Fiorenza, eds., Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian 
Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009); Benjamin Dunning, Aliens and Sojourners: Self as Other in Early Christianity 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); David M. Goldenberg, The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in 
Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Patrick J. Geary, “Ethnicity as a 
Situational Construct in the Early Middle Ages,” Mitteilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien 113 (1983): 
15-26; Nicola Denzey, “The Limits of Ethnic Categories,” in Handbook of Early Christianity, ed. A. Blasi, J. Duhaime 
and P.‐A. Turcotte (New York: Almira Press, 2002), 489‐507 (this essay should be used with caution; it is marked by 
a number of linguistic mistakes and dubious conclusions). Hervé Inglebert, Interpretatio Christiana: Les mutations des 
savoirs (cosmographie, géographie, ethnographie, histoire) dans l’Antiquité chrétienne (Paris:Institut d’Études 
Augustiniennes, 2001) 109–92, does expressly draw out the category of ethnography, but he confines his 
discussion almost singularly to the interpretation of Genesis 10. Aaron P. Johnson, “The Blackness of Ethiopians: 
Classical Ethnography and Eusebius’Commentary on the Psalms,” Harvard Theological Review 99.2 (2006): 179‐200 
similarly references the notion of classical ethnography without parsing the locution. It is telling that, despite the 
article’s title, the word ethnography never appears in the body of the essay (both references are in the first 
footnote). The lack of distinction between ethnography and ethnicity remains problematic.  
 
14 On ethnicity, race, and nationalism in the context of Judaism see: Beth Berkowitz, Defining Jewish Difference: From 
Antiquity to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Gideon Bohak, “Ethnic Continuity in the 
Jewish Diaspora in Antiquity,” in Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman Cities, ed. J.R. Bartlett (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 175‐192; Mark G. Brett, Ethnicity and the Bible (Boston: Brill, 2002); Shaye D. Cohen, The Beginnings of 
Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); David M. Goodblatt, 
Elements of Ancient Jewish Nationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Erich Gruen, “Jewish 
Perspectives on Greek Culture and Ethnicity,” in Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity, ed. Irad Malkin (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 347‐373; Hayim Lapin, “Introduction: Locating Ethnicity and Religious 
Community in Later Roman Palestine,” in Religious and Ethnic Communities in Later Roman Palestine, ed. Hayim Lapin 
(Bethesda, MD: University Press of Maryland,1998), 1‐28; Steve Mason, “Jews, Judaeans, Judaizing, Judaism: 
Problems of Categorization in Ancient History,” Journal for the Study of Judaism 38 (2007): 457‐512; Doron Mendels. 
Rise and Fall of Jewish Nationalism (New York: Doubleday, 1992); Jacob Neusner, “Was Rabbinic Judaism Really 
‘Ethnic’?” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 57 (1995): 281‐305; Kevin Osterloh, “The Reinvention of Judean Collective 
Identity in a Hellenistic World Contending with Rome” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2007); and Tessa 
Rajak, “Ethnic Identities in Josephus,” in her Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in Cultural and Social 
Interaction (Boston: Brill, 2001), 137‐146. 
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incisive reading of Eusebius of Caesarea’s Preparatio evangelica, construes ethnic argumentation 
as a process of identity formation that explicitly utilizes the language of oppositional ethnicity. 
As he explains, “The apologetic method of the PE—what I designate ‘ethnic argumentation’—
centers upon a construal of the ethnē (or nations) of the world and upon the construction of 
Christianity as an ethnos which stands as a stark alternative to those other ethnē.”15 And while 
much scholarly energy has been devoted to contrasting ethnicity and religion—the degree to 
which they coexisted, excluded, or reinterpreted one another16—ethnography does not, I 
argue, presuppose a rigid distinction between ethnicity, race, and religion. Ethnography exists 
above and apart from these second-order category instantiations.17  
                                                        
15 Aaron Johnson, “Identity, Descent and Polemic: Ethnic Argumentation in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica,” 
Journal of Early Christian Studies 12 (2004): 27. 
 
16 See Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004), 1-111; Jeremy Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 15-109; Denise Buell, Why This New Race; Aaron Johnson, Ethnicity and 
Argument in Eusebius’ Praeparatio evangelica; David Olster, “Classical Ethnography and Early Christianity;” and 
Philippa Lois Townsend, “Another Race? Ethnicity, Universalism, and the Emergence of Christianity.” 
 
17 Nor must ethnographic texts offer a rigid formulation of peoplehood, deploy motifs of kinship, or identify and 
describe an indigenous geographical habitat. The descriptions of customs and habits of any sort of communal 
group (however amorphously defined), theories of ethnogenesis, and models of human difference are all 
emblematic of ethnographic writing. The ethnographic impulse of Philo’s De Vita Contempletiva, for example, 
exists apart from the fact that he used the term γένος to describe the ascetical Therapeutae. Philo undertakes a 
description of a community, which foregrounds their customs and habits. Indeed, despite the fact that his treatise 
does not systematically define its notion of community or peoplehood (and it has nothing whatsoever to say 
about kinship), it is an immensely useful example for thinking about ancient modes and methods of ethnographic 
writing. See Maren R. Hiehoff, “The Symposium of Philo’s Therapeutae: Displaying Jewish Identity in an 
Increasingly Roman World,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 50 (2010): 95-116; and Joan E. Taylor, Jewish Women 
Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria: Philo’s ‘Therapeutae’ Reconsidered (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
esp. 105-153, 173-226. For Philo’s usage of the word hairesis (and the unity of Judaism over against the discord of 
Greek philosophical parties), see David Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek Hairesis-Model,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 53.2 (1999): 117-147. On the broader phenomena of communal identity, see Daniel Richter, Cosmopolis: 
Imagining Community in Late Classical Athens Roman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Simon Swain, 
Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50-250 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); 
Emma Dench, From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples from the Central Apennines 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); eadem, Romulus’ Asylum, 222-297; Jeremy duQuesnay Adams, The 
Populus of Augustine and Jerome: A Study in the Patristic Sense of Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); 
Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New Race, 63-93; and Greg Woolf, Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization 
in Gaul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
  
9 
In its most capacious and heuristic sense, beyond the narrowly construed etymological 
notion of writing foreign peoples and lands (writing ἔθνος), ethnography, conceptually, 
constitutes writing about any and all groups or communities and moments of communal 
habitation: military triumphs, celebratory banquets, ritual gatherings, brigands, magicians, 
pirates, and philosophical parties (among other groups) all rightfully belong within the gaze of 
the ethnographic author.18 Ethnography is neither the study of ethnicity, nor an effort to parse 
its criteria:19 it is the study of the ways in which population groups of religious, political, 
military, and ethnic orientation were written and categorized as cultural entities. 
Ethnographic writing does not, necessarily, participate in the development of the criteria or 
definition of ethnicity. While it is possible to infer from texts with ethnographic interests (or 
from texts that might reasonably be called ethnographic) what may have constituted the 
components of ancient ethnicity, ethnography, both as a historical and heuristic category, 
captures more than criteria of ethnicity. In asking “whether, or to what extent, early 
Christians abandoned such criteria (and indicia) of identity, and how they challenged them, 
and changed,” Philippa Townsend correctly distinguishes modes of identification from 
                                                        
18 On banquets, see Philo’s De Vita Contempletiva and Petronitus’ Satyricon. On diet, see Brent D. Shaw, “‘Eaters of 
Flesh; Drinkers of Milk’: the Ancient Mediterranean Ideology of the Pastoral Nomad,” Ancient Society 13/14 
(1982/3): 5-31; Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 66-81; and Nicholas Purcell, “The Way We Used to Eat: Diet, Community, and History at 
Rome,” The American Journal of Philology 124.3 (2003): 329-358. On triumphs and conquest, see Emma Dench, 
Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexandria to the Age of Hadrian (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 69-80; Katharina Schmidt, Kosmologische Aspekte im Geschichtswerk des Poseidonios (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
and Ruprecht), 97-104; and Leena Pietelä-Castrén, Magnificentia Publica: The Victory Monuments of the Roman Generals 
in the Era of the Punic Wars (Helsinki: Societas Scieniarum Fennica, 1987). 
 
19 Even if we offer a more capacious sense of corporate identity, the failure to identify indigenous ethnography 
remains pervasive. Insofar as ethnography operates as a means of assessing differentiation, the internal 
application of ethnographic analysis functions as causal and explanatory model of human diversity. In that sense, 
late antique efforts to describe monastic habits and customs surely fall within the parameters of ancient 
ethnographic writing. John Cassian, Evagrius Ponticus, Socrates, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, and Sozomen all note 
regional differences among the monks. This didactic or aspirational ethnography is yet another manifestation of 




methods of definition.20 But precise attention to the evolving standards of definitional 
ethnicity, additions and subtractions alike, does not fundamentally alter the distinction I am 
proposing. The process of writing people is not a delimitation of criteria; it is more than the 
language of kinship alone. It represents the writing of customs, habits, and practices of groups 
(and even individuals in the modern sense of anthropology), while its authors ponder how 
these habits reflect broader theoretical, political, and social exigencies.21 
If we think of ethnography as an effort to translate reality into writing and, inversely, 
to use rhetoric to construct reality, it encompasses a multifaceted process of analysis, which 
necessitates the collection of data—from social discourse, travel, or recapitulation of sources—
and the organization, systemization, and theorization of its discoveries. Though not a 
disciplinary practice or a scientific genre in the modern sense, as Greg Woolf has cogently 
explained, ancient ethnographic writing nonetheless draws upon procedures of knowledge 
acquisition and the rhetoric, as the opening quote from Epiphanius illustrates, of “scientific” 
exactitude.22 The analysis of ethnography hinges on the representative capacity of authors and 
                                                        
20 Philippa Lois Townsend, “Another Race? Ethnicity, Universalism, and the Emergence of Christianity,” 13.  
 
21 Even though the expression ethnography did not exist in the ancient discourse, it was a manifestly real 
preoccupation insofar as authors from across the Mediterranean concerned themselves with the customs and 
habits of all sorts of peoples. To the extent that ethnicity cordons off certain types of groups (by delimiting 
criteria of shared history, territory, and kinship), ethnography, as a contemporary field of inquiry and as a 
heuristic designation for ancient groups, signals a far more capacious perspective. The facets of group 
membership need not be elaborated as irreducible criteria for the ethnographic impulse to be discernible. The 
force and effects of writing peoples transcends, as it were, the specificity of terms (ἔθνος and γένος) and the 
threefold criteria of ethnicity. Moreover, the etymological correlation between ἔθνη and ethnography, fails to 
measure the non-ethnically oriented ways in which people or groups existed and were written (even in cases 
where they are described as ἔθνος or γένος, it does not necessarily follow that these terms denote race or 
ethnicity). 
 
22 Greg Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 
13-17. Cf. Charles Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), who fallaciously argued that, “early ethnography is marked by a scientific objectivity and unprejudiced 
characterization of alien modes that are a pleasure to behold” (12). Rosalind Thomas, Herodotus in Context, has 
argued, quite persuasively, that ethnography comfortably falls within ancient notions of science insofar as it was 
an effort to comprehend and order the world in all its natural, human, and geographical diversity. Epiphanius 
quite telling naturalizes the heretics into the very fabric of the world and world history, which enables his 
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texts. Ethnographic writing, both in its modern and ancient guises, is an authorial orientation 
that provokes questions about the capacity of language and texts to represent and 
communicate human difference and identity. It is not simply that ethnographic subjectivity 
belies its purported objectivity, but that the ethnographic impulse exposes the conceptual 
fissures within language and text. Ethnography is a mode of inquiry, and the textualization of 
people is its method of representation. In Hellenicity, Hall’s follow-up work to Ethnic Identity, he 
outlines the difference between cultural groups and ethnic groups in terms of limiting factors: 
If cultural identity can be defined as the conscious reification of ideas, beliefs, 
values, attitudes and practices, selectively extracted from the totality of social 
existence and endowed with a particular symbolic signification for the purposes 
of creating exclusionary distinctiveness, then ethnicity is a specific type of 
cultural identity, alongside other subvarieties such as linguistic identity, 
religious identity, occupational identity, and so forth. What distinguishes it 
from these other types of cultural identity is the fact that the symbols upon 
which it draws revolve around notions of fictive kinship and descent, common 
history and a specific homeland.23 
 
Hall’s criteria of ethnicity may be right or they may be wrong—parsing their propriety is not 
my interest here—but they do not encompass the totality of ethnographic writing in the 
ancient world.24 Ethnography, I have argued, consists in writing about the subvarieties of 
cultural indicators that Hall identifies, not only those limited, strictly speaking, to the criteria 
of ethnicity. It embraces indicia and criteria alike, and, in many ways, reveals the authorial 
quest to write, interpret, and produce culture and cultural systems.  
While the parallels between heretics and nations further evidences the diffusive impact 
of thinking ethnically within early Christian literature, the exploration, systemization, and 
theorization of Christianity’s diversity encompasses more than claims of Christianity’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
investigation to proceed with a certain scholastic cachet. To classify and describe the heretics is no simple feat; it 
parallels the efforts of early ancient scientific authors.  
23 Hall, Hellenicity, 17. 
 
24 See, for example, David Konstan, “Defining Ancient Greek Ethnicity,” Diaspora 6 (1997): 97‐110. 
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ethnicity, its ethnic character, its ethnic criteria, and the tension, real or not, between ethnic 
and religious identity. Like the philosophical schools of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Eminent 
Philosophers and the Jewish sects of Josephus’ Jewish War and Antiquities, the heresies are 
emblematic of certain traditions of knowledge, custom, and culture.25 But unlike the Sadducees 
or Platonists who exist comfortably within their circumscribed milieux, the heretics serve as 
exponents and reflections of the Christian narrative of the history and theorization of human 
diversity. Heresiology poses the relationship between human diversity and Christian diversity 
directly: the differences and variety within the world of Christianity and the world writ large 
have been recast as interdependent phenomena. The history of human difference parallels and 
even becomes the history of sectarianism. Emanating from one another and suffusing to 
become part and parcel of a singular Christian history, the heretics, like the nations, were 
treated as creatures of custom, susceptible to the piercing eye of Christian (polemical) 
ethnographers. In exploring how Christians wrote their indigenous peoples, the heretics, I am 
explicitly casting heresiology as a textual endeavor that seeks to rationalize the topography, 
customs, and wonders of its external and internal environments.  
As the heresiologists investigate the diversity of Christian sectarianism across the 
Mediterranean, they produce a textual world driven by their own interests, observations, and 
preoccupations. The study of Christian plurality articulates the conditions of a distinctly 
                                                        
25 On Diogenes Laertius, see Jørgen Mejer, “Diogenes Laertius and the Transmission of Greek Philosophy,” Aufstieg 
und Niedergang der römischen Welt (ANRW) II.36.5 (1992): 3556-602. The latter part of 36.5 (3556-3792) contains 
several essays on doxography, Diogenes, and Hippolytus of Rome, while the entirety of 36.6 pursues these themes. 
There are essays on the content of structure of each of the books and on the major philosophical parties 
(including the Peripatetics, Stoics, Cynics, Pyrrhonism, Epicureanism). The best study of ancient Jewish 
sectarianism remains Albert I. Baumgarten’s The Flourishing of Jewish Sects in the Maccabean Era: An Interpretation 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997). See Seth Schwartz’s complementary dialogue in Imperialism and Jewish Society: 200 B.C.E. to 640 
C.E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 92-99. See also, Morton Smith, “Zealots and Sicarii: Their Origins 
and Relation,” Harvard Theological Review 64 (1971): 1-19; Shaye J.D. Cohen, From the Maccabees to the Mishnah. 2nd ed. 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 110-166; and now Jonathan Klawans, Josephus and the Theologies of 
Ancient Judaism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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Christian world. In writing while scrutinizing this world, the heresiologists translate the 
microscopic, the minutiae of the habits and customs of particular Christian peoples, into the 
macroscopic, broader extrapolations about human nature, human diversity, and human 
behavior. They parse the value of social and intellectual discourse, the very lifeblood of 
ethnography, and how cross-cultural contact fits into an ideological system built upon 
exclusive truth. And the discovery and allure of knowledge and the implications of obtaining it 
and seeking it, produce authorial self-reflection about the heresiologists’ own capacity to 
comprehend the world around them in texts. The overarching aim of this study is to trace how 
the ethnographic impulse, embedded within certain strands of early Christian discourse 
informed and affected Christian representations of history, theorizations of religious diversity 
and change, and the organization and hierarchization of Christian systems and theories of 
knowledge. My argument is that even as polemical works of ethnography, heresiologies 
grapple with the implications of authorial reflexivity and the epistemological confines of 
representation. I trace how the Christian authors framed their texts ethnographically by 
amassing data, marshaling their discoveries, fashioning explanatory models, and theologizing 
and negotiating their own authorial abilities. Heresiology is the Christian application of 
ethnographic interests and techniques.26 This dissertation analyzes how Christians harnessed 
the vernacular of ethnography, the process of describing and classifying peoples, to advance 
theories of human difference and the boundaries of human knowledge. 
                                                        
26 Hervé Inglebert, whose immense and invaluable work, describes, traces, and presents how various genres were 
Christianized over the course of Late Antiquity. He treats geography, historiography, cosmography, and 
ethnography. Chapter II, “La Christianisation De L’Ethnographie” focuses primarily on the legacy of Genesis 10 
(from Jewish sources down to Isidore of Seville). His analysis, which belabors genealogical and chronological 
techniques, separates the heretics into the relam of history. Inglebert’s rationale stems, so it seems, from his 
argument that ancient ethnography was always an external process or endeavor (unlike modern anthropology, 
which strives to see cultures or peoples in their own terms). There is no room in his scheme for indigenous 
ethnography. I reject this argument. It is clear, as Inglebert’s work shows, the formal and methodological 




Ancient Ethnography: Genre, Tradition, and History 
 
 
In the most rudimentary or, indeed, purely etymological sense, ethnography is the 
writing of peoples (ἔθνος, if we take it as a designation of peoplehood, community, or 
ethnicity). It names the aggregate process by which peoples are rendered in the written word. 
While the idea of ethnography, conditioned by a certain investigative fervor is a manifestly 
real preoccupation in the Greco-Roman world, the term ethnography and its academic 
disciplinary origins date to nineteenth century.27 Its use within the study of the ancient world 
as a generic or historical designation follows most decidedly from the work of the historian 
                                                        
27 It is, of course, true that ethnography and anthropology have long and quite complex histories, which as I argue 
extend back into the world of antiquity. On this point, see the work of Dell Hymes, ed., Reinventing Anthropology 
(New York: Vintage, 1974); Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, Geschichte der Anthropologie (Frankfurt: Athenäum-Verlga, 
1948); Regna Darnell, ed., Readings in the History of Anthropology (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); and John J. 
Honigmann, The Development of Anthropological Ideas (New York: The Dorsey Press, 1976). There were abundant late 
antique, medieval, and early-modern authors who produced works of ethnography. To that end, number of 
scholars contend that anthropology was a specifically Renaissance endeavor: Giuseppe Cocchiara, Il mito del buon 
selvaggio: Introduzione alla storia delle teorie ethnologiche (Messina: G. D’Anna, 1948); and Margaret T. Hodgen, Early 
Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964). Others 
argued that the practice/discipline rightly belonged to the Enlightement: Edward Evans Evan-Pritchard, Social 
Anthropology (London: Cohen and West, 1951); idem, A History of Anthropological Thought, ed. André Singer (Boston: 
Faber and Faber, 1981); Michel Foucault, The Order of Things; Marin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A 
History of Theories of Culture (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968). The colonial project, most overwhelmingly, 
attests abundant anthropological exchange, discovery, and writing. See Talal Asad, ed., Anthropology & the Colonial 
Encounter (New York: Prometheus Books, 1995); Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink, ed. Colonial Subjects: Essays on the 
Practical History of Anthropology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); and George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 
Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1991). But the term, as a specific reference to a disciplinary activity, has a particularly 19th century lineage. 
See Henrika Kuklick, The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885-1945 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991); and Thomas C. Patterson, A Social History of Anthropology in the United States (New York: 
Berg, 2001). If Franz Boas is the “father” of modern anthropology (in America), his essays in A Franz Boas Reader: 
The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911, ed. George W. Stocking, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989), detail opinions about fieldwork, philology, geography, ethnology, folklore, and cultural determinism. For a 
more global account, see Fredrik Barth, Andre Gingrich, Robert Parkin, and Sydel Silverman. One Discipline, Four 
Ways: British, German, French, and American Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). See also, 




Felix Jacoby.28 Writing in the early twentieth century, Jacoby undertook anew the task of 
collecting, arranging, editing, and commentating upon the abundant fragments from ancient 
historians authors works were lost or incomplete.29 In the wake of Carl Müller’s 
chronologically arranged—and in Jacoby’s mind problematical—Fragmenta Historicorum 
Graecorum (Fragments of the Greek Historians) and Geographici Graeci Minores (Minor Greek 
Geographers), Jacoby’s project, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (The Fragments of the Greek 
Historians) advocated an organizational schema of these prose writers by development of 
literary style and genre.30 To justify his arrangement of the fragments by genre, Jacoby 
elaborated an integrated theory of Greek prose writing. In its earliest stages, he contended, 
prose writing was a composite endeavor or, put inversely, indistinguishable by genre. 
Genealogy, mythography, ethnography, and geography were all part and parcel of 
historiography. This integrative model of historiography (vis-à-vis Müller’s strict bifurcation 
of historical and geographical writing) presented a more capacious aspect to historical writing, 
which Jacoby argued never fully dissipated. Despite the differentiation and evolution of style 
and genre over time—with Hecataeus of Miletus as Jacoby’s prime example of the origins of 
ethnography, genealogy, history, and geography, the latter two of which would be united by 
                                                        
28 Carl Müller, ed., Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, 5 vols. (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1841-1870); and his Geographi 
Graeci Minores, 3 vols. (Paris: Firmin Dido, 1855-1861) and Felix Jacoby, “Über die Entwicklung der griechischen 
Historiographie und den Plan einer neuen Sammlung der griechischen Historikerfragmente,” Klio 9 (1909): 80-123.  
 
29 Some fragments are simply references to the author, his birthplace, or the title and/or content of his work. 
Other more substantive fragments include actual citations and/or substantial discussion (and naturally 
disagreement) about the author’s claims, project, conclusions, argument, etc.  
 




Herodotus—Jacoby insisted that the various ancient genres remained essentially 
interdependent and forever interrelated.31 
In the third part of his larger project, Geschicthe von Städten und Völkern (History of 
States and Peoples), which Jacoby broadly framed under the categories of “Horographie” (local 
history) and “Ethnographie” (writings about other peoples), we find three further divisions or 
typologies of authorship.32 First, are those who wrote about different cities (verschiedene 
Städte);33 second, those about individual cities (einzelne Städte, with a supplemental volume on 
Athens alone);34 and finally there are those concerning individual countries (einzelne Länder).35 
The fragments reference and represent an array of authors from various historical periods, 
including Apollodoros of Artamita’s (and his Parthika), Philo of Byblos (and his Phoenician 
                                                        
31 Felix Jacoby, “Über die Entwicklung der griechischen Historiographie.” For a recapitulation of Jacoby in more 
modern guise see Oswyn Murray, “History,” in Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge, ed. Jacques Brunschwig 
and Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996), 328-337. See also Katherine 
Clark, Between Geography and History: Hellenstic Constructions of the Roman World (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 56-66. On Hecataeus, see Lucio Bertelli, “Hecataeus: From Genealogy to Historiography,” in The Historian’s 
Craft in the Age of Herodotus, ed. Nino Luraghi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 67-95; Thomas Braun, 
“Hecataeus’ Knowledge of the Western Mediterranean,” in Greek Identity in the Western Mediterranean: Papers in 
Honour of Brian Shefton, ed. Kathryn Lomas (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 287-347. For Jacoby, the various strands of 
historical writing began as indistinguishable endeavors and even as they slowly emerged as distinct genres (with 
Herodotus and Hecataeus) they were forever interrelated and, in essence, never really distinct. Moreover, unlike 
the distinction that can be parsed between degrees or levels of geographic comprehensiveness—between 
geography (the study of the earth), chorography (the study of a region), and topography (the study of a place)—
there exists no such terminological differentiation between ethnographic description at the margins and 
ethnography at the core.  
 
32 See Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Part I, Genealogie und Mythographie, vol. a (New York: Brill, 
1995), VII-X. Also, the title page of Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Part 3, Geschichte von Staedten und 
Voelkern (Horographie und Ethnographie), vol. a (Leiden: Brill, 1940), 6. As far as I can tell, no one has linked Jacoby’s 
project with the rise of the scholastic discipline of anthropology.  
 
33 See Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Part III, vol. a (Leiden: Brill, 1940), 1. 
 
34 Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Part III, vol. b (Leiden: Brill, 1950). He calls IIIB “die Geschichte 
der Griechischen Städte und Landschaften,” in Part III, vol. a, 6.  
 
35 Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Part III, vol. c (Leiden: Brill, 1958). He calls IIIC, “die der 
Barbarenländer enthalten,” in Part III, vol. a, 6. For an extremely useful comparative guide, see Appendices I and 
II, “Table of Historians” and “Name and Nationality,” from John Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient 
Historiography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 267-275, in which he presents a massive table of 
historians, their works (including the historical periods about which they wrote) and a discussion of the ways in 




History), Isidoros of Charax (and a preserved title, the Description of Parthia, τῆς Παρθίας 
Περιηγητικός), Androsthenes of Thasos (and his Sailing Along the Indian Coast, ᾽Ινδικῆς 
Παράπλους), Megasthenes (and his Indika), and Dionysios of Rhodes and his Topographical 
Histories (῾Ιστορίας τοπικὰς).36 Jacoby’s belief in the essential unity of Greek historiography has 
not gone unchallenged.37 While his refusal to present ethnography as a tradition of writing 
fully outside the shadow of historiographical writing has likewise triggered serious 
contestation, Jacoby’s work remains quintessential precisely because it thrust the designation 
ethnography into the vernacular of the study of the ancient world. The vexing problems 
                                                        
36 Apollodoros of Artamita wrote his Parthika between 130 B.C.E. and 20 B.C.E. See José Miguel Alonso-Núñez, “Un 
historien entre deux cultures: Apollodore d’Artémita,” in Mélanges Pierre Lévêque. Vol. II: Anthropologie et société, ed. 
Marie-Madeleine Mactoux and Evelyne Geny (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989), 1-6; and Valerii P. Nikonorov, 
“Apollodorus of Artemita and the Date of his Parthica Revisited,” Electrum 2 (1998): 107-22. For the fragments, see 
FrGrHist IIIC 779 F1-8 (pp. 773-776). On Philo of Byblos, who was active in the late first and early second centuries 
C.E., see Harold W. Attridge and Robert A. Oden, Philo of Byblos: Phoenician History, Introduction, Critical Text, 
Translation, Notes (Washington D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association 1981); and Albert I. Baumgarten, The Phoenician 
History of Philo of Byblos: A Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1981). For the fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 790 T1-4; F1-57 (pp. 
802-824). Isidoros of Charax, who wrote, it seems, in the last decades of the first century B.C.E., is a highly 
enigmatic figure, known only from a fragment of Pliny the Elder. For a few general comments on Isidoros, see 
William Woodthorpe Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966) 53-55. 
Androsthenes of Thasos was an early Hellenistic author, who explored the Persian Gulf and the coast of the Indian 
Ocean. See Jan Restö, The Arabs in Antiquity: Their History from the Assyrians to the Umayyads (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 269-273; and G.W. Bowersock, “Tylos and Tyre: Bahrain in the Graeco-Roman World,” in Bahrain Through the 
Ages: The Archaeology, ed. Shaikha Hay Ali Al Khalifa and Michael Rice (New York: Routledge, 1986), 399-406. For 
the fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 781 T1-3; F1-19 (pp. 777-785). For the fragements, see FrGrHist IIIC 711 T1-4; F1-5 
(pp.592-596). Megasthenes was another early Hellenistic author and traveler (his prime period of writing was the 
late 4th C B.C.E.). The extant evidence suggests he did, in fact, travel through India, spending considerable time at 
the court of Sandrakottos at Palimbothra. See A.B. Bosworth, “The Historical Setting of Megasthenes’ Indica,” 
Classical Philology 91 (1996]) 113-27; and idem, “Arrian, Megasthenes and the Making of Myth,” in Mitos en la 
literatura griega helenística e imperial, ed. J.A. López Férez (Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas 2003), 299-320). For the 
fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 714 T1-7; F1-34 (pp. 603-639). Knowledge of Dionysios of Rhodes is considerably 
limited by the fact that fragmentary evidence about various authors named Dionysius considerably complicates 
the picture. There is Dionysios the Periegete who produced a description of the world in Hadrianic times, 
Dionysios the Samian, who wrote a ten-volume history of education, and Dionysios of Byzantium, who was a 
geographical writer of the second century C.E.  
 
37 See R.L. Fowler, “Herodotus and his Contemporaries,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 116 (1996): 62-87; Charles 
Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome. See also the works in Collecting Fragments/Fragmente 
sammein, ed. Glenn W. Most (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1997), especially G. Schepens, “Jacoby’s 
FGrHist: Problems, Methods, Prospects,” 144-172 and G.W. Bowersock, “Jacoby’s Fragments and Two Greek 




within and surrounding the very idea of ancient ethnography begin, for better or worse, with 
Jacoby.  
In the decades since the publication of Jacoby’s work, numerous scholars have 
presented incisive criticisms and augmentations of his underlying thesis.38 While it would be 
impossible to survey and summarize these abundant criticisms and augmentations, it is 
nonetheless important to enumerate how scholars have conceptualized ethnography as one of 
the “basic types of historical writing,”39 a tradition of writing about foreign lands, and a 
hybridized form of various methodological and textual conventions.40 Ethnography entailed 
surveying, categorizing, and theorizing this manifold diversity, and, in turn, articulating a 
relational position to and even apart from it. Emma Dench, refining the work of Jacoby, 
situates ethnography in relation to history, as “a feature of ancient historical discourse,” and 
frames the totality of ethnography as relating to matters both minute and grandiose:  
…when ancient historians engage in traditions of delineating the lands and 
customs of “other people,” they are drawn into rhetoric and practices that came 
to be regarded in antiquity as quintessentially historical. These include the 
assertion of the authority of the writer and his text, claims of veracity and the 
superiority of the account to that of predecessors. They also include interest in 
historical change, causation, and explanation (not least of imperial rule), 
patterns of the rise and fall of individuals and powers, and broadly didactic 
                                                        
38 See Skinner, The Invention of Greek Ethnography; 30-58; Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History, 59-76; 
Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome; and Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 41-46. 
 
39 Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome, 1. 
 
40 See Richard F. Thomas, Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Philological Society, 1982). Thomas argues for an ethnographic tradition, which began with Homer and was later 
Latinized by the Romans. The formal structure of ethnography hews to five elements of detail: (1) physical 
geography of an area; (2) Climate; (3) Agricultural or natural resources; (4) origins and habits of the natives; (5) 
Social, political, and military organization. Thomas’ rather crude formulation has not held up well to scrutiny, 
though he is certainly right to flag certain thematic tendencies. And while scholars debate the veracity of the 
locution “ethnographic tradition,” there is no reason or evidence to suggest any such rigid criteria of form or 




concerns such as the provision of vicarious experience and case studies of 
exemplary behavior.41 
 
Underlying much if not all of ancient ethnographic writing is an expansive and reflective 
disposition, what Dench calls the ancient ethnographic gaze: “the characterization of ‘other 
peoples’ particularly with reference to their customs, practices, and the behavior that typifies 
them and/or their lands.”42 The particularities of peoples not only vibrantly color the 
historical narrative, but they illustrate how minutiae shape and govern the course of history, 
cosmology, geography, and religious systems. Ethnography functions as an intellectual 
feedback loop, in which ideology shapes interpretive strategies, the collection of data, and the 
consequent analysis even as new data and its collection shape ethnographic values and those 
same interpretive strategies. Because ethnography does not simply describe the world as it is—
it is a process of representation—it creates an imagined sense of where the world has been, 
where it is now, and where it will go through the language of custom, habit, origins, discovery, 
and exchange.43 The capacity of ethnography to explain the differences within the world, 
foreshadow history, and justify conquest and expansion is an immensely powerful ideological 
and textual tool.44  
                                                        
41 Emma Dench, “Ethnography and History,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, ed. John Marincola 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 493. 
 
42 Dench, “Ethnography and History,” 496. 
 
43 See Jerry H. Bentley, Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993); Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 8-31, posits the creation of middle ground, a space of 
(potential) coexistence and exchange: “If Roman expansion brought fewer transformative technologies, and 
nothing like the biological carnage that followed the Columbian Exchange, it did create a world profoundly 
disrupted by contact yet not, for a long while, intensively assimilated by the invaders. From at least the middle 
second century BCE traders operated in parts of Spain, Gaul and Africa, far beyond the areas controlled by Roman 
arms…there is some point in thinking of the Roman West, especially during the republican empire, as a middle 
ground on which many different kinds of people met, not always in situations where one side was clearly the 
master” (18).  
 
44 See Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, trans. Hélène Leclerc (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1991); Elizabeth Rawson, “Geography and Ethnography,” in Intellectual Life in the Late 
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Following in the lineage of ancient historians who disputed and augmented Jacoby’s 
historiographic thesis, James Rives outlines an ethnographic tradition through a discussion of 
the interplay between form and content.45 In the introduction to his translation and 
commentary on Tacitus’ Germania, Rives contends that the ethnographic tradition originated 
with Hecataeus of Miletus’ now lost Periegesis or Periodos Ges (“a leading around the world”), 
which presented the peoples and places of the Mediterranean world through the prism of an 
extended journey.46 Rives’s demarcation of tradition does not, however, posit an explicitly 
evolutionary progression (i.e. stages) of the ethnographic tradition; it offers, instead, a 
descriptive account of the broad forms of ethnography in the ancient world. In the wake of 
Hecataeus’ textual legacy, three distinct ethnographic modalities or typologies emerged (Rives 
calls them strands, which then became precedents).47 First, there was, what Rives calls, the 
periegetic tradition, which in actuality encompasses two related generic forms: the more 
technical periplous narrative (“sailing around”) and the less formal, more expansive periegesis 
(“leading around”).48 As a “coastal sailing itinerary,” the periplous was “primarily for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Roman Republic (London: Duckworth, 1985), 250-266; C.R. Whittaker, Rome and Its Frontiers: The Dynamics of Empire 
(New York: Routledge, 2004), 63-87; and the essays in Daniela Dueck, Hugh Lindsay, and Sarah Pothecary, eds., 
Strabo’s Cultural Geography: The Making of a Kolossourgia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
 
45 James B. Rives, Germania. Translated with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).  
 
46 Rives, “Introduction,” in Germania, 12-15. The first book of Hecataeus’s text covered Europe and a second 
considered Asia, Libya, and Egypt. See also Jan Assmann, “Periegeria: Egyptian Reactions to Greek Curiosity,” in 
Cultural Borrowings and Ethnic Appropriations in Antiquity, ed. Erich S. Gruen (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2005), 37-59. The 
oldest surviving travel account from the ancient Mediterranean is the Periplus of Hanno the Carthaginian Periplus, 
(which presents itself as a Greek translation of a Phoenician original), dating to the fifth century B.C.E.  On Hanno, 
see Duane W. Roller, Through the Pillars of Herakles: Greco-Roman Exploration of the Atlantic (New York: Routledge, 
2006), 24-42 and 129-132. 
 
47 Rives, “Introduction,” in Germania, 12. 
 
48 As Scott Fitzgerald Johnson, “Travel, Cartography, and Cosmology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity, ed. 
Scott Fitzgerald Jonhson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 562-3, explains, “the technical periplous 
genre “provided the framework for sea captains, explorers, and other travelers to publish, at the least, a basic 
record of ports along sea or river routes or, at the most, an encyclopedic work containing many disparate types of 
information” (562-3). For my purposes, the distinction is largely immaterial and, indeed, much of the scholarship 
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assistance of sailors, but as it tended to include topographical features and characteristics of 
the local inhabitants, the periplous soon took on geographical, commercial, and ethnographic 
overtones.”49 Guided by the genre’s essential function as guidebook, its authors invariably 
looked beyond the narrowly potamological and included descriptions of territories, 
topographies, peoples, customs, myths, cities, and monuments, among various other types of 
knowledge. Notable works include the anonymous Periplus of the Erythraean Sea,50 Arrian of 
Nicomedia’s Periplous of the Euxine Sea,51 Pseudo-Skylax’s Periplous,52 and the fragmentary 
periplus of Pytheas of Massila.53  
By contrast, the periegesis narrative was a verbal map of the known world that explicitly 
extended beyond the confines of waterways and travel routes. As Scott Fitzgerald Johnson 
explains, “in form, it is a literary description of the known world, often in verse.”54 Though 
Hecataeus’ now lost text originated the tradition, its most influential illustrations remain the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
treats them, as Rives does, as literary siblings. For a formal discussion of the periplous genre, see O.A.W. Dilke, 
Greek and Roman Maps (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 130-44.  
 
49 Duane W. Roller, Through the Pillars of Herakles: Greco-Roman Exploration of the Atlantic, 8. 
 
50 See Lionel Casson, The Periplus Maris Erythraei (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
51 For the text, translation, and commentary, see Aidan Liddle, Arrian: Periplus Ponti Euxini (London: Bristol 
Classical, 2003). A slightly better version is from Alain Silberman, Arrien: Périple du Pont-Euxin (Paris: Belles Lettres, 
1995). On Arrian more broadly, see Philip A. Stadter, Arrian of Nicomedia (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980). For an extremely learned analysis, see Tim Rood, “Black Sea Variations: Arrian’s Periplus,” 
Cambridge Classical Journal 57 (2012): 137-163. 
 
52 For Pseudo-Skylax see, Graham Shipley, ed. and trans, Pseudo-Skylax’s Periplous: The Circumnavigation of the 
Inhabited World, Text, Translation and Commentary (Bristol: Phoenix Press, 2011). 
 
53 See Christina Horst Roseman, Pytheas of Massalia: On the Ocean: Text, Translation and Commentary (Chicago: Ares 
Publishers, 1994); Danièle Roman, La Gaule et ses mythes historiques: de Pythéas à Vercingétorix (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1999); and Duane W. Roller, Through the Pillars of Herakles: Greco-Roman Exploration of the Atlantic, 57-91. 
 
54 Scott Fitzgerald Johnson, “Travel, Cartography, and Cosmology,” in Johnson, 563. On periegesis (specifically, 
Pausanias’ description/periegesis of Greece), see William Hutton, Describing Greece: Landscape and Literature in the 
Periegesis of Pausanias (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-29, 241-324. On the periplus, see Katherine 




Periegesis of Dionysius Periegetes55 and Pausanias’ Description of Greece (Ἐλλάδος περιήγησις).56 
In each case, we are led through a tour of peoples and places and supplied with bountiful 
geographical and ethnographic information, while an overarching “map” schematized the 
entreity of known world; these text oriented and described a world of minute particularity and 
massive scope. Consider a generic kin, Pomponius Mela’s Chorography, written around 44 CE.57 
The text identifies itself as “a description of the known world” and served primarily to name 
the myriad peoples and places of the οἰκουμένη (the known world).58 As a tour through Africa, 
Asia, and Europe, it frequently describes (and comments upon) the customs and traditions of 
particular peoples, but those comments are brief and buried under pages and pages of 
chorographical detail. In the case of both the periplus and periegetic narratives, however 
much the detail, form, and structure varied, these texts captured the seemingly endless depths 
of the world’s diverse configurations of peoples and places. And, above all else, as 
                                                        
55 For the Greek text (with German translation), see Kai Broderson, ed. and trans., Das Lied von der Welt: Dionysios 
von Alexandria (New York: G. Olms, 1994). The French translation of Christian Jacob, La Description de la terre habitée 
de Denys d'Alexandrie, ou la Leçon de géographie (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990) contains a useful introduction with a map 
of Dionysius’ world. His “L'œil et la mémoire. Sur la Périégèse de la terre habitée de Denys,” In Arts et légendes 
d'espaces. Figures du voyage et rhétoriques du monde, ed. Christian Jacob and F. Lestringant (Paris: ENS, 1981), 21-97 is 
also quite helpful. See also J.L. Lightfoot’s Dionysius Periegetes: Description of the Known World with Introduction, 
Translation, and Commetnary (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). For now, her “Catalogue Technique 
in Dionysius Periegetes,” Ramus 37.1/2 (2008): 11-31 details the thrust of her reading. For the specifically poetic 
elements of the text, see Richard L. Hunter, “The Periegesis of Dionysius and the Traditions of Hellenistic Poetry,” 
Revue des Etudes Anciennes 106 (2004): 217-231.  
 
56 On Pausanias, see John Elsner, “Pausanais: A Greek Pilgrim in the Roman World,” Past & Present 135 (1992): 3-39; 
and Susan E. Alcock, John F. Cherry, and Jas Elsner, eds., Pausanias: Travel and Memory in Roman Greece (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), especially the essays in Part I, 3-52 with essays from Elsner, Ewen Bowie, Jones, 
and Rutherford. 
 
57 On the dating, see F.E. Romer, Pomponius Mela’s Description of the World (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1998), 3, which follows Georg Wissowa, “Die Abfassungszeit der Chorographia des Pomponius Mela,” Hermes 51 
(1916): 89-96. 
 
58 See F.E. Romer, Pomponius Mela’s Description of the World, 1-32; and Rhiannon Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show: 




“geographical studies, practical handbooks for merchants, and literary compositions providing 
old and new information,” there were invariably ethnographic details aplenty.59 
In the second iteration of the tradition, ethnographic description was decoupled from 
the periegetic framework, and authors wrote monographs about a particular people. Tacitus’ 
Germania, an extremely short treatise devoted exclusively to Germania and the Germani, is the 
earliest extant Latin ethnography.60 There are lost ethnographic works too, including 
Megasthenes’ treatise on India and Alexander Polyhistor’s Indica, Aigyptiaca, On Bithynia, On 
Illyria, and Peri Ioudaion.61 The third tradition of Rives’ brief survey of ethnographic literature 
adheres to the rubric of historiography. The periegetic framework of the more geographically 
oriented texts was replaced with a historically focused overlay or, in the words of Charles 
Fornara, it “was the interpolation of ethnography into a history. Ethnographic tracts appear as 
digressions from the exposition of res gestae.”62 Herodotus’ Histories considers the Egyptians, 
                                                        
59 Rives, “Introduction,” in Germania, 13. There was no bright line between geography and ethnography in the 
ancient world. Both Elizabeth Rawson, “Geography and Ethnography,” in Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic, 
and Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History, make this point abundantly clear.  
 
60 As Rives, “Introduction” in Germania, importantly notes, however, the second part of the work (28-46) covers 
the individual tribes of Germania, which is clearly reminiscent of the periegetic tradition. As Rives explains, “In 
the early first century AD the historian Velleius Paterculus promised an ethnographic work on the Pannonians 
and Dalmatians (2.96.3), although there is no evidence that he ever wrote it, while a little later the younger 
Seneca apparently composed treatises on India and Egypt that have not survived (Pliny NH 6.60, Serv. Aen. 6.154 
and 9.30). Otherwise, there is no indication that any Latin author before Tacitus devoted an entire monograph to a 
particular land or people” (13-14). On Tacitus and ethnography, see also Ellen O’Gorman, “No Place Like Rome: 
Identity and Difference in the Germania of Tacitus,” in Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Tacitus, ed. Rhiannon Ash 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 95-118. 
 
61 On Alexander Polyhistor, see Geert De Breucker, “Alexander Polyhistor and the Babyloniaca of Berossos,” Bulletin 
of the Institute of Classical Studies 55.2 (2012): 57-68; Jacob Freudenthal, Alexander Polyhistor und die von ihm erhaltenen 
Reste jüdischer und samaritanischer Geschichtswerk (Breslau: H. Skutsch, 1874); and William Adler, “Alexander 
Polyhistor’s Peri Ioudaion and Literary Culture in Republican Rome,” in Reconsidering Eusebius: Collected Papers on 
Literary, Historical, and Theological Issues, ed. Sabrina Inowlocki and Claudio Zamagni (Boston: Brill, 2011), 225-240. 
For the fragments see Jacoby, FrGHist IIIA, 273, T1-8; F1-145 (pp. 96-126). 
 




Scythians, Libyans, and Persians;63 Caesar’s Gallic Wars describes the Gauls and Germani (6.11-
28);64 Diodorus Siculus’ Universal History discusses Arabia, Greece, Egypt, India, Scythia, 
Mesopotamia, and North Africa;65 Sallust’s Jugurtha incorporates ethnographic details about 
the Numidians;66 and Tacitus’ Agricola halts his narrative to describe the Britons.67 In each case, 
these histories evidence the utility and allure of ethnographic detail in service to the 
particularities of universal, political, military, and geographical historical narrative. The 
historical narrative “treat[ed] ethnography as an excursus within a longer historical 
composition.”68 
                                                        
63 Herodotus’ Histories considers Egypt (2.2-182), Scythia (4.5-82), Libya (4.168-99), and Persia (his comments on 
Persian customs and habits are interspersed through the text, though Book 7 contains the most ethnographic 
information). See Donald Lateiner, “Ethnography as Access to History,” in The Historical Method of Herodotus 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 145-162; François Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of 
the Other in the Writing of History, trans. Janet Lloyd (Berkeley University of California Press, 1988); Thomas, 
Herodotus in Context; and Rosaria Vignolo Munson, Telling Wonders: Ethnographic and Political Discourse in the Work of 
Herodotus (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001); and eadem, Black Doves Speak: Herodotus and the 
Language of the Barbarians (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).  
 
64 See Brenda M. Bell, “The Contribution of Julius Caesar to the Vocabulary of Ethnography,” Latomus 54 (1995): 
753-767; and Andrew M. Riggsby, Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
2006), 47-72. 
 
65 For more on Diodorus Siculus’ Universal History, see Iris Sulimani, Diodorus’ Mythhistory and the Pagan Mission 
(Leiden: Brill, 2011); Charles E. Muntz, “The Sources of Diodorus Siculus, Book 1,” The Classical Quarterly 61.2 (2011): 
574-594; John Marincola, “Universal History from Ephorus to Diodorus,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman 
Historiography, ed. John Marincola (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 171-179; Peter Green, Diodorus Siculus, Books XI-
XII.37.1. Greek History 480–431 BC: The Alternative Version (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006); Kenneth S. Sachs, 
Diodorus Siculus and the First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, “Diodorus and His 
Sources: Conformity and Creativity,” in Greek Historiography, ed. Simon Hornblower (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 213–232; C. I. R. Rubincam, “The Organization and Composition of Diodorus' Bibliotheke," Echos du 
Monde Classique 31 (1987): 313-328; and eadem, “Cross-References in the Bibliotheke Historike of Diodorus,” Phoenix 
42 (1989): 39–61. 
 
66 See Robert Morstein-Marx, “The Myth of Numidian Origins in Sallust’s African Excursus (Iugurtha 17.7-18.12),” 
American Journal of Philology 122.2 (2001): 179-200; Carin M.C. Green,  "De Africa et eius incolis: The Function of 
Geography and Ethnography in Sallust’s History of the Jugurthine War (BJ 17–19)," Ancient World 24.2 (1993): 199-
212; and Greg Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 55-58; and Thomas F. Scanlon, “Textual Geography in Sallust’s The War 
with Jugurtha,” Ramus 17.2 (1988): 138-175. 
 
67 See Katherine Clarke, “An Island Nation: Re-Reading Tacitus’ Agricola,” Journal of Roman Studies 91 (2001): 94-112; 
and Janet P. Bews, “Language and Style in Tacitus’ Agricola,” Greece & Rome 34.2 (1987): 201-211. 
 




Owing to the fact that most ethnographic material was routinely subsumed within 
larger narratives, many scholars remain reluctant to identify a formally structured genre or 
tradition of ancient ethnography. Even so-called independent expressions of ethnography or 
the ethnographic monographs—Hellanicus of Lesbos’s Aigyptiaka and Persika,69 Xanthus the 
Lydian’s Lydiaka,70 Manetho’s Aegyptiaca,71 Berossus’s Babyloniaka,72 and the lost texts described 
by Jacoby—were brimming with historical and geographical details. As Rives explains,  
“This tradition gained considerable momentum from the conquests of 
Alexander the Great, which brought Greeks into direct and regular contact with 
a huge range of peoples. As a result, there was a steady stream of ethnographic 
writers from the Ionian Megasthenes, who in the early third century BC 
composed a celebrated account of Indian (FGrH 715), down to the indefatigiable 
Cornelius Alexander ‘Polyhistor’, ‘the very learned’, who in Rome during the last 
century BC composed works on Bithynia, Egypt, Libya, and India, among others 
(FGrH 273).”73  
                                                        
69 On Hellanicus, who lived during the fifth century B.C.E., see, David L. Toye, “Dionysius of Halicarnassus on the 
First Greek Historians,” The American Journal of Philology 116.2 (1995): 279-302, esp. 288-290; and Astrid Moäller, 
“The Beginning of Chronography: Hellanicus Hiereiai,” in Luraghi, 241-262; Lionel Ignacius Cusack Perason, Early 
Ionian Historians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 203-209; Robert Drews, The Greek Accounts of Eastern History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 22-24; and Dominique Lenfant, “Greek Historians of Persia,” in 
Marincola, 200-2009. For the fragments, see FGrHist IIIB 601a F1-2 (pp. 732-3); IIIC 608a F1-7 (pp.1-2); 645a T1 (; 
687a T1-3; F1-11 (pp. 412-4). 
 
70 On Xanthus (mid to late fifth century B.C.E.), see Drews, Greek Accounts, 100-103; Pearson, Early Ionian Historians, 
117-125; and George M.A. Hanfmann, “Lydiaka,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958): 65-88; and 
Marguerite Flushin, “Deux legendes de l’ancienne Lydie d’après Xanthos le Lydien,” Revue Historique 256.1 (1976): 
3-13. For the relevant fragments, see FGrHist IIIC 765 T1-9; F33 (pp. 750-758). 
 
71 For Manetho, see Gerald P. Verbrugghe and John M. Wickersham, Berossos and Manetho, Introduced and Translated: 
Native Traditions in Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 95-212; and 
John Dillery, “The First Egyptian Narrative History: Manetho and Greek Historiography,” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie 
und Epigraphik 127 (1999): 93-116; and idem, “Greek Historians of the Near East: Clio’s ‘Other’ Sons,” in Marincola, 
221-230. For the fragments, see FGrHist IIIC 609 T1-14; F1-28 (pp. 5-112). 
 
72 On Berossus, see Geert de Breucker, “Berossos and the construction of a Near Eastern Cultural History in 
Response to the Greeks,” in Constructions of Greek Past: Identity and Historical Consciousness from Antiquity to the 
Present, ed. Hero Hokwerda (Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2003), 25-34; Amélie Kuhrt, “Berossus Babyloniaka and 
Seleucid Rule in Babylonia,” in Hellenism in the East. The Interaction of Greek and Non-Greek Civilizations from Syria to 
Central Asia after Alexander, ed. Amélie Kuhrt and Susan M. Sherwin-White (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 32-56; and Johannes Haubold, Giovanni B. Lanfranchi, Robert Rollinger, and John Steele, eds., The World of 
Berossos (Harrassowitz; Auflage, 2013). For the fragments, see FrGHist IIIC 380C 680 T1-11; F1-F22 (pp. 364-397). 
 
73 Rivers, “Introduction,” Germania, 13. If, as Rives hypothesizes, treatises of independent ethnography may have 




And while Rives concedes that the “larger historical component” of these texts “may even 
have overshadowed the ethnographic framework,”74 I remain sympathetic to the general 
position that ethnographic writing was a real preoccupation of ancient authors. How we 
construe that impulse to write peoples may differ, but the central objective remains 
consistent. From historiographical and historical narratives75 to philosophical treatises76 to 
accounts of war,77 travelogues,78 astrological texts,79 dramas,80 geographies,81 and national or 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
problematic. But the diffusion of ethnography across genres need not preclude an effort to trace its discursive, 
methodological, and rhetorical emphases. 
 
74 Rives, “Introduction,” Germania, 13. 
 
75 Herodotus, Histories (The Persian Wars) (A.D. Godley, LCL 117-120); Livy, History of Rome (B.O. Foster, LCL 114, 133, 
172, 191, 233; Evan T. Sage, LCL 295, 301, 313, 332; Frank Gardner Moore, LCL 355, 367, 381; Alfred C. Schlesinger, 
LCL 396, 404); Ammianus Marcellinus, History (J.C. Rolfe, LCL 300, 315, 331); Tacitus, Histories (Clifford H. Moore, 
LCL 111, 249); Polybius, Histories (W.R. Paton, LCL 128, 137, 138, 159, 160, 161); Diodorus Siculis, Library of History 
(C.H. Oldfather, LCL 279, 303, 340, 375, 384;, 399 Russel M. Geer, LCL 377, 390; Charles L. Sherman, LCL 389; Francis 
R. Walton, LCL 409, 423; Bradford C. Welles, LCL 422); and Pliny’s Natural History (H. Rackham, LCL 330, 352-3, 370-1, 
394; W.H.S. Jones, LCL 392-3, 418; D.E. Eichholz, LCL 419). 
 
76 Pseudo-Hippocrates, Airs, Water, and Places (W.H.S. Jones, LCL 147), Plato, Laws (R.G. Bury, LCL 187, 192). 
 
77 Caesar, The Gallic War (H.J. Edwards, LCL 72); Caesar (Aulus Hirtius?), African War and Spanish War (A.G. Way, LCL 
402); Sallust, War with Jugurtha (J.C. Rolfe, LCL 116); Josephus, The Jewish War (H. St. J. Thackeray, LCL 203, 210, 487); 
Appian, Roman History (Horace White, LCL 2-3). 
 
78 Pausanias, Description of Greece (W.H.S. Jones, LCL 93, 188, 272, 297; R.E. Wycherley, LCL 298); Philostratus, Life of 
Apollonius of Tyana (Christopher P. Jones, LCL 16-17, 458); Homer, The Odyssey (A.T. Murray, LCL 104-5); Arrian, 
Indica; Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica (William H. Race, ed., LCL 1); Xenophon, Anabasis (Carleton L. Brownston, 
LCL 90); Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander (P.A. Brunt, LCL 236, 269). 
 
79 Manilius, Astronomica (G.P. Goold, LCL 469); Sextus Empiricus, Against Professors (R.G. Bury, LCL 382). For Ptolemy 
Tetrabiblos (F.E. Robbins, LCL 435). 
 
80 Aeschylus, Persians (Alan H. Sommerstein, LCL 145) Euripides, Trojan Women (David Kovacs, LCL), Phoenician 
Women (David Kovacs, LCL 11); Aristophanes, Acharnians (Jeffrey Henderson, LCL 178).  
 
81 Strabo, Geography (Horace Leonard Jones, LCL 49, 50, 182, 196, 211, 223, 241, 267). For Ptolemy’s Geography, see J. 
Lennart Berggren and Alexander Jones, Ptolemy’s Geography: An Annotated Translation of the Theoretical Chapters 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) and C.F.A. Nobbe, ed. Claudii Ptolemaei Geographia, 3 vols. (1843-1845; 




religious histories,82 the diverse array of texts from the ancient world attesting an 
ethnographic impulse foregrounds the difficulty in isolating an ethnographic tradition. The 
diversity of motivations, techniques, formulations, and conclusions that constitute and inform 
the writing of peoples signifies that ethnography was and remains very much a constellation 
of preoccupations, born of and in the ancient and modern moments respectively. It is easier 
perhaps to identity ethnographic interests, tropes, and implications, which emerge as 
moments, digressions, and even monographs, than it is to speak of an ancient genre, a neatly 
traceable tradition, or a formal style embedded within historiographical and geographical 
texts.83  
In corralling works together under the rubric or title “ethnography,” we can observe 
how works that display the textual flavor of ethnography—considerations of territory, climate, 
topography, wonder, agriculture, religious customs, social practices, dress, eating habits, 
origins, governmental structure—present, organize, and interpret their findings. The diversity 
of ways in which peoples were written pushes us toward a more capacious (and heuristic) 
understanding of ethnography and ethnographic writing.84 The scope of “writing peoples” 
compels us to observe the multiplicity of authorial objectives and rhetorics encapsulated in 
the textual construction. We are better served by treating ethnography as a dispositional 
orientation, which implicates and shapes the expression of history, geography, theology, and 
literature, even as these thematic interests molded the very techniques of ethnographic 
                                                        
82 Josephus, Antiquities (H. St. J. Thackeray, LCL 242, 490; Ralph Marcus, LCL 281, 326, 365; 410, 489; Louis H. 
Feldman, LCL 433, 456); Tacitus, Germania (M. Hutton, LCL 35); Manetho, History of Egypt (W.G. Waddell, LCL 350). 
We might also think of Lucian’s De Dea Syria as an ethnographic description of Syrian religious praxis. See J.L. 
Lightfoot, Lucian: On The Syrian Goddess (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), as well as her essay, “On 
Greek Ethnography of the Near East: The Case of Lucian’s De Dea Syria,” Studi Epigrafici e Linguistici sul Vicino Oriente 
Antico 19 (2002): 137-148. 
 
83 Richard F. Thomas, Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographic Tradition. 
 
84 This also reduces the need to settle on a multi-pronged, battle-tested, irreducible definition of ethnography. 
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writing. I follow the work of Emma Dench, Greg Woolf, and James Rives, among the others, 
which has demonstrated that ancient ethnographic writing, and even ethnographic 
stereotyping, entailed a web of negotiations in the effort to comprehend the surrounding 
world in all its complexity and diversity. And like them, in using ethnography as a textual 
marker, I am intentionally implicating a wide array of ethnographic typologies and functions. 
What I call an ethnographic disposition, similar to Dench’s notion of an ethnographic gaze, 
encapsulates the process and effects of writing people and defining cultural systems. I am less 
determined than they are to define its perimeters narrowly—only ἔθνη can be written 
ethnographically—or to align it with a distinctly historical project. In tracing how 
ethnography was written Christianly (how Christians developed their own ethnographic 
vernacular), we see how the heretics upended and reinforced certain ethnographic tropes, 




 If we think about ethnography as a multi-faceted process in which information about a 
particular people is collected and then theorized, the ethnographic disposition encapsulates 
the underlying rationale behind these methodological and theoretical decisions. In analyzing 
the process of textual construction, we are posing two interrelated questions about the 
authorial method: what were the sources with which one wrote ethnographically? And how 
was the information contained therein obtained? When an author explicitly states the 
methods and sources of his ethnographic inquiry (and in many cases we are left merely to 
infer), it tends to follow one of three lines: autopsy, witnesses (from testimony and 
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conversation), and the recycling (and reinterpretation) of textual precedents. Writers such as 
Herodotus, Lucian, Caesar, Pausanias, and Josephus, to name but a few, underscore their 
personal travels and involvement in the events, places, and peoples they identify and 
describe.85 Historiographers, ethnographers, and geographers alike wrap themselves in the 
credibility of autopsy: “I have been. I have seen. I know.”86 Josephus’ avowedly 
historiographical method, like Herodotus’ preferred process of assembling information, 
emphasizes, though not at the exclusion of alternative modes of inquiry, his first-hand 
knowledge of events of the Jewish War. In contrast to the Greeks, who have written histories 
without visiting the pertinent sites and, furthermore, have put together “a few hearsay 
reports” (ἐκ παρακουσμὰτων ὀλίγα συνθέντες), Josephus stands as an insider of customs and a 
witness to history: “I, on the contrary, have written a veracious account, at once 
comprehensive and detailed, of the war, having been present in person at all the events I was 
in command of those whom we call Galilaeans, so long as resistance was possible.”87  
                                                        
85 On autopsy, see O. Kimball Armayor, Herodotus’ Autopsy of the Fayoum: Lake Moeris and the Labyrinth of Egypt 
(Amsterdam: JC Gieben, 1985); idem, “Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?“ Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 
82 (1978): 45-62; idem, “Sesostris and Herodotus' Autopsy of Thrace, Colchis, Inland Asia Minor and the Levant,” 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 84 (1980): 51-74; Detlev Fehling, Herodotus and his “Sources:” Citation, Invention 
and Narrative Art, trans. J.G. Howie  (Leeds: Francis Cairns, 1989); Thomas, Herodotus in Context, 168-248; John 
Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography, 63-85, 276-9; and Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus, 260-
370. 
 
86 See Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991): “Travel in Herodotus is linked with the insistent claim to personal experience, the authority of the 
eyewitness. It is possible to imagine a history based upon extensive travel that does not overtly make this claim 
but rather suppresses it in the name of an alternative conception of history, such as that articulated brilliantly by 
Thucydides. That is, we have to understand Herodotus’ references to his travels less as an autobiographical fact 
that as a discursive choice. We have, after all, no way of verifying Herodotus’ travels, any more than we do 
Mandeville’s; we are dealing rather with what Michel de Certeau calls the text’s utterative markings and 
modalities. The most characteristic of the markings is an appeal to the narrator’s own presence: ‘I have heard,’ ‘I 
say,’ ‘I write,’ and above all ‘I have seen.’” (123).  
 
87 Josephus, Contra Apionem I.9, ed. and trans. H. St. J. Thackeray, Loeb Classical Library, 186 (Cambridge, MA: 




In other cases, writers draw on the testimony of witnesses to help bolster their 
narratives. In briefly recounting the history of Lydia, for example, Herodotus describes a 
protracted war between the Lydians, then ruled by Alyattes, and the Milesians. During the 
course of battle (in the twelfth year), the Lydians inadvertently set fire to the temple of Athene 
at Assesus (they had intended merely to burn crops), which, Herodotus notes, was thought to 
have inflicted upon Alyattes a protracted and incurable illness. Seeking a remedy, the Lydians 
ventured to the oracle at Delphi, but “Apollo refused to give an answer until the Lydians had 
rebuilt Athene’s temple.”88 The details and context of the story need not concern us. What does 
need emphasizing is Herodotus’ immediate point of clarification: “I know this first hand, for I 
heard it from the Delphians; the Milesians, however, have something to add to the story.”89 
Unspecified testimony, from unknown witnesses or simply “what I have heard,” to quote 
Pausanias, similarly guide an author’s writing about events, peoples, and places.90 Diodorus 
Siculus’ introduction to his discussion of the Ethiopians in his Universal History illustrates quite 
nicely the piecemeal nature of writing ethnographically in a work of history:  
Concerning the historians (τῶν συγγραφέων), we must distinguish among them, 
to the effect that many have composed works on both Egypt and Ethiopia, of 
                                                        
88 Herodotus, Histories I.19, ed. and trans. A.D. Godley, Loeb Classical Library, 117 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), 22. 
 
89 Herodotus, Histories, I.20 (Godley, 22). He continues, “They say that Periander, son of Cypselus, who was a very 
close friend of Thrasybulus, king of Miletus at that time, got to know of what the Delphic Priestess had said to 
Alyattes’ messengers, and had thereupon sent to tell Thrasybulus all about it, knowing that to be forewarnded is 
to be forearmed.” 
 
90 Fornara’s insistence that ethnography embraces a less rigorous standard of evidentiary admittance—a 
willingness to report “the wondrous”—assumes that ethnography and historiography are readily distinguishable 
genres. It would postulate that Herodotus’ methodological rigor consciously oscillated as he moves from 
ethnographer to historian? Or would it? It seems implausible to maintain such a distinction for at least two 
reasons. As I have discussed already, arguments about an independent tradition of ethnography remain muddled 
and unclear. Moreover, the claim that ethnography embraces and reports the improbable presupposes as it insists 
on the fundamental difference between the two. Fornara’s claim assumes that a figure such as Herodotus could 
and did distinguish his ethnographic writing from his historiographical writing, which would mean that 




whom some have given credence to false reports and others have invented 
many tales out of their own minds for the delectation of their readers, and so 
may justly be distrusted. For example, Agatharchides of Cnidus in the second 
Book of his work on Asia, and the compiler of geographies, Artemidorus of 
Ephesus, in his eighth Book, and certain others whose homes were in Egypt, 
have recounted most of what I have set forth above and are, on the whole, 
accurate in all they have written. Since we ourselves, during the time which we 
crossed over into Egypt, associated with many of its priests and conversed with 
not a few ambassadors from Ethiopia as well who were then in Egypt; Carefully 
inquiring from them about each matter, and putting to the test the reports of 
the historians, we have prepared accounts in accordance with what they most 
fully agree.91   
 
Textual precedents will be scrutinized—and drawn upon freely—and individual reporting will 
serve to augment previous findings.92 To the extent that ethnographers, like historiographers 
and geographers, drew upon textual precedent, they made textual choices and judgments, 
which create, intentionally or not, textual correctives and overtly inter-textual histories.93 This 
                                                        
91 Diodorus Siculus, Universal History, III.11, ed. and trans. C.H. Oldfather, Loeb Classical Library, 303 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 112-114. 
 
92 Because there is no evidence that writing people required an especially rigorous program of travel and 
observation, though this was true in certain cases (Caesar, Pausanias, Herodotus, Pytheas of Massalia, among 
others), reliance upon earlier sources was a routine component of ethnographic writing. Tacitus, we know, 
garnered much of his data about the Germans from Pliny the Elder’s now lost treatise, History of the German Wars. 
Unlike contemporary ethnographers who now venture into the field to observe their subjects “first hand”—
though the power of “being there” for anthropology or sociology was by no means a disciplinary constant (think 
Durkheim, Frazer, or Benedict)—ancient writers wrote freely of peoples with whom they seemingly had no 
personal contact at all. On the use of libraries to produce ancient ethnography, see Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 
66-79. Because much ethnography was written with second-order data (in consultation with the libraries of Rome 
and Alexandria or by reading the works one possessed of various historians, geographers, and ethnographers), it 
seems apposite to think of our ancient authors as the forbearers of armchair or uncritical anthropologists. I am 
not, however, suggesting that the methodological or procedural “rules” of ancient ethnography were 
standardized, explicated, or vastly different from historiographical writing. Nor am I arguing that ethnographic 
authors deployed especially rigorous or especially lax conventions of research and writing. But there is no 
evidence, I think, to suggest ethnographers were especially lax in their evidentiary disposition. To the extent that 
ethnography and geography were often pieces of a larger historiographical narrative, it becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, to erect a strict methodological wall between them. In cases where ethnography stands alone—
Tacitus, Arrian, Manetho, Berossus—the inclusion of wonderment seems to me no different than the wondrous, 
mythological observations of Herodotus, Livy, Ammianus, or a so-called ancient historian.  
 
93 Fornara, it is worth noting, insisted that each of the genres of historical writing was circumscribed “by its own 
rules, often unstated conventions, and particular focus.”93 Ethnography traded on a different set of conventions, 
which Fornara argues suspend the rules of history writing. He explains: “The laws of evidence and obedience to 
truth were at least in theory mandatory in history. Ethnography permitted the publication of the unconfirmed 
report of even the improbable. The physis, the nature, of ethnography was historia in the original sense: “inquiry” 
into what was “worthy of relation,” “marvelous,” “deserving to be heard.” Whether something was true or likely 
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ancient tendency toward armchair ethnography—the interpretation peoples via textual rather 
than experiential knowledge—ties the ethnographic disposition, in part, to the process of the 
inter-textual reading and knowledge production. Ancient ethnographic analysis was, in many 
instances, doubly interpretive: one had to reinterpret the findings of an author, who had 
already situated his data within his narrative.  
Ancient ethnography encompasses not only the collection of data, but also its 
theorization, which rationalizes the puzzles of the natural world and the people within it. 
Reflections on the practices, habits, and phenotypes of peoples—the facets of microscopic or 
particularistic investigation—engender theorization and disquisition on the causes, conditions, 
and factors of human diversity (the macroscopic explanations of this microscopic “data”). The 
transformation of minutiae into grander historiographical arguments serves not only to 
illuminate the observable differences among the people of the world, but to regularize those 
differences in accordance with natural and supernatural phenomena. All of this “scientific” or 
ideological ordering depends upon a chain of ethnographic knowledge. To organize and 
arrange ethnographic “data,” meant to posit the causes and effects of human diversity. And 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to be true was secondary to the fact that it was a logos told by an informant. Perfectly just men living on the 
periphery of the world (Herodotus), man-eating ants (Onesicritus), fish living underground (Polybius)—all were 
grist for the mill” (The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome, 15). Greg Woolf, by contrast, has posited that, 
“ethnographic knowledge…is that knowledge we gain of one another in conversation, specifically in dialogues 
conducted across a gradient of unfamiliarity” (Tales of the Barbarians, 17). While the methodological distinction 
hinges on a decidedly historical reading of these texts—the extraction of realia is presupposed by certain 
methodological liberties or propensities—I do not conceptualize my project as fundamentally historical or driven 
by the veracity of ethnographic description. To the extent that ethnographers did or did not suppress the 
strictures of historiographical writing—a premise I find faulty—it does not fundamentally change my reading of 
ethnography in Christian Late Antiquity or even among Greco-Roman authors. But the constellation of sources 
and procedures shared in writing history and ethnography—for Woolf concedes that historiography similarly 
relies upon autopsy—encourages us to distinguish the history and ethnography as a composite, multi-faceted 
endeavor. Just as the wondrous alone—pace Fornara—does not signal ethnographic instincts, methodology—in all 
its variation—is not the determinative indicator of ethnographic writing or of the ethnographic disposition. It is 
the full procedural gamut of ethnographic writing—from collection of knowledge to the application of said 
knowledge—that molds its form and function. And, as we shall see, unpacking those components or facets of 
writing people reveals the ethnographic disposition or the underlying assumptions and theoretical 
underpinnings of textual representation. 
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interpretive paradigms or schemes were utilized and developed alongside data pools not only 
to try to explicate the causes and forces of the diversity of human behavior, customs, habits, 
and appearance, but to systematize and categorize the peoples of the observable world.  
Greg Woolf, in his Tales of the Barbarians, discusses the paradigms by which the 
ethnographic parts were worked into a whole or, at the very least, the process by which the 
whole was explained in terms of its parts. In his discussion of ancient ethnography, Woolf has 
identified two dominant explanatory paradigms of ancient ethnography: genealogy and 
geography (the latter of which included sub-types such as climatology and cosmology and 
astrology).94 The ordering of ethnographic knowledge, whereby a people was located either 
with respect to location (within a larger cosmological framework) or identified via a 
genealogical tree, offers a paradigm through which to explain human diversity and “to map 
ethnic groups.”95 And while the quest to locate origins (either spatially or genetically) and thus 
to explain the cultural, religious, and geographical heterogeneity of the world represents but 
one dimension of the larger project of arraying ethnographic “data,” the ancient 
preoccupation with validating ancestral lineage guides much of the ethnographic tradition. 
Genealogy served as a tangible measure of cultural and ethnic priority (and, in certain 
                                                        
94 Greg Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 32-58. For geography see Woolf, 44-51; climatology, 44-48; astrology, 48-51. As 
Wolf explains, “genealogy and geography each offered general explanatory frameworks within which 
ethnographic data might be made to make sense. ‘Might’ is, in fact, too weak. All ethnographers need paradigms 
to enable them to interpret their harvest of oral testimony and observations…Paradigms also contribute to the 
structuring of knowledge when it is encoded in text. Ethnography, after all, literally means ‘writing people.’ As a 
discipline of recording it always involves the translation of people into texts. Paradigms operate in some way like 
master narratives, and in other rather like sets of generic conventions” (36). On ethnography as conditioned by its 
allegorical possibilities (i.e. ethnography as a genre and practice of multiple meanings and multiple readings) see 
James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Allegory,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, ed. James 
Clifford and George E Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 98-121. 
 




instances, superiority).96 Drawing upon the traditional appeal to genealogies, dating back to 
Homer, Woolf posits that it was possible to coalesce a line of descendants around a lone 
figure’s individual eponym, if it was “located sufficiently far back in mythic times.”97 Another 
of the genealogical functions of ancient ethnography, specifically what he identifies as the 
process of “situating particular individuals or families at the centre of an ethnic history,”98 
holds the potential both to distance and bind together specific population groups.99 
Genealogies, indeed, evidence proximity as much as they report distance.100 Ties of fictive 
kinship prove functional tools by which communities are drawn together.101 Here, again, texts 
represent ideas that were, in all likelihood, historically vapid. But, as our authors knew, as 
much as representation becomes a weapon by which alliances can be forged or hostility 
explained, it likewise brought to bear unintended or unforeseen problems of philosophical 
import. In venturing to discover and circumscribe the known and unknown worlds, 
ethnography filled gaps in knowledge and clarified claims about the peoples and places of the 
world. But the collection of evidence of peoples’ ways of life, by autopsy and with the aid of 
                                                        
96 See Elias Bickerman, “Origines gentium,” Classical Philology 47.2 (1952): 65-81; T.P. Wiseman, “Legendary 
Genealogies in Late-Republican Rome,” Greece & Rome 21.1 (1974): 153-64; Hall, Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity, 40-
51, 77-89; Hall, Hellenicity, 15-29; Robert L. Flower, “Genealogical Thinking, Hesiod’s Catalogue, and the Creation of 
the Hellenes,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 44 (1998): 1-19; Daniel Richter, “Plutarch on Isis and 
Osiris: Text, Cult, and Cultural Appropriation,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 131 (2001): 191-
216; Rosalind Thomas, Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 161-195; and Claude Calame, “Spartan Genealogies: The Mythical Representation of a Spatial Organization,” 
in Interpretations of Greek Mythology, ed. Jan N. Bremmer (London: Routledge, 1988), 153-186; and Benjamin Isaac, 
The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
 
97 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 41. 
 
98 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 41. 
 
99 Woolf is quite adamant that ethnography has been overly defined by its capacity to define and distance an 
“other,” when in fact it possesses the very same ability to bind “a world of strangers” (41). 
 
100 This is a point also stressed in Erich S. Gruen’s, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011).  
 
101 See Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity, 253-307; and Christopher P. Jones, Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient 
World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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textual precedents engendered problematic questions and realizations about the causes of 
human difference, the impossibility of cultural translation, the falsity of authorial objectivity, 
and the scope of ethnographic knowledge. There are certain methodological, philosophical, 
and textual assumptions that inform the ethnographic writing process, others that become 
implicated in the writing process, and still more that emerge only from writing people. Indeed, 
as much as inquiry requires ethnographic exempla, ethnographic writing begs and begets 
further inquiry and explanatory models.  
 
 
Reading Heresiology in Context 
 
 
Because the terms of Christian religiosity were diverse and diffuse and institutional 
structures and traditions were seemingly negotiable and even inchoate, the history of early 
Christianity evidences both the rhetorical efforts by which boundaries between sects were 
constructed and the actual imposition of ecclesiastical and political barriers to institutional 
and communal development.102 Heresiology was an effort by particular members of the still 
nascent Christian community to elaborate and solidify claims of tradition by specifying the 
terms and vernacular of Christian principles, practices, and theology.103 As Christians spread 
                                                        
102 David Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), 90-111; Einar Thomassen, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Second-Century Rome,” Harvard Theological 
Review 97.3 (2004): 241-256; and Elaine Pagels, “‘The Demiurge and His Archons’: A Gnostic View of the Bishop and 
Presbyters,” Harvard Theological Review 69.3/4 (1976): 301-324; and Alain Le Boulleuc, La notion d’hérésie dans la 
literature grecque IIe-IIIe siècles. 2 vols. (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985). 
 
103 On the diversity of early Christianity and the creation of Christian authority, see Karen L. King, “Which Early 
Christianity?” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 66-84; eadem, “Factions, Variety, Diversity Multiplicity: Representing 
Early Christian Differences for the 21st Century,” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 23 (2011): 216-237; 
Brakke, The Gnostics, 1-28; Peter Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); Gerd Lüdemann, Heretics: The Other Side of Christianity, trans. John Bowden 
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themselves across the Mediterranean preaching the good news of Christ and as peoples 
assumed the mantle of Christianity in different ways and in different environments, 
theological and ecclesiastical diversity became increasingly endemic to Christian culture. With 
the number of Christians multiplying,104 disputes over the finer points of theological doctrine, 
ecclesiastical governance and authority, Christian epistemology, exegesis, ritual observation, 
and canonical inclusion, to name but a few areas of contention, naturally followed.105 With 
each new church, the purported unanimity within the nascent Christian church was subjected 
to new potentialities of fissure and dissolution.106 Paul himself, as his epistles clearly 
demonstrate, struggled to maintain order among the communities he visited and wrote. 
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104 For an incisive, yet admittedly speculative, analysis of Christian demographics, see Keith Hopkins, “Christian 
Number and Its Implications,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 6.2 (1998): 185-226. 
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Gnostic and Orthodox Traditions,” in Gnosis: Festschrift für Hans Jonas, ed. Barbara Aland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
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Gnostic Theological Reflection,” in Reading in Christian Communities: Essays on Interpretation in the Early Church, ed. 
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Communities forgot, disputed, or ignored his instructions about Christ’s gospel.107 Writing 
from the middle of the second century onward, these compilers of descriptions and refutations 
of heretics birthed a new genre: heresiology. The heresiologists devise and order a Christian 
epistemological system, which thrusts two competing realities into forced contention with 
each other: knowledge of the heretical world and the exclusive truth of orthodox Christianity. 
The heresiologists’ codification of differences of praxis and theology, from cosmology to 
Christology to dietary practices and clothing preferences, became metrics of heresy—as a 
name and thus a charge—and the tools by which Christians could try to excise and limit the 
profusion of diversity.108 
Nearly a century and a half after the apostle Paul, in the preface to his five-book 
refutation of heresies, Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons (ca.130-202), enumerates the principal hazard 
of the heretics. Though frequently referenced by its shorter title, Adversus Haereses,109 the 
fourth-century bishop Eusebius of Caesarea reports a fuller and more precise heading for 
Irenaeus’s work: “Exposé and Overthrow of What is Falsely Called Knowledge.”110 Knowledge 
                                                        
107 Even a cursory reading of Paul’s epistles to the Galatians, Corinthians, and Romans demonstrates the problems 
of obedience, truth, and communal coherence. On this point, see William E. Arnal, “Doxa, Heresy, and Self-
Construction: The Pauline Ekklēsiai and the Boundaries of Urban Identities,” in Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, 
ed. Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 50-101.  
 
108 See Marcel Simon, “From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical 
Intellectual Tradition, ed. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 101-116; 
Brakke, The Gnostics, 1-28; Heinrich von Staden, “Hairesis and Heresy: The Case of the haireseis iatrikai,” in Jewish 
and Christian Self-Definition, vol. 3, Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World, ed. Ben F. Meyer and E.P. Sanders 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 76-100. On the political and dispositional meaning of haeresis, see John 
Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978), 168-175; Rebecca Lyman, 
“2002 NAPS Presidential Address: Hellenism and Heresy,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 11.2 (2003): 209-222; and 
Richard Kalmin, “Christians and Heretics in Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity,” Harvard Theological Review 87 
(1994): 155-169. 
 
109 Even in antiquity the text was known by its shortened title. Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica 2.13.5, 3.28.6; Basil 
Liber de Spiritu santco 29.72; Jerome De viris illustribus 35; Maximus, Scholia in Pseduo-Dionysius Areopagita, De 
ecclesiastica hierarchia 7, and Photius, Bibliothecae codices. 120.  
 
110 Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, V.VII.1, ed. and trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classical Library 153 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 450: Ἐλέγχου καὶ ἀνατροπῆς τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως. 
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(gnosis), sadly absent from the abridged title, is not simply the corrective target of Irenaeus’ 
treatise (though the gravest offenders, the “Gnostics” are far from his only target);111 rather, it 
guides and structures the intellectual trajectory of the entire heresiological project: to survey 
theologically and polemically the οἰκουμένη that is Christian, assert the inerrant succession of 
apostolic knowledge, and delimit human claims of knowledge about the intricacies of Scripture 
and God himself.112 In elaborating even the most minute of heretical customs and doctrines—
from baptismal rituals and intricate cosmologies to dietary habits and alternative scriptural 
interpretations—the heresiologists exhibit not only their so-called mastery over the 
formidable bastion that is the world of Christian heresy, they confront how the procession, 
production, and ordering of knowledge underscores and alters the very foundations of 
Christianity and the Christian world.  
Precisely because the heretics “believe differently about the same things as time passes 
and never have a stable doctrine, because they wish rather to be sophists of words than 
disciples of the truth”113 Via their addenda and excisions, the heretics, so the heresiologists 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
111 Though often described as an anti-Gnostic text Irenaeus (and his fellow heresiologists) traces and ventures far 
more deeply into the world of sectarian Christianity. That is to say, Irenaeus contests a wide swath of “heretical” 
opinions, some of which are not categorized as so-called Gnostics. The world of heresy is occupied by an 
abundance of distinct opinions, cosmologies, habits, and theological doctrines. On The Gnostics, see Brakke, The 
Gnostics; Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Michael Allen 
Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999); and Nicola Denzey Lewis, Introduction to “Gnosticism”: Ancient Voices, Christian Worlds (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
 
112 See W.C. van Unnik, “Theological Speculation and Its Limits,” William R. Schodel, “Enclosing, not Enclosed: The 
Early Christian Doctrine of God,” and Richard Norris, “The Transcendence and Freedom of God: Irenaeus, the 
Greek Tradition and Gnosticism,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, ed. William R. 
Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 33-43, 75-86, and 87-100.  
 
113 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses III.24.2 (Contre les hérésies, Livres III, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis 
Doutreleau, SC 211 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974], 3:2:474). Translations for Books I-III are from Dominic J. Unger, 
et al. in St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against the Heresies, Books 1, 2, and 3. ACW 55, 65 and 64 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
1992, 2012, 2012). On this point, see Karen L. King, “Social and Theological Effects of Heresiological Discourse,” in 




charged, adulterated the revealed truth of Christ. Rather than simply allow the truth to be, so 
Irenaeus charges, they massage it, augment it, recast it, and ultimately threaten its 
untrammeled facilitation through generations of Christians (of course, the heretics saw it 
differently). In holding themselves as exponents of (an alternative) system of truth, the 
heretics craftily “speak the same language” as (orthodox) Christians, though they “intend 
different meanings.”114 Their treachery, however, as Irenaeus diagnoses it, attests an 
underlying and more perilous condition: they persist and metastasize “under the pretense of 
knowledge.”115 Their so-called knowledge—while revealing detailed cosmologies, alternative 
scriptures, a multiplicity of deities, the impetus of creation, the divisions within the soul, the 
process of redemption, and the metaphysical principles of the universe—imports a grandiose 
claim of privileged authority into their schematization of a cosmic narrative. In supplanting 
the primacy of the God of the Bible and his Word, the creative and enlightening powers behind 
the creation of the universe and thus the human race, the heretics embark upon a massive 
restructuring of revealed truth. 116 Reorienting the truths of the apostolic age not only 
disrupted claims of ecclesiastical authority and the regulated transmission of knowledge, it 
also perpetuated an open and unfixed conceptualization of tradition.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
114 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I. Pr. 2.33-4 (Contre les hérésies, Livres I, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, 
SC 264 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1979], 1:2:22).  
 
115 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I. Pr. 1.8-9 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1:2:19). 
 
116 After having surveyed the Valentinian’s cosmological system, Irenaeus summarizes their claims in the context 
of knowledge and scripture. “Such is their system which neither the prophets preached, nor the Lord taught, nor 
the apostles handed down. They boast rather loudly of knowing more about it than others do, citing it from non-
scriptural works; and, as people say, they attempt to braid ropes of sand. They try to adapt to their own sayings in 
a manner worthy of credence, either the Lord’s parables, or the prophets’ sayings, or the apostles’ words, so that 
their fabrication might not appear to be without witness. They disregard the order and the connection of the 
Scriptures and, as much as in them lies, they disjoint the members of the Truth” (Adv. haer. I.8.1-11 [Rousseau and 




While a number of Christian writers singled-out specific heretics for withering 
criticism (Arius, Marcion, Nestorius, Mani, Jovinian, to name but the most glaring), only a few 
late antique authors ventured to survey and refute the entirety of the heretical world.117 It is 
these expansive texts that I consider here as the exemplars of heresiological literature. They 
include Hippolytus of Rome’s (ca. 170-236) Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, Irenaeus of Lyons’ (ca. 
150-202?) Adversus Haereses, Tertullian’s De Praescriptione Haereticorum, Epiphanius of Salamis’ 
Panarion, Augustine of Hippo’s De Haeresibus, and Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Haereticarum Fabularum 
Compendium. Epitomized by the Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis (ca. 315-403), heresiology has 
proven itself a rather mundane object of study. Before the discovery of the Nag Hammadi 
Codices in 1945,118 heresiologists were largely unverifiable sources and treated as historical 
authorities. The narrative of the ecclesiastical historians—orthodoxy, the true and rightful 
inheritor of the apostolic legacy, combated the derivative, strayed impostors of Christianity, 
the heretics119—was more or less embraced.120 The descriptions of the heretics collected in the 
heresiologies only bolstered the narrative of an apostolic Christian tradition struggling to 
contain those who sought to amend, corrupt, and therefore destroy it. Since the pioneering 
                                                        
117 Athanasius wrote against Arius, Terullian against Marcion and Valentinus, Jerome against Jovinian, Augustine 
against Faustus (and the Manicheans more generally); and Cyril against Nestorius, among others.  
 
118 On Nag Hammadi, see, Frederik Wisse, “The Nag Hammadi Library and the Heresiologists,” Vigiliae Christianae 
25 (1971): 205-23; and James M. Robinson, “The Coptic Gnostic Library Today,” New Testament Studies 14 (1968): 
356-401. 
 
119 See, Walter Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, ed. Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel and trans. 
Phiadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins. 2nd ed. (Mifflintown, PA: Sigler Press, 1996). Bauer describes the 
“ecclesiastical” position as threefold. First, Jesus reveals the true Word of God to his disciples, who, next, traverse 
the world and introduce the “unadulterated gospel.” In the process, however, of proselytizing seeds of doubt are 
sowed (by the devil, of course), who blinds genuine Christians to the ways of the truth. “The development [of 
becoming a Christian] takes place in the following sequence: unbelief, right belief, wrong belief. There is scarcely 
the faintest notion anywhere that unbelief might be changed directly into what the church calls false belief. No, 
where there is heresy, orthodoxy must have preceded” (xxiii).  
 
120 See, for example, H.E.W. Turner, The Pattern of Christian Truth: A Study in the Relations between Orthodoxy and 




work of Walter Bauer and the increasingly sophisticated scholarly works on heresy in all its 
myriad forms and guises, the very notion of orthodoxy and heresy have been qualified, 
questioned, dismantled, reassembled, and dismantled again.121 Orthodoxy is no longer treated 
as an a priori ecclesiastical phenomenon—with heresy as its theological or satanic corruption—
but rather it is seen as a process through which theologians, ecclesiastics, and emperors 
crafted its constitution and anathematized those who defied it or threatened its coherence.122 
And yet even as specific instances and contexts of heresy have benefited from the 
abandonment of old assumptions and skillfully moved beyond them, from Virginia Burrus’s 
discussion of Priscillian in The Making of a Heretic to Caroline Humfress’s treatment of 
orthodoxy in the legal context, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity, the heresiologists 
themselves remain largely outside the reach of reevaluation and rehabilitation.123 If the study 
of heresy has progressed by leaps and bounds, the heresiologists still lag behind.  
These are texts, scholars frequently noted, of rote stylization and polemic. They are 
tired screeds, largely devoid of sophistication and nuance. Theodoret of Cyrrhus’s Compendium 
remains a peripheral text (without a critical edition), Augustine’s list of heresies is perhaps his 
                                                        
121 On the reception of Bauer, see Frederick W. Norris, “Ignatius, Polycarp, and I Clement: Walter Bauer 
Reconsidered,” Vigiliae Christianae 30.1 (1976): 23-44; D.J. Harrington, “The Reception of Walter Bauer’s Orthodoxy 
and Heresy in Earliest Christianity during the Last Decade,” Harvard Theological Review 70 (1980): 289-298; and Lewis 
Ayres, “The Question of Orthodoxy,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 14.4 (2006): 395-8. I see no need to retrace the 
scholarly evolution of the study of heresy and orthodoxy in the ancient world. It has been well described. For 
excellent offerings, see Eduard Irinischi and Holger M. Zellentin, “Making Selves and Making Others: Identity and 
Late Antique Heresiologies,” in Irinischi and. Zellentin, 1-27; and Karen King, What is Gnosticism, 1-109.  
122 On the development of orthodoxy, see Alain Le Boulluec, “Orthodoxie et hérésie aux premiers siècles dans 
l’historiographie récente,” in Orthodoxie, Christianisme, Histoire, ed. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and Antonella 
Romano (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000), 303-319; Richard Lim, “Christian Triumph and Controversy,” in 
Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World, ed. G.W. Bowersock, Peter Brown, and Oleg Grabar (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 196-212; Rowan Williams, “Does It Make Sense to Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodo 
Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?” in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1-23; and Caroline Humfress, “Roman Law, Forensic Argumentation and the 
Formation of Christian Orthodoxy,” in Elm, Rebillard, and Romano, 124-147; Denise Kimber Buell, Making 
Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
 
123 Virginia Burrus, The Making of a Heretic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and Caroline Humfress, 
Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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least studied text, and one of his sources, Philaster of Brescia’s Compendium of the Heresies, is 
almost universally ignored. In an aptly titled article “How to Read Heresiology,” the historian 
Averil Cameron bemoans this state of affairs, and offers both to trace this failure and outline a 
series of theoretical and historical paths forward. Cameron frames this scholarly maltreatment 
around the general predicament of a post-Enlightenment mentality, impassive to the 
tendentious and static stereotyping of heresiological authors, and as a particular failing of 
Byzantine scholarship and its Eastern canon (in contrast to the relatively well-studied Western 
medieval heresiologists). She further contends that scholars have failed to comprehend the 
myriad complexities within these texts due in large measure to the unfortunately simple and 
mechanical foundation laid by Epiphanius’ Panarion. Insofar as the production of heresiological 
literature reflects banal generalizations about the need to dispel error and articulate the 
topography of true Christianity, heresiologists leave in their wake an almost rote polemical 
dispute between two mutually exclusive yet dependent theological categories. The judgment 
that these texts lack sophistication, combined with a textual complexion consisting of prolix 
description of (often indecipherable) cosmologies, disgusting religious practices, 
hermeneutical variance, feigned scholarship, frequent tirades, staid categorization, and, in the 
case of Epiphanius, lengthy citations from his heresiological forbearers, theological allies, and 
the work of heretics themselves,124 leaves few interested in studying these texts as anything 
but compilatory wastelands of polemic.125 Heresiology, despite its encyclopedic aspirations, is 
                                                        
124 Theodoret of Cyrrhus, in his largely unstudied magnum opus, presents not cited material to aid his refutation, 
but simply acknowledges that his predecessors have successfully dismantled the heresy in question.  
 
125 See Brent D. Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in Vandals, Romans and Berbers, ed. A.H. Merrills  
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 227-258; and Frances M. Young, “Did Epiphanius Know What He Meant by 
Heresy?” Studia Patristica 17.1 (1982): 199-205. Cf. this see, Clemens Scholten, “Die Funktion der Häresienabwehr in 




mired as much by the simplicity of its own dichotomous worldview as by its perceived lack of 
“imaginative content.”126  
Cameron contends that this notoriously unattractive genre, shaped by “a poetics of [its] 
own,”127 harbored a web of interrelated (and understudied) rhetorical, theological, political, 
ecclesiastical, and scholastic agendas, wherein the production of heresy and heresiological 
literature should be read “as part of Byzantine pedagogy and the Byzantine sociology of 
knowledge.”128 Like Pausanias who guides his reader through the Greek world and like 
Diogenes Laertius who guides his readers through the known philosophical parties, 
heresiology offers its readers an intellectual map of the sectarian world. Mapping the world of 
heresy demonstrated the scholastic reach of Christian writers, which facilitated their pivot 
from recording and refutation toward the elaboration of orthodox opinion as honed by but 
distinctive from the surrounding milieu of heretics, Jews, and pagans.129 The deliberate forging 
of an intellectual tradition of heresiology, what Cameron calls a “traditio haereticorum,” exhibits 
both how error was schematized and classified as well as how the genre itself evolved, 
rhetorically and formally, over centuries. The relationship between relatively static content 
and a plurality of textual forms merits particular attention.130 Styling this bounty of heretical 
knowledge as a handbook, a universal history, an encyclopedia, or a dialogue nuances the 
                                                        
126 Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 473. 
 
127 Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 472. 
 
128 Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 484. 
 
129 On the elision between Jews and Heretics see Averil Cameron, “Jews and Heretics—A Category Error?” in The 
Ways That Never Parted, edited by Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 
345-360; and eadem, “Blaming the Jews: The Seventh-Century Invasions of Palestine in Context,” Travaux et 
Mémoires 14 (2002): 57-78; and Daniel Boyarin and Virginia Burrus, “Hybridity as Subversion of Orthodoxy? Jews 
and Christian in Late Antiquity,” Social Compass 52.4 (2005): 431-441. 
 




seemingly routine nature of the genre by drawing us to understand the interplay between its 
theological and literary ambitions. 131  
 
Heresiology as Ethnography 
 
In an oft-cited remark, Clifford Geertz, long ago observed that, “doing ethnography is 
like trying to read (in the sense of ‘construct a reading of’) a manuscript.”132 “Foreign, faded, 
full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries,” the 
manuscript like the ethnography is defined by its layers of content and polyvalent structure.133 
Insofar as they are analogous pools of “data,” rife with meaning and symbolism, both are acts 
of interpretation and documents that invite (or even necessitate) still more interpretation 
(acts of reinterpretation). In doing ethnography, the anthropologist or sociologist dissolves, 
translates, and interprets seemingly foreign opacity in search of cultural and social knowledge 
and explanation. In much the same way that the manuscript presents itself as a textual relic 
with strata of meaning, my reading of heresiology as a Christianized mode of ethnography 
posits a similar effort to interpret the layers of heresy’s meaning and its ever-diversifying 
                                                        
131 Though Cameron’s analysis derives much of its insight and applicability from tracing methods and modes of 
textual variation and evolution over the course of nearly a millennium’s worth of Byzantine sources, reading 
heresiology necessitates moving beyond an analysis of the rote polemic to investigate how theological 
argumentation influences history, to understand the intellectual space occupied by these texts, and to appreciate 
its stylistic complexities, classificatory techniques, and epistemological theorizations. By emphasizing the 
manner in which heresiological texts articulated more than merely incorrect practices and the superiority of 
correct doctrine, scholars have begun to uproot the tendency to view these texts as unskilled polemic.  
 
132 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures 
(New York: Perseus, 1973), 10. 
 




presence within the world of Christian culture.134 By using the work of their predecessors, the 
heresiologists of the later Roman Empire, Theodoret, Augustine, Philaster, and Epiphanius 
strive to coalesce the heretical world. In writing about and explaining their own internal 
differences, the heresiologists deployed, and in some cases simply invented, ancient paradigms 
of ethnography in order to classify, array, understand, and ultimately defeat the Christian 
plurality around them. Concurrently, Christian writers framed the plurality of opinions and 
groups endemic to their own Christian world as the underlying explanation of the manifest 
diversity within the known world. Christian investigation of itself conceptualized the internal 
                                                        
134 In his The Life and Miracles of Thekla: A Literary Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), Scott 
Fitzgerald Johnson describes the relationship between ancient (non-Christian) compilatory texts and those 
produced under the banner of Christianity. In contextualizing his analysis of paradoxography, Johnson 
foregrounds heresiological literature as an illustration of the Christian production of literary compendia. He 
cautions, however, against reading heresiology as evidence of the process of Christianization. Indeed, both 
Theodoret and Epiphanius, he tells us, produced other compilatory texts. Epiphanius wrote a texts On Weights and 
Measures, “which tries to define what biblical words for weights and measures mean in contemporary terms,” 
while Theodoret produced the Eranistes (a tripartite dialogue between “Orthodoxos” and “Ernaistes”), each 
section of which culminates in compiled supporting material from late antique ecclesiastics (193; see the 
forthcoming article of Andrew Jacobs, “Epiphanius of Salamis and the Antiquarian’s Bible,” in the Journal of Early 
Christian Studies for a useful analysis of intellectual eclecticism in late antiquity). The florilegia serves as a 
repository of theological evidence (used, most obviously, to counter heretical opinions). Theodoret also wrote a 
collection of philosophical opinions in his Remedy for Hellenic Maladies. Johnson summarizes his findings:  “On the 
basis of the broad literary corpora of Epiphanius and Theodoret—two of the most virulent heresiologists of late 
antiquity—it could be said that the technique of literary compilation was not a tool of ‘christianization,’ as argued 
by Hervé Inglebert, as much as it was simply a common means of literary expression, shared by writers of 
different religious commitments. In fact, what is most distinctive of the catalogue or compilation form in late 
antiquity is that it was not religiously affiliated at all, but was suitable for scientific, medical, scholarly textbooks, 
as well as (when the occasion arose) polemical and religious discourse” (194-5). Johnson’s analysis, however, 
assumes that the appropriation of a pre-existent genre—and its non-Christian ubiquity—fails to evidence the 
Christian turn in late antique literature. I would argue first that heresiology, as a compilatory text, was a 
decidedly Christian project (Johnson’s argument against Inglebert appears to collapse, oddly enough given the 
introduction of his fourth chapter, form and content). Though heresiology obviously draws on literary 
precedents, it uses those precedents to advance a particularly Christian worldview and ideology. It is this novel 
blending of form and content that produces a Christian effect. While heresiological literature did not signal the 
birth of classificatory literature or even of Christian compendia, its deployment of language of philosophy, 
science, and medicine in compilatory perpetuated the terms of Christian theological and literary discourse. I 
argue, in fact, that heresiology was a tool of Christianization in its absorption of ethnographical techniques to 
explain the totality of human difference and posit a Christian edifice to world history and diversity. At the same 
time, heresiology was an overt attempt to think through the internal diversity of the Christian world in the 
language of ethnography, science, medicine, and polemic. To label this literary appropriation, adaptation, and 
augmentation Christianization is not to suggest that heresiology was an illustration of increased Christian power 
(a historical claim about the demographic and/or political rise of Christianity); rather, it refers to the production 
of a literay tradition that utilized familiar forms to present Christian cultural preoccupations and interests (the 
articulation of the Christian perspective on ethnography, geography, etc.).  
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diversity of the Church into a larger disquisition on the nature and causes of all human 
diversity. Christian authors engulfed the Church and its intellectual traditions in a polemical 
project of ethnography: write the peoples of Christianity in order to contest and control them.  
Though the task of the heresiologist is explicitly polemical and coordinated within an 
ideological framework of mutual exclusivity, it fits comfortably, I argue, within the realm of 
ancient ethnographic discourse. Heresiological literature functions as an expression of a 
Christian ethnographic disposition, which, above all else, negotiates and performs the 
immensely difficult task of representing peoples in textual form. In line with Geertz’s 
metaphor of manuscript reading, Christian heresiologists peeled back and erected layers of 
meaning, symbols, and language to explicate their understanding of the known world and 
elaborate a Christian narrative of sacred history. To that end, the heresiological project is itself 
ethnographic—the exploration and interpretation of a festering diversity—and the rhetoric 
deployed in pursuing that goal hones the ethnographic reach and scope of Christian 
knowledge of its cultural and religious environs.135 It is not simply or even that Christian 
authors were imitating ethnographic and geographic techniques and tropes from earlier Greek 
and Roman authors, many of whom they likely had never read; instead, I argue that Christian 
ethnographers wrote about Christianity as if it were a world, an expansive geography in need 
                                                        
135 The great historian of the later Roman Empire, A.H.M Jones famously asked, in an article from 1959“Were the 
Ancient Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?” Journal of Theological Studies 10:2 (1959): 280-298. 
Although Jones answered firmly in the negative, it is nonetheless clear from the extant evidence that the 
heresiologists explicitly invoked the language of ethnic reasoning in their delineation of the nature, origin, and 
identity of the heretics. But beyond that limited vernacular, the facets of ethnographic writing incorporate more, 
much more, than a rote delineation of the qualities or criteria of nationhood. There is a far more complicated 
negotiation surrounding the authorial capacity to represent peoplehood or even moments of social experience. 
The ethnographic mark of heresiology turns as much on its descriptions of peoples as it does on the author’s gaze 
upon the structure and capacity of his text to contain and define a field of knowledge. How, in essence, did the 
heresiologists articulate their authorial selves and engage in their authorial ability? Even the seemingly flat-
footed writings of the heresiologists, which intertwine investigation and self-defensive postulations, are 




of exploration, classification, and investigation, which feeds a loop of ethnographic discourse 
and exchange.136  
Reports about the customs and habits of heretics, as ways of schematizing and 
classifying the diversity of the Christian world and as representations of diverse ways of life, 
become meditations on the seemingly limitless but yet severely limited capacity of Christian 
authors to know, comprehend, and codify the history of sectarianism. Ethnographic writing 
encompassed a way of seeing the world, of enumerating and negotiating the cultural, social, 
political, and intellectual space occupied by a people and its traditions. It reflects and 
encapsulates the tension between comprehension of and rule over the known world (and 
discovering more and more peoples along the way) and claims to comprehend and rule the 
entire world. By writing people one considers their microscopic or particular ways of life, 
behavior, etc., while also aligning these particularities with causes and effects or macroscopic 
theories and paradigms of ancient ethnographic discourse. Indeed, the heresiologists 
attempted not simply to deny their objects of study the title “Christian,” but, more 
importantly, they theorized with the heretics about the relationship between human difference, 
knowledge (its acquisition, study, and contemplation), and the epistemological limits 
governing the textualization of an ever-diversifying world. Heresiological literature evinces 
that the Christian οἰκουμένη is mired in division, strife, and contestation; to survey its 
                                                        
136 Averil Cameron’s deft argument in Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1992), that Christian writers were, in essence, fashioning a world for 
themselves throughout late antiquity undergirds much of my own thinking.  It may be unnecessary to insist that 
reality was in fact made via texts, but it is certainly true, as I hope this dissertation will demonstrate, that the 
monastic and heresiological writers constructed a textual world of monks and heretics that was built upon and 
negotiated ethnographic knowledge and tradition. As Cameron notes, “Out of the framework of Judaism, and 
living as they did in the Roman Empire and in the context of Greek philosophy, pagan practice, and contemporary 
social ideas, Christians built themselves a new world. They did so partly through practice—the evolution of a 
mode of living and a communal discipline that carefully distinguished them from their Jewish and pagan 
neighbors—and partly through a discourse that was itself constantly brought under control and disciplined” (21). 
I shall address the Christian creation of a language of ethnography in chapter one, while the question of control 
and discipline shall be considered in chapters four and five. 
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contents is not simply to describe its inhabitants, but to articulate its possibility, its potential 
to be whole. What lingers, to borrow Emma Dench’s observation about ancient Roman 
ethnography, is that the spread of Christianity feeds a self-reflective ethnographic process. 
Christianity, through its writers and preachers, emerges as its own ethnographical subject, 
bringing the gaze inward to trace its own history and its own foreignness in order to bracket 
its defects and articulate its essence.137 In itemizing the nature of the heretics, having arranged 
them genealogically, chronologically, or typologically, as the case may be, the heresiologists 
attempt to impose order on their heterodox objects via claims to an ethnographic authority 
and a parsing of the rectitude and expansiveness of Christian knowledge.  
 “The making of ethnography is artisanal, tied to the worldly work of writing,” writes 
James Clifford in his introductory piece to the essays that constitute Writing Culture.138 He 
further identifies no less than six ways in which “ethnographic writing is determined:” 
contextually (by environment), rhetorically (by expressive conventions), institutionally 
(within and against traditions, powers), generically (the distinctiveness of the ethnographic 
genre), politically (who represents whom and how), and historically (the ever-changing 
conventions of ethnography).139 While the “the inscription of coherent ethnographic fictions,” 
or the discursive, poetic, and performative qualities of ethnographic writing, foregrounds the 
productive process of ethnography, the making and making up, the conditions around and 
under which ethnography writing proceeds sharpen its questions, form, subject, and 
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method.140 The facets or contingencies that govern our own histories in our own times 
determine the reception and the writing of ethnography in ways beyond our control. For 
Clifford, language and ethnographic language in particular are only partially the property of 
their authors. The production of ethnography entails more than interpretation, 
representation, and translation; it engenders a system of relationships between subject and 
object, informants and author, and reader and author, which, in turn, cultivate 
phenomenological and epistemological consonance and dissimilitude. In contemporary 
anthropological work, the principal techniques of collecting “data,” for instance, have been 
subjected to similarly trenchant criticism, insofar as the ethnographer’s privileging of autopsy, 
the visualization of culture, comes at the expense of the other senses.141 Watching firsthand 
even as she is from afar, the anthropologist claims to stand outside and apart from her object 
of study, objectifying it as she gazes. The emphasis on the visual (as opposed to the sonorous) 
feeds “the taxonomic imagination of the West…constituting cultures as if they were theaters of 
memory, or spatialized arrays.”142 The performative spectacle of ethnography, the fantastical 
and the ordinary alike, is bound, authoritatively, to the phenomenological experience of 
autopsy, translated and transformed by the words of the ethnographic page.  
In emphasizing the discursive components of ethnography (over and against the 
visualist tendencies), Clifford thrusts expressive speech and the anthropologist’s own voice to 
the fore of the ethnographic experience. The once automatic authority ascribed to the 
anthropologist (with respect to his object of study) has slowly frayed in the wake of the 
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141 On the ethnographic (and, more broadly, Western) emphasis on visuality, see Johannes Fabian, Time and the 
Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and Walter Ong, Interfaces of 
the Word (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). 
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complex and ongoing critiques of representation itself. As the classic ethnographies of the 
early and mid-twentieth century distinguished between authorial subjectivity and textual 
objectivity,143 the former was understood to be a stylistic flourish, not a determinative feature. 
The ethnography was the reportage by an author but not of the author. Clifford, however, 
insists upon a renewed focus on the means by which cultural texts are produced, not simply 
interpreted: 
An interest in the discursive aspects of cultural representation draws attention 
not to the interpretation of cultural ‘texts’ but to their relations of production. 
Divergent styles of writing are, with varying degrees of success, grappling with 
these new orders of complexity—different rules and possibilities within the 
horizon of a historical movement….It is enough to mention here the general 
trend toward a specification of discourses in ethnography: who speaks? who 
writes? when and where? with or to whom? under what institutional and 
historical constraints?144 
 
The ethnographers’ role in the ethnography itself, her having written it and her having, to 
some extent, produced the data, exposes the dilemma of ethnographic description: writing 
peoples is always representative and interpretive. It is never free from the inclinations and 
preconceptions of its author. Ethnography instances not the passive chronicling of customs 
and habits, but the active imposition of political power, ideological control, and authorial 
inclinations. In serving the interests of its author, ethnography necessarily translates peoples 
into the vernacular of its author and her culture. 
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In his Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author, Geertz likewise analyzes the 
complexities undergirding the production of ethnographic texts. He describes the problem in 
terms of signature (how the author or author-function is “made manifest in the text”) and in 
terms of discourse (what is it that the author authors?).145 Signature has cast a long shadow 
over ethnographic writing precisely because it has framed the problem not in terms of 
narrative but in terms of epistemology, viz. “how to prevent subjective views from coloring 
objective facts.”146 Geertz continues: 
The clash between the expository conventions of author-saturated texts and 
those of author-evacuated ones that grows out of the particular nature of the 
ethnographic enterprise is imagined to be a clash between seeing things as one 
would have them and seeing things as they really are.147 
 
Though he finds the subjective anxieties of author-ization to be overstated, anthropologists, 
he laments, have too often conceived the problem of ethnographic description in terms of “the 
mechanics of knowledge” surrounding fieldwork.148 The self/other dilemma of fieldwork was 
prioritized over those of self/text process (the former somehow naturally solved the latter).  
He diagnoses the problem of authorial discourse, through Foucault’s “What is an Author,” 
which hones a distinction between authors and writer, and Roland Bathes’ “From Work to 
Text,” which navigates the terrain between writers of texts and founders of discursivity.149 For 
Geertz, the lasting impact of literary acumen follows, in some sense, from the distinction 
between the multiplicity of ongoing productions within a text (between “language as praxis or 
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language as means”).150 And although the distinction between writing and authoring may lack, 
for Geertz, intrinsic value,151 it nonetheless signals the tension between the practicalities of 
textual representation in the service of information (the text as a physical object with 
knowledge) and consciousness about the vernacular of knowledge production. Process and 
product are linked together as inseparable facets of ethnographic writing.  
Anthropology, in Geertz’s estimation, is trapped “mule-like” between its scientific 
aspirations and its literary explication.152 Framed in terms of signature and discourse the 
problem becomes a negotiation of uncertainty: “the uncertainty that appears in signature 
terms as how far, and how, to invade one’s text appears in discourse terms as how far, and 
how, imaginatively to compose it.”153 While heresiology is an extreme example of tendentious 
textual representation, the genre firmly remains a prolonged engagement with the struggle to 
capture people in the written word, even when those words are divorced from objectivity, 
facts, and accuracy. Fraudulently writing peoples is not without a sense of peril, exasperation, 
and impossibility. Though the heresiologists express no hesitation to write themselves into 
their text, its “scientific” bona fides is explicit: Epiphanius’ literally constructs his text as a 
Panarion or medicine chest for the disease of heresy. But the invocation of discourse, as Geertz 
identifies it, denotes the problem of literary composition, which in turn generates an 
amassment of epistemological quandaries: 
Confronted, in the academy, by a sudden explosion of polemical prefixes (neo-, 
post-, meta-, anti-) and subversive title forms (After Virtue, Against Method, Beyond 
Belief), anthropologists have had added to their “Is it decent?” worry (Who are 
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we to describe them, emphasis Geertz) an “Is it possible?” one (Can Ethiopian 
love be sung in France?), with which they are even less prepared to deal. How 
you know you know is not a question they have been used to asking in other 
than practical, empiricist terms: What is the evidence? How was it collected? 
What does it show? How words attach to the world, texts to experience, works 
to live, is not one they have been used to asking at all.154  
 
The representative capacity of language, as we shall see, in the context of writing and 
interpreting people is not a new problem. In that sense, I want to take seriously the various 
rhetorical maneuvers of the heresiologists, which they signal authorial fears, hopes, and 
dilemmas. Though organizationally, contextually, and stylistically distinct, the heresiological 
works of Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Epiphanius, Augustine, and Theodoret of Cyrrhus all 
reflect the authors’ efforts to delineate their own roles as ethnographers and caretakers of the 
Christian tradition. Although the ideological rigidity of Christianity—the imposition of a 
discourse of truth—resists certain ethnographic needs, the danger of knowledge in a radically 
changing world is framed not just as an institutional problem but as a conceptual one: what 
can be known? 
The pervasive rhetoric of travel, discovery, and peoplehood connotes an imaginative 
sense of ethnographic exposition.155 In conjunction with its overtly polemical tone and 
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character, my reading of “heresiology as ethnography” demonstrates that, while writing 
heretics was configured within the rhetoric of an emerging orthodox Christianity (analogous 
to the moralizing or civilizing discourse in Greco-Roman ethnography), the ethnographic 
process was equally perilous due to its inevitable finitude and limits. The genre interrogates 
the value of social discourse, attempts to define and parse the limits of Christian knowledge, 
and organizes the world of heresy, all while reflecting on the very nature of writing itself. In 
searching for information about the heresies, while trying to understand and even justify their 
place within a world governed by the Christian God, heresiology often became a grander 
disquisition on the processes by which the world itself, and its divine architect, can and could 
be comprehended and systematized. Understanding heresy was a gateway into explicating the 
expansiveness and limits of human comprehension of both natural and divine phenomena. 
The particularities of heretical habits were the microcosms of a larger macroscopic vision and 
history of the Christian world, and this polemical ethnography encapsulates the tension 
between knowing, knowing too much, and the very capacity to know at all. But there remains 
an unpredictable, even elusive quality, to heresiologies, which indicates their literary 
complexity. While the stated justification for these massive compilations of evidence and 
commentary is altogether obvious, their findings and the implications of those findings impose 
a series of uncalculated conceptual and theoretical hazards. Despite its superficial 
protestations, heresiology is an epistemological vortex, impossible both in its conceit and 
execution.  
 




In expounding the development of a Christian language of ethnography (and a 
language of Christian ethnography), I start with texts that illustrate Christian comprehension 
and the contested grounds of ethnographic analysis. I then pause, in chapter III, to outline the 
rhetorical edifices of heresiological literature, before turning to the final two chapters about 
ethnographic limits, textualization, and subject-object distinction. The ensuing chapters are 
organized thematically rather than chronologically (though, in cases where texts work in 
thematic dialogue with each other, I do treat them chronologically). I have chosen a thematic 
structure because it most clearly captures my interest in the constructive and deconstructive 
aspects (i.e. highly destabilizing quality) of ethnographic knowledge. Rather than trace a 
diachronic style or genre, which may fallaciously suggest a single genealogy or systematic 
process of thought, I have configured this dissertation to show (1): how ethnography functioned 
within heresiological literature (how it organized or disorganized sects); and (2): how the 
production of Christian ethnography engulfs the heresiologists in a series of literary and 
textual paradoxes.   
In producing a history or narrative of sectarianism, heresiological literature reveals an 
indigenous ethnographic project, which foregrounds the processes, results, and consequences 
of protracted internal investigation. I begin my analysis, in chapter one, with a discussion of 
the language of ethnography in heresiological literature. I focus primarily on Hippolytus of 
Rome and his polemic against (what he deems to be) fallacious models of human diversity. For 
Hippolytus, the heretics’ embrace of astrological determinism and cosmological mythography 
contests the ethnographic aspirations of a comprehensive and thoroughly Christian theory of 
the world’s creation, diversity, and and human difference. Insofar as the heretics and 
heresiologists spar in broadly ethnographic terms—through competing macroscopic theories 
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of human behavior—they define their differences via an attempt to impose a fixed history and 
order upon the world.  
In chapter two, I trace the ways in which the heresiologists organized the internal 
diversity of the Christian Church (in conjunction with the diversity of the known world). 
Diffused with the language of exposition, tireless discovery, and fact-finding, heresiological 
texts present themselves as purifying and utilitarian ventures into the abyss of heretical 
machination. The ethnographic impulses of Epiphanius of Salamis and Theodoret of Cyrrhus 
strive to map the Christian world by schematizing its geographical, theological, and 
intellectual character, while distancing an orthodox center (Rome or Constantinople) from a 
heretical periphery. As verbal maps of theological heterogeneity, these two authors attempt to 
classify a disorganized and chaotically evolving world. It is altogether telling that the very first 
line of Irenaeus’s Adversus haereses, parroting 1 Timothy 1:4, condemns the heretics for their 
introduction of false words and endless genealogies (verba falsa et genealogias infinitas).156 There 
is one true genealogy, and it resides within the catholic church. Epiphanius and Theodoret 
amplify (and complicate) Irenaeus’ observation by deploying a multiplicity of paradigms—
genealogies of knowledge, periodized histories of sectarianism, and typological orderings—to 
array their ethnographic “data” within a coherent narrative of sectarian origins.   
In chapter three, I outline the rhetorics of heresiological ethnography. Even as they 
seek to delve into the intricacies of their theological enemies, Jewish, Christian, and pagan 
alike, the heresiologies articulate a pervasive discomfort with the potentialities of dialectic and 
social exchange within a diversified, increasingly Christian world. The intellectual scope and 
ethnographic claims of heresiological literature evolve in tension with the avowed polemic of 
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these texts. Just as the heresiologists emphasize their mastery and comprehension of the 
heretical world, they do admit a deep ambivalence about the value of inquiry and 
ethnographic investigation. The inculcation of knowledge—traditions of pedagogy—and the 
formal investigation and expression of scholarly knowledge—notions of scholasticism—emerge 
as two expressions or intellectual sites fraught with potential danger.157 The scholastic reach of 
Augustine’s mind becomes as dangerous as that of the hubristic Gnostics. How, then, do you 
negotiate the permissiveness of theological exposition in service of Christian truth? Even the 
seeming straightforwardness of the Irenaeus’ or Theodoret’s process of naming, 
differentiating, classifying, hierarchizing, and prescribing its heresies, belies the ethnographic 
impulse of Christianity to transform knowledge about the Christian world into an 
epistemological system, wherein the world itself is now governed by Christian knowledge and 
understanding.  
In chapters four and five, I turn to a discussion of epistemological boundaries of 
ethnographic writing and thinking. In chapter four, I juxtapose Epiphanius’ Panarion with the 
ethnographic writings of Pomponius Mela and Pliny the Elder. Surveying and organizing the 
heretical world forces the heresiologists, like Pliny and Pomponius, to contemplate the extent 
to which they can comprehend the totality of Christian world around them (it is not simply a 
question of expressing new knowledge, but of obtaining the full gamut of knowledge of the 
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Christian world). The macroscopic theorization from microscopic details induces a chain of 
inquiries beyond the paradigmatic organization of the heresies. Although genealogy, 
demonology, and astrology provide conceptual models by which diversity can be routinized or 
explained, the theorization of heresy’s causes neither thwarts its persistent impact nor 
concretizes the comprehensiveness of the heresiological project. Heresy’s conceptual 
infinitude only enervates the control of its orthodox advocates. I demonstrate that Epiphanius 
not only admits this loss of control, but, in some sense, embraces it. There is no attempt to 
hide the fissures within his knowledge; it reflects his humanity and humility. 
In chapter five, I turn to Augustine’s largely ignored De Haeresibus to illustrate how he 
confronts not only the textual possibilities and limitations of epistemological representation, 
but also their theoretical capacity to comprehend their heretical environs. Through inter-
textual reading, tireless research, and personal experience, the heresiologists edit the works of 
their antecedents and contemporaries. By adding heretics to bring totals in line, heresiologies 
function as polemical palimpsests of ethnographic knowledge. But while the heresiologists 
insist on their expansive and unlimited knowledge of the heretics, they readily admit to falling 
short. Their texts are totalizing in aspiration, perhaps, but not in practice or even in theory. 
Instead, heresiological texts despite all their bluster, gusto, and bravado attest a stark 
conversation about the capacity of texts to represent and circumscribe ethnographic 
phenomena. Ethnography, as Paul Veyne argues, encapsulates the tension between totality 
and partiality, comprehension and ignorance, and the insurmountable gap between human 
nature and the natural world.158 Ethnographic data holds the potential to inspire as much as 
puzzle and to fracture as much as unify. It is these twin tensions that I explore below.  
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Unlike the travel text, however, which is, as such texts are by nature, one 
damn thing after another, the ethnographic text has a thesis, the thesis 
in fact that Lévi-Strauss has pursued for the quarter century or so since: 
namely, ‘the ensemble of a people’s customs has always its particular 






Averil Cameron’s now canonical book, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The 
Development of Christian Discourse, built upon the insights of Michel Foucault and post-
structuralist analysis, explores the various ways in which Christian writers developed and 
honed “an organized system of thought and expression.”2 Though not a singular language or 
discourse, as the messy history of late antique Christian so ably illustrates, Christian authors 
produced languages of Christian education, scholasticism (writing and books), historiography, 
suffering and violence, and law, among myriad others, to illustrate and advance Christian 
                                                        
1 Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 37. Geertz 
is quoting Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques [A World on the Wane], trans. John Russell (New York: Criterion 
Books, 1961), 180. 
 
2 Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1991), 6. Cameron’s analysis, in many ways, is bound to the imperial turn in late antique 
Christianity. She argues that Christian writers positioned themselves over time to take full advantage of the rise 
of Christianity within the imperial apparatus of the later Roman Empire. While there is certainly some truth to 
her suggestion that empire was always lurking in the background, I am less persuaded by and interested in this 
notion of Christianity’s development of a totalizing discourse (in light of imperial circumstances). Though many 
of the rhetorics I mention above insist upon/derive from Christianity’s changed fortunes (post-Constantine), I 
will argue that Christian authors’ formation of an ideology of control (via these multiple discourses) was always 
less stable than it appeared. My point is not that Christian texts failed to establish their control—that was true in 
many cases and untrue in others—but that their authors actively and explicitly reflected upon these 
shortcomings and challenges. Christian writers were conscious of the limits of their own textual endeavors.  
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theological, political, and intellectual interests.3 The diversity of these writings—what 
Cameron calls the “elasticity” of early Christian discourse—demonstrates the struggle not only 
to fashion coherent and standardized narratives and opinions about Christian history and 
tradition, but also to emphasize the evolution and potential of the Christian intellectual 
tableau. Christianity was growing in the world as its adherent were writing its texts and 
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writing it into texts. The process of creating rhetorics of Christianity was not simply an 
exercise in culture making or religious formation, but a protracted endeavor to create the 
conditions and language of a decidedly Christian world and worldview. As Cameron notes: 
Out of the framework of Judaism, and living as they did in the Roman Empire 
and in the context of Greek philosophy, pagan practice, and contemporary 
social ideas, Christians built themselves a new world (emphasis mine). They did 
so partly through practice—the evolution of a mode of living and a communal 
discipline that carefully distinguished them from their Jewish and pagan 
neighbors—and partly through a discourse that was itself constantly brought 
under control and disciplined.4 
 
I wish to suggest that the effort to construct this textual world hinged on the Christian 
appropriation and reinterpretation of ancient ethnographic writing. The process of creating 
this “intellectual and imaginative universe” was, at its most basic level, an exercise in 
ethnographic reasoning: it was a process of organizing and classifying the contents of the 
known world into a Christian worldview.5  The project of world-making necessitated 
knowledge of human particularity (microscopic ethnography)—how peoples behaved, thought, 
presented and organized themselves—and human universality (macroscopic ethnography)—
how humanity became differentiated by geography, language, phenotype, and culture.6 Insofar 
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5 Elizabeth Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, has rightly championed the idea of early Christian culture making, by 
which she means the forging of a Christian framework for producing culture via the collective memory of 
suffering and martyrdom. Memorialization served as a prism through which cultural legacies could be molded 
and massaged to serve a particular project of identity formation. Building on the work of Castelli and Cameron, I 
contend in this dissertation that one facet of late antique Christianity was the project of world making. Though 
world-making and culture making can and did operate in tandem, world-making functioned to contextualize and 
support notions of Christian identity. Making the world Christian not only framed the burgeoning power of 
Christian identity, it also fed the process by which identity became bound to a reading of the outside world. With 
the notion of world making, as one fundamental aspect of ethnographic writing, I am gesturing at a conceptual 
endeavor related to culture making, but bigger and grander. Christian identity was being formed in conjunction 
with a deeper desire to read the entire world’s content and history as part and parcel of a Christianizing gaze.  
 
6 If Christianity can be said to have developed a discourse for itself (in various manifestations and to various ends) 
heresiology serves very much as the science (in the Foucauldian sense) of heresy. To, follow, then, the analysis 
Foucault offers in his Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 
heresiology perpetuates and produces a structural form (the catalogue) that encompasses a field of knowledge. 
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as Christian writers constructed and theorized a textual world by explaining the relationship 
between micro-customs and macro-forces in order to propound a narrative of human history, 
evolution, and difference, their texts attempted to present the world as eternally and 
irrevocably Christian.  
In the process of describing and refuting the heretics, heresiologists frequently homed 
in on their opponents’ appropriation of the opinions and practices of the Greek philosophers, 
the biblical nations, most notably Assyria, Persia, and Babylonia, and even Celtic and Druidic 
traditions, among other supposedly un-Christian practices and customs.7 Heresiologies, in 
essence, catalogued the foreign traditions and arts that had come to reside, by the will of 
heretics, within certain “Christian” circles. By association, these hybridized Christians (i.e., 
false Christians from the perspective of the heresiologist)—part Christian, part Druidic 
philosopher; part Christian, part numerologist; part Christian, part diviner—became exemplars 
of corrupt and fallacious intellectual pedigrees. While I shall dwell at some length on the 
“orthodox” Christian deployment of ethnographic models to explain sectarian proliferation 
later in this chapter (with reference to Hippolytus of Rome and Epiphanius of Salamis), I shall 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
And in that very process, it crosses the threshold of epistemoligzation, wherein a discursive formation (and its 
attendant claims, norms, coherence) “exercise a dominant function (as a model, a critique, or a verification) over 
knowledge” (186-7). As he goes on to explain, “at this level, scientificity does not serve as a norm: in this 
archaeological history, what one is trying to uncover are discursive practices in so far as they give rise to a corpus 
of knowledge, in so far as they assume the status and role of a science. To undertake a history of the sciences at 
this level is not to describe discursive formations without regard to epistemological structures; it is to show how 
the establishment of a science, and perhaps its transition to formalization, have come about in a discursive 
formation, and in modifications to its positivity…. The analysis of discursive formations, of positivities, and 
knowledge in their relations with epistemological figures and with the sciences is what has been called, to 
distinguish it from other possible forms of the history of the sciences, the analysis of the episteme. This episteme 
may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, 
which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of 
thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape—a great body of legislation written once and for all by 
some anonymous hand” (190-1). 
 
7 Hippolytus, for example, identifies the following peoples and arts that have found their way into the customs 
and beliefs of the Christian heretics: astrology, numerology, mystery cults, cosmogony, divination, Pythagoras, 
Epicurus, Thales, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, 
Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Echpantus, Hippo, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Egyptians, Jews, Chaldeans, 
Brahmans, Druids, Pyrrhoneans, Arithmeticians, Stoics, and magicians.  
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begin my discussion of the Christianization of ethnography by elaborating the heresiologists’ 
engagement with, or rather refutation of, competing sectarian theories of ethnographic 
difference. Some of these infiltrating traditions—astrology, divination, philosophy, typology, 
and mythology—offered rationalizations of human diversity as measured by behavioral, 
dispositional, ritualistic, and phenotypical difference.8 As I shall demonstrate below, the 
heretics, according to the heresiologists, internalized and manipulated ethnographic 
observations and theories of grand design to bolster and support their own particularized 
theological doctrines and cosmologies.  
Heresiological literature thus engaged with ethnographic theorization as both a force 
to be harnessed positively, in the advancement of a Christian interpretive model of the world, 
as well as a force to be contested, when contrarian theories of intellectual and theological 
opponents were deemed sufficiently disruptive and problematic to necessitate rejoinder. It is 
this two-fold process, the protracted oscillation between cooption and rejection of 
ethnographic techniques and styles, that I explore in this chapter. Both sides of this prolonged 
struggle, so it seems, advocated and coopted analytical trajectories that explained the nature, 
causes, and implications of human diversity.9 In conceptualizing the contestation between 
                                                        
8 On paradigms of ethnographic analysis, see Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 32-58, which I summarize in my 
Introduction, 28-30. 
 
9 The majority of our knowledge about the various heretical parties in the ancient Mediterranean comes from the 
hands of so-called “orthodox” writers (the winners, if you will). That is, few texts from the hands of so-labeled 
heretics survive. The discovery of the Nag Hammadi texts in 1945, however, is a clear exception as are the diverse 
and various Manichaean texts. Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity, 126-
137, has looked at the theme of ethnic reasoning in the Tripartite Tractate and Gospel of Philip, two texts from the 
Nag Hammadi Codices. In her dissertation, “Another Race? Ethnicity, Universalism, and the Emergence of 
Christianity,” (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2009), Philippa Lois Townsend likewise investigates the 
rhetoric of ethnicity and universalism with respect to Manichaeism (she identifies what she calls ethno-religious 
language in Manichaean texts), 142-207, as well as the Gospel of Judas, 249-268. David Brakke, The Gnostics, 70-74, 
also discusses Gnostic usage of kinship and ethnic language. In each of these cases, however, we should not forget 
that the language of ethnography is not to be equated with the language of ethnicity. At the same time, however, 




orthodoxy and heresy as a fundamentally ethnographic endeavor, I focus on their competing 
efforts to comprehend and order their surroundings in distinctly Christian terms. 
Ethnography was a fertile ground on which Christians wrote not only their identities, but also 
their conceptualization of the world and cosmos. I begin my treatment of Christian 
ethnography with a discussion of the heretics’ deployment of two particular paradigms of 
macroscopic ethnography: astrology (or astrological determinism) and mythography (or 
mythographical cosmology). In each case, I argue, the heretics apply (fallaciously, in the eyes 
of the heresiologist) ethnographic knowledge and analysis to map the contours of their cosmic 
worldview. They strive, in other words, to understand the world through the development of 
their own language of Christian knowledge.   
 
Rejecting Paradigms: Hippolytus, Astrology, and Heretical Master Narratives 
 
Hippolytus of Rome, an ecclesiastical leader of the late second and early third 
centuries, wrote a ten-book refutation of the heresies known in Latin as Refutatio Omnium 
Haeresium and in Greek as Ὁ κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων ἔλεγχος.10 In elaborating the intellectual 
trajectory of heretical practices and opinions, Hippolytus, as I will demonstrate below, infuses 
his heresiological treatise with an ethnographic substratum of explanatory mettle. While he 
                                                        
10 The Greek edition I have used for Hippolytus is: Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1986). I have followed (with alterations) the translation in ANF. Hippolytus’ reign as ecclesiastical leader 
and his complicated and disputed episcopacy in Rome has been the subject of much scholarly attention. For the 
purposes of my argument, whether Hippolytus was ever in Rome is somewhat immaterial (as is the theory of 
multiplicity of authors) the biography is quite large. I have altered the translation from the Ante-Nicene Fathers 
often in order to clarify the text and update the language. The following offer exhaustive, if not always 
convincing, treatments of the various questions pertaining to the historical and authorial Hippolytus: Allen Brent, 
Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension before the Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop 
(New York: Brill, 1995); J.A. Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the 
Corpus (New York: Oxford, 2002); David G. Dunbar, “The Problem of Hippolytus of Rome,” Journal of Evangelical 
Theological Studies 25 (1982): 63-74; and Marcovich, ed., Hippolytus, 8-17.  
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enumerates the multitudinous forces that engendered Christian heresy, the bishop exerts 
considerable energy combating alternative models for organizing human difference and 
creation. Moreover, undergirding his analysis of heretical etiology and heretical plurality is his 
narrative of supposed “true” Christianity, which posits a continual tradition from Jesus and 
the apostles into his contemporary world.11 Hippolytus, like nearly all of his heresiological kin, 
explicitly juxtaposes his narrative of true Christianity against the lineage of heretical deviation 
and error. In case of both the unbroken chain of orthodoxy and the fragmented proliferation 
of heresy continuation, his text propounds its vision of the makeup of the Christian world on 
the terms of ethnographic discourse. In the course of his treatise Hippolytus marshaled the 
effects of ethnographic writing—genealogy, methodology, classification, etc.—to solidify his 
narrative and likewise frame his opponents’ history, birth, and practice in ethnographic 
language. In challenging certain theorizations about human difference, Hippolytus used his 
heresiology to propound his own theory of human diversity. The ethnographic disposition 
emerges both in contestation with and in relation to the heretics’ own claims to “read” the 
world via astrology, numerology, and mythography. To illustrate the contested ethnographic 
ground of heresiology, I have chosen to discuss two of the most illustrative examples of the 
heretics’ own theorization of human diversity: the cases of astrological determinism (the 
relationship between the stars and human behavior, phenotypes, and orientation) and 
                                                        
11 Hippolytus concludes his heresiological treatise with a two-fold exercise in ordering the universe, its history, 
and theology. He first tackles the so-called Jewish Chronology (Ref. X.30-31 [Marcovich, 405-408]), which is a 
highly condensed history of the Jews, and then offers a theological vision (covering cosmology, creation, 
anthropology, etc.) of the Christian God and his creation (Ref. X.32-33 [Marcovich, 408-414]). His final remarks, 
moreover, encapsulate the universalizing aspirations of his text. “Such is the true doctrine in regard of the divine 
nature, O men, Greeks and Barbarians, Chaldeans and Assyrians, Egyptians and Libyans, Indians and Ethiopians, 
Celts, and you Latins, who [so often] lead [your] armies [to victory], and all you that inhabit Europe, and Asia, and 
Libya. And to you I become an advisor, inasmuch as I am a disciple of the benevolent Logos, and [am myself] 
humane, in order that you may hasten and by us may be taught who the true God is, and [what] is His well-
ordered creation…Do not devote your attention to the fallacies of artificial discourses, nor the vain promises of 
plagiarizing heretics, but to the venerable simplicity of unassuming truth” (Ref. X.34.1-2 [Marcovich, 415]). I shall 
return to this passage later in this chapter.  
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cosmological mythography (the relationship between myth, cosmology, and the human being). 
In each case, Hippolytus’ description and disapprobation of these alternative models is framed 
within a conceptual vernacular that seeks to establish the Christian state of the world and the 
human position within it. Ethnography now serves to color and explain the world of 
Christianity.   
In Book IV of his Refutation of the All the Heretics, Hippolytus cites and summarizes the 
far-reaching claims and practical procedures of the astrological arts as delineated by the 
second-century physician and Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 C.E.) in his 
Against the Mathematicians (Adversus mathematicos).12 Alongside the numerical theorists who 
“suppose that they interpret life” (τὸ ζῆν διακρίνειν νομιζόντων) and the magicians who 
harness “the powers of secret knowledge” (ἀπορρήτων ματημάτων…τὰς δυνάμεις), the 
astrologers present themselves as fonts of an exclusive knowledge of the future.13 By deriving 
and fixing the horoscope as well as mapping the sidereal (lit. of the stars) influences over 
territories and “nations” (astrogeography or ethnographic astrology), the astrologers purport 
to understand the causes of human biological and dispositional diversity as well as the fated 
                                                        
12 Technically, Μάθημᾶτικός means mathematician or astrologer. Bury’s title, Against the Professors, is somewhat 
misleading. Sextus is known as the ancient skeptic (literally, inquirer), par excellence. His Against the Professors 
targets six intellectual movements for their promulgation of systems of knowledge that do not, from Sextus’ 
viewpoint, attain philosophical truth. His treatise attacks six arts or disciplines on skeptical (Pyrrhonian) 
grounds: the grammarians, rhetoricians, geometricians, arithmeticians, astrologers, and musicians. The six-part 
treatise is generally referenced by its broader title, Against the Professors or Mathematicians (abbreviated as M) with 
corresponding numbers attached to each of the subjects. His treatise against the astrologers, for example, is 
usually described as M 5. For the outlines of Sextus Empiricus’ biography and philosophical thinking, see Alan 
Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Luciano Floridi, 
Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a 
precise concordance of Hippolytus’s reliance on Sextus’ Against the Astrologers (Against the Professors, Book V), see 
Marcovich, ed., Hippolytus, 18-31. Hippolytus quotes Sextus verbatim at IV.I.2-17=Math. V.37-39, 44; IV.III.1-
52=Math. V.50-61; IV.IV.1-37=Math. V.64-70; IV.V.18-28=Math. V.88-89; IV.V.30-41=Math. V.92-93. He follows him at 
IV.VI.1-5 (Math. V.95-6); IV.VI.5-7 (Math. V.102); IV.VI.7-13 (Math. V.97-98). I have followed the text and translation 
of Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, vol. 4, ed. and trans. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library 382 (Cambridge, 
M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1949).  
 
13 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.15.1, 34.1 (Marcovich, 109, 122).  
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trajectory of human life.14 For nearly thirty chapters of Book IV, Hippolytus evaluates the 
practices of the astrologers, outlining and refuting their essential claim of accurate 
prognostication and sidereal determination of human disposition and physiology via a 
recapitulation of Sextus’ own text. Though he insists that the art of the Chaldeans is unstable 
and untrustworthy sui generis, the falsity of their practice has now found a home within the 
Christian (or anti-Christian from Hippolytus’ perspective) intellectual world. He rails against 
the proximate ascendancy of “those who have cultivated the art, becoming disciples of the 
Chaldeans…having changed the names [merely],” and “have from this source concocted their 
heresy.”15 Hippolytus’ refutation strives to contain the burgeoning influence of astrology 
within the domain of Christian tradition: “we will prove that the astrological arts are 
incoherent, intending thereafter to invalidate also the Peratic system (a type of Gnostic 
Christianity) as a branch growing out of an unstable root” (τὴν ἀστρολογικὴν ἐπιδείξομεν 
ἀσύστατον, αὖθις μέλλονωτες καὶ τὴν Περατικὴν ἀκυροῦν, ὡς κλάδον ἐκ ῥίζης ἀσυστάτου 
πεφυκυῖαν).16 Astrology’s infiltration into the lexicon of Christian dogma and cosmology 
tarnishes the so-called genealogical purity of Christian truth by undermining the claims of 
Christian knowledge about the world and God. The Peratists, as Hippolytus argues, “deriving 
their doctrine from astrologers, act despitefully towards Christ” by importing an alternative 
                                                        
14 Fixing the horoscope refers to genethlialogical astrology, while chorographical or mundane astrology applies to 
“the study of the influence of the stars on cities or regions of the world” (Tamsyn Barton, Ancient Astrology [New 
York: Routledge, 1994], 180). I will address this distinction in more detail when I discuss (below) Ptolemy and his 
Tetrabiblos. 
 
15 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.2.3 (Marcovich, 93; my translation). On astrological determinism among the Gnostics, see 
Horace Jeffrey Hodges, “Gnostic Liberation from Astrological Determinism: Hipparchan ‘Trepidation’ and the 
Breaking of Fate,” Vigiliae Christianae 51.4 (1997): 359-373; and Nicola Denzey Lewis, Cosmology and Fate in Gnosticism 
and Graeco-Roman Antiquity: Under Pitiless Skies (Boston: Brill, 2013), chapter 8. 
 





narrative of human destiny and design into Christianity.17 But before we can explore 
Hippolytus’ discussion in any detail, we must briefly consider the ethnographic implications of 
ancient astrological discourse. 
Tamsyn Barton and Greg Woolf situate Greco-Roman astrological discourse, as 
evidenced in the works of Manilius, the first-century C.E. astrological poet, and Ptolemy, the 
second-century C.E. mathematician, astronomer, and astrologer at the nexus of cosmological, 
geographical, imperial, and ethnographic theorization.18 Manilius’ Astronomica, a poetic study 
of astrology and its effect over microcosmic reality, propounded a system of cosmic-terrestrial 
interdependence, whereby a study of sidereal phenomena enabled humans to garner 
knowledge of the cosmos and utilize it to various effects, both global and particular.19 As the 
opening section of the poem proclaims, Manilius traverses the study of the heavens “to mark 
                                                        
17 Hippolytus, Ref. V.13.1 (Marcovich, 174). In clinging to the teachings of the astrologers, the Peratics abandon 
their fealty to Christ: “For I shall set down, in contrast with the previously mentioned Chaldaic art of the 
astrologers, some of the Peratic treatises, from which, by means of comparison, there will be an opportunity of 
perceiving how the Peratic doctrines are those confessedly of the astrologers, not of Christ” (Ref. V.13.13 
[Marcovich, 177]). In addition, the heretics who allegorize Aratus’ Phaenomena translate, with the aid of Scripture, 
its astrological findings into a Christian cosmology, polluting and corrupting Scripture and ensnaring the minds 
of those stunned by their wondrous findings but fail to grasp the broader machinations:17 “wherefore I desire that 
no one, astonished by similar wonders of those who interpret the aspect of heaven, should, like the owl, be taken 
captive” (Ref. IV.46.5 [Marcovich, 131]). In urging followers of the heretics “to retrace their course to the serene 
haven of the truth,” Hippolytus abuts this imminent desire for a return to truth with a dismantling of the 
heretics’ system of Christian knowledge (Ref. IV.46.2-3 [Marcovich, 130]). 
 
18 See Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2011), 48-51 
and Barton, Ancient Astrology, 157-207. On Astrology and fatalism, see Katharina Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual 
Background (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 59-76. Other useful resources include Roger Beck, A Brief 
History of Ancient Astrology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007); Frederick H. Cramer, Astrology in Roman Law and Politics 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1954), 3-44; Valentina S. DeNardis, “Ratio omnia vincit: 
Cosmological, Political and Poetic Power in the Astronomica of Manilius,” Diss. New York University, 2003; A. A. 
Long, ‘Astrology: Arguments Pro and Contra’, in Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes et al (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 165–92; Otto Neugebauer, A History of Ancient 
Mathematical Astronomy, 3 vols. (New York: Springer, 1975). 
 
19 For Manilius in general, see the magisterial work of Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background. For the 
problem of dating the text, see Chapter 4, “Horoscopes and Emperors,” 137-161. For the introduction, see P. H. 




how it controls the birth of all living beings through its sign.”20 Manilius, as a “hard” 
astrologer, someone who ascribes causative (not merely associative) control to the stars, 
propounds a system that cedes all-encompassing power to determine the fate of humankind.21 
As an explanatory mechanism for the course of history, the governance of the home and the 
city, the paths of war, filial relations, among other conditions, institutions, and historical 
phenomena, Manilius’ treatise theorizes, if ambiguously, the ethnographic impulse embedded 
within ancient astrological discourse: “the ethnic and national differences among the peoples 
of the earth are due to the fact that different signs of the zodiac dominate different regions, 
crucially influencing the appearance and lifestyle of their inhabitants.”22  
According to Manilius, the chorographic division of the world into three continents, 
Libya, Asia, and Europe, each identified and categorized by an overarching quality (the 
serpentine Libya, the wealthy Asia, and Europe for its heroes and cities) correlates with 
zodiacal governance: 
These then are the boundaries which land and sea are to be summoned to 
observe, for the creator has divided the world into portions, distributing it 
among the individual signs. To each guardian power he has given a special 
region of the world to rule, bestowing also the peoples and mighty cities proper 
to them, wherein the signs should claim their predominant influences. And just 
as the human frame is apportioned among the signs and the protection they 
afford, though collectively extending over the whole body, is in addition 
                                                        
20Manilius, Astronomica I.17, ed. and trans. G.P. Goold, Loeb Classical Library 469 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), 6. 
 
21 Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background, “In his system, the heavenly bodies do not only signal fate, but 
themselves bring about the manifold events that befall human beings, as is apparent already from the poet’s 
announcement of his topic as conscia fati | sidera diuersos hominum uariantia casus (‘the stars, knowledgeable of 
fate, which govern the diverse fortunes of men’ [Astr. 1.1–2]), 61.  
 
22 Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background, 102. See Manilius, Astr. 4.696-806 (Goold, 276-286). The most 
thorough treatment of Manilius’ astrogeography (or ethnographic astrology) is found in Godefroid De Callataÿ, 
“La géographie zodiacale de Manilius (Astr. 4, 744–817), avec une note sur l’Énéide virgilienne,” Latomus 60 (2001): 
35–66. Manilius details the distinguishing features of the various peoples and lands of the known world. As 
Callataÿ observes, the poet is especially interested in charting the differences between nations via an elaboration 




exercised separately over the limbs allocated among them…so in like manner do 
different signs lay claim to different lands. For this reason the human race is so 
arranged that its practices and features vary: nations are fashioned with their 
own particular complexions; and each stamps with a character of its own the 
like nature and anatomy of the human body which all share.23 
 
While the signs of the zodiac comport with territories they govern (owing, as Tamsyn Barton 
notes, to “myth of other analogical associations”24)—the Bull is appropriate for Scythia, Asia, 
and the Arabs; the Crab for Ethiopia; Capricorn for Germany, etc.—Woolf insists that, “the 
relationship between signs and peoples are left vague.”25 On account of this ambiguity (the 
unspecified degree to which astrology or sidereal movement exclusively governs or 
determines ethnic or national difference), Woolf further posits that the astrological 
determinism of the Astronomica functions as “an additional set of factors” within ancient 
ethnographic discourse.26 In other words, astrology does not supplant—instead, it 
complements—alternative ethnographic paradigms such as climatic determinism or ancestral 
genealogy.27 Manilius is clearly following in a philosophical (Pre-Socratic, Platonic, 
Aristotelian, Stoic, etc.) tradition of harnessing the explanatory capacity of cosmology to 
elucidate the observable phenomena of the natural world.28 And, moreover, because the 
                                                        
23 Manilius, Astr. 4.696-714 (Goold, 276-8).  
 
24 Barton, Ancient Astrology, 181. 
 
25 Manilius, Astr. 4.725a (Goold, 280). Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 50: “Libra rules over Italy, Gaul and Germany 
under Capricorn. Libra is appropriate because the balance represents the fact that it measures all things, because 
the equal length of days and nights makes it the normalized centre, because Rome raises and depresses the 
fortunes of peoples placed in the scales. Capricorn is appropriate for Germany because it is a hybrid of man and 
best (like all barbarians) and because it is ambiguous between land and see, like Germany itself with its tides.” See 
Callataÿ, “La géographie zodiacale de Manilius,” 40-62. 
 
26 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 50 (emphasis his).  
 
27 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 50. 
 
28 On the intersection of cosmology, astrology, and philosophy, consult Barton, Ancient Astrology, 32-63; and David 
E. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Athens, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1977); and, above all else, Otto 
Neugebauer, A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy, especially vol. 2.  
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universe itself is “formed by the diverse elements of nature—air and fire, earth and stretched-
out sea,” cosmology conditions the study of geography, ethnography, and climatology.29 While 
the Astronomica is unsystematic on the point of detailed ethnographic causation, Manilius’ 
concluding remarks on the ethnographic reasoning of astrologically-related physiology 
construct an explicitly causal parallelization between the structure of the heavens (what Volk 
terms the macrocosm) and geographical and humanistic organization (two different iterations 
of microcosm).30 This conceptual broadening of the governing capacity and force of the cosmic 
horoscope is punctuated by two concurrent causalities: first, that “thus is the world for ever 
distributed among the twelve signs, and from the signs, and from the signs themselves must 
the laws prevailing among them be applied to the areas they govern,” and second that, “every 
man shun or seek a place to live in, so hope for loyalty or be forewarned of peril, according to 
the character which has come down to earth from high heaven.”31 As Volk tersely explains it, 
“on earth as it is in heaven, man is ruled by the stars, not only through his horoscope, but also 
in terms of his dwelling place and country of origin.”32 The world of men, as it were, follows 
the order of the stars.  
At one particular juncture in his poem, having just outlined the geographical 
distribution of the signs (each sign “rules” a particular region, “wherein the signs should claim 
                                                        
29 Manilius, Astr. 1.248-9 (Goold, 22-24). See Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background, 61 n.8: “Manilius appears 
to vacillate between considering the stars themselves to be independent agents and regarding them as the mere 
tools of such diverse superior powers as the universe, god, nature, and fate (cf. the quotation that follows in the 
text with those in the next fn.). However, this does not constitute a contradiction, since, in the poet’s pantheistic 
cosmos, mundus (‘universe’), deus (‘god’), natura (‘nature’), and fatum (‘fate’) to some extent function as synonyms, 
and the starry sky can likewise be referred to as mundus and thus be identified with the cosmos as a whole.” 
 
30 Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background, 102-103, 212-215, 221-223. 
 
31 Manilius, Astr. 4.4.815-7 (Goold, 286-88). 
 




their predominant influence”), Manilius coordinates the physiology of human difference with 
climatological and geographical forces:33 
The Ethiopians stain the world and depict a race of men steeped in darkness; 
less sun-burnt are the natives of India; the land of Egypt, flooded by the Nile, 
darkens bodies more mildly owing to the inundation of its fields: it is a country 
nearer to us and its moderate climate imparts a medium tone. The Sun-god 
dries up with dust the tribes of Africans amid their desert lands.34 
 
Shortly thereafter, the above example (along with other naturalistic phenomena) is 
streamlined into a fairly straightforward theory: “the signs shine upon the special regions to 
which they have been allocated and imbue with their climate (suo aere) the peoples that lie 
beneath.”35 There is a correspondence, then, between astrological determinism and 
climatological determinism. Moreover, while Manilius had offered an explicit “assignation of 
zodiac signs to zones,” which could implicate climatological effects, the vast majority of his 
treatise explains the relationship between zodiacs and zones in mythological terms (the 
worshippers of Aries, for instance, follow from the myth of the golden fleece).36 Here, we 
glimpse Woolf’s notion of complementary ethnographic theories in action simultaneously. By 
contrast, Ptolemy’s astrological text theorizes the relationship between peoples and the stars 
in fixed ethnological and climatological terms. Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos, according to Tamsyn 
Barton, propounded the most complicated and systematic theorization of the intersection of 
astrology, climatology, physiognomy, and ethnography.37 Indeed, the totality of the second 
                                                        
33 Manilius, Astr. 4.700 (Goold, 278). 
 
34 Manilius, Astr. 4.723-729 (Goold, 280). 
 
35 Manilius, Astr. 4.742-3 (Goold, 278). 
 
36 Manilius, Astr. 4.743-935 (Goold, 280-296). 
 
37 Tamsyn Barton, Ancient Astrology, 182-3. See also her Power and Knowledge: Astrology, Physiognomics, and Medicine 
under the Roman Empire (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 84, 92-94, and 120-122. For more on 
Ptolemy, astrology, and ethnography, see Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: 
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book of his Tetrabiblos is an investigation of geographical (or ethnographic) astrology. The 
book begins by explaining the distinction between the two main parts (μέρη) or branches of 
astrology, the first of which governs territories and/or countries (and shall be the focus of 
Book II) and the second of which governs the individual (Book III): 
Since, then, prognostication by astronomical means is divided into two great 
and principal parts, and since the first and more universal (γενικωτέρου) is that 
which relates to whole races, countries, and cities (ὅλα ἔθνη καὶ χώρας καὶ 
πόλεις λαμβανομένου), which is called general (καθολικόν), and the second and 
more specific is that which relates to individual men, which is called 
genethlialogical, we believe it fitting to treat first of the general division, 
because such matters are naturally swayed by greater and more powerful causes 
than are particular events.38 
 
The distinction between mundane and genethlialogical astrology—the former applies to 
corporate or national character, events, and effects, while the latter claims predictive 
determination over individual character by way of fixing the horoscope at birth—illustrates 
the bipartite dominion of the astrological arts. Neither the nation nor the individual is beyond 
the reach of its explanatory and deterministic capacity: astrology provides answers and 
systemization.   
Following Polemo of Laodicea, the second-century sophist, Ptolemy articulates a 
tripartite division of the world: “the demarcation of national characteristics (ἐθνικῶν 
ἰδιωμάτων τὰ...διαιρεῖσθαι) is established in part by entire parallels and angles, through their 
position relative to the ecliptic and the sun” and includes the northern parallels, the southern 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Princeton University Press, 2004), 99-101. Isaac insists that Ptolemy’s astrological determinism operated in the 
same way as competing theories of environmental and geographic determinism (100, and 100 n. 159). Though, 
unlike the author of the treatise Airs, Waters, Places, Ptolemy’s astrological model allows for people to improve, 
change, or hereditary influence. An especially useful resource is the “Introduction” of J. Lennart Berggren and 
Alexander Jones, Ptolemy’s Geography: An Annotated Translation of the Theoretical Chapters, 4-54, and lastly the 
comprehensive investigation of Germaine Aujac, Claude Ptolémée, astronome, astrologue, géographe: Connaissance et 
representation du monde habité (Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1993). 
 
38 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.1. I have followed Ptolemy Tetrabiblos, ed. and trans. F.E. Robbins, Loeb Classical Library, 




parallels, and the central region.39 Those who are “far removed from the zodiac” in the “more 
northern parallels” inhabit a cooler climate and are themselves cooled (white in complexion, 
for example).40  Similarly, “the southernmost of them are in general more shrewd and 
inventive, and better versed in knowledge of things divine because their zenith is close to the 
zodiac and to the planets revolving about it.”41 And, of course, those who exist in the middle, 
between the extremes, “share in the equable temperature of the air, which varies, to be sure, 
but has not violent changes from heat to cold. They are therefore medium in coloring, of 
moderate stature, in nature equable, live close together, and are civilized in their habits (καὶ 
τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἥμεροι τυγχάνουσι).”42 Ptolemy’s text, however, moves beyond this tripartite 
schema and introduces a four-fold world, each quarter of which is ruled by a triad of zodiacal 
signs. The north-western quadrant of the world, which is governed by Aries, Leo, and 
Sagittarius, consists of the territories Britain, Galatia (Transalpine), Germany, Bastarnia, Gaul 
(Cisalpine), Apulia, Sicily, Tyrrhenia, Celtica, and Spain.43 The nations of this quarter have a 
general similarity—they are “independent, liberty-loving, fond of arms, industrious, very 
warlike…cleanly, and magnanimous,” and yet they are distinguished by their familiarity 
and/or proximity to one of the three zodiacal signs of the region.44 Because, then, Britain is 
more familiar with Aries, they “are fiercer, more-headstrong, and bestial” (ἀγριώτεροι καὶ 
αὐθαδέστεροι καὶ θηριώδεις), while the Sicilians, following Leo, “are more masterful, 
                                                        
39 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.2 (Robbins, 120). 
 
40 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.2 (Robbins, 122). 
 
41 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.2 (Robbins, 124). 
 
42 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.2 (Robbins, 124). 
 
43 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.3 (Robbins, 128). 
 




benevolent, and co-operative.”45 In detailing ethnic characters, Ptolemy explicitly intrudes 
into the domain of the ethnographers and the physiognomists (the study of the relationship 
between outward appearance and inward character); astrology, he contends, provided a 
systematic explanation of human diversity via an analysis of climatological and cosmological 
principles. Climatic determinism (as a mode of geographical and cosmological ethnography) is, 
in fact, embedded within Ptolemy’s work (as well as in the Astronomica’s descriptions).46 
Ptolemy conjoined ethnographic difference with climatological phenomena, which were, in 
turn, bound by cosmological principles.  
Though, as Woolf notes, “the mechanisms of explanation, in which the planets as well 
as the zodiacal constellations” differ between Manilius and Ptolemy, they both ascribe the 
ethnic stereotypes of various nations to astrological and broader cosmological patterns.47 In 
creating a hierarchical dependence between the realm of the cosmos and the world of men, 
astrology postulated a system of governance over the entire universe and its human 
participants. Whether at the level of the individual or the nation—genethlialogical or 
mundane—astrology sought to organize the world by measurable, observable rules and 
regulations. The universe, despite its seeming infinitude and diversity, and the humans within 
it can be arrayed by the fixed and perpetual patterns of the stars. The state of the world—its 
                                                        
45 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.3 (Robbins, 134).  
 
46 On climatological and environmental determinism (the influence of nature (physis) on human difference and 
behavior) in ancient literature, see Jonathan Hall, Hellenicity: 196-198; Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in 
Classical Antiquity, 55-109 (Isaac discusses the following authors: Herodotus, Pseudo-Hippocrates, Xenophon, 
Polybius, Vitruvius, Posidonius, Aristotle, Vegetius, Cicero, Livy, Strabo, Lucan, Pliny, Tacitus, Seneca, Caesar, 
Ptolemy); and Rosalind Thomas, Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 75-101. The notable texts are the late fifth-century pseudo-Hippocratic 
treatise, Airs, Waters, Places and Herodotus’ Histories, even though the latter privileges an investigation of culture 
over against environmental factors.  
 




geography, ethnography, climatology, etc.—is organized and comprehended at the 
macroscopic and microscopic levels through an investigation of the heavens.    
For Hippolytus, the astrologically inclined heretics not only pollute Christian teaching, 
via admixture with Chaldean and Greco-Roman error, they also undermine Christian notions 
of authority, knowledge, and sacred history. With the power of the horoscope, astrologers 
“could be seen as an independent means of discovering the future.”48 The astrological arts 
emphatically bound human fate to the power of the stars and seemed to produce an all-
encompassing schematization of causal determination for both individuals and nations. Not 
only did the art of astrology disrupt notions of human free will, it also lessened the 
omnipotence of the Christian God, who became subservient and secondary to the position of 
the stars. The depreciation of God’s omnipotence further included theories of astrological 
control over the particularities of human difference. The heretics embraced, by association, an 
organizational model of human diversity that was untenable for Christian writers and the 
Christian interpretation of scripture and sacred history.49 The astrologers’ inclusion of a 
systematic theory of human difference—a way of explaining both personal and communal 
characteristics throughout the world—garnered the attention of Hippolytus, who offered a 
sweeping and extremely detailed, though entirely borrowed, response. By engaging with the 
                                                        
48 Barton, Ancient Astrology, 72.  
 
49 On Christianity’s complex attitude toward astrology, see Tamsyn S. Barton, Power and Knowledge, 62-69; Barton, 
Ancient Astrology, 71-85; and Wolfgang Hübner, Zodiacus Christianus: Jüdisch-christliche Adaptionem des Tierkreises von 
der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Königstein: Beiträge zur Klassischen Phiologie, 1983). While astrology was most 
commonly linked with heretical thinking within the Christian intellectual tradition, authors as diverse as 
Sidonius Apollinaris, Origen, and Terullian (among others) seem to have allowed room for the astrologers to 
practice their skill and conceded that they had (or once had) wisdom and even wisdom of the future. Perhaps the 
most problematic hurdle for Christians to explain was the presence of the Magi in the Gospel of Matthew. Because 
the association between magi and astrology was altogether obvious, the Christian interpretations to undo the 
astrological presence were diverse and multifold. See Barton, Ancient Astrology, 76. A nice summarization of 
Augustine’s position, for instance, can be found in Thomas O’Loughlin, “The Development of Augustine the 
Bishop’s Critique of Astrology,” Augustinian Studies 30:1 (1999): 83-103.  
  
77 
ethnographic theory of astrological determinism— the theory that the positions of the zodiac 
causally conditioned human phenotypes, personalities, and attitudes—Hippolytus affixes his 
heresiological reasoning to a debate, in part, over the terms of ethnographic and macroscopic 
theorization.  
Hippolytus’s plan of attack against the astrologers focuses on the known particulars of 
their “τέχνη,” what Sextus terms “a method of attack at close quarters/at first causes/origins,” 
rather than a broadly construed conceptual denial of the celestial impact upon the terrestrial 
or the impossibility of a singularly fatalistic or pre-determined mode of existence.50 To dispel 
the authoritative prescience of the astrological art and the knowledge it claims to receive 
uniquely, Hippolytus forswears the very possibility of fixing the horoscope (“it is impossible to 
fix the horoscope”), which demolishes the entire astrological enterprise: “for from this are 
derived the rest of the cardinal points.”51 First, the obtainment of a horoscope depends upon 
the astrologers’ knowledge of the precise moment of an individual’s generation, whether from 
the moment of conception or physical birth (the two possible points from which the horoscope 
can be dated).52 Having dismissed the possibility of affixing the moment of conception, 
Hippolytus, quoting from Sextus verbatim, proceeds to frame the ascertainment of birth 
                                                        
50 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.2.3 (Marcovich, 93); Sextus, Math. V.49 (Bury, 342). See also Augustine, De Haeresibus LXX.1.13-
21 in S. Aurelii Augustini Pars XIII, ed. R. Vander Plaetse and C. Beukers, CCSL 46 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1969), 334.  
 
51 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.3. Tamsyn Barton, Power and Knowledge, describes quite succinctly the two “basic lines of 
argument [against astrology] from the second century B.C. to the Byzantine period. First, it is asked how it can be 
asserted that the physical or mental characteristics of a person depend on the configuration of the starts at birth 
or conception, when in fact the same bodily or mental traits are to a large extent found in all the members of one 
people, and, alternatively, the instances in which large numbers of people die at the same time, though they were 
born at different times, are brought up. The case of the destinies of twins serves frequently to illustrate the 
converse: How can two people under the same astral influence turn out so differently? Second, there are attacks 
on what the writers represent as the principles of astrogeography, insofar as it is concerned with astral influence 
on the inhabitants of particular regions…The apologists engage even less than their predecessors with the theory 
and practice of ‘scientific’ or savant astrology, though with better excuse that such research was seen as highly 
compromising” (65).  
 
52 Sextus, Math. V.55-67 (Bury, 344-350). 
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moment as equally fraught. Aside from wondering what exactly constitutes the moment of 
birth—“when the fetus begins to incline towards the orifice, or when it may project a little, or 
when it may be borne to the ground?”—Hippolytus defies any astrologer (via the midwife or 
the attendant) to pinpoint the moment of any of these three states of birth.53 But even if one 
granted them the ability to mark the moment of the child’s existence from physical birth or 
conception, the second fallacious link of the horoscope’s chain obviates the first. By the 
clanging of a metallic rim/gong, what Sextus calls the horologe, word of the child’s birth is 
transmitted to the astrologer who “from an elevated place is contemplating the stars.”54 But, as 
Hippolytus reminds his readers, just as there is a temporal lag between the descent of the axe 
and the tree’s fall, so too does time elapse between the moment the gong is struck and the 
sound reaches the astrologer. And in the interim, the position of the stars has changed. 
Thirdly, it is not at all easy, Hippolytus insists, to read the constellations of the sky, least of all 
because the position of the “rising star” will cohere with the horizontal position of the 
observer: “in one place its declination will be supposed to be the horoscope, and in another the 
ascension the horoscope….”55 
Each of the three steps in fixing the horoscope are described, scrutinized, and 
summarily dismissed. Having recounted and refuted the procedures undergirding the 
determination of the horoscope, Hippolytus next considers the astrologers’ predictive 
effective claims. Sextus Empiricus had distinguished two methods the Chaldeans deployed “in 
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54 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.4.4 (Marcovich, 96). 
 
55 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.5.1 (Marcovich, 97). The tripartite process of affixing the horoscope merely agglomerates a 




making their forecasts of the ‘effects.’”56 The first, which he terms the simpler effects, “are 
those which occur by reason of the Sign or the simple power of a star—as, for instance, that 
‘this particular star when it is in this particular Sign produces men of such and such a kind.’”57 
The causal paradigm correlates a single sidereal position with an individual’s disposition or 
character. The second, “more exact” paradigm examines a series of sidereal arrangements (a 
star’s position in the horoscope, the mid-heaven, and the anti-mid-heaven) to ascertain the 
precise anthropological effects. The difference lay in the degree of methodological 
sophistication, not in the effect’s claims; both astrological modes claim the same findings. 
Since it bears no relevance to his central contention against the folly of astrological 
anthropology or ethnography, Hippolytus reports that they proffer “an account concerning 
the action of the zodiacal signs, to which they say that the things (being) generated (therein) 
are assimilated” (οἷς φασι προσομοιοῦσθαι τὰ ἀποτικτόμενα).58  
A few chapters later in the Book IV, he returns to a discussion of astrological 
determinism and the portentous “art of divination” (μετωποσκοπικὴ μαντεία).59 Though 
Hippolytus uses yet a second term to categorize all forms of Greek speculation (μεριμνητής or 
those with an anxious mind), the anxiety of the astrologers corresponds precisely to the 
Chaldean art: 
There are some who ascribe to the stars figures that mold the ideas and 
dispositions of men, assigning the reason of this to births [that have taken 
place] under particular stars; they thus express themselves: those who are born 
under Aries will be of the following kind: long head, red hair, contracted 
eyebrows, pointed forehead, eyes grey and lively, drawn cheeks, long-nosed, 
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57 Sextus, Math. V.41 (Bury, 340). 
 
58 Hippolytus, Ref. V.6.1 (Marcovich, 98; altered from ANF). 
 




expanded nostrils, thin lips, tapering chin, wide mouth. These, he says, will 
partake of the following nature: cautious, subtle, perspicuous, prudent, 
indulgent, gentle, over-anxious, persons of secret resolves, fitted for every 
undertaking…they, in the majority of cases, end their days in a foreign land.60  
 
Hippolytus includes descriptive biological and dispositional accounts for each of the twelve 
signs of the zodiac. The text, unfortunately, is corrupt at the point at which Hippolytus 
ventures to conclude his foray into the deterministic holdings of the astrological signs. And 
while his consideration of the astrological arts owes to its prevalence among certain Christian 
sects, Hippolytus is nonetheless adamant that the astrologers propose a fundamentally flawed 
model to account for human diversity. As he reminds his readers, the claims of “sidereal 
influences themselves” are easily refuted:61 
For those who have been born at the same time do not spend the same life, but 
some, for example, have been made kings, and others have grown old in fetters. 
There has been born none equal, at all events, to Alexander the Macedonian, 
though many were brought forth along with him throughout the earth; [and] 
none equal to the philosopher Plato. Wherefore the Chaldean, examining the 
time of the birth in any particular latitude, will not be able to say accurately, 
whether a person born at this time will be prosperous.62 
 
While Hippolytus never himself systematically or concretely links astrology as a causative 
factor in ethnographic reasoning, he explicitly invokes, again quoting Sextus, the impossible 
confluence of ethnography, geography, and astrology. In other words, he posits that astrology, 
in a move beyond what Woolf had suggested with respect to Manilius, is not merely 
insufficiently capable of mapping the known world (that is, to function in lieu of geographic or 
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61 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.5.4 (Marcovich, 97). 
 
62 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.5.4 (Marcovich, 97); Sextus, Math. V.88 (Bury, 360). The passages are nearly identical, save for 




genealogical models), but its incapacity derives from its utter fraudulence.63 While Hippolytus 
directs his ire against genethlialogical astrology—the fixity of individual identity and life by 
means of the horoscope (instead of a more corporatized, mundane, astrology)—he is still 
contesting a model for explaining human difference, both phenotypically and dispositionally. 
The debate over astrology’s diminution of God’s power is not simply about fate and free will, 
rather, it engages the core of Christianity’s explanatory capacity: how do we conceptualize the 
natural world and how do we understand the human position within it? Astrology, both 
individually and communally, hews to a false narrative and false powers. The principle at stake 
is one of macroscopic theorization. Hippolytus is telling a story of Christianity’s control over 
the contours of the world, its nature, its sectarianism, and the human condition. In order to 
produce his own genealogical narrative, built around Genesis and other sources, he must clear 
away competing thought systems.  
Indeed, since the qualities of the individual born under Virgo are in no way related to 
the zodiac’s name, the ethnographic determinism of the entire paradigm collapses under 
scrutiny: 
For, according to them, it is not possible for an Ethiopian to be born in Virgo; 
otherwise he would allow that such a one is white, with long straight hair and 
the rest. But I am rather of opinion, that the ancients imposed the names of 
received animals upon certain specified stars, for the purpose of knowing them 
better, not from any similarity of nature.64 
                                                        
63 Unlike Hippolytus, who merely glosses the fraudulence, Empiricus clarifies the process by noting three orders 
of distinction: (1) heavenly and earthly creatures are fundamentally incompatible; (2) merely because the stars 
that compose the sign of Leo happen to look like a Lion does not necessitate a physical or biological relation 
between the cosmic shape and the human figure; (3) It is entirely possible that the name Leo was chosen simply 
“for the sake of clearness in exposition,” since the description of some of the zodiacs seems a forced resemblance 
(Sextus, Math. V.98 [Bury, 364-66]). As Sextus further remarks, “so it is not reasonable that life is ordered 
according to the motions of the stars; or if it is reasonable, certainly it is beyond our comprehension” (Sextus, 
Math. V.95 [Bury, 364]). 
 
64 For the same passage from Sextus, Math.V.102 (Bury, 366-8): “And again, if he who has the Virgin for horoscope 




What is striking about Hippolytus’ argument here is the terms on which it proceeds and its 
larger import for his text as a whole. Indeed, the entirety of his Refutatio explicitly analogizes 
the theorizations and practices of the Celtic Druids, Babylonian astrologers, Assyrian 
numerologists, Indian Brahmans, Jewish prophets, and Greek philosophers with the now 
burgeoning world of Christian heresy. Not only do the heresies readily and freely appropriate 
from these cultural elites, but they also function as their intellectual kin. The heretics are the 
most recent illustration of diversity within the known world. By proposing a precise 
intellectual and conceptual correspondence between these two categories of knowledge 
practitioners, Hippolytus fashions a world that is now marked by its Christian, and indeed, 
heretical character. At the same time, the substance of his argument turns upon an analysis of 
the macroscopic facets of ethnographic theorization. His refutation of a particular heretical 
appropriation—the incorporation of astrological knowledge into Christian tradition—becomes 
a debate about the legitimacy of certain paradigms for understanding the nature and causes of 
human diversity. And while Hippolytus eventually offers his own model for understanding 
human diversity, built upon certain biblical precedents, most notably Genesis 11, his text blurs 
the distinction between heretical etiologies and human, cultural, religious, and ethnic 
etiologies. In rejecting the work of the astrologers and astrologically inclined heretics, 
Hippolytus conceives his heresiology as a text that tries to identify and thus explain the root 
causes of philosophical, religious, and ethnic diversity of thought, practice, and custom. 
Astrological determinism does not tell the story of human difference that Hippolytus himself 
wishes to articulate. The task of explaining the rise of the heretics emerges as an altogether 
natural outgrowth of Christian efforts to categorize and organize the intellectual and cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
horoscope, else they will be granting that an Ethiopian is white, bright-eyed and straight-haired, which is of all 
things the most absurd.” 
  
83 
world around them. Even in dismissing certain principles of knowledge, we see clear evidence 
here of the textual mechanisms by which Christians appropriated and applied the logic, 
techniques, and paradigms of ancient ethnographic discourse. In contesting heretical theories 
of human difference, Hippolytus is engaged in a dispute over macroscopic ethnography: he is 
thinking ethnographically.  
 
Etiologies Transformed: Hereticizing Mythology, Cosmology, and Human Behavior 
 
Although the primary avenues of errancy down which the heretics travel were 
philosophical, astrological, and genealogical (both intellectually and biologically), Book V of 
the Elenchos posits another source of these doctrinal machinations. The book begins with a 
brief explanation of its contents65: it will enumerate the heresies of the Naasseni, the Peratae, 
the Sethians, and the tenets of a certain Justinus. And while the charge leveled against the 
Naasseni concerns their dependence on the philosophical systems of the Phrygians, Thracians, 
Assyrians, and Egyptians, the opinions offered by the heresiarch Justinus are of a curiously 
different kind; they proceed, contends Hippolytus, “from the marvelous tales of Herodotus the 
historiographer” (ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν Ἡροδότου τοῦ ἱστοριογράφου τερατολογιῶν).66 Having 
abandoned the holy books, Justinus is accused of appropriating the “legendary accounts 
prevalent among the Greeks” (τὰ παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι μυθευόμενα διηγούμενος) and using them as 
models for his own doctrinal positions on “the generation of the universe” (εἰς τὴν τῶν ὅλων 
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γέννησιν), angelology, and anthropology.67 Hippolytus, expressing a familiarity with Justinus’ 
now lost book Baruch, expounds that the heretic transposed the legendary account of Heracles’ 
sexual relations with the half-woman, half-serpent Echidna,68 mother of Agathyrsus, Gelonus, 
and Scythes, into an allegory of cosmic creation and arrangement and the role of Christ in that 
process. In the Histories itself, Heracles’ sexual encounter with Echidna is one of three accounts 
Herodotus offers to trace the origins of the Scythian land and its inhabitants. Purportedly 
conveyed by the Greeks of Pontus, the legend posits that Scythes, the youngest child of 
Heracles’ sexual encounter with Echidna, received the right to stay “in the country now called 
Scythia,” because he alone possessed the skill to draw the bow of Heracles and don his father’s 
vessel-tipped girdle.69 And “from Scythes [son] of Heracles,” reports the Halicarnassian, “is 
born the whole line of the kings of Scythia (τοὺς αἰεὶ βασιλέας γινομένους Σκυθέων).70 Though 
Herodotus himself places stock in the third of the three traditions of Scythia—that the 
Scythians fled Asia on account of their conflict with the Massagetae and displaced the 
Cimmerians from their ancestral land (which is renamed Scythia)—and rejects the myth of 
Heracles and Echidna, Hippolytus explicitly glosses the story’s latter half (and its larger 
                                                        
67 Hippolytus, Ref. V.23.1; 25.4 (Marcovich, 198; 200). 
 
68 Though she is described without the proper name Echidna in both Hippolytus’s summary and in Herodotus’ 
Histories, both texts employ the adjective ἕχιδναν/ἐχίδνης to describe this hybrid creature. 
 
69 Herodotus, Histories IV.8, ed. and trans. A.D. Godley, Loeb Classical Library 118 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 206. The account also serves to explain why “the Scythians carry vessels on their girdles 
to this day” (Hist. IV.10), tracing a contemporary practice to its mythic origin. See Rosaria Vignolo Munson, Telling 
Wonders (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 240; François Hartog, “Where is Scythia,” in The Mirror of 
Herodotus, 12-33. 
 




context), excising the narration’s relevance for the foundation of the Scythians’ ancestral line, 
in order to begin his discussion of Justinus’ heretical appropriation straightaway.71 
Though Hippolytus brackets Justinus’ cosmological narrative with condemnatory 
rhetoric and a meager and dismissive refutation, he recounts the narrative itself without 
overtly polemicizing its content.72 What the presbyter lists is a complex and at times 
confounding sequence of events, in which Justinus uses the hierarchy of the creative agents of 
the universe to uncover the true condition of humanity and its creators. Embedded within 
Justinus’ admixture of Herodotus, sacred oaths, and other non-scriptural material is a history 
of the universe and its creation, the origins of Christianity, and an etiology of sexual and 
marital practices, which Justinus elucidates through his concomitantly literal and allegorical 
exegesis of the cosmological narrative. The universe, according to Justinus, is governed by 
three unbegotten principles: the Good One known as Priapus, the Father called Elohim, who 
lacks foresight and is invisible (ἀπρὀγνωστος <καὶ ἄγνωστος>), and the female named Edem, 
who is of two minds and two bodies—the cosmological equivalent of the serpentine Echidna.73 
Ensnared by each other, Edem and Elohim copulate and produce twenty-four angels (twelve 
paternal and twelve material). The angels in toto represent paradise, which is depicted as the 
conjugal joy of Edom and Elohim, and each is fashioned allegorically as a tree of the garden in 
                                                        
71 Herodotus, Hist. IV.11 (Godley, 210). Hippolytus, Ref. V.25.4 (Marcovich, 200). “But after these details, a lengthy 
account [follows] from Herodotus, farewell, however, to it for now” (μακρὸς δὲ ὁ μετὰ ταῦτα μῦθος Ἡροδότῳ, 
χαιρέτω δὲ τὸ νῦν). 
 
72 Cf. the polemical commentary one finds embedded in Epiphanius’ descriptions. Hippolytus tends to bracket the 
doctrines he outlines from his refutation of them. Of course, since Hippolytus remains our lone extant source 
about Justinus and his opinions, it may well be that the very style and content of Hippolytus’s retelling is 
explicitly misleading and implicitly polemical. 
 




Paradise.74 The angels receive “the most beautiful earth,” which is, “from the parts [of Edem] 
above the groin of human form and from gentle parts” (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ βουβῶνα ἀνθρωποειδῶν 
καὶ ἡμέρων χωρίων), out of which they fashion mankind (τὸν ἄνθρωπον);75 the lower parts of 
Echidna, those resembling a snake, generate the animal kingdom.76 Elohim, having completed 
the creation, ascends “to the elevated parts of heaven,” where he discovers the Good One, the 
Lord above him, who charges him to stay in the highest reaches, assigning Edem reign over the 
earth.77 The maternal angels are then divided into four principles, and each principle is 
represented as a river of the οἰκουμένη.78 The angels, who manage (διέπουσι) the world with a 
satrap-like authority as agents of Edem, alternating their rule, release the evils of famine and 
disease upon the world in accordance with the will of Edem.79 Heartbroken by her separation 
from Elohim, Edem further orders the angel Babel (also known as Venus) “to cause adulteries 
and dissolutions of marriages among men,” so that humanity can experience her own marital 
pains.80 Baruch, one of Elohim’s angels, is sent to paradise to insist that man ignore Naas (the 
                                                        
74 Baruch, the third of the paternal angels, is the tree of life. Naas, the third of the maternal angels, is the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil. 
 
75 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.7 (Marcovich, 202). 
76 In the process of creation, Edem bestowed a soul upon Adam and Eve, while Elohim gave them a spirit. 
Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.9 (Marcovich, 202). 
 
77 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.14 (Marcovich, 204). 
 
78 Pheison, Geōn, Tigris, and Euphrates (Φεισὼν καὶ Γεὼν καὶ Τίγρις καὶ Εὐφράτης). Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.11 
(Marcovich, 203). 
 
79 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.11 (Marcovich, 203). “And when Pheison holds sway over places, famine, distress, and 
affliction prevail in that part of the earth, for the arrangements of these angels is miserly. Similarly also there 
belong to each part of the four, according to the power and nature of each, evil times and hosts of diseases. And 
continually, according to the dominion of each fourth part, this stream of evil, just like a current of rivers, 
careers, according to the will of Edem, uninterruptedly around the world. And from some cause of this 
description has arisen the necessity of evil” (Ref. V.26.13 [Marcovich, 203). 
 
80 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.20 (Marcovich, 204-5). Naas is tasked with punishing “the spirit of Elohim, the one which is 
in men (V.26.20)” in order that Elohim through the spirit might be punished for having deserted his spouse, in 




malicious maternal angel), who has sexually debauched both Adam and Eve (introducing 
adultery, again, and sodomy). Baruch implores Adam and Eve to refrain from eating of the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil, which represents Naas himself.81 While through punishment 
and transgression Naas repeatedly chastens humanity’s spirit (and by fiat Elohim), Baruch 
insists that humanity must follow the remaining eleven (paternal) angels of Edem, “who 
possess passions, but are not guilty of transgression.”82 
Justinus’ morality play, wherein the rise of vices and virtues is attached to cosmic 
fighting and the introduction of the cause of evil (bound, so it seems, to the spirit of the Father 
within humans), serves as background to the process by which the Good One attempts to 
redirect the gaze of humanity toward himself. Naas perpetually thwarts Baruch’s efforts to 
convince generations of supposed divine adherents (Moses and the biblical prophets, most 
notably) to follow the precepts of Elohim and to return to the Good One. As this cyclical game 
of instruction and disruption persists, Elohim chooses Heracles, an uncircumcised prophet, to 
free the spirit of the Father from wickedness imposed by its maternal angelic captives. The 
twelve labors of Heracles are allegorized as divinely sanctioned efforts to defeat the angels of 
the spirit’s captivity. Having “divest[ed] him of his power,” the maternal angels ultimately foil 
Heracles’ efforts to propel the commands of Baruch into the earthly world below.83 It is only 
during the reign of Herod that Baruch finds a prophet who can resist the enticements of the 
angels. Jesus, son of Joseph and Mary, obeyed Baruch and directed humanity to the exalted 
Father and Priapus. Naas, enraged at Jesus’ faithfulness to the Father and his message, “caused 
                                                        
81 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.7 (Marcovich, 202). 
 
82 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.22 (Marcovich, 205). 
 




him to be crucified.”84 Justinus further asserts, according to Hippolytus, that a number of Greek 
legends (Leda and the swan, Ganymede and the eagle, Danae and gold) are all allegorized tales 
of the cosmological events he has just enumerated. Inasmuch as Hippolytus charges Justinus 
with borrowing from Herodotus, Justinus holds the opposite: he enlightens the truth of Greek 
μῦθος. 
Although Hippolytus’ condensed version of Justinus’ narrative lacks the ethnogenic 
details of Epiphanius’ Panarion, it operates, as we shall see momentarily, much the same as 
Epiphanius’ history of heresy. The account functions as an allegorical mechanism by which 
Greek legends can be subsumed within and explained by a (heretical) Christian cosmology. The 
systematic attempts of the pseudo-Gnostic Justinus (τὰ Ἰουστίνου τοῦ ψευδογνωστικοῦ 
ἐπιχειρήματα) to meld together heresy and legend, are decried by Hippolytus as an 
interpretive paradigm that blurs the genealogical and epistemological divisions he erects 
between revealed Christian opinion and the philosophical, astrological, and mythological 
conjecture of the nations.85 The implication, despite Hippolytus’s mostly temperate rhetoric, is 
that the philosophers (as the theological representatives par excellence of the nations) have no 
standing in the genealogy of Christian knowledge; that is, as both a source to be used and 
(potentially) to be elucidated, the philosophical reflections of the Greeks, Romans, 
Babylonians, Druids, and Indians exist wholly apart from the traditions of the Christian 
οἰκουμένη; the theological pursuits of the nations fundamentally fail to accord with an Adamic 
(in the case of Epiphanius) or Noahide (in the case of Hippolytus) lineage of divine knowledge 
                                                        
84 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.31 (Marcovich, 207). 
 




and devotion.86 As with philosophy, Greek legends are likewise disruptive and corrupting 
barriers to the stability and succession of the Christian epistemological boundaries, insofar as 
Justinus’ ability to read the truth out of Greek legends posits a meaningful relationship between 
the two categories or kinds of knowledge. Knowledge and its proper transmission erect and 
define the genealogical distinction between Christians and the nations, philosophers, 
astrologers, arithmeticians, mythologizers, and heretics.  
The heretics, furnished with their derivative opinions—even if those opinions serve to 
illuminate the true meaning of “antecedent” sources, tales, legends, etc.—further unsettle the 
ordering of Christian knowledge by introducing their own books (as repositories of prophecies, 
legends, exegesis, cosmologies) and founding their own schools (as pedagogical institutions), 
which generate an alternative history and experiential reality of Christian tradition.87 To allay 
his fears of widespread adoption of heretical opinions, Hippolytus similarly proposes that his 
readers ignore the heretics altogether. In making the case for blissful ignorance, the presbyter 
invokes the travails of Odysseus, who fended off the seductive and destructive voices of the 
Sirens by filling his companions’ ears with wax and binding himself to the mast of his ship.88 
With an overtly Christian emendation, Hippolytus marshals Odysseus’s shrewdness and 
resolve to promulgate his dictum: “And my counsel to my readers is to adopt a similar 
                                                        
86 Epiphanius, Panarion 2.4-5; 18.1.3 (Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl, GCS 25 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1915], 1:174-5; 215-6); 
Hippolytus, Ref. V.31.1-6 (Marcovich, 407-8). 
 
87 On Callixtus’s founding of a school see Hippolytus, Ref. IX.12.20, 25 (Marcovich, 354, 356). Irenaeus states that 
Valentinus founded a school and Cerdon had one as well (Adv. haer. I.27.2; 1.11.1, [Contre les hérésies, Livres I, ed. and 
trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 264 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979], 1:2:350; 1:2:167-170]). On 
schools in the Panarion, see Epiphanius 44.1.2; 46.2.4 (Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 31 [Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1980], 2:189-90, 2:206). On the heretics’ own books, see Hippolytus, Ref. V.14, 15, 22-24, 27; 
VII.37; VIII.19; IX.13, 15, 17 (Marcovich, 177-180, 181, 198-199, 208-209; 320; 338-9; 357-359, 360-1, 362-3). On the 
books of the heretics in Epiphanius see Pan. 26.8.1; 30.15.1; 38.2.4; 39.5.1; 40.2.1, 40.7.5; 45.4.1; 53.1.3; 62.2.4 (Holl, 
1:284, 352; Holl and Dummer, 2:66-67, 75, 82, 88, 202, 315). 
 




tactic…to smear their ears with wax and sail through the tenets of the heretics, not even 
listening to those [opinions] easily capable of enticing (them) toward pleasure, like the sweet-
toned song of the Sirens, or, by binding oneself to the Cross of Christ, obeying faithfully, not to 
be distracted....”89 The Greek legends, so it seems, have a Christian use after all. With both 
rewritten mythography and applied astrology, Hippolytus’ fear of the heretics emerges as a 
deep disquietude over alternative theories of organizing the universe and the people within it. 
The Christian conceptualization of the world, its macroscopic ordering and its microscopic 
materialization, remains firmly under attack by the hereticization of ethnographic knowledge.  
 
Hippolytus’ Master Narrative: The Birth of Heresy and Intellectual Genealogy 
 
Genealogy possesses a prominent hold over and function within heresiological 
literature, where writers use it paradigmatically to illustrate the deviation of the Christian 
heresies, the succession of orthodox Christianity, the antiquity and history of the church, and 
the proliferation of heterodox traditions.90 For Hippolytus, genealogy was the tool by which he 
could narrate the Christian vision of the world in all its detail and division, while also 
explaining the corrupting influence of the heresies. In his Refutatio, the rise of the nations (and 
their genealogy) explicitly attested the antiquity of “a nation of worshippers (the pious) of 
                                                        
89 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.13.3 (Marcovich, 280). 
 
90 For more on the genealogical and procreative language of early Christian authors see Denise Kimber Buell, Why 
This New Race, 63-93; Denise Kimber Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Caroline E. Johnson Hodge, If Sons, Then Heirs: A Study of Kinship and 
Ethnicity in the Letters of Paul (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007); Aaron Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in 
Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Susanna Elm, “The Polemical Use of 
Genealogies: Jerome’s Classification of Pelagius and Evagrius of Ponticus,” Studia Patristica 33 (1997): 311-8; 
Rebecca Lyman, “A Topography of Heresy: Mapping the Rhetorical Creation of Arianism,” in Arianism after Arius: 
Essays on the Development of Fourth Century Trinitarian Conflicts, ed. Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. Williams 




God” (τὸ τῶν θεοσεβῶν γένος) “more ancient than all Chaldeans, Egyptians, <and> Greeks.”91 
Christians, by becoming “friends of God,” had already grafted themselves onto the lineage of 
this nation of worshippers, the antediluvian devotees of God.92 The nation of worshippers 
(both before Noah and after Christ) was defined both positively and negatively: by its piety, on 
the one hand, and by not positing, on the other, overly complicated cosmologies, investing in 
astrological symbols and arithmetic equations, or philosophizing incessantly about the nature 
of God. The nations (τὰ ἔθνη), in contrast, who all trace their ancestry back to Javan, son of 
Japheth,93 not only remained affixed to a more recent (νεῶτερα) pedigree, as descendants of 
rather than precursors to Noah, they were likewise “related” by their devotion “to questions of 
philosophy” (τὰ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀπασχοληθέντα).94 Though Hippolytus never causally linked 
philosophy, astrology, idolatry, or magic with the emergence of the nations as Epiphanius 
explicitly did (as we shall see below), it is clear that he nonetheless defines and organizes the 
nations by their shared interest in cosmological and philosophical speculation. The “inability 
to find consensus concerning the deity” among the nations, which included the opinions of the 
natural, moral, and dialectical philosophers of Greece and the theological reflections of the 
Persian, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indian sages and astrologers (among others), further 
                                                        
91 Hippolytus, Ref. X.30.8 (Marcovich, 407). 
 
92 Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.6 (Marcovich, 408). Hippolytus explicitly circumvents his own call to explain the divine 
devotion of those who existed before Noah.  
93 Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.4-5 (Marcovich, 408). “How would the worshippers of God not be of greater antiquity than 
all the Chaldaeans, Egyptians, and Greeks, of whose father was born from this Japeth [receiving] the name Javan, 
from whom [also came] the Greeks and Ionians (πῶς οὐ προγενέστεροι ἦσαν <οἰ> θεοσεβεῖς πάντων Χαλδαίων, 
Αἰγυπτίων, Ἑλλήνων—ὧν πατὴρ ἐκ τούτου <τοῦ> Ἰάφεθ γεννᾶται, <τὸ> ὄνομα Ἰωύαν, ἐξ οὗ Ἕλληνες καὶ Ἴωνες;).  
 
94 Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.5-6 (Marcovich, 409). Their novelty, it is implied, also obviates the validity of their 




illustrates the disorder of their epistemological relationship with God.95 As with the Christian 
heretics, diversity of opinion attested divine alienation.96 Because philosophy operated as a 
barrier to understanding the truths of divinity and creation, Hippolytus ventured to explain 
God’s creative power in order “to elucidate those causes [of creation], which the Greeks, failing 
to understand, supposed in boastful rhetoric to be the parts of creation, while being ignorant 
of the creator.”97 The Greeks’ inability to grasp the truths of creation left them perpetually 
excluded from the lineage of the nation of worshippers.98 To join this ancient γένος 
(race/nation/clan), then, required instruction in God’s nature and creation, a lesson 
Hippolytus explicitly undertakes at the very end of his treatise.99 He appeals to the Greeks, 
Barbarians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Egyptians, Libyans, Indians, Ethiopians, Celts, and Latins as 
their advisor,100 a spiritual mentor of sorts, urging them to spurn the “fallacies of artificial 
discourse” and the “vain promises of plagiarizing heretics,” and instead embrace the truth and 
join the nation of worshippers of God.101  
                                                        
95 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.43.1 (Marcovich, 127). For a detailed discussion of the Brahmans in Greek and Rome 
literature and in the Elenchos in particular, see Guillaume Ducoeur, Brahmanisme et Encratisme à Rome au IIIe siècle 
ap. J.C: Etude d’Elenchos I, 14, 1-7 et VIII, 20, 1-3 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001), 69-177. 
 
96 See Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.10; III.1-4 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1:2:154-166; Contre les hérésies, Livres III, ed. and 
trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 211 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974], 3:2:20-53).  
 
97 Hippolytus, Ref. X.32.5 (Marcovich, 410). 
 
98 See Hippolytus, Ref. IV.43; X.6-8 (Marcovich, 127-129; 342-3). 
 
99 Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.6 (Marcovich, 408). 
 
100 In the Prooemium, Hippolytus describes himself as leading an investigation in “expounding the tenets of the 
several schools with minuteness,” which was begun and transmitted by the apostles (Ref. Pro. 5; Marcovich, 55). 
“But,” he continues, “we, as their successors, and as participators in this grace, high-priesthood, and office of 
teaching, as well as being reputed guardians of the Church, must not be found deficient in vigilance, or disposed 
to suppress correct doctrine” (Ref. Pro. 6 [Marcovich, 55]).  
 




The heretics, according to the Roman presbyter, are in truth imitators of the Greek 
philosophers and not practitioners or participants in the tradition of Christian truth.102 And 
though Epiphanius will charge the philosophical sects with sowing the seeds of idolatry, 
impiety, and godlessness, Hippolytus, who expends great energy and space elucidating the 
philosophical doctrines of Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, Empedocles, and Thales, among others, 
only haphazardly details the errors and confusion among them.103 In Book I of his Refutation of 
all heresies, for example, he surveys Greek, Druidic, Indian, and Babylonian philosophical 
doctrines with relative care and dispassion, never polemicizing or even contesting their 
validity; he simply narrates their opinions programmatically.104 Though as the text unfolds he 
                                                        
102 Debates about the true identity of Hippolytus, author of the Elenchos abound. Though they are largely 
irrelevant to the argument I am making here, I remain unconvinced by J.A. Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and 
West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) that Hippolytus 
was a scion of the East. See also the massive work of Allen Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third 
Century: Communities in Tension before the Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop (New York: Brill, 1995).  
 
103 Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, 
Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Ecphantus, Hippo, Socrates, Archelaus, Plato, Chrysippus, Zeno, Pyrrho the 
Brahmins among the Indians, the Druids among the Celts, and Hesiod all receive treatment. Though it may be 
implied, Hippolytus never outright suggests that Greek philosophical opinions were genealogically conditioned. 
The Prooemium of the work gestures explicitly at the errancy of the philosophers, though, again, it is 
contextualized and explained as an exercise of intellectual facilitation. There are instances in which Hippolytus 
challenges the philosophers directly—the riddles of Plato, for instance—but his ire is not homed toward the Greek 
philosophical tradition. He is content to push them aside, if only to focus his attention firmly on heterodox 
Christians. 
 
104 In the introduction to his critical edition of the Greek text, Marcovich explains that Book I—later referenced by 
Hippolytus himself as Τὰ Φιλοσοφούμενα (Ref. IX.8.2 [Marcovich, 343)—would come to exist independently as a 
Synopsis of Greek Philosophy. “It is not surprising,” explains Marcovich, “that this succinct and handy Synopsis of 
Greek Philosophy had been early separated from the rest of the Elenchos, most probably to serve as a textbook in 
philosophy. As a consequence, Book I has its own textual transmission” (1). For the doxographical record of 
Hippolytus see Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context; and Catherine Osborne, Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: 
Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics (London: Duckworth, 1987). The nearest literary kin may be the multi-
volume work of Diogenes Laertius, whose Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers showcases a markedly similar 
compulsion to chronicle and classify, which then reveals and posits expansive questions about the genesis, 
history, definition, and character of philosophy itself (Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 
I.1-21, vol. 1., ed. and trans. R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library 184 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925, 
2-22]. See also James Warren, “Diogenes Laërtius, Biographer of Philosophy,” in Ordering Knowledge in the Roman 
Empire, ed. James König and Tim Whitmarsh [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 133-149; and Allen 
Brent “Diogenes Laertius and the Apostolic Succession,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 44.3 [1993]: 367-389). Some 
Greek authors, explains Diogenes, ascribe the origins of philosophy to the barbarians. Dispassionately outlining 
the evidence of those advocates who trace “the different forms [philosophy] assumed in different countries”—
Persians with Magi, Babylonians/Assyrians with Chaldeans, Indians with Gymnosophists, and Celts/Gauls with 
  
94 
would add words of displeasure, bafflement (reading Mt. 10:5 as signifying that Christians 
“should not attend to the futile doctrines of the Gentiles” and linking the novelty of the 
nations with philosophical speculation), or outright disagreement, the harshness of his 
rhetoric is channeled almost exclusively toward the heretics.105 His detailing of philosophical 
opinions clearly emphasizes less the specific invalidity of those philosophical systems and 
doctrines and instead serves primarily to illustrate the theological and genealogical deviation 
of the heresiarchs. As the opening lines of the Proem argue, investigating the details and 
varieties of philosophical opinion reflects the derangement and danger of the heretics: “for 
even [the philosophers’] incoherent tenets must be received as reliable, on account of the 
excessive madness of the heretics (ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῶν αἱρετικῶν μανίαν).”106 The theological 
ignorance, philosophical speculation, and astrological misguidance of the nations, inasmuch as 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Druids—Diogenes neither directly disputes the truthfulness of the evidence nor contests its specific claims (Lives 
I.6 [Hicks, 6-8]). Instead, he simply asserts that, “these authors forget that the achievements which they attribute 
to the barbarians belong to the Greeks, with whom not merely philosophy but the human race itself began” (Lives 
I.3 [Hicks, 4]). For Diogenes philosophy has a precisely Greek genealogy, the origins of which are traced via 
successional lists (διαδοχαὶ) to the Ionian school of Thales, a Milesian, and the Italian line begun by Pythagoras 
(Lives I.13-14 [Hicks, 14]). The genetic purity of the philosophical tradition, elaborated with biographical and 
doxographical details, compels his fellow Greeks (who incidentally supply the entirety of Diogenes’ information 
about the barbarians’ philosophies) to reclaim the primacy of their own philosophical icons within a Greek 
intellectual narrative (See Warren, “Diogenes Laërtius,” 141-142). Though on occasion philosophers who are 
unattested in the succession lists of the prologue disrupt his genetic thesis, the structure of philosophical 
succession via instruction remains integral to his mapping the history of philosophy (Lives I.13-15 [Hicks, 14-16]. 
Here Diogenes enumerates the successive lines of the Ionian and Italian schools [without any doctrinal 
elaboration]. But, as Warren observes, “the Cyrenaics, the Megarians, Empedocles, Pyrrho, Timon, and the 
Pyrrhonists and those philosophers Diogenes himself labels ‘scattered’ or ‘ungrouped’ [οἱ σπορἀδην (8.91, 9.20)], 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus, do not appear in these lists but all figure in the Lives” [141-142]).  
 
105 Hippolytus, Ref. V.23.1 (Marcovich, 198). A prime example of this tendency to criticize the philosophers 
dismissively and cursorily can be found in Book V. As Hippolytus begins his discussion of the Naasseni, he 
recapitulates the theme of philosophical dependence, inserting a brief assertion of the value of these 
philosophical opinions: “For from philosophers the heresiarchs deriving start-points, [and] like cobblers patching 
together, according to their own particular interpretation, the blunders of the ancients, have advanced them as 
novelties to those that are capable of being deceived, as we shall prove in the following books” (Ref. V.6.2, 
[Marcovich, 140]). 
 
106 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 1 (Marcovich, 54; altered from ANF). For more on the madness of the heretics see 
Hippolytus, Ref. IX.12, 17 on the Elchasaites (Marcovich, 350-6, 362-3). For the madness of the astrologers, to 




they are tepidly contested, are juxtaposed rather strikingly with the irrationality and 
contagion of the heretics.107 For Hippolytus, the philosophers garner attention in their capacity 
as a resource for heretical leaders, who, in turn, duplicitously and secretively despoil the 
teachings of Christ by altering the “evangelical and saving doctrine” of true Christianity.108 The 
heretics not only alter apostolic teachings, but they appropriate and refashion the “novel” 
opinions of the philosophers under the guise of Christian truth. And although Hippolytus 
expends the first two books of his Elenchos detailing the opinions of the philosophers and 
astrologers, the substance of their opinions is, in some sense, immaterial to his argument. It is 
the very idea of introducing anything foreign into the realm of Christian truth that destroys the 
tradition of the nation of worshippers. In fashioning themselves as teachers and purveyors of 
Christian truth, the heretics “act despitefully” toward the legacy and tradition of the disciples, 
which Hippolytus guards as a successor of the apostles.109 
In deriving their opinions from the philosophers, the heresiarchs attach themselves to 
a distinctly different theological and intellectual tradition. “Being parts of astrological 
discovery and the arithmetical arts of the Pythagoreans” (ὅντα μέρη ἀστρολογικῆς ἐφευρέσεως 
καὶ ἀριθμητικῆς Πυθαγορείου) the doctrines of the heresies are “invalid and far removed from 
the knowledge that is in accordance with religion” (ὄντα ἄκυρα καὶ μακρὰν τῆς κατὰ 
                                                        
107 The association between illness and heresy reaches its apex under Epiphanius of Salamis and his Panarion or 
medicine chest. The text articulates itself as a balm to the disease of heresy. I shall discuss his usage of this 
rhetoric in chapters two and four.  
 
108 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.19.9 (Marcovich, 286). The language is more vicious and direct in Tertullian’s De 
Praescriptione Haereticorum, 7 (Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. R.F. Refoulé, SC 46 [Paris: Éditions du 
Cerf, 1957]). 96), where he excoriates the philosophers for enabling the fanciful theorizations of the Christian 
heretics: “For worldly wisdom culminates in philosophy with its rash interpretation of God’s nature and purpose. 
It is philosophy that supplies the heresies with their arms” (7.2-3, Ipsae denique haereses a philosophia subornantur). 
See also Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.14 (Contre les hérésies, Livres II, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, 
SC 294 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982], 2:2:130-147). 
 




θεοσέβειαν γνώσεως).110 Hippolytus begins and ends his Elenchos with the same underlying 
proposition: the heresies have grafted themselves onto the historically later and (theologically 
inadequate) opinions of the philosophers, astrologers, and arithmeticians, who belong to an 
entirely different genealogy of knowledge.111 Hippolytus’ capacious definition of philosophy 
similarly cordons off the pedagogical contributions of the nations. Truth owes nothing to the 
“wisdom of the Greeks,” the doctrinal tenets of the Egyptians, the incoherent fallacies and 
curiosities of the Chaldeans, nor anything to the astonishment and demonism of the 
Babylonians.112 The uncovering of the heretics’ dependence upon the philosophers—Basilides 
upon Aristotle,113 Marcus upon Pythagoras,114 Marcion upon Empedocles,115 the Docetists from 
the Sophists,116 Monoïmus from Pythagoras,117 Noetus from Heraclitus,118—upends the very idea 
of being Christian. Precisely because the philosophical theories of Pythagoras and Plato, who 
                                                        
110 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.52.1 (Marcovich, 272; altered from ANF). 
 
111 Buell, Making Christians, again observes this phenomenon with respect to Clement of Alexandria. She argues 
that “Clement’s contention that some Christians such as Valentinus and Basilides distort some original Christian 
truth and unity proceeds from his allegation that so-called heretics have broken or distorted the genealogy of 
Christian knowledge. Clement claims that other Christians, such as Marcion, Prodikos, and “those like them” (toi 
homoioi), did not understand the true tradition that they had in fact received, and hence distorted and added to it, 
thereby producing heresy in the name of continuing the tradition (Strom. 7.103.6-7). He can accuse them of being 
prideful dissenters from one true unified stream of Christian tradition” (88). 
112 Hippolytus, Ref. X.5.1-2 (Marcovich, 380). “But the definition of the truth is constituted after the manner in 
which every true definition is, namely, as simple and unadorned. A definition such as this, provided it is made 
manifest, will of itself refute error. And although we have very frequently propounded demonstrations about it, 
and with sufficient fullness elucidated for those willing to learn the rule of the truth; yet even now, after having 
discussed all the opinions put forward by the Greeks and heretics, we have decided it not be at all events 
unreasonable to introduce, as a sort of finishing stroke to the nine books of the present work, this demonstration 
throughout the tenth book” (Ref. X.5.1-2 [Marcovich, 380]). 
 
113 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.14-21, 24 (Marcovich, 280-8, 293-4). 
 
114 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.52 (Marcovich, 272-6). 
 
115 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.29-31 (Marcovich, 304-314).  
 
116 Hippolytus, Ref. VIII.11 (Marcovich, 330). 
 
117 Hippolytus, Ref. VIII.15 (Marcovich, 335). 
 




“derived [their] tenets originally from the Egyptians, and introduced their novel opinions 
among the Greeks,” were appropriated by the heretical leader Valentinus, Hippolytus charges 
that his heresy and its line of succession existed and operated outside the successive tradition 
of Christianity119: “And from this [system of Pythagoras and Plato], not from the gospels, 
Valentinus, as we have proved, has collected the [materials of] heresy—I mean his own 
[heresy]—and may therefore justly be reckoned a Pythagorean and Platonist, not a 
Christian.”120 Once the philosophical veneer of the heresies has been revealed, their disciples 
and devotees become nothing more than mere gentiles (ἐθνικοί), “naked and shameful, 
(γυμνοὺς καὶ ἀσχήμονας),” whom Christ “will in no way profit.”121 Though Hippolytus 
explicitly gestures at the association between the heretics and pagan intellectual culture—the 
latter of which corrupts and is corrupted by the heretics—his text does not cover a 
systematically thorough narrative of this doctrinal cross-pollination. It is telling, indeed, that 
Epiphanius, to whom the genre of heresiology is most commonly associated, seized on the 
insights of Hippolytus (and Irenaeus of Lyons) to offer a far broader analysis of the history and 
genealogy of sectarianism. In the process of amplifying and expanding Hippolytus’ inchoate 
and implicit theory of heretical origins, Epiphanius situates the diversification of heresy 
within a universal narrative of pious orientation and the rise of corporate identity.  
 
Conclusion: Contesting Contours and Uniting Humanity 
 
                                                        
119 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.21.3 (Marcovich, 229).  
 
120 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.29.1 (Marcovich, 237; altered from ANF). 
 
121 Hippolytus, Ref. Pro. 11; VII.19.9; VII.19.9 (Marcovich, 56, 286; altered from ANF).  
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Of the multiplicity of grounds on which Christians honed their history, models of 
creation and, by extension, theories of human difference emerged as an especially fraught site 
of contestation. Although the heresiologists chastised the heretics for any number of 
perceived transgressions, I have highlighted astrology and cosmography (and/or 
mythography) to illustrate the macroscopic ethnographic hue of heresiological literature. 
Clearing away the brush of fallacious heretical theorization enabled the heresiologists, most 
especially Epiphanius, to elaborate a unified theory of human history as a history of 
sectarianism, in which human and sectarian difference become conjoined phenomena. 
Heresiological texts, in contesting certain heretical theories and expounding other “orthodox” 
schematizations, harness the power of the ethnographic to rationalize the world in distinctly 
Christian terms. The corollary to the purported universalism of Christianity (or, in an earlier 
guise, Rome) is a supreme discomfort with the shared humanity of all the world’s people. Paul 
Veyne explains the phenomenon:  
The ancients knew that, in theory, humanity was one, but they did not want to 
know it. How long had they known it? How long had men thought that all 
humans belonged to one and the same species—Greeks and barbarians, free men 
and slaves? Classical philology has constructed an entire hagiographical novel 
on that question. It praises Cicero or Seneca for speaking of the ‘common 
society of the human race’ (Cicero De finibus 3.19.62); it honors the Stoics for 
their so-called universalism; at times it affirms that, before those philosophers, 
the Greeks held the slave or the barbarian to be nonhuman; it sees in Terences’ 
famous “homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto” (“I am a man, I count nothing 
human foreign to me”) one of the great moments in history. Such is the tenacity 
of the idealistic—or rather the academic—illusion that confounds the reality of 
history with the image of that reality in the mirror of classical texts.122 
 
By insisting on the unity of humankind, Christianity articulated a shared human nature even 
as it works to thrust outward and rationalize oppositional parties. Macroscopic ethnography 
paradigms facilitated the development of a master narrative of human unity in which the 
                                                        
122 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans,” in The Romans, ed. Andrea Giardina, trans. Lydia G. 
Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 345-6. 
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stages of human evolution and devolution were explained through the language of heresy. And 
while the desire to situate heresy within an ethnographic narrative of human fracture signals 
the potential for Christian reunification, it also asserts a literary routinization of knowledge 
about the world at large.  
In turning to the work of Epiphanius and Theodoret in the next chapter, I contend that 
heresiology functions as an ethnographic map of heresy and humanity by blurring the 
distinction between the two. Heresiology was no mere repository of heretical knowledge: its 
seeming narrowness encompassed a much wider intellectual and cultural perspective. By 
projecting an ordered, comprehensive systemization into the history and heterogeneity of the 
known world, the heresiologists give it an irrepressible Christian structure. Heresiologists 
composed a portrait of a decidedly Christian world, written in the language of heresy, in which 
ethnographic knowledge supplies the very conditions and terms for human consolidation and 









In the eighteenth century, the continuity of nature is a requirement of all natural history, 
that is, of any effort to establish an order in nature and to discover general categories 
within it, whether they be real and prescribed by obvious distinctions or a matter of 
convenience and quite simply a pattern produced by our imagination. Only continuity 









If the primary aim of heresiological literature was didactic (polemical didacticism, as 
was often the case), the process of theological instruction via description and disputation of 
contrarian opinion took the form of classificatory literature.2 Later heresiologists in particular, 
those texts of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, demonstrated their knowledge 
                                                        
1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 147. 
 
2 On classification in late antique Christianity, see Philip Wood, “Classification in a Christian Empire,” in ‘We have 
no king but Christ: Christian Political Thought in Greater Syria on the Eve of the Arab Conquest (c. 400-585) (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 21-37 and Scott Fitzgerald Johnson, The Life and Miracles of Thekla: A Literary Study 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 171-220. Johnson’s analysis in Chapter Four pertains to 
paradoxography or literary collections and miscellanies. As he explains, “first attested in the third century BC, 
paradoxography was closely associated with the ethnographic current of ancient historical writing and was, 
consequently, associated with Herodotus and somewhat at odds with the political history of Thucydides and 
Xenophon” (174). He discusses the work of Callimachus of Cyrene (Collection of Wonders from the Whole Earth 
Arranged by Locality) and Antigonus (Collection of Marvelous Researches), and traces the genre’s various 
preoccupations and emphases (as guided tours through the wonders of the world). He also demonstrates, 
moreover, the influence of paradoxography on later literary collections can be seen in the works of Pliny the 
Elder, Aulus Gellius, Athenaeus, and various Christian writers, including Clement, Origen, Jerome, and Eusebius. 
On the banality of heresiological literature, see Frances Young, “Did Epiphanius Know What He Meant by 
Heresy?,” Studia Patristica 17.1 (1982): 199-205, and Averil Cameron’s response in “How to Read Heresiology,” 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 33:3 (2003): 471-492. On heresiology’s utility as a source of philosophical 





through catalogues of heretics.3 At the same time, heresiology’s content not only probed the 
most minute details of heretical opinion and praxis, the ethnographic “data” of early Christian 
writers, but the genre also harnessed this burgeoning knowledge to contemplate the genesis of 
Christian and human difference. Heresiology mapped, as it were, two interdependent and fluid 
facets of Christian knowledge: the particular habits and customs of the heretics and the 
causative mechanisms of this diversity. The impulse to produce a seemingly exhaustive, 
though trope-laden, account of sects and heresies is a decisive act of (re)presentation that 
binds the utility of heretical information to an array of loftier intellectual pursuits: the 
exposition of universal and ecclesiastical histories, the ordering of classes of knowledge, the 
defining of the parameters of Christian pedagogy, and the production of Christian 
ethnographic language.4  
To that end, heresiology is best thought of as an instantiation of intellectual mapping, 
much like uncritical ethnography of medieval and early modern Europe (and at times, the 
parallels with critical ethnography of the twentieth century), wherein the world is organized 
by a decidedly Christian orientation.5 Heresiology charts an intellectual world that is built 
                                                        
3 See Brent D. Shaw, “Who Were the Circumcellions?” in Vandals, Romans and Berbers: New Perspectives on Late 
Antique North Africa, ed. A.H. Merrills (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 227-258. I shall return to the subject of 
heresiological form, namely the list, in Chapter five when I discuss Augustine’s vastly underappreciated De 
Haeresibus. 
 
4 On encyclopedia and heresiology, see Richard Flower, “Genealogies of Unbelief: Epiphanius of Salamis and 
Heresiological Authority” in Unclassical Traditions. Volume II: Perspectives from East and West in Late Antiquity, ed. 
Christopher Kelly, Richard Flower and Michael Stuart Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
70-87. While much of Flower’s article is persuasive—and offers an incisive reading of Epiphanius, which 
complement my own—he does fail to expound the very complex notion of encyclopedism in antiquity (he 
assumes its existence and generic integrity). Indeed, the very idea has long been subject to scrutiny. The debate is 
particularly acute in the Byzantine tradition, which attests the largest corpus of so-called encyclopedias. For the 
contours of the debate, see the recent volume by Peter Van Deun and Caroline Macé, eds., Encyclopedic Trends in 
Byzantium? Proceedings of the International Conference held in Leuven, 6-8 May 2009. Orientalia Lovaniensia analecta 212 
(Leuven:  Peeters, 2011).  
 
5 One of the most intriguing implications for Christianized ethnography concerns its capacity to expand the scope 
of sacred history and missionary activity. Ethnographic analysis enabled Christians to claim a wider theological 
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upon cosmological, theological, geographical, ecclesiastical, ritualistic, and exegetical 
principles. By situating the rise and spread of Christianity within a discourse of ethnographic 
investigation, wherein Christian authors strove to survey the contents of their own world, 
they concurrently contemplated and theorized about the very merits and possibility of doing 
so. The problem of human and religious diversity is thus framed as both a theoretical 
question—how did the world become so diverse, and how did Christianity itself become so 
diverse (and what are the parallels between the two)—and a practical matter, an analysis of 
customs “on the ground,” insofar as they represent habituated and entrenched diversity. 
As I will argue in this chapter, heresiology of Epiphanius of Salamis collapsed (or simply 
analogized) the distinction between ethnic or cultural diversity, on the one hand, and religious 
diversity, on the other; thus the history of Christianity became the history of the world and the 
world’s manifest and multifold divisions. The process of organizing the multitude of diversity 
within the world and elucidating its origins, causes, and contours revealed the textual and 
epistemological limits of the human efforts to rationalize and comprehend these differences. 
In coordinating their understandings of human diversity in terms of Christian diversity (and 
vice versa), Christian heresiologists posit that diversity is symptomatic of an endemic 
epistemological hubris (emerging out of a newly oriented communalized world), which 
persistently disrupts the divine-human relationship. The Christian aspiration to construct the 
foundation and contours of an increasingly Christian world finds an especially salient 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and missionary reach. For that particular phenomenon, see the fantastically fun essay by Scott G. Bruce, 
“Hagiography as Monstrous Ethnography: A Note on Ratramnus of Corbie’s Letter Concerning the Conversion of 
the Cynocephali,” in Insignis Sophiae Arcator: Medieval Latin Studies in Honor of Michael Herren on His 65th Birthday, ed. 
Gernot R. Wieland, Carin Ruff, and Ross G. Arthur (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 45-56; and Ian Wood, “‘The Ends of 
the Earth’: The Bible, Bibles, and the Other in Early Medieval Europe,” in The Calling of the Nations: Exegesis, 
Ethnography, and Empire in a Biblical-Historic Present (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 200-216. 
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encapsulation in the production and perpetuation of heresiological writing.6 While the 
heretics were portrayed by the heresiologists as deviations from a normative theological and 
apostolic center, they served a vital function in the narrative of Christian ascension.7 Not only 
were heretics emblems of temptation and trial, but they also became the conceptual 
playthings around which Christian ethnographic writing and theorization of the world’s 
diversity were coordinated. In this chapter, I am concerned with the Christian interpretation 
and deployment of macroscopic theories of ethnographic analysis: how Christian writers 
engaged the genesis and perpetuation of heresy in explicitly ethnographic terms. The capacity 
of ethnographic analysis to create and advance a comprehensive system of the world—to 
articulate a worldview—held enormous potential for Christian authors of late antiquity. To 
theorize the Christian world and to make the world Christian was a thoroughly ethnographic 
endeavor.   
To make my argument I have chosen to juxtapose the work of Epiphanius of Salamis 
and Theodoret of Cyrrhus precisely insofar each of them advances a model of heretical origins 
that traces their progressive development. Epiphanius, as we shall see, proposes a periodized 
history of sectarianism, which situates the contemporary Christian dilemma of heretical 
profusion in a global genealogical history of ethnogenesis. Beginning with Adam, the Cypriot 
bishop enumerates an elaborate pre-Christian history of sectarianism in which the problem of 
                                                        
6 See, for example, Gillian Clark, “City of Books: Augustine and the World as Text,” in Klingshirn and Safran, 117-
140.  
 
7 As I noted in the Introduction, this observation was first surmised in the groundbreaking work of Walter Bauer. 
More recent scholarship has demonstrated not only the fluidity and constructedness of the categories orthodoxy 
and heresy, but also the plurality of conceptual and discursive prisms through which the binary was expressed. 
For an excellent summary of the current state of the field, see Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin, “Making 
Selves and Marking Others: Identity and Late Antique Heresiologies,” in Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. 
Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 1-27. The point here is that the 
language of heresy and orthodoxy melded with a variety of Christian interests, so that they become embedded 
within debates and discussions about gender, law, ecclesiology, scholasticism, exegesis, etc.  
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Christian heresy is but the most recent outgrowth of a far more entrenched historical 
phenomenon. Theodoret, by contrast, eschews any "pre-Christian" past, and instead offers a 
model that begins with Simon Magus and follows a typological structure: the devil produced 
ages of heresy that were organized around particular doctrinal cores. Heresy’s ever-shifting 
disposition is thus a reflection of its demongenic lineage, whereby the heresies were created 
anew after the forces of orthodoxy vanquished their predecessors. The devil adapted his plan 
of attack by producing new types of heretical opponents to contest orthodox supremacy. 
While the specific trajectories of these two models are distinct, they each theorize heresy as 
process of progressive evolution and adaptation. Epiphanius and Theodoret both map the 
stages of heretical manifestation in the world. It is the heresiological periodization of 
ethnographic knowledge that I trace in this chapter.  
 
A Periodized History of Heresy: The Panarion, Genealogy and Geography  
 
In a missive requesting the advice of Epiphanius (ca. 315-403), the former Palestinian 
abbot and current bishop of Salamis in Cyprus, the archimandrites Acacius and Paul of Chalcis 
and Beroea (in Syria) relate the need for additional instruction regarding heretical Christians.8 
The monks explain that they are writing Epiphanius in hopes of expanding their minimal 
                                                        
8 Epiphanius, Panarion: Letter of Acacius and Paul (Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl, GCS 25 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1915], 
1:153-4). Translation from Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis, 2 vols., NHS 35–36 [Leiden: Brill, 
1987, 1994]. The circumstances under which Epiphanius, who was born in a Palestinian village of Besandouke near 
Eleutheropolis between 310 and 320, came to occupy the office of bishop in Cyprus remain somewhat unresolved. 
See Frank Williams, trans.,  “Introduction,” XIV, in The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: Book I (Sects 1-46) (Boston: 
Brill, 2009) for a description of the problem. In the fourth century, at the behest of Constantius II, Salamis was 
rebuilt and renamed as Constantia; A. Papageorghiou, “Cities and Countryside at the End of Antiquity and the 
Beginning of the Middle Ages in Cyprus,” in ‘The Sweet Land of Cyprus:’ Papers Given at the Twenty-Fifth Jubilee Spring 
Symposium of Byzantine Studies, ed. A.A.M. Bryer and G.S. Georghallides (Nicosia, Cyprus: The Cyprus Research 
Centre for the Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies, 1993), 27-51. Sozomen Ecclesiastical History 6.32.3-4 




knowledge of the world of heresy into a fuller and more precise portrait with the bishop’s help 
and instruction: “we have heard names assigned to the sects (αἱρέσεσιν) by your Honor,” and 
thus “we are asking your Reverence to tell us explicitly the heresy (αἵρεσιν) held by each of 
these cults (θρῃσκείας).”9 It is Epiphanius’ “fame” (φήμη) and his righteousness as a 
pedagogical paragon that inspire the abbots to solicit the opinions of the Cypriote bishop:10 
“for not we alone, but all who hear of you, confess that the Savior has raised you up in this 
generation as a new apostle and herald, a new John, to proclaim the things that ought to be 
observed by those who have undertaken this course.”11 Through this apostolic analogy, 
Epiphanius emerges as the Christian voice of his era. He garners a highly particularized 
authority of tradition and is empowered, by biblical standards, to act as a herald of au courant 
heresiological knowledge. Moreover, Acacius’ and Paul’s solicitation to transfer knowledge of 
the heresies from one corner of the Christian world to another actually serves to arrest them 
in a state of ritualization. With fast and prayer, they await the spiritually transformative 
potency of Epiphanius’ instruction. By partaking of Epiphanius’ knowledge, “the load of our 
transgressions,” write the monks, “is lightened when we are filled with your spiritual 
utterances.”12 The spiritual and experiential import of knowledge furnishes Epiphanius with a 
scholastic, theological, and authorized mandate to catalogue the world of heresy.   
Epiphanius commences his project of enumerating, ordering, describing, and refuting 
the heresies of the world with a brief reply to his monastic interlocutors. The pedagogical 
utility of his text, emphasized by the call of the monks and the response of the bishop, sets the 
                                                        
9 Epiphanius, Pan.: Letter of Acacius and Paul 1.9 (Holl, 1:154). 
 
10 Epiphanius, Pan.: Letter of Acacius and Paul 1.7 (Holl, 1:154). 
 
11 Epiphanius, Pan.: Letter of Acacius and Paul 1.6 (Holl, 1:154). 
 




conceptual order for his therapeutic elaboration.13 His rejoinder, which takes the form of the 
first of two proems, is an altogether lopsided affair. It begins with a succinct description of his 
overarching textual purpose—“I am going to tell you the names of the sects and expose their 
unlawful deeds like poisons and toxic substances”—and then segues into an entirely 
uncommon feature of ancient literature: a table of contents.14 Here, Epiphanius explains the 
precise plan of his work: there are three volumes with seven sections into which the eighty 
sects have been arranged. “The saving dispensation of our Lord Jesus Christ divides” his table 
of contents into two broad classes of heresy:15 twenty pre-Christian sects and sixty Christian 
sects.16 In these prefatory remarks, most of the heresies are simply named (and, in some cases, 
Epiphanius lists multiple names for a single group), though a small number of sects are 
                                                        
13 Παναριον (Panarion) translates as medicine chest. The text, in Epiphanius’ rationalization, functions as a 
remedy for the disease of heresy. Indeed, the entire text is framed typologically as medicinal. See J. Rebecca 
Lyman, “Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in Orthodoxy, Christianity, History, ed. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and 
Antonella Romano (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000), 149-161. From the title to the pervasive metaphors of 
poisonous reptiles and insects, Epiphanius insists on the antidotal utility of his work. As he explains at the 
conclusion of his second Proem: “my work too has been compiled as a defense against them [sects] and for your 
safety, to reveal the appearance of the dreadful serpents, and their poisons and deadly bites. And to correspond 
with these I shall give as many arguments, like antidotes, as I can in short compass—one or two at most—to 
counteract their poison and, after the Lord, cure anyone who wants to be cured, if he has fallen, willingly or 
inadvertently, into these snake-like teachings of the sects” (Pan. Pro. II.3.4-5 [Holl, 1:171-2]). 
 
14 Epiphanius, Pan. Prooemium I.1.2 (Holl, 1:155). On the subject of ancient tables of contents, see Andrew M. 
Riggsby, “Guides to the Wor(l)d,” in Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire, ed. Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 88-107. By Riggsby’s definition—“a ‘table of contents’…is a 
summary of the contents of a work by means of listing its contents in abbreviated form and in the order of the 
text” (88)—Epiphanius’ Proem I surely qualifies.  
 
15 Epiphanius, Pan. Pro. I.4.1 (Holl, 1:157). 
 
16 As will become clear in Chapter three, Epiphanius’ accounting practices strain even the most forgiving of critics. 
There are eighty sects in total—a number that is derived from Song of Songs 6:8—with four “foundational” (or 
mother) sects, Barbarism, Scythianism, Hellenism, and Judaism (see Colossians 3:11) generating sixteen (sub)sects. 
Hellenism includes four philosophical schools (Pythagoreans/Peripatetics, Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans). The 
Samaritan sect (itself derived from Judaism) also contains four sects: Gorothenes, Sebuaeans, Essenes, and 
Dositheans. Finally, Judaism itself holds seven sects (Scribes, Pharisees, Sadducees, Hemerobaptists, Ossaeans, 




identified by specific characteristics.17 The Alogi, the thirty-first Christian sect (or fifty-first 
overall), for example, are distinguished in the prologue by their rejection of the Gospel and 
Revelation of John.18 Having numbered, named, and ordered the sects once already in Proem I, 
Epiphanius begins this enumeration yet again—“in this one of my summaries”—in order to 
direct his “scholarly readers” to the precise volume and section of each heretical entry.19 
Imbued with both utilitarian, ideological, and scholastic heft, none to the necessary exclusion 
of the others, the table of contents of Proem I mirrors the essential form and content of 
Epiphanius’ prolonged heresiological discourse itself: this is a list, which blossoms to become a 
polemicized ethnography of sectarianism and its complex history. In the case of the Panarion, 
however, the table of contents serves to define the precise parameters and vision of the text. 
Epiphanius conceptualizes his text as a formal imposition of ordered knowledge and design. 
The text thus orders two contents at once: it provides a tightly arranged account of heresy and 
heretical origins just as it orders the entirety of world through an ethnography of heresy.  
In contrast to his heresiological predecessors—Irenaeus of Lyons, who began his 
Adversus haereses by describing and refuting the Valentinians before circling back to attribute 
the root of all heresy to the magician Simon Magus, and Hippolytus of Rome who opens his 
Refutation of All the Heretics in classical Greece with the doctrines of the natural, moral, and 
                                                        
17 He alludes to this reality in his Proem I, when he observes the multiplicity of names ascribed to a single sect. He 
elaborates on this point in his valedictory remarks De Fide 6.4-5: “And so, as I have said, the sects I have listed in 
succession are eighty concubines. But no one need be surprised if each of them is given different names in every 
country. What is more, we must observe that each sect in turn has frequently divided into many parts on its own 
and taken different names. This is no surprise; it is the way things are” (Epiphanius, De Fide: 6.4-5, ed. Karl Holl and 
Jürgen Dummer, GCS 37 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985], 3:502). 
 
18 Epiphanius, Pan. Pro. I.4.5 (Holl, 1:158).  
 
19 The first Proem repeats itself insofar as Epiphanius first lists each of the eighty heresies by name before he 
returns to explain the precise division of the volumes and sections and again names the sects. Text breaks down 
in the following structural pattern, as outlined in Pro. I.5.2-5.9: Vol. I, sec. 1.: twenty sects; Vol. I, sec. 2: thirteen 
sects; Vol. I, sec. 3: thirteen sects; Vol. II, sec. 1: eighteen sects; Vol. II, sec. 2: five sects; Vol. III, sec. 1: seven sects; 




dialectical philosophers—Epiphanius situates heresy in a protracted and far grander 
narratological sequence.20 Already in the skeletal ordering and numbering of the heresies in 
Proem I of his Panarion, Epiphanius unveiled his intention to tell an exhaustive tale of all the 
world’s heresies, beginning with “their mothers.”21 In Proem II he further amplifies his 
intention to offer an “account and discussion of faith and unbelief, of correct views and 
divergent views” by situating his narrative in the context of “the world’s creation and what 
followed it.”22 Firmly rejecting the claim that heresy began only in the apostolic age or with 
the Greek philosophers, the Panarion frames its study of sectarianism with a sweeping history 
of the world, proposing four successive “generations” (γενεαὶ) or ages of heresy.23 This 
introductory narrative, as we shall see, imposes a particular context and Christian structure on 
the programmatic enumeration of the eighty heresies. Epiphanius articulates his vision of the 
world by creating a master narrative in which the history of the world and sectarian division 
become manifestations of an intellectual genealogy and ethnogenic innovation. Narrated in 
the second Proem of the Panarion, the bishop uses genealogical, geographical, and ethnogenic 
reasoning within the same narrative of sectarianism’s birth and growth. By beginning in the 
pre-Christian past (or the past that was not yet manifestly Christian), Epiphanius traces the 
history of heresy from Adam down into his own day with the “Christian” Massalians. In the 
                                                        
20 For a discussion of Epiphanius in the context of early Christian heresiology, see Aline Pourkier, L’hérésiologie chez 
Épiphane de Salamie (Paris: Beauchesne, 1992), 53-75; Gerard Vallée, A Study in Anti-Gnostic Polemics: Irenaeus, 
Hippolytus, and Epiphanius (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid University Press, 1981); Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. 
Zellentin, “Making Selves and Marking Others: Identity and Late Antique Heresiologies,” in Iricinschi and 
Zellentin, 1-27.  
 
21 Epiphanius, Panarion Pro. I.5.2 (Holl, 1:159). 
 
22 Epiphanius, Pan. Prooemium II.1.1 (Holl, 1:169).  
 




process, he subsumes the history of the world under a history of religion and religious 
deviation.24  
“For by offering a schooling” in universal history, as Diodorus Siculus expresses in the 
opening lines of his Bibliotheca historica (Library of History), the historians “provide their 
readers, through such a presentation of events, with a most excellent kind of experience.”25 
While preserving and narrating the past serves to heighten and sharpen readers’ abilities to 
understand the circumstances surrounding their own present and future, for Epiphanius the 
present age is conceptualized as an effort to reclaim humanity’s largely dormant Adamic past. 
As an experiential and theological template for the present, the past contextualizes and 
explains the underlying situation of the contemporary Catholic Church; the Church’s contests 
with her sectarian opponents (i.e., Christian heretics) belongs to Epiphanius’ decidedly 
Christian narrative of religious history, which he articulates as the uninterrupted history of 
heresy. The past, then, is not some long-forgotten relic, but a continuously lived contest 
between the truth of Christianity and the falsity of her opponents.26 His account imposes an 
order upon a disordered and contentiously experienced world by arraying its data in 
accordance with scriptural dicta. His text “expresses the omnipresent sign of divine 
                                                        
24 Epiphanius, Pan. 80.1.1-11.7 (Holl and Dummer, 3:484-496). 
 
25 Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica I.1.1, ed. and trans. C.H. Oldfather, Loeb Classical Library 279 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1933). For more on universal history in antiquity see Iris Sulimani, Diodorus’ 
Mythistory and the Pagan Mission (Boston: Brill, 2011); Jose Miguel Alonso-Núñez, The Idea of Universal History in 
Greece: From Herodotus to the Age of Augustus (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 2002); Katherine Clarke, “Universal 
Perspectives in Historiography,” in The Limits of Historiography: Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts, ed. 
Christina S. Kraus (Boston: Brill, 1999), 249-79; Arnaldo Momigliano, “The Origins of Universal History,” in On 
Pagans, Jews, and Christians (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 31-57; and Michael I. Allen, “Universal 
History 300-1000: Origins and Western Developments,” in Historiography in the Middle Ages, ed. Deborah Mauskopf 
Deliyannis (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 17-42. 
 
26 For the historiographical impulse behind Christian heresiology see Hervé Inglebert, “L’histoire des hérésies 
chez les hérésiologues” in L’historiographe de l’Église des premiers siècles, ed. B. Pouderon and Y.-M. Duval (Paris: 




providence” and infuses both ethnographic project with a thoroughly Christian analytical 
apparatus.27 It is the commands of the apostle Paul and the Song of Songs that, above all else, 
mold the structure of his universal story. 
Following Galatians 3:28 and Colossians 3:11, Epiphanius correlates the Barbarian, 
Scythian, Hellene, and Jew of Paul’s epistles (or deutero-epistle, in the case of Colossians) with 
the four foundational or mother heresies28: “From Adam until Noah, Barbarism. From Noah 
until the tower, and until Serug two generations after the tower, the Scythian superstition. 
After that, from the tower, Serug and <Terah> until Abraham, Hellenism. From Abraham on, the 
true religion which is associated with this same Abraham—Judaism, (named) for his lineal 
descendant Judah.”29 As ages of human development, each of the four eras introduced and 
inscribed particular religious beliefs and conduct, which over time (after the age of 
Scythianism) ossified into cultural ethics and ethnic sensibilities. The first two ages, Barbarism 
and Scythianism, hew to the general framework of the biblical narrative of Genesis, with the 
apocryphal book of Jubilees added to refine the account’s details.30 Adam’s disobedience sowed 
                                                        
27 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 4. 
 
28 “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of 
you are one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28). “In that renewal, there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and 
uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all” (Col. 3:11). 
 
29 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.3.2 (Holl, 1:188). On the sources, structure, and argument of Epiphanius’ theorization of the 
nature of sectarianism William Adler, “The Origins of the Proto-Heresies: Fragments from a Chronicle in the First 
Book of Epiphanius’ Panarion,” Journal of Theological Studies 41.2 (1990): 472-501, is the most thorough and 
compelling analysis. Adler’s essay is the most exhaustive discussion, as far as I know, of Epiphanius’ non-
heresiological sources.  
 
30 Jubilees 5:28; 7:1, 17; 10:15 at Epiphanius, Pan. 2.1 (Holl, 1:174). The author of Jubilees (Ch. 11) explains idolatry’s 
genesis (specifically the worship of molten images) as the product of the contestation between the sons of Noah 
for power and “political” authority. Erecting their own kingdoms and cities, the sons of Noah wage war against 
each other and in the process erect molten images to worship. The text ascribes this development to the sons of 
Noah (not to any one son), though it does take place during the age of Seroh/Serug’s birth. The consequences of 
idolatry are likewise discussed at length during Terah’s lifetime, but he is not expressly charged with sewing the 
initial seeds of idolatry (Jub. 11:14-17; 12:1-8, 12-14). Epiphanius has modified the narrative of Jubilees at Pan. 3.1-5 
(Holl, 1:176-77), which may reflect a general familiarity with the text (rather than exact knowledge or a copy of 
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the initial seeds of human wickedness, which were further nurtured by Cain’s fratricide.31 In 
the lifetime of Jared, the great-grandson of Seth and fifth generation after Adam, “came 
sorcery, witchcraft, licentiousness, adultery, and injustice.”32 The age of Hellenism (the third 
mother heresy) also bears responsibility for the introduction of sorcery and witchcraft, while 
the practices of astrology and magic are ascribed to Nimrod, who sits squarely on the edge of 
the Scythian and Hellenic ages.33 It is worth noting that the comprehensive narrative of 
Epiphanius’ pre-Christian history is neither wholly precise nor entirely consistent.34 There is 
an ambiguity of language and a repetition of cultural developments, which assign the identical 
religious and cultural practices and particularities to different ages and individuals. 
Wickedness, for example, is introduced among the human race on at least three occasions: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the text). At Pan. 39.6.1 (Holl and Dummer, 2:76), during his discussion of the Sethians, Epiphanius invokes Jubilees 
(or “The Little Genesis”) to refute their claim that Seth, descendent of Adam, was endowed by the Mother with 
the seed of power and was the original source of human righteousness. Seth’s descendants were thus held to be 
pure (untarnished by blood dispute of Cain and Abel) and the true descendants of the divine power. For the 
cosmic ethnography of Jubilees see James M. Scott, “On Earth as in Heaven: The Apocalyptic Vision of World 
Geography from Urzeit to Endzeit according to the Book of Jubilees,” in Geography and Ethnography: Perceptions of the 
World in Pre-Modern Societies, ed. Kurt Raaflaub and Richard J.A. Talbert (Malden, M.A.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 182-
196.  
 
31 See Epiphanius, Pan. 1.3 (Holl, 1:172). 
 
32 Epiphanius, Pan. 1.3 (Holl, 1:172). The text, however, introduces an unresolved ambiguity with respect to the 
precise moment of each particular error’s emergence: “but now in the time of Jared and afterward, [came] 
sorcery, witchcraft, licentiousness, adultery, and injustice” (νῦν δὲ ἐν χρόνοις τοῦ Ἰάρεδ καὶ ἐπέκεινα φαρμακεία 
καὶ μαγεία, μοιχεία τε καὶ ἀδικια, Epiphanius, Pan. 1.3 [Holl, 1:172]). “But now (νῦν δὲ),” the contemporary 
situation of Jared, stands alongside the vague pronouncement “and afterward (καὶ ἐπέκεινα).” At this point in his 
text, Epiphanius leaves the exact arrival of the religious errors unspecified.  
 
33 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.11 (Holl, 1:178-9).  
 
34 Not only are the same errors introduced on multiple occasions (at various junctures in the history of the world), 
but the historical organization of cultural, ethnic, religious, and national priority and interaction is largely 
unelaborated. In his discussion of Hellenism, for example, Epiphanius explains that “Hellenism began with the 
Egyptians, Babylonians and Phrygians, and then made a hash of men’s ways” (Epiphanius, Pan. 3.11 [Holl, 1:178-9). 





with Adam, Cain, and Jared.35 Though this history of human error may tax our ability to 
pinpoint precisely the culpable party (or parties), the general schema remains perfectly clear: 
each age produced certain anthropological, theological, and religious errata.  
Epiphanius is explicit that among the earliest generations of Adam, “there was no 
difference of opinion yet, no people that was at all different, no name for a sect, and no 
idolatry either,” yet he likewise asserts that “everyone served as a law to himself and 
conformed to his own opinion.”36 This seeming tension between uniformity and individuality, 
coherence of opinion and lawlessness, is resolved in the bishop’s discussion of the age of 
Scythianism, where he expounds that it was only prior to the destruction of the tower at 
Babylon that individuals lacked any signs of distinctive ethnic, religious, or cultural identity. 
Under the first two ages of humanity, the world was inhabited only by “men” of a single 
language and speech, who comported themselves either with godliness or ungodliness.37 In 
affirming or rejecting natural law, the lone correlative of godliness, men did not, according to 
Epiphanius, foment sectarian divisions; they were simply behaving obediently or 
disobediently.38 During the age of humanity’s division into seventy-two distinct peoples (and 
the allotment of land and bestowal of languages), Rheu, of Noah’s stock, bore Serug, who 
introduced idolatry into human consciousness with paintings and portraits.39 Serug’s 
                                                        
35 Epiphanius, Pan. 1.3 (Holl, 1:172). In his condensed narrative of Jesus earthly ministry, the bishop explains that it 
is from wickedness (to truth) that the nations must be rescued (Pan. 3.5 [Holl, 1:231]). 
 
36 Epiphanius, Pan. 1.9 (Holl, 1:172). 
 
37 Epiphanius, Pan. 2.3 (Holl, 1:174). 
 
38 “And there was nothing on earth, no sect, no opinion clashing with another one, but only ‘men’ were spoken of, 
‘one speech and one language’ (Gen. 11:1). There were only ungodliness and godliness, the natural law and the 
natural error of each individual’s will, not learned from teaching or writings. There was no Judaism, no Hellenism, 
no other sect at all” (Epiphanius, Pan. 2.3 [Holl, 1:174]).  
 
39 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.4 (Holl, 1:177). Around this time autocracy, astrology, and magic—debasements ascribed to 
Nimrod—also spread throughout the world.  
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grandson, Terah, went further still, making “images with clay and pottery.”40 The age of 
idolatry is marked by the bishop as the era of Hellenism, though, in fact, “Hellenism began 
with the Egyptians, Babylonians and Phrygians,” who exported their errors throughout the 
world. The rites and mysteries of the Greeks, he reports, “were brought to [them] by Cadmus, 
and by Inachus himself,” which then flourished into distinct heresies “during the lifetime of 
Epicurus, Zeno the Stoic, Pythagoras and Plato.”41 The process of transporting error occupies 
much of Epiphanius’ attention in his discussion of the fourth and final of the mother heresies, 
Judaism. Originally known as Abramians, these ancestral worshippers of God were defined by 
the piety of their namesake. Their lineal descendants ultimately became the Jews (though they 
were not called Jews until the time of David) and were held by God’s choice as “the true 
religion and circumcision.”42 The age of Judaism, however, as it moved further away from its 
Abrahamic ideal, was vitiated by the Jews’ misinterpretation of divine legislation. The 
pedagogical import of biblical Law, though “giving its precepts physically,” held a spiritual 
hope, a hope the Jews had perilously failed to grasp.43 For Christians the Lord Jesus Christ, the 
ultimate pedagogue, illuminated the truth of God’s Law, replacing its types and symbols with 
spiritual truths. 44 The Jews’ continued adherence to the “legal” obligation of circumcision 
upended their divinely sanctioned status.  
This periodized narrative, framed in Euhemeristic terms, as Jeremy Schott has sharply 
observed, wherein mythological figures are accorded historical agency as human inventors of 
                                                        
40 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.5 (Holl, 1:177). 
 
41 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.11; 4.2.6; 4.2.7 (Holl, 1:178-9; 182). 
 
42 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.5.1 (Holl, 1:190). 
 
43 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.5.4 (Holl, 1:190). 
 




civilizing or barbarizing tendencies, articulates the etiology of sectarianism as a history of 
culture.45 Each mother heresy functioned, in Epiphanius’ schema, as a cultural or devotional 
unit, which marked ethical, ethnic, and religious geneses, progressions, and deviations.46 
                                                        
45 Jeremy Schott, “Heresiology as Universal History in Epiphanius’ Panarion,” Zeitschrift Fuer Antikes Christentum 
10.3 (2006): 546-563. See also Walter Ameling, “Ethnography and Universal History in Agatharchides,” in East & 
West: Papers in Ancient History Presented to Glen W. Bowersock, ed. T. Corey Brennan and Harriet I. Flower (Cambridge, 
M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 13-59; Jonathan M. Hall, “Land and Peoplehood: The Ethnogenesis of the 
Hellenes,” in Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002), 125-171. On the 
history of culture in early Christianity, see Arthur J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the 
History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989) and Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of 
Christian Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Schott outlines the two prevailing (and opposing) 
models of human development in antiquity, primitivists and anti-primitivists. The former, epitomized by Hesiod, 
the Stoics, and Ovid, located humanity’s apex in its earliest stages. For the primitivists, humanity’s golden age was 
interrupted and ultimately disrupted by technological and artistic advancement. The anti-primitivists, 
represented by Lucretius, Diodorus, and Protargos, argued that primitive humans lived in a state of rampant 
anarchy; they inhabited a lawless, cultureless swirl of disorder. Cultural and technological developments, borne 
out of philosophy, religion, political necessity, etc., engendered a civilizing process that lifted human beings out 
of their natural state of discord. Schott then argues that Epiphanius represents a modified third position: “Like 
the anti-primitivists, Epiphanius felt that most ancient humans lived in a state of anarchy, without the rule of law. 
On the other hand, he does not join the anti-primitivists in their progressive attitude toward the civilizing 
process. Rather, his view of civilization is resoundingly negative (554).” While it is quite explicit in the Panarion 
that as the ages unfold, the state of humanity declines insofar as it drifts further afield from its Christian faith, 
Epiphanius never explicitly registers dislike or disapproval of the age of Barbarism. He does explain that the flood 
destroyed it—for justifiable reasons—but he comes to praise Adam in De Fide as the paradigm of religiosity. Other 
biblical luminaries (Abel, Seth, Enosh, Enoch, Methuselah, Noah and Eber, and Abraham are all praised as 
emblems of a pre-Christian piety) are similarly held up as models of piety. If a dichotomy between ancient 
theories of primitivism and anti-primitivism can be said to exist, Epiphanius operates within an entirely different 
paradigm. For him, it is neither about reviving a golden age nor is it about overcoming the barrenness of the 
earliest age through technological and artistic advancements. It is about rekindling or revitalizing the faith of the 
generations borne by a particular line of successors, who themselves, he admits, are not free from moral or 
religious culpability. Though his periodized history of heresy is told as a universal history, it fundamentally 
serves to chart the thread of orthodoxy, which has been eclipsed by the repeated introduction of religious 
deviance. The history Epiphanius produces does not, it seems to me, fall within the paradigms Schott elaborates 
(his suggestion of a third way obscures the lens through which Epiphanius articulates his history of humanity). 
For a detailed study of the idea of progress in early Christian literature see Wolfram Kinzig, Novitas Christiana: die 
Idee des Fortschritts in der Alten Kirche bis Eusebius (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1994). 
 
46 To the extent that the language of heresy is gendered (the ages of heresy are feminized as mothers), men, by 
contrast, lead all the sectarian parties, save heresy forty-nine, the Quintillianists or Priscillianists or Pepuzians (or 
the Priscillianists). The mothers birthed almost exclusively male progeny. Epiphanius attack against them 
emphasizes their contravention of apostolic gender norms: “Even though it is because of Eve that they ordain 
women to the episcopate and presbyterate, they should listen to the Lord when he says, ‘Thy resort shall be to 
thine husband, and he shall rule over thee’ (Gen. 3:16). And they have overlooked the command of the apostle, ‘I 
suffer not a woman to speak, or to have authority over a man,’ (1 Tim. 2:12) and again, ‘the man is not of the 
woman, but the woman of the man,’ (1 Cor. 11:8) and, ‘Adam was not deceived, but Eve, deceived first, fell into 
condemnation’” (1 Tim. 2:14; Pan. 49.3.1-3; [Holl and Dummer, 2:243-44]). I am not suggesting that women are 
largely absent from the Panarion: far from it. Indeed, Virginia Burrus has incisively explored the relationship 
between women, heresy, and orthodoxy: “The Heretical Woman as Symbol in Alexander, Athanasius, Epiphanius, 
and Jerome,” Harvard Theological Review 84.3 (1991): 229-248 and “Equipped for Victory: Ambrose and the 
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Barbarism and Scythianism, on the one hand, had precise beginnings and ends—they were 
historically closed—while Hellenism and Judaism, on the other, remained ambiguously open, 
as the Greek philosophical schools and the Jews endured into the era of Christianity.47 The 
former, while introducing certain base human errors, affixed errancy to the disobedience of 
natural law, while the divided world of Hellenism and Judaism marked the introduction of an 
ethnic, or in Schott’s parlance, ethnogenic linkage between cultural development/decay and 
human religiosity.48 There is a further distinction between the ages of Barbarism and 
Scythianism, on the one hand, and Hellenism and Judaism, on the other. The former operated 
as ages of individuals, while the latter emerge in a world already divided by ethno-
communities. The world has become marked by its particularization and communalization.  
Although both Judaism and Hellenism proliferated during the post-Babylon reign of 
nations, the former, defined by the practice of circumcision, oriented only the nation of Israel, 
while the latter broadly signified the practice of idolatry. In the case of Hellenism, moreover, 
Epiphanius intimates that the making of gods facilitated, reinforced, and perhaps even 
engendered the process of human division that comprised the post-Babylon world. He argues: 
And after [Scythianism] people made gods of wretched despots, or sorcerers 
who had deceived the world, by honoring their tombs. And much later they 
made Cronus, and Zeus, Rhea, Hera and the rest of them into gods, and then 
they made gods by worshipping Acinaces—and the Scythian Sauromatians made 
gods by worshipping Odrysus and the ancestor of the Thracians, from whom the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Gendering of Orthodoxy,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 4.4 (1996): 461-475. It is, however, striking that while 
women are among the followers of heretics, they are rarely the leaders of heretical movements.  
 
47 Barbarism began with Adam and ended with the great deluge, and Scythianism began after the flood and ended 
with the construction and destruction of the tower at Babylon. And while in his discussion of Abraham, 
Epiphanius recapitulates his narrative thus far, declaring that the age of Hellenism lasted from Serug until 
Abraham, the sects of Hellenism (the philosophical schools of Stoics, Platonists, Pythagoreans, and Epicureans) 
have survived. The implication seems to be that mother heresies may pass, while their descendants endure.  
 
48 Jeremy Schott, “Heresiology as Universal History,” 555-562. 
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Phrygian people are derived. This is why Thracians are named for the person 
called Thera, who was born during the building of the tower.49 
 
Tracking the genesis of heresy exposes the historical-theological correlation between 
peoplehood and ancestral worship (or religious errancy) and the formation of and/or 
perpetuation of communal identities. The causative conditions of sectarianism quite clearly 
rest on the production of individualized deviant opinions and the now communalized world, 
which continually germinate and fissure via pedagogical transmission. There is now an 
ineradicable outlet—the nation or the very construct of bounded community—in which 
individualized error can be housed and spread. With the advent of the nation, individual 
opinion—doctrinal fallacies, above all else—now had a forum for their germination and 
immortalization. Thinkers of all varieties, from philosophers, astrologers, numerologists, 
prophets, etc., harnessed the phenomena of community to advance their enlightened 
ideologies. And, if communal incorporation failed, they simply created a new one.  Ancestral 
worship, then, was the logical outcome of a world marked by human division and diversity. 
During his presentation of the age of Hellenism, Epiphanius ascribes the introduction of 
idolatry, the point at which sectarianism emerges, to the excessive freedom of human 
intellect:  
Peleg was the father of Reu, and Reu was the father of Serug, which means 
‘provocation’; and, as I have been taught, idolatry and Hellenism began among 
men with him. It was not with carved images yet or with reliefs in stone, wood 
or silver-plated substances, or made of gold or any other material, that the 
human reason invented evil for itself and, with its freedom, reason and intellect, 
invented transgression instead of goodness, but only with paintings and 
portraits.50 
 
                                                        
49 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.9-10 (Holl, 1:178). 
 
50 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.4 (Holl, 1:177).  
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Unbridled reason and intellectual speculation bred the very notion of evil and in so doing 
fomented alternative systems of worship. The introduction of idols not only signifies an end to 
the exclusive relationship between humanity and the singular divinity, but it marks the 
emergence of a sustained history, with its soon-to-be multifold divisions, of religious 
deviation. While ungodliness had existed from the beginning among the peoples of 
Barbarianism and Scythianism, the idolatry of the Hellenistic era ruptured the religious 
history and lineage of humanity in an unprecedented manner. Human reason had moved 
beyond the rejection of natural law to the active production, by its excessive curiosity and 
rationality, of ethnogenically aligned traditions of sectarian adherence. Though Epiphanius’ 
account of the rise of idolatry concerns only pre-Christian intellectual hubris (and the process 
by which reason precipitates humanity’s separation from the goodness of natural law), the 
intellectual corruption of religious truth is the driving force of his world history—it clouds the 
Jewish sects, the Hellenistic schools, and the Christian heresies as well.  
Indeed, it is the transmission of error in a world divided that propels this narrative of 
heresy’s emergence, and Epiphanius aims to expose its agents. Teaching and craft underlie and 
perpetuate the production of errant epistemological conceptualizations. It was the “historians 
and chronicles,” whose importation and dissemination of Egyptian imposture—heathen 
mythology—gave rise to the magical rites.51 The philosophical schools, which were born of the 
Greeks’ mysteries and rites, “devise[d] a concordant science (ὁμόστοιχον γνῶσιν) of idolatry, 
impiety and godlessness.”52 Idolatry, having set in motion a progression of fallacies, wherein 
the creation of false deities invited the theistic speculations of the philosophical schools, 
                                                        
51 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.11 (Holl, 1:178-9). 
 




introduced new practices of devotion and further waylaid the path of the godly. The Stoics 
with their “promise of knowledge” emphasized fate as the driving force within the universe, 
exasperated Epiphanius.53 “If it is fate,” he reasoned, “that equips the educated and intelligent, 
no one should learn from a teacher.”54 Reaffirming his distaste for the scholastic frauds of the 
Hellenic era, Epiphanius chastises the “poets, prose authors, historians, astronomers” and all 
the others who “made men’s opinion giddy and confused” (ἐσκότωσαν καὶ ἐθόλωσαν) by 
planting fallacious arguments and introducing errant doctrines.55 Even in later generations, 
the keenness of the Jews and Samaritans to reject idolatry and their desire “to know the one 
God,” despite their having received the wisdom of the law, was displaced by a lack of “interest 
in more precise information.”56 In contrast stands the pre-sectarian religiosity of men, which 
was “not learned from teaching or writings,” but operated by faith apart from any 
institutional, national, philosophical, or pedagogical instruction.57 The professionalism of 
knowledge not only stymies the unfolding of religious truth, it actively indoctrinates 
generations into systems of competing falsehoods. By creating a formal (i.e. legitimate) space 
                                                        
53 Epiphanius, Pan. 5.2.4 (Holl, 1:184). 
 
54 Epiphanius, Pan. 5.3.2 (Holl, 1:185). The tension between fate and instruction as articulated by Epiphanius 
parallels Christian debates about the intersection of faith and instruction. The second chapter of this dissertation 
analyzes this tension in the context of ancient attitudes toward pedagogy and the process of ordering types and 
classes of knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the divine, human knowledge, learned knowledge, innate knowledge, 
etc.). How “social discourse” functions within and in service of heresiology is a particularly vexing and important 
query, to which I shall turn next.  
 
55 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.2.1 (Holl, 1:187). 
 
56 Epiphanius, Pan. 9.2.3 (Holl, 1:198). 
 




and process in which erroneous errors could be taught, the Greek philosophical tradition 
asserts and preserves its grip on the minds of men.58   
 
The Sects as the New Nations of the World 
 
 After the Jews had been expelled from the land of Israel—as a result of the Babylonian 
captivity—“the elders approached Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon and begged that some of his 
own subject be sent to Israel as settlers, to keep the country from becoming an uninhabited 
wasteland.”59 The king complied with the request and sent “four groups of his own people (τῶν 
ἰδἱων τέσσαρα γένη), called the Cuthaeans, Cudaeans, Sephharuraeans and Anagogavaeans,” to 
Samaria “with their idols.”60 The land, however, was far from hospitable to these new settlers; 
they were continuously ravaged by the attacks of wild beasts. While requesting aid from the 
king, the four nations insisted that, “no nation could settle there unless it kept the law of God 
of heaven, given through Moses.” And so, Nebuchadnezzar heeded their pleas and sent a copy 
of the Law and also “Ezra, as a teacher of the Law, to teach the Law of Moses to the Assyrians 
who had settled in Samaria—the Cuthaeans and <the> others.”61 This, the bishop tells us, 
explains the genesis of the Samaritans. He further notes the impact of this intersection of 
national identity and legal opinion in the history of sectarianism: “it is an amazing coincidence 
                                                        
58 I shall return to the rhetoric of Christian anti-intellectualism in the next chapter when I discuss Christian 
opinion about dialectic, debate, and exchange.  
 
59 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.8.5 (Holl, 1:195). 
 
60 Epiphanius, Pan.  8.8.6 (Holl, 1:195). 
 
61 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.8.10 (Holl, 1:196). On Samaritanism broadly, see Pan. 9.1-5.5 (Holl, 1:197-203). For his 
discussion of each of the emergent Samaritan sects: Pan. 10.1.1-5 (Holl, 1:203-4) for the Essenes; Pan. 11.1.1-3 (Holl, 
1:204-5) for the Sebuaeans; Pan. 12.1.1-2 (Holl, 1:205) for the Gorothenes; and Pan. 13.1.1-2.1 (Holl, 1: 205-207) for 




that, to correspond with the four nations, four sects have also arisen in that very nation—I 
mean first, the sect of Essenes; second, of Gorothenes; third, of Sebuaeans; and fourth, of 
Dositheans.”62 When Epiphanius finally offers to enumerate the underlying causes of 
sectarianism, having just explained the rise of divisive opinions within Israel during the exilic 
and post-exilic periods, he embraces the metaphor of ethnogenesis: 
Here I can begin my treatment of the subject of sectarianism (ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχή μοι 
γίνεται τῆς τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος κατὰ αἱρέσεων πραγματείας), and I shall briefly 
explain how it arose. How else but in the same way in which tribes arose from 
the proliferation of the different languages, various nations emerged to 
correspond with each tribe and clan, every nation chose its own king to head it, 
and the result was the outbreak of wars, and conflicts between clashing 
nations…So too at this time we have been discussing. Since there had been a 
change in Israel’s one religion, and the scripture of the Law had been 
transferred to other nations—I mean to Assyrians, the ancestors of the colonist 
Samaritans—the division of Israel’s opinion also resulted. And then error arose, 
and discord began to sow seed from the one true religion in many counterfeit 
beliefs, as each individual thought best, and thought that he was proficient in the 
letter (of scripture) and could expound it to suit himself.63  
 
Here, we have all the pieces of Epiphanius’ sectarian puzzle coming together in an explicit 
formulation: nations (i.e. communities) + individualized opinion = sectarianism and the 
proliferation of error. Even if Epiphanius’ aim with his historicized schema was to mark off 
ethical or religious deviation as ethnically or culturally particularist, while simultaneously 
asserting that the principles of Christianity existed apart from these errant preoccupations, 
the narrative history of sectarianism inculcates an ethnographic ordering not only of the 
temporal (i.e. bad) world but of the Christian tradition itself. In the context of heresiology, the 
appeal to study heresy’s roots and describe them in expressly generative language reveals not 
simply a kinship with the language of ethnography, but a persistent frame of reference for the 
                                                        
62 Epiphanius, Pan.  9.1 (Holl, 1:195). 
 
63 Epiphanius, Pan. 9.1-9.4 (Holl, 1:196-7). 
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totality of his undertaking.64 The text imposes a vision of sectarianism and religious genesis 
that forecasts and elucidates the longue durée proliferation of ethnographic and heretical 
division.  
For Epiphanius, geographical, genealogical, and ethnogenic ordering are all affixed to 
the same narrative of sectarianism’s birth and growth, which concludes that history is in fact 
dominated by the unceasing ascent of self-made (heterodox) innovation. Thus even as he 
mimics his predecessors’ genealogy of Christian heresy—it always begins with Simon Magus—
and parrots specific details they possess, he simultaneously expands the genre’s capacity to 
comprehend the world of religious opinion by constructing a religious history of the “world” 
alongside its historical twin, the birth of sectarianism. Christian heresies produce or sow the 
same ethnic particularities and epistemological claims as Hellenic and Jewish sects.65 They are 
defined by deviant conduct and fallacious opinions, all of which hearken back to the 
emergence of divisive opinions among nations, philosophers, Samaritans, and Jews. Although 
the history of the world, having just entered the era of (manifest) Christianity, has been 
recalibrated, the Christian heresies graft onto this previously articulated ethnogenic and 
ethnographic schematization because its sectarian proponents continue to occupy the same 
historical and theological space as the heresies of yore. The process of error has not ceased, 
nor had its essential contents; the Panarion builds a successive chain of heterodoxy, beginning 
                                                        
64 Cf. Tertullian’s De Praescriptione Haereticorum 4 (Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. R.F. Refoulé, SC 46, 
[Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1957], 92-3), which conceptualizes heresies as a divinely ordained test for the resolve of 
the true followers of Christ. For Tertullian, the mere existence of heresies serves a precise divine function. 
Epiphanius, in contrast, maintains that heresy is a natural human phenomenon, insofar as it shapes and guides 
the contours of history. The current state of the world—the proliferation of heresy—is not altogether 
unparalleled. The relative stakes, however, have changed precisely because the opportunity has arisen for 
humanity to return to its Adamic state of being. Since the world has now undergone the transformative 
experience of Christ’s gospel, humanity possesses the opportunity to reforge its unity and univocality.   
 
65 On the use of ethno-racial language against the heretics see Denise Kimber Buell, “A Genos Saved by Nature,” in 
Why This New Race, 116-137. On the charge of blackness with respect to the heretics see Gay L. Byron, Symbolic 
Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature (New York: Routledge, 2002), 9-10, 46, 105-8, 120-1. 
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with the unstoppable force of Hellenic error. The ethnogenic mapping of the pre-Christian 
world has been supplanted by the rise of Christianity, wherein the Christian heresies function, 
in some sense, as the new nations of the world.66  
Because the history of the world is an iterative cycle of orthodox and sectarian 
contestation, surveying and classifying the Christian sects by their ritualistic customs, 
cosmologies, modes of biblical interpretation, Trinitarian formulations evince the Christian 
interpretation and exposition of ethnographic investigation.67 The history of the world in the 
Panarion traces the struggle to reclaim the untarnished Adamic legacy, to free humanity from 
the excesses of the idolaters, philosophers, Jews and Christian heretics.68 Though the human 
creation of deities (idols) aptly foreshadows the reproductive propensity of the Christian 
heresies, it exposes how error produces a schematized narrative both of the past and the 
present, in which uncovering and ordering its contents becomes the prevailing occupation of 
the heresiologist. In combining the tradition of apostolic succession and the Hellenic and 
Jewish heresies with the genealogy of the nations in Genesis 10, Epiphanius organizes the 
“entire” history of the world as a history of religious exploits, governed by his knowledge of 
                                                        
66 Cf. A.H.M Jones, “Were the Ancient Heresies National or Social Movements in Disguise?,” Journal of Theological 
Studies 10 (1959): 280-98; and W.H.C. Frend, “Heresy and Schism as Social and National Movements,” in Schism, 
Heresy and Religious Protest, ed. Derek Baker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 37-56. 
 
67 Young Kim, “Epiphanius of Cyprus and the Geography of Heresy,” in Violence in Late Antiquity, ed. H.A. Drake 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 235-252, studies the geographical distribution of the heresies of the Panarion. Like 
most of the scholarship on the geography of heresy, he takes a decidedly literal view of the matter (i.e. locating 
each of the heresies within a fixed geographical location). See also Thomas Robinson, The Bauer Thesis Examined: 
The Geography of Heresy in the Early Christian Church (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1988). Averil Cameron, “How to 
Read Heresiology,” explores the conceptual possibilities and limitations of heresiological literature. She suggests 
that the scholarly neglect of the genre owes much to Epiphanius, whose Panarion was judged to be inarticulate, 
solipsistic, and altogether unsophisticated. In addition to mounting a spirited defense of Epiphanius, Cameron 
indicates that a more capacious study of the geography of heresy (one less interested in the facts of geographical 
dispersal) would be extremely valuable. In the next section of this chapter, I will argue that Epiphanius, 
Theodoret, and Hippolytus employed the conceptual and metaphorical language of geography and travel 
(topographical surveying) to articulate Christian attitudes of triumph and conquest.   
 
68 Epiphanius’ censure of heretical invention, articulated earlier by Hippolytus and Irenaeus, their introduction of 
novel interpretations, full books of alternative scripture, and misguided rituals, reflects the same underlying 
concern: unrestrained curiosity, intellectual and reasoned pursuits produce transgression, chaos, and error.  
  
123 
truth and threatened by the altogether natural perpetuation of ignorance and falsity. The 
generation of culturally specific idols (and their corresponding deities) and the failure to 
comprehend the true meaning of divine (or even natural) law disrupt the linear, though 
periodized, progression of godliness evidenced by Adam, Abraham, and other biblical 
luminaries; the rise of heresy obscures the orthodox line of Christianity.69 The rise of Christian 
sectarianism follows a historical pattern, conditioned by the errors of human intellect. When 
Epiphanius characterizes the Melchizedekians as “inflated by a more excessive 
imposture/arrogance of thought” (περισσοτέρᾳ ἀλαζονείᾳ ἐννοίας ἀρθέντες), he has, in fact, 
provided an encapsulation of the heresiologists’ most basic charge against the totality of the 
sectarian world.70 Those who depart from the knowledge inscribed by Scripture and entrusted 
to the ecclesiastical hierarchy are stripped, via genealogical exclusion, of the designation 
Christian.71 In his attack on this same sectarian offshoot, Epiphanius explicitly appeals to the 
language of tradition and succession in defense of orthodoxy, words which could easily have 
been uttered by Irenaeus himself: “apostolic traditions, holy scriptures and successions of 
teachers have made our boundaries and foundations for the upbuilding of our faith, and God’s 
truth has been protected in every way.”72 
                                                        
69 Although the thrust of Epiphanius’ argument throughout his narrative of the four ages of heresy demonstrates 
the processes by which human error or disobedience produced multiple types of false worship and behavior, he 
concurrently tracks the epitomes of piety, juxtaposing godliness and ungodliness as mutually operative 
categories (from the very beginning of human history until the present age). The kernel of faith begins with Adam 
who, notwithstanding his transgression against God, symbolizes the apex of human piety. Adam and his entire 
generation are elevated before God to “royal rank and status” (“a generation in Christ is called a ‘queen,’”) on 
account of Adam’s knowledge of the divine. (De Fide 4.1 [Holl and Dummer, 3:499]). 
 
70 Epiphanius, Pan. 55.9.1 (Holl and Dummer, 2:336). 
 
71 For instance, see Pan. 21.1.1, 2.1, 7.2; 27.3.3, 4.1; 29.1.2, 6.6, 7.1 (Holl, 1:238, 239, 245; 304, 304; 321, 328, 329). 
 




Since the church is the lone offspring of its “mother,” co-opting (or Christianizing) the 
language of Song of Songs 6:9, it stands singularly apart from all the heretics, “the concubines” 
(παλλακαί) who came before and would come after the incarnation.73 But, as the Cypriote 
bishop explains, the heretics, both Christian and pre-Christian, “have not been entire 
strangers to the covenant and inheritance.”74 The very fact that “a faith which exhibited the 
character of Christianity and an unbelief which exhibited the character of ungodliness and 
transgression” persisted into the age of Scythianism suggests that mapping onto the genealogy 
of godliness (i.e. Christianity or the faith of Christianity) was an affirmative choice “until the 
time I have just mentioned.”75 Christianity was genealogical insofar as the generations of 
descendants were clearly arranged by the piety of their leading devotees, and yet a decision to 
disobey the law of nature (an act of ungodliness) excised one from the tree of faith. In the era 
of Christ, the same choice confronts those who are divorced from the pious lineage of Adam 
and Abraham. Epiphanius’ typological reading of Abraham’s children with Keturah and Hagar 
reveals that those born outside the true lineage, nonetheless, “received gifts,” which “were a 
type of the good things to come, for the conversion of the gentiles to the faith and truth.”76 
Abraham’s children by Keturah received gifts of wealth (taken from raids in Damascus and 
                                                        
73 Epiphanius, De Fide 5.6, 6.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501). “And later he shows how all of them will find her the most 
honored of them all, the mistress of them all, and his only choice, the one whose children are the king’s heirs and 
legitimate children. For they are ‘children of the promise’ and not ‘children of the bondmaid’ or the concubine, or 
of the others whose description is endless” (De Fide 7.2 [Holl and Dummer, 3:502-3]). 
 
74 Epiphanius, De Fide 6.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501). 
 
75 Epiphanius, Pan. 2.7 (Holl, 1:175). The ambiguous locution “until the time I have just mentioned” (ἕως τοῦ 
προδεδηλωμένου χρόνου) could mean either until the time of Abraham or of Noah; the text is hopelessly vague on 
this point. 
 




Samaria), which would ultimately be returned to Christ (“to gain their share of the same 
hope”), since the magi were descendants of Keturah: 
And do you see how the truth has expressions and consequences? The sects too 
are concubines, and their children have received gifts, though the concubines 
have only received the name, and have only been called by Christ’s name and 
received their few texts from the sacred scripture, so that they can/should 
understand the truth by these if they want (ἐὰν θέλωσιν). But if they do not 
wish to (understand) but return to Herod (for they are told not to return to 
Herod, but to go to their country by another way)—and if they do not do as they 
are told, the gifts are without purpose for them, just as their coming would have 
done the magi no good if they had returned to Herod. For these same sects 
debase the teachings of God’s oracles in a way that resembles Herod’s.77 
 
As genealogy often produces “a ranked order of relationships” (an expression of spatial and 
“genetic” difference), as with the tradition enumerated by Diogenes Laertius, with Epiphanius, 
indebted to the procreative and hierarchized models of the Christian tradition, epitomized by 
the writings of Irenaeus, Clement, and Hippolytus, his Panarion holds the capacity to reunify a 
once coherent humanity as it traces the sources of that disruption.78 Because the truth “was 
plainly revealed in the world at Christ’s coming,” access to the genealogy of true knowledge is 
no longer shrouded by darkness of sectarian opinion.79  
                                                        
77 Epiphanius, De Fide 8.4-5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504). I have modified Williams’ translation here.  
 
78 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 41. A recent article by Young Richard Kim prefers to think about the Panarion as a 
form of collective biography, “Reading the Panarion as Collective Biography: The Heresiarch as Unholy Man,” 
Vigiliae Christianae 64 (2010): 382-413. See also, Patricia Cox Miller, “Strategies of Representation in Collective 
Biography: Constructing the Subject as Holy,” in Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity, eds., Tomas Hägg 
and Philip Rousseau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 209-254. Kim’s reading has much insight to 
offer, but it fails, I think, to situate the collective biography within the larger textual framework. I have argued in 
this chapter that Epiphanius conceptualizes the heresiological venture in a far grander narrative than a mere 
doxographical biography or genealogy. It is the master narrative—the macroscopic theorization—that sets the 
text apart.  
 
79 Epiphanius, De Fide 6.8 (Holl and Drummer, 3:502). 
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 As I noted in the Introduction, ethnographic paradigms of genealogy function as much 
to create unification as they do to engender separation.80 With Epiphanius we see his master 
narrative embellish these twin organizational operations of ethnographic analysis. For him, 
orthodoxy is the counterpoint to this history of heresy, even as it finds itself suffering from 
the very disease it seeks to destroy. The second Proem’s exposition of cultural and ethnic 
origins and the main text’s description and denunciation of heretical Christian beliefs and 
practices exist as a persistent, though surmountable, foil and disruption to the ancient 
succession of “Christian” generations. Epiphanius’ history of heresy expounds the history of 
the world, charted through an investigation of religious knowledge (or lack thereof), and the 
relationship between the rise of disparate opinions and the coalescence of those opinions into 
nations, sects, schools, or heresies. The presentation of a history of heresy, which is also a 
history of the world and of Christianity itself—as it existed from the very beginning of 
creation—unfolds as “a style of sociological writing that will describe whole cultures 
(knowable worlds) from a specific temporal distance and with a presumption of their 
transience.”81 The bishop presents a worldview that imposed an impending summation for 
humanity at large. “The world’s time periods are no longer counted by lineages,” he writes, 
since the genealogies of the present and the measure of time are ultimately “summed up in 
one unified whole,” the “unshakeable stay” of the church.82 Truth and orthodoxy, for 
Epiphanius, remain totally bound to the language, both implicit and explicit, of genealogical 
argumentation. The process of excising heresies hinges on an appeal to a multiplicity of 
                                                        
80 This point is stressed both by Greg Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians and Erich S. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in 
Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), though the latter does not explicitly use the framework of 
ethnography, his overall point is the same as Woolf’s. 
 
81 James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Allegory,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, ed. James 
Clifford and George E. Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 114. 
 
82 Epiphanius, De Fide 5.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501). 
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strictures, which utilizes the (genealogical) legacy of Jewish and Hellenistic error and the 
genealogical inheritance of the Church itself. Appealing, again, to the metaphor of the Song of 
Solomon, Epiphanius announces the eventual triumph of Christianity (the dove as the symbol 
of the Church) by parsing a distinction between those who ultimately come around to the 
church and those who do not:  
‘But one,’ he says, ‘is my dove, my perfect one: the daughter of her mother, elect 
for her that bore her.’ And later he shows how all of them will find her the most 
honored of them all, the mistress of them all, and his only choice, the one whose 
children are the king’s heirs and legitimate children. For they are ‘children of 
the promise’ and not ‘children of the bondmaid’ or the concubine, or of the 
others whose description is endless.83 
 
The force of Epiphanius’ genealogy of piety (or of divine knowledge), elaborated in Proem II, 
drives his historical theory, viz. that the history of the world is, in fact, a history of (orthodox!) 
Christianity. Genealogy, geography, pedagogy, and scholasticism have been subsumed within a 
larger argument about the history of religion and the Christian history of the world.  
Despite the progression of this seemingly unbroken line of proto-Christians, no age of 
humanity fully bore its potential; no era was known by its unerring piety. Every age of 
humanity remained tainted by its errors, even the age of Christianity. If a dichotomy between 
ancient theories of primitivism (a return to the golden age of humanity) and anti-primitivism 
(betterment by technological and artistic progression) can be said to exist, Epiphanius shatters 
the paradigm completely. For him, it is neither about reviving a golden age nor is it about 
overcoming the barrenness of the earliest age with technological or artistic advancements. It 
is about rekindling or revitalizing the faith of the generations borne by a particular line of 
successors, who themselves were not free from error. Insofar as they lived in the past, their 
history, as told in the Bible, was the recourse to rescue the downfall of the present.  
                                                        
83 Epiphanius, De Fide 7.1-2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:502-3). 
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Perhaps the most interesting ideological parallel is found in Aelius Aristides’ oration 
Regarding Rome, delivered before the imperial court in 155 C.E., in which he exalts the empire of 
the Romans through a comparative history of empire, an elaboration of Rome’s civil and 
military policy, and its beneficent administration.84 A devotee of Asclepius, the orator posits 
that Rome’s empire was not in fact unforeseen. While Homer had proclaimed the eventual 
empire of the Romans in his Iliad, Hesiod, on the other hand, Aristides posits, “would not as 
now describe the generations of man by beginning with the golden race.”85 Instead: 
When he had made this beginning, in his discussion of the final race of iron, he 
would not say that their destruction would occur, ‘when they were born with 
gray temples’. But he would say that the iron race would perish on the earth 
when your leadership and empire were established, and then he would grant 
Justice and Reverence to return to mankind, and he would have pitied those 
born before you.86 
 
For Aristides it is the return of principled governance, epitomized by Rome’s just and equitable 
rule, that nullifies the disorder of the human race. It is the end of an age, hastened by a 
                                                        
84 I have used the following edition of the Greek text: Aelius Aristides, “Oratio XXVI, ΕΙΣ ΡΩΜΗΝ,” in Aelii Aristidis 
Smyrnaei quae supersunt omnia, ed. Bruno Keil, vol. 2, Orationes XVII-LIII (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898). Reprinted 2000, 
91-124. Charles A. Behr, trans., The Complete Works: P. Aelius Aristides, vol. 2, Orations XVII-LIII (Boston: Brill, 1981), 
374 n.1, outlines a nine-fold division within the text, which includes his comparative analysis of empires runs 
from 14-57 (and consists of a discussion of the Persians, Alexander, and the Greeks, essentially the Athenians and 
Lacedaemonians [Keil, ed., Aelii, 95-107) and also a rhetorical encomium to the magnificence of Roman 
governance.  On Aelius Aristides more generally, see William V. Harris and Brooke Holmes, eds., Aelius Aristides 
between Greece, Rome, and the Gods (Boston: Brill, 2008); Alexia Petsalis-Diomidis, Truly Beyond Wonders: Aelius 
Aristides and the Cult of Asklepios (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), especially 67-121; and Charles Allison 
Behr, Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales (Amsterdam: A.H. Hakkert, 1968). On his Roman oration, see James Henry 
Oliver, The Ruling Power: A Study of the Roman Empire in the Second Century after Christ through the Roman Oration of 
Aelius Aristides. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. V. 43. Part R. (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1953), 871-1003. I have followed the translation of Charles A. Behr, The Complete Works: P. 
Aelius Aristides. 
 
85 Aelius Aristides, To Rome 106 (Keil, 2:123; Behr, 2:97). The passage contains a reference to Homer, Iliad XX.307-8, 
ed. and trans. A.T. Murray, Loeb Classical Library 171 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), 392 and 
Hesiod, Works and Days 181 in Theogony. Works and Days. Testimonia, ed. and trans. Glenn W. Most, Loeb Classical 
Library 57 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 102.  
 
86 Aelius Aristides, To Rome 106 (Keil, 2:123; Behr, trans., Aelius, 2:97). 
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reinfusion of a proper values, institutional structures, and legal norms, that recommits 
humanity to a pathway of stability and enculturation.87  
Like the Romans before them, the learned men of orthodox Christianity had become, in 
Aelius’ phrasing, “universal geographers for all men by opening up all the gates of the 
inhabited world (ἅπασι περιηυνταὶ κοινοὶ γεγόνατε, ἀναπετάσαντες ἁπάσας τῆς οἰκουμένης τὰς 
πύλας) …and by assigning universal laws for all men and by stopping practices which formerly 
were pleasant to read about, but were intolerable if one should actually consider them…and by 
organizing the whole inhabited world like a single household (καὶ συντάξαντες ὥσπερ ἕνα 
οἶκον ἅπασαν τὴν οἰκουμένην).”88 The ethnographic gaze—the wide lens through which the 
world is reoriented and translated—has become the vernacular, as we have seen, of the 
coalescing catholic church. The tarnish of the age of Barbarism did not dispel Epiphanius’ 
longing for a world free of sectarian opinion, a world he insists is immanently Christian and 
bound to the very experience of being human. Aristides insists that the reign of Rome provides 
precisely such order over against a corruptibly divisive world: “before your empire everything 
was in confusion, topsy-turvy, and completely disorganized (ἄνω καὶ κάτω συνετετάρακτο καὶ 
εἰκῆ ἐφέρετο), but that when you took charge, the confusion and faction (ταραχαὶ καὶ στάσεις) 
ceased and there entered in universal order (τάξις δὲ πάντων) and a glorious light in life and 
                                                        
87 The rise of Rome and its expansive governance inaugurates a certain unification and harmony among the 
world’s peoples: “And the whole inhabited world, as it were attending a national festival, has laid aside its old 
dress, the carrying of weapons, and has turned, with full authority to do so, to adornments and all kinds of 
pleasures. And all the other sources of contention have died out in the cities, but this single rivalry holds all of 
them, how each will appear as fair and charming as possible. Everything is full of gymnasiums, fountains, 
gateways, temples, handicrafts, and schools” (To Rome 97 [Keil, 2:120; Behr, trans., Aelius, 2:94-5]). On the role of 
ethnography and geography in forging the Roman imperial world, see Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 55-61, 
Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History, 294-336, and Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the 
Early Roman Empire, trans. Hélène Leclerc (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 1-56.  
 
88 Aelius Aristides, To Rome 102 (Keil, 2:121; Behr, trans. Aelius Aristides, 2:95-96). 
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government and the laws came to the fore and the altars of the gods were believed in.”89 While 
Rome’s ordering is entirely novel according to Aristides, for Epiphanius the Church, as bound 
by Nicene orthodoxy, recalls a distant past free from division and bound to the simplicity of 
faith in God and the laws of nature. To that end, the age of Barbarism symbolizes the potential 
of the age of Christianity to perfect the divine plan: to uproot the sectarian divisions of the 
Christian age through the revealed truth of Christ and to return to an antediluvian way of life.  
Epiphanius, having refined the inchoate ethnogenic and sectarian theorizations of 
Hippolytus, broadens the conceptual and epistemological scope of heresiological literature. 
The Panarion is not simply an attempt to organize the world of Christianity; it organizes the 
world as a whole by its latent Christianity. What was only hinted at in Hippolytus—the 
sectarian taint of philosophical schools and astrological speculation—has become a 
paradigmatic exposition on the very nature of human religiosity. The Panarion’s project is 
encapsulated perfectly and eerily in a single line from Aelius’ oration: “And it can be said in 
medical terms that the inhabited world was, as it were, ill at the start and has now recovered 
(ἐπιστημόνως τε ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν οἷον πεπονηκυῖαν ἐξ ρχῆς νακεκομίσθαι τὴν οἰκουμένην).” The 
healing capacity of Rome to rectify and regulate a straying world has been recast in the 
language of heresiological ethnography. In Epiphanius’ thinking the church functions as the 
temporal and theological summation point because it nullifies the counting of successive 
generations. In unifying all peoples under the genealogy of Christ, the line of Adam and 
Abraham,90 the church thus offers all peoples, nations, and places the choice to resubmit 
(reattach) themselves to the one true God. All time, having been previously “divided into the 
sixty-two generations up until Christ” now existed in the single body of the church: “all things 
                                                        
89 Aelius Aristides, To Rome 103 (Keil, 2:121-2; Behr, trans. Aelius Aristides, 2:96). 
 
90 Aelius Aristides, To Rome 97 (Keil, Aelii, 2:120; Behr, trans. Aelius Aristides, 2:96).  
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are completed in [the church], whether they are times and seasons, years and intervals of 
generations, and whether the age counts its dates by emperors, consuls, Olympiads or 
governorships.”91 The secession of lineages “will make it evident that the end of the age is 
separate from time, and will be over at the transition to the age to come.”92 And as the age of 
Christianity has burgeoned, the atemporal finality of Christ lingered over the linear 
progression of sacred time toward a decisive eschatological moment. Although the heresies of 
Judaism and Hellenism endured, it was simply a matter of time (or the very undoing of time 
itself!) before the epochs of sectarian opinion would be a remnant of an earthly past.93 
 
Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Master Narrative: A Typological Ordering of Heresy 
 
                                                        
91 Epiphanius, De Fide 5.5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501). 
 
92 Epiphanius, De Fide 5.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501). For a parallel development, see the outstanding work of 
Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), who argues, in a close analysis of Bede’s The Reckoning of 
Time and his Ecclesiastical History of the English People (alongside Amitav Gosh’s In an Antique Land), that the political 
theology of time is a negotiation between incarnational time and political time, 103-131.  
 
93 Similar to apocalyptic temporality and its rigidly defined ages and kingdoms, which function as the theological 
counterweight to the eventual revelation of messianic deliverance, Epiphanius’ history of the church as told in his 
De Fide counts the generations between Adam and Christ in order to plot what was only suggested in his universal 
history of sectarianism: an exegesis of the biblical precedent for the unerring lineage of Christianity. Because, as 
the bishop reports, “the number of each thing in scripture is unalterable, and…nothing which is assigned a 
number can be without value or be reduced to number in the scripture for no good reason” the sixty-two 
generations in Matthew’s genealogy and the sixty generations (or “queens”) of the Song of Songs signify not only 
the biblical succession of the church but a fundamental reordering of the very measure of human history (De Fide 
3.5 [Holl and Dummer, 3:499]). But “since no one has reported or arranged the numbers by generation any 
further, because the number of this sort of thing has been sealed and closed by the number of the queens, which 
is counted up to the incarnation itself,” the post-incarnation era ceases to be measured generationally and the 
“later authors, or rhetoricians, annalists or historians” instead counted by the “successions and times of the 
emperors” (De Fide 5.2, 5.3 [Holl and Dummer, 3:500-501]). Epiphanius, in fact, appeals to the succession of the 
consuls during the years of Jesus’ life to prove the unerring truth of scripture and to thwart the speculative 
opinions of the sectarians. See, also, the successive reigns of consuls, from Augustus and Silanus onward, deployed 
in his attack against the Alogi, who reject the teaching of John’s Gospel and his Revelation the succession of 
consulships (Pan. 51.22.24 [Holl and Dummer, 2:290-1]). Epiphanius also provides a succession list of the Jerusalem 




In the middle of the fifth century—in the wake of the Council of Chalcedon in 451—
Theodoret, bishop of the Syrian city of Cyrrhus, composed four books, known as the 
Compendium Against Heretical Fables (Αἱρετικῆς Κακομυθίας Ἐπιτομή or Haereticarum fabularum 
Compendium), along with a fifth book, The Compendium of Divine Doctrines (Θείων δογμάτων 
Ἐπιτομή or Divinorum decretorum Epitome).94 Taken together, the text is known as The 
Discernment of Lies and Truth (Ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας διάγνωσις or Falsi verique distinctio).95 With 
descriptions of fifty-seven heresies and twenty-nine chapters on orthodox doctrine, this 
                                                        
94 Theodoret, Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium, Preface, Patrologia Graeca 83: 336-556, ed. J.P. Migne, 340B. 
 
95 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 340B). On Theodoret generally, see Theresa Urbainczyk, Theodoret of Cyrrhus: 
The Bishop and the Holy Man (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); István Pássztori-Kupán, Theodoret of 
Cyrus (New York: Routledge, 2006; Ian Tompkins, “The Relations between Theodoret of Cyrrhus and His City and 
Its Territory, with Particular Reference to the Letters and Historia Religiosa (D.Phil. diss., University of Oxford, 
1993). For an analysis of Theodoret and the web of connection and conflict in Roman Syria, see Adam Schor, 
Theodoret’s People: Social Networks and Religious Conflict in Late Roman Syria (Berekely: University of California Press, 
2011). On Chalcedon, see Frances M. Young, From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983). For two intriguing essays on Theodoret’s own identity, see Fergus Millar, 
“Theodoret of Cyrrhus: A Syrian in Greek Dress?” in From Rome to Constantinople: Studies in Honour of Averil Cameron, 
ed. Hagit Amirav and Bas ter Haar Romeny (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 105-125 and Philip Rousseau, “Knowing 
Theodoret: Text and Self,” in The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies, ed. Dale Martin and Patricia Cox Miller (Duke 
University Press: Durham, NC: 2005), 278-97. Helen Sillett has treated the largely unstudied Discernment of Lies and 
Truth in her essay, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Theodoret of Cyrus’ Compendium of Heresies,” in Orthodoxy, 
Christianity, History, 261-273. Much of what she writes about Theodoret is apt and entirely plausible, but I disagree 
wholeheartedly with her characterization of late antique heresiology. She asserts, as is customary with the study 
of heresiology, that by the fourth and fifth centuries the genre had become a banal, rote exercise. This once 
“vibrant, engaged” genre “settled into a flatter form, and the intellectual energy which fueled the earlier works 
was less readily apparent. Dialogue had been replaced by monologue, and no longer was refutation the principal 
aim of heresiology. The falseness of doctrines was presumed evident, and did not inspire elaborate 
demonstration. Heresiologies were now encyclopedic epitomes, cataloging the history of heresy through brief 
descriptions and labels” (270). Broadly speaking, my project aims to upend this dubious and shortsighted reading. 
Indeed, Sillett’s account here grossly mischaracterizes the genre’s evolution, complexity, discomfort, and purport. 
She fails to consider the elaborate literary qualities embedded in heresiological texts, and, more importantly, to 
consider how they negotiate the very capacity of human knowledge. Moreover, Sillett is certainly mistaken that 
the genre evolved from dialogue to monologue in the fourth and fifth centuries. As far as I know, none of the 
extant heresiological texts are dialogic; they are all monologues. I will argue in the Chapter three that the 
heresiologists, in particular Tertullian, expressly contest the value of philosophical or theological dialogue. It is a 
concern from the very beginning not the fourth century. Sillett is also mistaken to assert that the heresies 
Theodoret discusses were already entirely known by the middle of the fifth century (and thus his text is but a 
rehearsal of sorts). First, it is also worth noting that even into the fifth century, Christian ecclesiastics wrote, as 
the case of Quodvultdeus beseeching Augustine demonstrates, in search of answers and in need to guidance on 
the subject of heresy. It is not a problem that has been altogether solved. Second, the heresies were not, as I will 
demonstrate in chapter three, entirely known. The genre persists because the problem endures. I have generally 
followed, though modified inaccuracies and necessary clarifications, the translation by G.M. Cope, “An Analysis of 
the Heresiological Method of Theodoret of Cyrus in the ‘Haereticarium Fabularum Compendium” (PhD diss., 
Catholic University of America, 1990).  
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bipartite heresiological treatise organizes heresy not explicitly by genealogy but by doctrinal 
consonance among the sectarian parties. Theodoret subsumes the genealogical paradigm, 
promoted by Hippolytus and Epiphanius under a typological (i.e., theological doctrinal) 
genealogy.96 His treatment of the heresies in Books I and II defines and organizes them in 
relation to doctrinal lineages. His master narrative imposes a typological ordering upon the 
heretical world that seeks to rationalize the consistently evolving scope and substance of 
heretical inquiry. It is a model that strives to illuminate change among the heretics. The first 
book, as the bishop explains, arrays all those heresies that “invented another creator,” “denied 
one beginning of the whole universe,” and said “that the Lord appeared among men by 
illusion.”97 The second book collects the heresies that hold the opposite, viz. that the universe 
has a singular beginning, but “they address the Lord as a mere man.”98 “The core point of 
comparison between the two main heretical groups,” as Helen Sillett has pointedly phrased it, 
“is Christology, and the errors made by the inadequate simultaneous expression of humanity 
and the divinity of Christ.”99 In Theodoret’s telling, the heretics progressed in history by 
theological variation: each stage of heretical attack was organized around an overarching 
doctrinal type. As one stage failed, a new type emerged to assume the reins.  
While Theodoret naturally inaugurates his discussion of the heresies with Simon 
Magus, in his Compendium Simon does not operate as the lone heretical seed of all the known 
                                                        
96 Sillett concedes that the language of kinship and inheritance does, in fact, exist in the text, but she fails to note 
its prominence. I will discuss this oversight below. See also Averil Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 478. For a 
related application of Theodoret’s typological inclinations, see Derek Krueger, “Typological Figuration in 
Theodoret of Cyrrhus’s Religious History and the Art of Postbiblical Narrative,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 5.3 
(1997): 393-419.  
 
97 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 337C). 
 
98 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 337D). 
 
99 Sillett, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Theodoret of Cyrus,” 269. 
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heretics; instead, he begets only the first of the two major Christological lineages: the 
invention of a divine hierarchy.100 Simon is juxtaposed quite directly with Ebion, the initiant of 
Book II, as a second foundational figure in shaping the contours of the history of heresy. And in 
each case, their pedigrees would ultimately be supplanted by future heretical variants, which 
tried to eradicate orthodox Christianity precisely because previous generations of heretics had 
failed. At Book III, the typology relaxes its bifurcated grip over the text and, instead, we find a 
collection of heretical miscellany. Six unrelated heresies are named, which emerged 
contemporaneously with the two Christological categories of Books I and II, defined as, “those 
who have sprouted between those former heresies (or more remote, temporally speaking) and 
these latter heretics (or nearer, temporally), who were the fathers of diverse doctrines” (τοὺς 
μεταξὺ τούτων κἀκείνων…βεβλαστηκότας, οἳ διαφόρων δογμάτων πατέρες ἐγένοντο).101 The 
Nicolatians, Montanists, followers of Noetus of Smyrna, Quartodecimans, followers of Novatus, 
and those hewing to Nepos exhibit an assortment of theological errors, ranging from 
polygamy to paschal dating, unrelated to the overarching typologies of either Simon or Ebion. 
The six are allied by temporal chance, having fallen in the midst of Theodoret’s larger 
typological classification: “these teachings sprang up between those denying the humanity of 
our God and Savior and calling a mere man the one who is eternal God. And the majority of 
                                                        
100 Augustine enumerates the Simonians first, but does not describe Simon as the root of all heresy (though that 
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101 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 337D; altered from Cope). Also at Haer. III. Pro. (Migne, 338A): Ἐπειδὴ τὰς 
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τούτων κὰκείνων ἐβλάστησαν τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας διδάξωμεν. “Since we have made clear in earlier books that the 
heresies are in opposition to each other, Come now, and we will teach those who are ignorant [about] the other 




them languished as soon as they sprang forth, and remained dried up.”102 The strict binary 
typology is broken as time passes, but it follows a pattern foretold by scripture. The parable of 
the tares (Matthew 7:15-20) forewarns of wolves in sheep’s clothing (the heretics), which will 
be identified by their (bad) fruits (i.e., teachings): “these ill-blowing and all-abominable 
doctrines are sufficient to demonstrate their shared father.”103 As the heretics fulfill their 
divinely ordained role in threatening the rise of Christianity104 (with the aid of common 
people, leaders, generals, and kings) their departure from truth, again, following the divine 
plan, ultimately convicts and defeats them. Like the heretics of Books I and II, the six heretics 
here have withered in defeat, and fled from Christian strongholds. In Theodoret’s telling, these 
theological temptations only serve to steady and strengthen the Church’s foundations.105  
In the first four books of the Compendium, genealogy still operates as a tool by which 
Theodoret arranges the heretics within a broader typological framework. Simon brings forth 
eight named heretical offshoots: the Cleobians, Dosithians, Gortheni, Masbothei, Adrianistians, 
Eutychetians, and Cainites.106 At other junctures, the language of succession (διαδεξάμενος 
from διαδέχομαι—to take up [the word], to succeed, or receive) is deployed to emphasize 
doctrinal heredity (not simply doctrinal parallelization or sequential ordering) or theological 
paternity. Simon is described as the precursor to Menander, who then served as teacher to 
Saturnilus and Basilides. Prodicus is labeled the successor to Carpocrates, and Valentinus is 
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104 See also Theodoret, Haer. I. Pro.; II. Pro. (Migne, 341 C; 384B-385C). 
 
105 Theodoret, Haer. III. Pro. (Migne, 401A). 
 
106 For the first four, see Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, ed. and trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classical Library 153 
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said to have received “his starting point” from the first six heresies named (Simon, Menander, 
Saturnilus, Basilides, Carpocrates, and Prodicus), and he ultimately bears the heresy of 
Secundus. At the turn of the twenty-third chapter, Theodoret refines his genealogical 
typology, declaring that the twenty-two heretics from Menander to Florinus, in fact, all “began 
from Simon” and “brought forth doctrines similar to one another, naming Aeons, and 
emanations of Aeons, and other emanations of emanations.”107 Book II does not explicitly 
follow a genealogy of knowledge or chain of intellectual inheritance until the fourth chapter, 
whereupon Theodotus is said to have “held these same [doctrinal] opinions with Artemon” but 
“led a different faction,” which then germinates the Melchezidecians.108 While the consonance 
between Theodotus and Artemon is ambiguous (is it shared either by coincidence or by 
inheritance), it is clear that Theodotus is the seed from which the Melchezidecians arise; they 
“are a division of these Theodotians.”109 The Elcesaites, moreover, “collected myths from 
various heresies,” evidencing further intellectual dependence among and between the 
heretical factions.110 And in Book IV, the fourth chapter concerns the “Pasthyrians and others 
derived from the heresy of Arius.”111 Polemon is noted to have taken “his starting point from 
the writings” of Apollinaris.112 In the chapter three, Theodoret describes the heresy of Aetius 
and his student Eunomius as an intensified offshoot of Arius: this sect “clearly increased the 
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blasphemies of Arius.” 113 Not only did they spread the essential theological message of Arius 
(thus carrying on his intellectual lineage), but also, like any living organism, they mutated and 
adapted to the challenges of orthodoxy. 
A heresiological system ordered by typology does not, as we see, necessarily dissolve 
genealogical relations; it can and does use and even illuminate them, while also emphasizing 
doctrinal similarity over against generative causation. The Compendium is not altogether 
dissimilar from the Panarion in the way that both use generative-kinship connections between 
the heresies to complement their broader schematizations: a universal genealogy of heresy 
writ large for Epiphanius and a theological typology of heresy for Theodoret. Though shaped 
by their different emphases, both Epiphanius and Theodoret employ the same language of 
classification (the micro-tools by which their narratives unfold). Epiphanius describes most of 
the heresies as a successor to the previous sect, and the succession itself, generally, follows one 
of two patterns: a temporal succession (the ambiguous “successor,” in which chronology is the 
driving structure) or an actual genealogical (intellectual) descent.114 As we noted above, the 
language of succession, though not dominant for Theodoret, does organize almost the entirety 
of Book I and various heresies throughout Books II, III, and IV. To that end, many of the 
heresies in the Compendium progress along an organizational trajectory markedly similar to 
that used in the Panarion. As the macro-frameworks of the Panarion and the Compendium 
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114 Epiphanius reports, for example, that Noetus “arose in his turn after Bardesanes, though not many years ago; it 
was about 130 years before our time” (Pan. 57.1.1 [Holl and Dummer, 2:343]). The Purists (Pan. 59.1.1-13.9 [Holl and 
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to the Noetians,” but doctrinal concordance does not necessarily identify a genealogical relationship (Pan. 62.1.2 
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organizationally diverge, they conceptually gesture toward the same conclusion. In both the 
case of typology and genealogy, the schematic function is to rationalize the disorder of the 
heretical world. In the Panarion, the universal genealogy turns the error of idolatry into a 
causative devolution by which heresy is defined out of the tradition and outside the space of 
Christian knowledge. Like Epiphanius’ De Fide, the Compendium of Divine Doctrines articulates the 
lineage of piety down into the Catholic Church, Theodoret tailors his treatise toward 
orthodoxy and, specifically, toward a refinement of its theological constitution. 
In the Compendium the emphasis on doctrine serves to trace the evolving proximity of 
heretical pestilence, which then builds the foundation for the imperative of his fifth book on 
orthodoxy:  
Now I call upon those who are reading [this], to examine each of the heretical 
doctrines in comparison with the teaching of the truth. For on account of this, I 
wrote the fifth book. For it shall be seen, on the one hand, that the fifth book 
follows the sayings of the divine spirit, while the other books are the invention 
of all-depraved thought.115   
 
By fomenting ecclesiastical purges and synodic battles, the doctrinal history of heresy 
conversely maps Theodoret’s discussions of orthodox doctrine. The utility of doctrinal heresy 
is precisely what propels and nurtures Theodoret’s typological model. It is the formation of 
Church doctrine via the interaction between heretical and orthodox theology that undergirds 
the typological paradigm, which brings into relief the necessity of coherent orthodox opinion:  
Therefore, since we proved the shame of the lies and we stripped the heretical 
fables bare, their impiety became evident, and carry joylessness and incredulity 
to them, come let us compare them to the Gospel teaching. We made plain the 
difference between light and darkness, between the peak of health and the 
difficulty of sickness. For it is not (possible) to find a likeness that they agree 
with the proposed comparison. For even the darkness, even if it also leaves 
behind the light, nevertheless produces the necessary utility for me. For the 
night brings about a respite for those who work during the day. And sickness 
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has become profitable for many. For having recognized the Savior and Creator 
through this, and having proclaimed the expulsion of evils, they who obtained 
what they asked turned their attention to virtue.116 
 
While protreptic language here is unmistakable, Theodoret’s argument posits a cosmic 
struggle between two forces, those of light and darkness. The contestation between the forces 
of the demonic and those of God not only creates the seemingly chaotic history of Christianity, 
it also serves as the foundation around which Theodoret can seek to impose order upon and 
comprehend systematically the ebb and flow between the devolution and evolution of 
Christianity’s standing throughout the world. His treatise expounds a theory of heresy that 
rationalizes the persistent and enduring threat of contrarian opinion by way demonic 
intrusion. In essence, it grounds abstract notions of Christian temptation in a demonogenic 
narrative.  
Theodoret argues that heresies arose from the work of the “wholly-evil demon, the 
destroyer of mankind” who, having lost “the roots…of polytheistic error, and himself being 
stripped bare of subjects,” “invented different concepts of the insidious attacks.”117 In the 
preface to the second book of his Compendium (the typology conditioned by Ebion, which 
emphatically declares Christ’s humanity), he explains the perpetuation of heresies as an 
unyielding effort by demonic forces to disrupt the ship of truth. The demon, unwed to 
principles consistency, steadily works his way through a bounty of heresies, jettisoning what 
fails and refining what succeeds:  
But these [heretics of Book I] were only a few who would be easily counted, and 
these, disperesed in some of the cities, were surrounded by the thrusting 
opprobrium for Valentinus, Marcion, and followers of Mani, probably by 
refutation of those who are now entrusted to maintain the churches but are 
unable to convert the small remains of the impious heresies. And the demon, 
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140 
hostile to God, could not take satiety of war against the godly; but again he 
sends others to war against the truth, with teachings in complete opposition to 
the previously described heretical beliefs.118  
 
The heresies of yore, having failed to counteract the forces of light, belong to the annals of 
history. They have been summarily exposed, counted, and demolished. And although the trope 
of demonic lineage persistently lingers over the discourse of heresy, Theodoret has fashioned a 
heresiological master narrative that explains typological succession by means of demonic 
plotting.119 In Theodoret’s telling, demonic intercession is not, then, some haphazard or 
sporadic occurrence, but a persistent and regulated effort to alter the contours of Christian 
history. Theodoret’s heresiology thus marshals this cosmic struggle to explain the state of the 
Christian world. Fourth and fifth-century heresies—the enduring contestations generated by 
Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, the Donatists, and Apollinaris, among others—reveal a worsening, 
adaptive demonic plot. Having been thwarted by God’s apostles and future generations of 
orthodoxy, who have stamped out the infamous opinions of Simon and Ebion’s legacy, the 
demonic power resumes its plan with new knowledge:  
But the Father of lies, whom the Lord reasonably called a murderer (for he 
always lays plots for the souls of men), contrived different devices of plots. For 
after understanding, as it seems, the things said concerning the God of the 
Universe on the part of the disciples of that one (i.e. Valentinus), to be wholly 
foul, so the message of their explanation did not hold plausibility. For some, on 
the one hand, said that the naked divinity appeared, and others, on the other 
hand, said that the human nature devoid of divinity performed the [divine] 
economy. He, the devil, mixed another impiety, devoid of the hyperbole of the 
former view.120  
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Realizing the implausibility of its Valentinian creation, the Evil One marshals subtler, more 
conniving blasphemies to challenge the pillars of truth. While heretical diversity had been 
used previously (by Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Epiphanius, and Augustine) to evidence 
the heresies’ incompatibility with the singular apostolic succession or Catholic truth, for 
Theodoret the diversity is an outward sign or remnant of previous demonic attempts, which 
have failed.  
Even in the instances in which heresy possessed a demonogenic lineage, the 
heresiologists ascribe heresy’s longevity, again, to the susceptibility of the human mind; 
heresy’s very livelihood hinges on the innate weakness of human existence.121 As Theodoret 
declares, while interpreting II Timothy, the apostle “Paul” “proves both the freedom of the will 
and the autonomy of the mind, which easily changes one’s inclination to whatever one 
wants.”122 Heresy is a phenomenon bound to and by human frailty. Similarly, during his 
refutation of the Sethians, Epiphanius supplements his periodized history of the heresy with a 
brief comment about culpability. After enumerating the various languages and peoples that 
arose in the aftermath of the tower’s destruction, the bishop ascribes the total contents of his 
universal narrative to the handiwork of the devil: 
Why is it, then, that these people have told their lies, interpolating their own 
mythology, imagining and dreaming of unreal things as though they were real, 
and banishing what is real from their own minds? But the whole thing is an idea 
of the devil which he has engendered in human souls. It is amazing to see how 
he deceived man into many offenses and dragged him down to transgression, to 
fornication, adultery and incontinence, to madness of idols and gluttony, and 
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any number of such things—but never before Christ’s coming ventured to say a 
blasphemous word against his own Master or mediate open rebellion.123 
 
As the instrumental realization of the demonic or divine plans, men and women emerge as the 
agents and markers of heresy in history.124 Just as “the all-wise God of the universe entrusted 
the [gospel’s] cultivation of the barren world to a few men,” the demon chose “men worthy of 
his own operation…placing on them like a mask the title of Christians.”125 He sowed the seeds 
of wickedness (“planted the tares”) before the gospel had been established—“immediately 
after those [Apostles] began to cultivate and to scatter the seeds of piety”—“he presented the 
noxious drug of falsehood to humankind.”126 But heresy’s persistence as a force at once natural 
and supernatural, caught between the world of men and the world of demons, exposes an 
important disjuncture within the rhetorical edifice of heresiology: the rationalization of 
heresy as a necessary source of temptation presupposes the human ability to comprehend it and 
triumph over it. Heresy’s oscillation between natural and supernatural force, I contend, frames 
the epistemological fortitude and intellectual heft of the heresiologists in terms of an evolving, 
yet always tenuous, command of heresiological sources and tradition.127 
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124 See Theodoret Haer. I. Pro. (Migne, 341B-C); II. Pro. (384C-388B); II.11 (397B-C); III. Pro. (Migne, 400B-401A). 
 
125 Theodoret, Haer. I. Pro. (Migne, 341B). 
 
126 Theodoret, Haer. I. Pro. (Migne, 341C). 
 
127 I shall return to this point in chapters four and five.  
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Sillett has posited a plausible historical explanation to account for Theodoret’s 
typological arrangement, in which the Compendium is best understood as “a literary response 
to” the Nestorian controversies of 431 and 451.128 Theodoret, having watched as Cyril and 
Nestorius waged synodal and doctrinal war against each another, interprets the vicissitudes of 
Christological contestation as an ever-encroaching demonically generated force precisely 
“because heresy looked, to the bishops involved, a lot like orthodoxy.”129 The ever-shifting 
theological landscape thus necessitates a discernment of truth and lies. Instead of contesting the 
heresies as he describes them, Theodoret thrusts a systematic counter-text upon them. His 
typological ordering, hastened by the Christological controversies of the fifth century—and 
the ensuing ecclesiastical messes—reflects the increasing fluidity between orthodoxy and 
heresy as narratives within ecclesiastical governance. Of Nestorius, Theodoret notes that he 
used “every instrument…continually undertaking his craft, in guise of orthodoxy.”130 Although 
the process by which the demon deploys his tricks in the name of God predates Nestorius—“for 
he undertook to attack everyone by the blasphemous fellowship of his name”—the current 
crises of the fifth century illustrate the demon’s progression and evolution.131 What was once 
easily discerned as outside the fold, now requires far more exacting scrutiny and investigation. 
                                                        
128 Sillett, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Theodoret of Cyrus,” 267. 
 
129 Sillett, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Theodoret of Cyrus,” 271. On Nestorius, Cyril, Theodoret, and heretical 
discourse, see Susan Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a Heretic 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Silke-Petra Bergjan, Theodoret von Cyrus und der Neunizänismus: Aspekte 
der Altkirchlichen Trinitätslehre (New York: de Gruyter, 1994). Further support for this argument is found in C.T. 
McCollough, “A Christianity for an Age of Crisis: Theodoret of Cyrus’ Commentary on Daniel” in Religious Writings 
and Religious Systems: Systematic Analysis of Holy Books in Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Greco-Roman Religions, Ancient 
Israel, and Judaism, ed. Jacob Neusner, Ernest S. Frerichs, and A.J. Levine (Atlanta, G.A.: Scholars Press, 1989), 157-
174.  
 
130 Theodoret, Haer. IV.12 (Migne, 433A). Although the process by which the demon deploys his tricks in the name 
of God predates Nestorius (see the Prologue of Book II), the current crises of the fifth century illustrate the 
demon’s progression. What was once easily discernible as belonging outside the fold now required far more 
exacting scrutiny.  
 
131 Theodoret, Haer. II. Pro. (Migne, 384 B).  
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In each successive generation, the heresies become more entrenched, hew closer to the line of 
orthodoxy, and become more difficult to discern.  
Inasmuch as Theodoret’s heresiological text directly confronts the problem of 
embedded heresy by augmenting heretical descriptions with orthodox instruction, it follows 
Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Epiphanius, all of whom situate the articulation of orthodoxy—or 
doctrinal truth—as their textual codas. In writing on twenty-nine subjects, ranging from 
abstinence to judgment, Theodoret’s treatise offers the most systematic juxtaposition between 
heresy and orthodoxy. Moreover, his text ventures beyond simple disputes over Christology 
and the proximate events of the fifth century’s theological controversies: it includes 
theological delineations of cosmology, demonology, anthropology, creation, resurrection, 
parousia (among others), alongside practical considerations such as second marriage, 
repentance, virginity, and abstinence. Even with its typology framework, the Discernment 
remains styled and shaped by the language of its heresiological predecessors. And as the 
typological genealogies of Simon and Ebion recede the text becomes an amalgam of heretical 
miscellanies, ordered only by a demonic machinations. Theodoret’s text is an exemplar of the 
genre’s structural capacity to adapt itself, to look backward and forward, as the persistence of 
heresy necessitates a consistent explanation even as the heresies become increasingly diverse, 
versatile, and resilient.  
 
Conclusion: Christianizing the World 
 
While the effects of erroneous opinions and practices are strikingly obvious in 
Epiphanius’ condensed history of the world, what has remained largely overlooked by scholars 
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is the degree to which he and the other heresiologists thrust a process of ethnographic 
reasoning (well beyond the procreative language of genealogies) to the fore of his Christian 
corrective. I have tried to illustrate in these two chapters how the investigation of heresy’s 
origins—and its ethnic or national character—prefigures and ultimately structures the 
taxonomy of the character and quality of Christian heresy. In elucidating the history and 
impact of cultural and religious progression and devolution, offering a typological theory of 
heretical diversification, and contesting alternative theories of cosmic and human 
classification, heresiology binds its analysis of sectarianism to a worldview that coalesces 
systematicity or macroscopic theorization with the production and evolution of heretical 
opinions. Having reached the epoch of Christianity, the interaction of theological opinions now 
shapes the history of the world. The ethnography of heresy at once narrows the order of the 
world to its Christian aegis and yet defines the world by its Christian (theological) governance. 
In the fifth book of his Confessions, Augustine (the subject of chapter V), challenges the 
Manichaean interest in astrology and astrological prediction. Although he attributes their 
errant obsession to the now commonplace heretical hubris—“they become lost in their own 
ideas and claim to be wise, attributing to themselves things which belong to you”—there is a 
secondary supposition to Augustine’s attack.132 “The person,” he observes, “with a scientific 
knowledge of nature is not pleasing to you on that ground alone.”133 Understanding the laws of 
nature without also knowing God is a hollow and meaningless discovery. Augustine insists that 
                                                        
132 Augustine, Confessiones V.III.5.50-52 (Confessionum Libri XII, ed. Martin Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 
[Brepols: Turnhout, 1990]), 59; Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick [New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998], 75). 
 




any knowledge of the natural world apart from God is a false knowledge.134  More than that, 
however, the world of nature not only evidences God, but it must be in accordance with the 
norms of Christianity. Naturalistic phenomenology “becomes an obstacle [for the self-
identified Christian] if he thinks his view of nature belongs to the very form of orthodox 
doctrine, and dares obstinately to affirm something he does not understand.”135 In other 
words, the natural world—its foundations and manifestations—must exist in harmony with or 
in mystery from orthodox doctrine. The natural world, which includes the profusion of 
peoples across its lands, is not an entity to be feared; rather, it must be brought within the 
discourse of Christianity. Heresiology functions as an unabashed illustration of this effort to 
make the world manifestly and exhaustively Christian. Through an analysis of the disharmony 
within Christianity (and the world more broadly), the heresiological genre works backward 
(from dissonance to consonance) to extrapolate theories of human diversity. The ethnographic 
impulse of heresiology emerges out of a desire to impose a fixed order on its world. 




                                                        
134 Augustine, Confess. V.IV.7.3-16 (Skutella and Verheijen, 60; Chadwick, trans., 75-6). 
 
135 Augustine, Confess. V.V.9.22-24 (Skutella and Verheijen, 61; Chadwick, trans., 77). 
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What is crooked cannot be made straight, and what is lacking cannot be counted. I said 
to myself, “I have acquired great wisdom, surpassing all who were over Jerusalem before 
me; and my mind has had great experience of wisdom and knowledge.” And I applied my 
mind to know wisdom and to know madness and folly. I perceived that this also is but a 
chasing after wind. For in much wisdom is much vexation, and those who increase 




While “precise knowledge” (ἡ ἀκρίβεια, lit. exactness) as Epiphanius of Salamis 
observed, “guides man, to protect him from error about either part of the truth,” 
heresiological literature illustrates the inadequacies and tensions within textual efforts to 
expound what one must know and do and refrain from doing to be a Christian.1 Embedded 
within the ethnographic impulse of the early Christian authors—the impulse to describe, classify, 
and polemicize with systematic lists and etiologies of peoples, doctrines, belief systems, etc.—is 
an acute awareness about the rectitude and propriety of inquiry, social discourse, and 
scholastic fervor.2 Precisely because the heresiologists characterized their heretical opponents 
as perpetually theologically probing and epistemologically restless, curiosity and investigation 
                                                        
1 Epiphanius, Pan. 62.7.7 (Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 31 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1980], 
2:396). Against Aetius’ ἀκριβολογία and his μαθών τῆς διαλεκτικῆς  (Pan. 76.3.7, 2.1 [Holl and Dummer, 3:343, 
341]). Translation from Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis, 2 vols., NHS 35–36 [Leiden: Brill, 1987, 
1994]. 
 
2 Greg Woolf’s Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 
8-31, posits a definition of ethnographic knowledge that is oriented around exchange (on a middle ground): 
“ethnographic knowledge, I take it, is that knowledge we gain of one another in conversation, specifically in 
dialogues conducted across a gradient of unfamiliarity. Conversations of this kind must have taken place long 
before the archaic period. Presumably they increased in frequency as the Mediterranean world and its 




were symbols of Christian contradiction.3 Theological, scriptural, and ethnographic inquiries 
were not neutral endeavors of pastoral protection. Even in the lands of the most learned 
ecclesiastics, inquiry was emblematic of the corrosive heretical mentality. As a symptom of 
scholastic indulgence, theological liberality, and epistemological hubris, heresy exposed not 
only the delicate balance between pious and impious knowledge, but also the threat posed by 
irresolution and probing to the discourse of Christian surety.4 The heresiologists’ awareness of 
the potential pitfalls of discovery and dialogue emphasizes that these Christian authors found 
themselves negotiating the ambiguous effects of Christian didacticism, scholasticism, and 
inquiry. By affirming that social discourse and scholastic investigation were tied to an 
overarching concern about the dangers of collection and codification, the heresiologists 
knowingly pursued their ethnographic agendas on treacherous rhetorical, epistemological, 
and theological terrain. 
                                                        
3 Inquiry encourages exchange and openness, which created the space for individual choice. Heresy, by its very 
etymology, was an affirmative act of subversion. The word itself, as Tertullian explains, derives from the Greek for 
choice (αἵρεσις), which emblemizes the arrogance of a self-determined and appropriated rationality to augment 
the teachings of the gospel of Christ (Praescr. 6.2 [Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 95]). The 
heretic secures his own self-condemnation—“if they are heretics, they cannot be Christians, since the names 
which they accept come not from Christ, but from the heretics whom they follow of their own choice”—in the 
very choice to expand and thus adulterate the apostolic and scriptural traditions of Christianity (Praescr. 37.2 
[Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 139]). For Tertullian, even an angel who claims to have 
received revelatory knowledge from the divine—and therefore to augment the apostolic tradition—should be 
anathematized from the church (Praescr. 6.5 [Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 95]). See 
Marcel Simon, “From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual 
Tradition, ed. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979). 101-116. 
 
4 On the importance of consensus in late antiquity as an outgrowth of the military, economic, and political crises 
of the third century, see Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power and Social Order in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1995), 24-30. The rise of the Constantine endowed Christians with newfound privileges and 
benefits: “the nomen Christianum,” as Lim calls it held enormous financial, political, and ecclesiastical power (26). 
To that end, clarity of voice within the city served the needs of the bishop and his city. The relationship between 
a local city and its imperial benefactors necessitated consensus within the city itself: “diffused discussions and 
disputing, with individuals applying their powers of persuasion in a freewheeling way, were potentially dire 
threats to the shaky bond between center and periphery” (28). The threat of heretical movements, most 
pronouncedly Manichaeism in the post-Constantinian era, threatened to disrupt the stability of imperial 
networks of ecclesiastical patronage.   
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If the binary between orthodoxy and heresy was a (rhetorical) distinction between 
order, coherence, and constancy, on the one hand, and restlessness, volatility, and persistence, 
on the other, inquiry emerged as the conceptual ground on which the distinction was pressed 
and elaborated. In this chapter, I array the heresiologists’ rhetorical and theological 
ruminations about their texts’ participation in and perpetuation of a Christian discourse of 
uncertainty and doubt.5 Although the task of describing and refuting the heretics was 
unquestionably justified on account of pastoral, theological, and ecclesiastical needs, the 
vehemence with which it was undertaken concealed the complexity and peril of its scholastic 
genealogy, pedagogical implications, and ethnographic ordering. The heresiologists’ 
cognizance of the fractious potentiality of their texts encapsulates their fears about 
ethnographic inquiry as a means of erroneously sanctioning an unrestricted investigation of 
the world and all its inscrutable diversity. Heresiology’s overarching epistemological and 
scholastic framework transformed the polemical ethnographic project of mapping heresy (and 
its eventual refutation) into a referendum on the relevance and legitimacy of knowledge 
acquisition as both an investigative process and a tangible end result. The process of 
elaborating an ethnographic model of heresy, having used geographical, genealogical, and 
typological paradigms to explain Christian difference, balanced the destabilizing facets of 
heresiological knowledge against the stabilizing duties of ecclesiastical authority.6 The 
imperative to guide and correct the language and normativity of Christian behavior and 
                                                        
5 See, for instance, Gillian Clark, “Can We Talk? Augustine and the Possibility of Dialogue,” in The End of Dialogue in 
Antiquity, ed. Simon Goldhill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 117-134; Averil Cameron, “Enforcing 
Orthodoxy in Byzantium,” Studies in Church History 43 (2007): 1-24; H.A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops: The 
Politics of Intolerance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); and Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 70-148. 
Lim has carefully demonstrated and emphasized, however, “the porosity of boundaries that separated the so-
called questioners from orthodox Christians” (178). The dialectical disjuncture between orthodoxy and heresy, 
like so much of the discourse, was an idealized construct.  
 
6 Claudia Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), especially 3-99. 
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thought necessarily included an appraisal of the value of study and learning as extensions of 
an already delimited Christian epistemology.  
In explicitly foreclosing both the method and conclusions of the (dialogic) 
philosophical method (embraced by the heretics), Tertullian, the prolific North African 
Christian author, pushed to demolish any genealogical consonance between the heretics and 
their Christian ethnographers. There was simply no room for any associative harmony. But by 
theorizing the legitimacy of inquiry and, in turn, recounting their own laborious scholasticism, 
the heresiologists navigated the treacherous terrain of intellectual elitism by humbling 
themselves and their task. While heresiology aimed to assert Christian control over and within 
the known world, the heresiologists’ tempered this rhetoric of mastery by emphasizing their 
toil on behalf of their Christian congregants. Richard Lim’s remarks about Augustine’s 
management of his authority, humility, and scholastic language, pertain equally to the 
heresiologists’ pursuits: 
As a priest and later bishop, Augustine regarded his own pastoral care of his 
fellow Christians who, in his view, could not be trusted to hold their own in 
discussions with heretics, as a primary concern. For this reason, among others, 
he was to write in ways that demonstrate more authority with a corresponding 
diminution in the amount of intellectual openness he was willing to grant 
himself in discussing matters of faith and belief.7  
 
As types of ethnographic theorists, the heresiologists persistently asked how one knows, when 
one knows, when one knows too much, and when one must cease from knowing. Theorizing 
knowledge, both as an end in itself and as an investigative process, shaped the formation of a 
Christian scholastic and pastoral tradition in which the barriers to, limits of, and utility for 
information were meticulously constructed and arrayed.  
 
                                                        
7 Richard Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 161. See Rapp on 
pragmatic ecclesiastical authority, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity, 23-55. 
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 Heretical Discourse: Problematizing Dialectic and Inquiry 
 
In his Rule Against the Heretics (De praescriptione haereticorum), Tertullian (ca. 160-220 C.E.), 
theorized the theological function and repercussions of heresy within a broader discussion of 
the Christian impulse to inquire assiduously.8 Unlike the heresiological works of Irenaeus, 
Epiphanius, Theodoret, Augustine, and Hippolytus, Tertullian’s text largely abstains from an 
analysis of particular heretical opinions. Even Tertullian’s claim late in the text to offer “a 
description of the heretics’ way of life” (converationis haereticae descriptionem) serves largely to 
meld various heresies into a single, generic mass of error and earthly interests.9 And although 
other works by the Carthaginian—most notably Adversus Marcionem, Adversus Hermogenem, 
                                                        
8 Praescriptio, in its literal sense, refers to a precept, law or rule; it does not, in fact, mean prescription. For the 
Latin of Tertullian’s text, I have used the Sources Chrétiennes edition: Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum 
(Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. R.F. Refoulé, SC 46 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1957]). I have followed 
(with my own alterations) S.L. Greenslade’s magisterial translation of The Prescriptions against the Heretics in Early 
Latin Theology: Selections from Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, and Jerome (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1956), 25-64. The text is comprised of forty-four chapters, though one (spurious) manuscript contains an 
additional eight chapters (which Migne prints in his edition of the text) with a list of heresies (these addenda are 
ascribed to a figure known as Pseudo-Tertullian). Even when he explicitly discusses Marcion, Apelles, and 
Valentinus in sections 29 and 30, Tertullian frames it as a digression in which he challenges not the doctrines of 
the heretics but their claims to represent truth. For truth, explains Tertullian, always exists before falsehood. On 
Tertullian generally, see Timothy David Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study, rev. ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985); Geoffrey D. Dunn, Tertullian (New York: Routledge, 2004); Robert D. Sider, Ancient Rhetoric 
and the Art of Tertullian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); David Rankin, Tertullian and the Church (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); David E. Wilhite, Tertullian the African (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007); and 
Carly Daniel-Hughes, The Salvation of the Flesh in Tertullian of Carthage: Dressing for the Resurrection (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001). For a more theologically oriented survey of Tertullian, see Eric Osborn, Tertullian: First Theologian 
of the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). On Tertullian and heresy, see Dimitri Michaélidès, Foi, 
Écritures et Tradition, ou Les ‘Praescriptiones’ chez Tertullien (Paris: Aubier, 1969); J.-Cl. Fredouille, Tertullien et la 
conversion de la culture antique (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1972), 195-234; Frédéric Chapot, Virtus Veritatis. 
Language et vérité dans l'oeuvre de Tertullien (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2009), especially chapters 2 and 
3; Charles Munier, “Analyse du traité de Tertullien de Praescriptione Haereticorum,” Revue des sciences religieuses 
59 (1985): 12–33; Clare K. Rothschild, “Christ the Foolish Judge in Tertullian’s On the Prescription of Heretics,” in 
Tertullian and Paul, ed. Todd D. Still and David Wilhite (New York: T&T Clark, 2013), 34-44; Timothy F. Merrill, 
“Tertullian: The Hermeneutical Vision of De Praescriptione Haereticorum and Pentateuchal Exegesis,” The Patristic 
and Byzantine Review 6 (1987): 153-67; and Stéphanie E. Binder, Tertullian On Idolatry and Misnah Avodah Zarah 
(Boston: Brill, 2012), 49-60. On Tertullian’s association with “the new prophets” (what most scholars term 
Montanism), see Laura Nasrallah, An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 97-111. 
 
9 Tertullian, Praescr. 41.1 (Refoulé, 146). The heretics are hasty with their ordinances, liberal in their acquisition of 
converts, and, most significantly, corrupters of established truth 
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Adversus Praxean, and Adversus Valentinianos—offer detailed descriptions and refutations of 
particular heretical holdings, De praescriptione presented a composite characterization of the 
essence of heretical identity.10 Within this amalgamated heretical disposition, Tertullian 
postulated an intellectual division between Christian and heretics by folding their identities 
into a referendum on the associative and substantive danger of inquiry.    
Tertullian enumerated the incontestable diktat incumbent upon all those who call 
themselves Christian: if the human experience within the world was to be grasped and 
maximized, it must be guided by the principle that “Christ laid down one definite system of 
truth,”11 which it then became necessary for all the nations to “believe without qualification.”12 
Insofar as men and women possessed an obligation to “seek in order that they may be able to 
                                                        
10 For the Latin text of Adversus Marcionem with translation, see Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, ed. and trans. Ernest 
Evans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). See also, Contre Marcion: Livre I, ed. and trans. René Braun, SC 365 (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 1990); Livre II, ed. and trans. René Braun, SC 368 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1991); Livre III, ed. and 
René Braun, SC 399 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1994); Livre IV, ed. and trans. René Braun and Claudio Moreschini SC 
456 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2001); and Livre V, ed. and trans. René Braun and Claudio Moreschini, SC 483 (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 2004). In his five books against Marcion, Tertullian disputes his dualism, rejection of the Hebrew 
Bible, and editing of the Gospels and Letters of Paul. For the Latin text of Adversus Hermogenem, see Contre 
Hermogene, ed. and trans. Frédéric Chapot, SC 439 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1999). In this treatise, Tertullian 
contests Hermogenes’ opinion that matter, co-eternal with God, becomes the source of evil in the world (matter 
itself was not, by nature, evil). See Adversus Praxean, ed. Aemelius Kroymann and Ernest Evans in Tertulliani Opera 
Pars II, CCSL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), 1157-1206. The text is mostly a theological dispute about the nature of 
the Trinity and the degree to which the Father and Son can be said to share the incarnational experiences of the 
latter. For the Latin of Adversus Valentinianos, see Contre les Valentiniens, ed. and trans. Jean-Claude Fredouille SC 
280 & 281 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1980). The treatise is a refutation of the Valentinians and their claims to possess 
secret knowledge of God and the cosmos.  
 
11 Tertullian, Praescr. 9.3 (Refoulé, 102). 
 
12 Tertullian, Praescr. 9.3 (Refoulé, 102). The contestation over epistemological expansiveness—the production, 
transmission, refinement, and delimitation of knowledge as it relates to the advent and rise of Christianity—
reflects the heresiologists’ insistence that the system of knowledge produced by the gospel of Christ functions to 
humble and close the human mind to alternate systems of truth. It is altogether fitting, then, given the cataloguing 
impulse of the Panarion, that Epiphanius begins his history of heresy with a juxtaposition of epistemological 
entreaties. His appeal to God, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit stands alongside “the Greek authors, poets, and 
chroniclers” who invoke a Muse “when they undertook some work of mythology” (Pan. Pro. II.1.3. [Epiphanius, ed. 
Karl Holl, GCS 25 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1915], 1:169). Epiphanius seeks to allay his expressed anxiety for the task 
that awaits him—his discussion of faith and unbelief—through a divine appeal, which will “give light to [his] poor 
mind, for its illumination with the knowledge of these things,” while his Greek counterparts seek the wisdom of a 
Muse, which was “devilish, ‘earthly, and not descended from above,’ as scripture says” (Epiphanius, Pan. 
Prooemium II.1 [Holl, 1:170]; Jas. 3:15 as cited by Epiphanius at Pan. Pro. II.1.3 [Holl, 1:169]). The praxis of entreaty, 
at once perpetuated and supplanted by Epiphanius, illustrates both the shift toward the Christian vernacular of 
the religious as it also instances the hierarchical distinctions of knowledge within the Christian universe. 
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believe,” the corollary to that process of inquiry was an acknowledgment of epistemological 
finitude: for “there cannot be indefinite seeking of that which has been taught as the one 
(unius) and definitive (certi) thing.”13 The association Tertullian posited between philosophers 
and heretics presages the hazards of heresiological ethnography that later iterations of the 
genre negotiated.14 Unlike Augustine, whose disfavor for the dialogic form reflected (among 
various other reasons) his determination that it was ill-equipped for the ecclesiastical 
necessities of mass communication, Tertullian’s treatise did not theorize dialectic as a 
distinctly ecclesiastical problem.15 Instead, he posited that dialogue was a symptom of a more 
troubling heretical disease. Insofar as he theorized the consequences of knowing the 
theological, heretical, and scriptural landscape of Christianity, he feared the destabilizing 
qualities of engagement, inquiry, and exchange. The refutation of the heretics constituted 
more than theological and ecclesiastical wrestling over differences of opinions: it inaugurated 
an ethnographic feedback loop of persistent and protracted discovery and discourse.  
                                                        
13 Tertullian, Praescr. 9.3, 9.4 (Refoulé, 102; altered from Greenslade).  
 
14 This is the avenue of inquiry I pursue in chapters four and five, giving specific attention to the heresiologies of 
Epiphanius, Theodoret, and Augustine.  
 
15 On late antique Christian appraisals and usage of dialogue, see Catherine Conybeare, The Irrational Augustine 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-60; Gillian Clark, “Can We Talk? Augustine and the Possibility of 
Dialogue?,” Richard Miles, “‘Let’s (not) Talk about It:’ Augustine and the Control of Epistolary Dialogue;” and 
Richard Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 117-134, 135-150, 
and 151-172. While Clark argues the problem of dialogue (both as a genre and as a means of communication) 
derives from Augustine’s ecclesiastical duties, she notes that even before he had become a bishop Augustine 
showed distaste for dialogue. He questioned its utility for seeking answers to complex questions. The turn toward 
sermons (or preaching in its various guises) was a magnification of his public responsibilities. In addition, she 
argues, implausibly, I think, that that actual social engagement with heretics could have undermined the 
authorial or ecclesiastical voice: “sympathetic understanding could be quoted against him; and if he did not 
convincingly defeat the opposition, his audience might not accept beliefs that in his judgment were lethal” (125). 
Of course, texts could just as easily be used against a bishop or learned Christian. Indeed, as I have already shown, 
the heresiologists ably marshaled their opponents’ words against them. As an especially elite and generally 
private mode of communication, dialogue not only necessitated an intellectually astute audience to follow its 
trajectory, it failed, if its lack of usage by late antique Christians is evidence, as a means of mass communication. 
For Lim, while dialogue remained a privilege of the elite, it failed to engage the masses of Christians across the 
empire. Moreover, dialogue held the potential to accentuate problematically the paideia and intellectualism of 
Christian ecclesiastics.  
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In Tertullian’s text, the Christian tradition, represented by its theological principles, 
texts, rituals, practices, and apostolic succession, stands cordoned off from additions of any 
kind.16 The parallel Tertullian drew between the heretics and the philosophers served to 
demarcate the genealogy of Christian tradition and praxis and to posit a dispositional 
distinction between those Christians who were restless and those who were satisfied.17 The 
ascertainment of knowledge flowed from Aristotle’s teachings on the value of relentless 
inquiry and what he termed “fruitless questionings” (quaestiones infructuosae)18: 
Wretched Aristotle! He who establishes dialectic for these men, the art which 
destroys as much as it builds, crafty in its opinions, forced in its conjectures, 
stubborn in its arguments, maker of struggles, annoying even to itself, retracing 
everything, it will have treated nothing in its entirety.19 
 
                                                        
16 The treatise begins by dismissing those who express astonishment at the very existence of the heretics, since, 
Tertullian explains, the heresies were divinely foretold in scripture (Matt 7:15; 24:4, 11, 24; 1 Cor. 11:19) as a 
phenomenological test: “for their purpose is that by holding a trial, faith would still possess approval” (Praescr. 1.1 
[Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 88]). The prevalence of heresy serves to uncover the 
specter of devotion, exposing those Christians—“a bishop or deacon, a widow, a virgin or a teacher, or even a 
martyr”— who lapse into heresy and forfeit their faithfulness (Praescr. 3.5 [Refoulé, 90]). For faith, Tertullian 
insists, is not tested by persons but persons by faith Tertullian, like his heresiological predecessors and 
successors, is offering a scriptural and theological rationalization of heretics in the world. However much they are 
opposed to the teachings of God, the heretics ultimately serve the divine will. 
 
17 The Gnostics, Epiphanius’ twenty-sixth heresy (Pan. 26.1.1-19.6 [Holl, 1:275-300), exemplify the elasticity and 
precariousness of theological speculation and restless inquiry. Unlike the heresiologists who argued that the 
totality of Christian knowledge would only arrive in the kingdom of God, the Gnostics were seemingly impatient; 
they devised systems to obtain higher orders of knowledge in the here and now. Moreover, these heretics, 
dissatisfied by the limited revelations of the divine, supplanted scripture with new books and prophecies. They 
likewise sought to transcend the limits of the holy books with exegeses that produced elaborate cosmologies, 
sanctioned particular ritualistic conduct, and established alternative theories of the anthropological condition. As 
Epiphanius tells it, in writing “nonsensical books” (a Gospel of Perfection, a Gospel of Eve, Questions of Mary, 
Apocalypses of Adam) and narrating fantastical stories, the Gnostics “yoke themselves to Nicolaus’ sect for the 
sake of ‘knowledge,” not only “pervert[ing] their converts’ minds, but “enslav[ing] their bodies and souls to 
fornication and promiscuity” (Pan. 26.1.3, 3.3 [Holl, 1:275]).  
 
18 Tertullian, Praescr. 7.7 (Refoulé, 98). 
 
19 Tertullian, Praescr. 7.6 (Refoulé, 97; altered from Greenslade). On Tertullian’s pagan education, see Barnes, 
Tertullian, 187-210 (for his philosophical tendencies, see especially 205-210). On his appropriation, modification, 




In asking, famously, “What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the Academy, the 
Christian with the heretic,” Tertullian adamantly insisted upon the theological futility of 
protracted investigation about scripture, Christ, theodicy, divinity, cosmology.20 Insofar as the 
geographical locus of Christianity (Jerusalem) attested further dichotomies of institution and 
identity, Tertullian postulated a clash of worldviews through this tripartite schematization. He 
sought to recast the intellectual underpinnings of the Greco-Roman world through the 
language and strictures of Christian knowledge. Tertullian’s recalibration of these three 
geographical, religious, and institutional symbols inaugurated the transformative era of 
Christianity: the terms of academic culture have been recast through the lens and dicta of 
Christian discourse.  
The endeavor to expand one’s epistemological horizon fallaciously operates as if 
knowledge was an end in itself effectuated through various intellectual, ethnographic, and 
experiential processes. For Tertullian and the Christianity he circumscribed, the search for 
knowledge was located in Christ, who made wisdom “freely accessible to all believers, 
irrespective of rank or birth.”21 As Richard Lim describes it, “Tertullian championed a 
paradoxical and radically inward-looking faith,” which could be known through the 
precedents of Scripture (and not via the dialectical pursuits of the Greek philosophers):22 
Our instruction is from the portico of Solomon, who himself had taught that the 
Lord must be sought in simplicity of heart. There is no use for those who had 
advanced a Stoic or a Platonic or a dialectic Christianity. After Jesus Christ there is 
no need for our curiosity, and after the Gospel no need of inquiry (Nobis curiositate opus 
non est post Christum Iesum nec inquisitione post euaugelium; emphasis mine). When 
                                                        
20 Tertullian, Praescr. 7.9 (Refoulé, 98). See, also, Justo L. González, “Athens and Jerusalem Revisited: Reason and 
Authority in Tertullian,” Church History 43 (1991): 17-25 and Wendy E. Helleman, "Tertullian on Athens and 
Jerusalem,” in Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World, ed. Wendy E. 
Helleman (Lanham, MA: University Press of America, 1994), 361-382. See also Barnes, Tertullian, 210. 
 
21 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 10. 
 
22 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 10. 
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we believe, we desire nothing beyond believing. For this we believe from the 
beginning, that there is nothing we ought to believe beyond [this].23 
 
Tertullian’s claim that Christ’s gospel halted the need for further inquiry (about the nature of 
God, etc.) contested more than just the dialectical propensity of the Greek philosophers. In 
fact, the compulsion among Christians, heterodox and orthodox alike, to discuss, exchange, 
study, and debate theological doctrine and scriptural minutiae hewed to the very words of 
scripture. The heretics’ appeal to the scriptural mantra “search, and you shall find” (quaerite et 
inuenietis at Matt. 7:7 and Luke 11:9), pushed Tertullian to develop an exegetical strategy to 
limit the scope of Jesus’ dictum. By insisting on a literal interpretation of the verses, Tertullian 
proposed a defensible means to delimit the boundaries of Christian inquiry.24  
De Praescriptione accorded the misinterpretation of the scriptural injunction “to search 
persistently” to a combination of a priori misassumptions and the neglect of the contextual and 
circumstantial conditions surrounding Jesus’ injunction. In the first place, Tertullian 
explained, the dictum was promulgated before Jesus had revealed himself to be the Christ (and 
before Peter had proclaimed him to be the Son of God). “When, thus far he had not been 
recognized, he still had to be sought,” it was altogether appropriate to encourage curiosity and 
investigation since the revelation of Christ was still unfolding.25 In addition, the command to 
seek “applies only to the Jews” (in Iudaeos competere) for the Jews alone possessed the bounty of 
textual material (the law and prophets) through which they could and should have found 
Christ.26 Because the Jews dwelt in God’s house, having been vouchsafed the promise by the 
                                                        
23 Tertullian, Praescr. 7.10-13 (Refoulé, 98-9; altered from Greenslade). 
 
24 See the latter half of Dunn’s “Tertullian’s Scriptural Exegesis,” 147-155.  
 
25 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.4 (Refoulé, 99; altered from Greenslade).  
 




God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they were implored by Jesus to search its contents anew.27 
“The nations, however, were never in God’s house. They were…always outside (foris semper).”28 
Because the apostles had not yet received the command “to go to the nations, who will be 
taught and baptized,” the gentiles remained in a state of ignorance about the messianic claims 
of Jesus of Nazareth.29 There was no knowledge basis from which they could seek and thus 
find.30   
Tertullian further contested the locution’s dangerously open-ended sanction of inquiry 
by proposing exegetical regulations to restrict its applicability. According to the him, exegesis 
was governed by the rules of reason (disciplina rationis interpretentur) only if it attended to the 
specifics of matter, time, and limit (what, when, and for how long).31 Tertullian thus bound the 
validity of investigation to the experience of spiritual fulfillment, so that “what you must seek 
is what Christ taught, (seeking) for such a time, assuredly, as you do not apprehend it, until, 
indeed, you do find it.”32 The principle was rather clear: belief in or knowledge of Christ 
nullified the necessity of further theological or epistemological exploration. Tertullian’s 
                                                        
27 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.4 (Refoulé, 99). 
 
28 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.9 (Refoulé, 99; altered from Greenslade). 
 
29 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.14 (Refoulé, 101; altered from Greenslade).  
 
30 Tertullian’s insistence, however, that “search and you shall find” belonged to a particularly Jewish context, 
which excluded the nations, seemingly obviated the universality of the Christian gospel. Anticipating the 
objection, Tertullian conceded but qualified the implication of his argument: “Indeed, all the words of the Lord 
were ordained for everyone. They came to us through the ears of the Jews; and most were directed at (these) 
peoples; thus they establish not a property of admonition for us but an example” (Praescr. 8.16 [Refoulé, 101]). To 
counter his critics, Tertullian proposed to exegete the verse as if it were a universal maxim, through which he 
identified the principal misunderstandings and mischaracterizations of those who appealed to Matthew 7:7 and 
Luke 11:19 in order to justify their epistemological fervor. 
 
31 “As to matter, that you consider what it is you must seek; as to time when you must seek; as to limit how long 
you must seek” Tertullian, Praescr. 10.1 (Refoulé, 103). On the lack of systematicity in Tertullian’s exegesis, see J.H. 
Waszink, “Tertullian’s Principles and Methods of Exegesis,” in Schoedel and Wilken, 17-32. 
 




position proclaimed the pedagogical fulfillment of Christ: “acceptance of the faith debars any 
prolongation of seeking and finding.”33 The sheer bounty of teachings available from the 
heretics, philosophers, and nations, a concerned Tertullian warns, engenders the possibility 
and likelihood of endless but worthless searching. The necessity of exposure again confronts 
the dangers of discovery, engagement, and legitimization. 
Inasmuch as Marcion, Valentinus, Ebion, Simon, and Apelles universally appealed to 
Matthew 7:7, they inculcated an epistemological worldview in which spiritual fulfillment and 
stability were continually challenged and disrupted:34 “therefore I shall be nowhere as I 
encounter ‘seek and you shall find’ everywhere” (ero itaque nusquam dum ubique convenio 
quaerite et invenietis).35 Tertullian quite explicitly feared that an open-ended call to seek 
would legitimate a destabilizing and corrosive mentality among his fellow Christians. A 
principle that embraced investigation as a scriptural mandate would transplant the disposition 
already fully embodied by the heretics—since the heretics are the emblems of unadulterated, 
limitless exploration— into the traditions of Tertullian’s vision of Christian tradition: 
                                                        
33 Tertullian, Praescr. 10.4 (Refoulé, 103). See also Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.27.1-2 (Contre les hérésies, Livres II, ed. and 
trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 294 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982], 2:2:264-6): “But to combine 
things that are not expressed openly or placed under our eyes with the explanations of parables, explanations 
that anyone excogitates at will, is unreasonable. It would result in no one’s having a Rule of the Truth. On the 
contrary, as many interpreters of the parables as there would be, just so many truths would be seen at war with 
each other and setting up contradictory opinions, as is the case with the questions of the pagan philosophers. 
According to that reasoning, then, man would always be in search without ever finding, because he had rejected 
the very method of investigation.” The translations of Irenaeus are from Dominic J. Unger, et al. in St. Irenaeus of 
Lyons: Against the Heresies, Books 1, 2, and 3. ACW 55, 65 and 64 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992, 2012, 2012). For 
books IV and V, I have followed ANF. On Irenaeus’ notion of the rule of truth, see Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 143-161.  
 
34 The false knowledge—or knowledge so-called—of various heresies, the Gnostics, the Simonians, the Secudians, 
the Marcosians, the Nicolatians—amasses its power from its claim to fill this epistemological lacuna of Scripture; 
it supplants and supersedes the transcendent knowledge the church ascribes to the God of scripture. As Irenaeus 
warns, the heretic “imagines that he has acquired not a partial, but a universal knowledge of all that exists” 
(Irenaeus, haer. II. 28.9 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:290]). Their theological promiscuity, as Hippolytus, 
Epiphanius, Irenaeus, and Theodoret all observe, triggers a far wider avalanche of promiscuous, indiscriminate 
conduct. 
 
35 Tertullian, Praescr. 10.9 (Refoulé, 104; altered from Greenslade). 
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For if they are still seeking, they have still found nothing certain, and for that 
reason whatever they appear to hold in the interim, they expose their own 
doubts, as long as they are seeking. Therefore, you, who are seeking in the same 
manner, looking to those who themselves also are seeking, the doubter to the 
doubters, the hesitator to the hesitators, blind, you must be led, by the blind 
into the ditch.36   
 
To wander astray philosophically, exegetically, cosmologically, or ritualistically (i.e. the 
various manifestations of the call to seek) was no mere act of impunity if it occurred under the 
conditions of established belief. To seek while believing was an act of outright desertion, and 
“therefore in deserting my faith, I am found to be a denier (ita fidem meam deserens, negator 
invenior).”37 To embrace a life of ceaseless scrutiny—a yearning to interpret scripture endlessly, 
try to ascertain the contours of heaven, and to posit a description of the transcendent 
Godhead—was to participate in a culture of heresy that eschewed humility and feared of God.38  
Having already expressed distaste for dialectic, Tertullian marshaled scripture yet 
again to broaden the scope of his earlier argument against debate by positing yet another 
reason by which inquiry and dialogue were to be forsworn. He adduced the precedent of Titus 
3:10, which forbade extended contestation even for corrective purposes: 
[Titus] forbids us to enter into investigations, to attach our ears to novel 
remarks, or to associate with a heretic ‘after one reproof,’ not after discussion.39 
He forbade discussion, designating reproof as the reason to meet with a heretic, 
and only one correction because the heretic is not a Christian. He is to have no 
right to a second censure, like a Christian, before two or three witnesses, since 
he is to be censured for the very reason that forbids discussion with him.40   
                                                        
36 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.7-8 (Refoulé, 107-8; altered from Greenslade). 
 
37 Tertullian, Praescr. 11.3 (Refoulé, 104; altered from Greenslade). 
 
38 Tertullian, Praescr. 43.3-4 (Refoulé, 150). 
 
39 The text of the Epistle to Titus refers to a first and second correction: “After a first and second admonition, have 
nothing more to do with anyone who causes divisions, since you know that such a person is perverted and sinful, 
being self-condemned” (3:10). For some unknown reason, Tertullian’s description of Titus omits reference to the 
second approbation.  
 




Because the heretics reject books of the Bible (or, conversely, add to them) and/or adduce false 
exegesis (adulter sensus), the very groundwork for holding conversation evaporates into 
nothing.41 Tertullian reasons that ceding oneself to the exercise of learned debate served only 
to embolden and legitimize the irrationality of the heretics and to induce those who waver in 
the faith to draw erroneous conclusions. An observer, watching such a dispute, “sees that you 
have accomplished nothing, the rival party being allowed equal rights of denial and 
affirmation and an equal status. As a result he will go away from the argument even more 
uncertain than before, not knowing which to count as heresy.”42 In giving the heretics equal 
standing, Christians foundered even before they made their case.43  Insofar as dialogue posited 
a degree of cultural symmetry between participants, it functioned as a space of legitimation. 
As Richard Lim explains, “the very capacity to participate as an informed interlocutor in a 
literary or philosophical symposium was the preserve of a cultured man who has mastered the 
elaborate codes necessary for such a performance….Conversely, the ideal dialogue could not 
                                                        
41 Tertullian, Praescr. 17.1-2 (Refoulé, 110). For an example, see Peter Iver Kaufman, “Tertullian on Heresy, History, 
and the Reappropriation of Revelation,” Church History 60.2 (1991): 167-179. 
 
42 Tertullian, Praescr. 18.2 (Refoulé, 111). 
 
43 The futility of protracted discussion between Christians and their heretical interlocutors centers round the 
authority of scripture, specifically the heretics’ claim to be proper exegetes of Scripture (Praescr. 18-19, 23). The 
falsification scripture by itself, however, captures only the superficial level of the contestation. Tertullian reasons 
it is the very claim to scripture that requires delineation: “It follows that we must not appeal to Scripture and we 
most not contend on ground where victory is impossible or uncertain or not certain enough. Even if a biblical 
dispute did not leave the parties on a par, the natural order of things would demand that one point should be 
decided first, the point which alone calls for discussion now, namely, who hold the faith to which the Bible 
belongs, and from whom, through whom, when and to whom was the teaching delivered by which men become 
Christians?” (Praescr. 19.1-2 [Refoulé, 111]). He secures his argument with the recollections of and appeals to the 
innate truth of the apostolic tradition, its foundation in scripture (particularly the incontrovertible writings of 
Paul), and its historical precedence over falsehood. In asking who owns Scripture, Tertullian recounts the 
production of an apostolic tradition in which churches were set up across the Mediterranean and “from which 
other churches afterwards borrowed the transmission of the faith and the seeds of doctrine and continue to 
borrow them every day” (Praescr. 20.5 [Refoulé, 112-3). Cf. T. P. O’Malley, Tertullian and the Bible: Language-Imagery-
Exegesis (Nijmegen and Utrecht: Dekker and van de Vegt, 1967), 130-134. The proper ownership of Scripture, as an 
apostolic claim, definitively jettisons the need to ask questions out of curiosity or interest.  
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operate if the interlocutors did not share this common outlook.”44 And while the presence of 
strangers within dialogues, Lim goes on to explain, served to emphasize “the overall solidarity 
of the (other) participants” (a role the heretics have played throughout the history of 
Christianity), the stranger’s participation within the dialogue incorporated them into a sacred 
cultural milieu.45 By participating in disputations and engagements with the heretics, 
Christians unknowingly sanctioned the heretics’ connection to a tenuous (third–century) 
Christian intellectual and cultural space and in the very process bound themselves to the 
philosophical pedigree of dialectic.46   
Tertullian’s offensive against the inclination to seek additional instruction and to ask 
additional questions culminated in the elaboration of a rule of faith (regula fidei), the 
enumeration of what it was Christians qua Christians defended (quid defendamus).47 The regula 
functioned as a dictation of the inarguable tenets of Christianity and as the metric through 
which Tertullian’s demarcation of valid avenues of theological and heresiological inquiry could 
be parsed.48 The rule expressed the singularity of God, who created the world through his 
Word (who is also called his Son), which the patriarchs and prophets attested. The Word “was 
brought down by the Spirit and Power of God the Father into the Virgin Mary, was made flesh 
                                                        
44 Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 163.  
 
45 Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 167.  
 
46 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, demonstrates the dialectical reputations of Manichaeism, 88-92, and the 
Anomoeans, 119-130. 
 
47 Tertullian, Praescr. 13.1 (Refoulé, 106). 
 
48 See L. William Countryman, “Tertullian and the Regula Fidei,” The Second Century 2 (1982): 208–27; Eric F. Osborn, 
“Reason and the Rule of Faith in the Second Century AD,” in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry 
Chadwick, ed. Rowan Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40-61; and Everett Ferguson, 




in her womb, was born of her and lived as Jesus Christ.”49 Jesus preached a new law, worked 
miracles, issued a new promise of the kingdom of heaven, and was crucified on the third day, 
after which he rose again and took his place at the right hand of the Father. Christ, Tertullian 
explained, would return to pass judgment on humanity, at which time he bestowed eternal life 
upon his followers and cast his disbelievers into an everlasting fire.50 The contours of this rule 
of faith operated to circumscribe the invalidity of all questions—“this rule…raises no questions 
among us (haec regula…nullas habet apud nos quaestiones)”—“except those which the heresies 
introduce and which make heretics.”51 Heretics contested the rule, not Christians. The 
propriety of epistemological investigations hung on the supposition that  “when the forma of 
the rule remains in its proper order, you may seek as much as you like.”52 Curiosity could be 
indulged and areas of obscurity, darkness, and confusion could be illuminated but only if they 
existed apart from or in total harmony with the uncontestable principles of Christian truth. In 
demanding that theological inquiry be pursued in accord with the rule of faith (both in terms 
of content and obtainment), the epistemological deference Tertullian proposed served to 
recalibrate the lens through which inquiry was to be gauged.53 The rule foreclosed unnecessary 
                                                        
49 Tertullian, Praescr. 13.3 (Refoulé, 106). 
 
50 Tertullian, Praescr. 13 (Refoulé, 106-7). 
 
51 Tertullian, Praescr. 13.6 (Refoulé, 106-7; altered from Greenslade). 
 
52 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.1 (Refoulé, 107; altered from Greenslade). 
 
53 Although the seemingly straightforward act of affixing theological inquiry to bedrock truths established by and 
in the regula shaped Tertullian’s assessment of the limits and propriety of inquisition, centuries of vigorous and 
violent debate obviously attest otherwise. The controversies surrounding figures such as Origen, Arius, Pelagius, 
Donatus, Jovinian, Priscillian, Nestorius, among innumerable others, illustrate the persistent presence of debate 
and disagreement over the meaning of scripture, the nature of sin, Christology, Trinitarianism, etc. For 
discussions of the wide-ranging theological, ecclesiastical, political, and discursive implications of these 
controversies, see, for example, Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992); Virginia Burrus, The Making of a Heretic: Gender, Authortity, and the Priscillianist Controversy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995; Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition (London: SCM, 2001); R.P.C. 
Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318-381 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic 
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speculation just as it demanded, as Tertullian’s treatise ably illustrated, efforts to defend its 
inviolability.  
For Tertullian, the regula remained fixed not to abstract theological debates or 
principles, but to the lived tradition of the churches, where the bishops, leaders, and teachers 
shepherded communities of Christ’s devotees.54 Because “no one is able to be instructed from 
where he is destructed” (nemo inde instrui potest unde destruitur), history and tradition supplied 
the requisite answers for those who inquired.55 When Tertullian implored his fellow Christians 
who actively sought knowledge to pursue their queries “in our own territory, from our own 
friends, and on our own business,”56 he naturally appealed to the great cities of the apostolic 
tradition: 
Come now, if you are ready to exercise your curiosity better in the business of 
your own salvation, run through the apostolic churches, where the very thrones 
of the apostles preside to this day over their districts, where the authentic 
letters of the apostles are still recited, bringing the voice and face of each one of 
them to mind. If Achaea is nearest you, you have Corinth. If you are not far from 
Macedonia, you have Philippi and Thessalonica. If you can go to Asia, you have 
Ephesus. If you are close to Italy, you have Rome, the nearest authority for us 
also.57  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Press, 2006); David G. Hunter, Marriage, Celibacy, and Heresy in Ancient Christianity: The Jovinianist Controversy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Bart D. Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture: The Effect of Early 
Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Susan Wessel, 
Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and a Heretic (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); and Carlos R. Galvão-Sobrinho, Doctrine and Power: Theological Controversy and Christian Leadership in the 
Later Roman Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).  
 
54 As the inheritors of the philosophers, the heretics compounded the danger of inquiry insofar as they gathered 
strength and confidence from the mere exercise of exchange and scriptural debate. By suggesting that, “the 
apostles did not know everything” or that, though knowing everything, “they did not hand everything on to 
everybody,” the heretics proposed “that the men whom the Lord gave to be teachers were ignorant” (Praescr. 
22.2-3 [Refoulé, 115, 116]. This challenge to the fullness of apostolic knowledge, tradition, and transmission 
created the intellectual vacuum that the heretics’ theological, cosmological, and exegetical pursuits would fill.  
 
55 Tertullian, Praescr. 12.4 (Refoulé, 105; altered from Greenslade). 
 
56 Tertullian, Praescr. 12.4 (Refoulé, 105). 
 
57Tertullian, Praescr. 36.1-2 (Refoulé, 137). 
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In Tertullian’s eyes, the apostolic cities were depicted as safe houses of Christian piety, even if 
they were also sites of heretical prominence.58 By virtue of their history, they purportedly 
offered a protective environ for those propelled by a desire to know, to learn, and inquire. 
Although Tertullian’s invocation of the uninterrupted truth of the apostolic tradition is hardly 
a novel move in early Christian literature, 59 it imagined and, indeed justified, a space in which 
                                                        
58 This is one important implication of Walter Bauer’s thesis in Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity. Not only 
were the so-called great cities of apostolic Christianity (Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, Corinth, and Ephesus, among 
others) characterized by substantial and early theological and ecclesiastical division and strife, heresy was not, 
historically speaking, a derivative of orthodoxy. Tertullian, in fact, knows the problem of persistent error can be 
gleaned from Paul’s epistles. The heretics appealed to the evidence of 1 Corinthians and Galatians. Tertullian 
argued, however, that Paul’s reprobation of the earliest Christian cities did not evidence, as the heretics 
contended, that the churches had gone astray from the beginning (or that they were marked by unrelenting 
contestation). Instead the Pauline epistles demonstrated that these churches were summarily corrected and 
“today mix with those churches reproved in the privileges of a single tradition [of teaching]” (Praescr. 27.6 
[Refoulé, 124]). Orthodoxy, as Bauer tirelessly demonstrated, did not always precede heresy. In many places, such 
as Edessa, Antioch, and Ephesus “heresy” was the first “version” of Christianity to arrive. Bauer writes of Edessa, 
for example, “in the picture that the representatives of the church sketch, it is precisely the detail about a great 
apostasy from the true faith that is seen to be incorrect—in any event, it is not true of Edessa. Here it was by no 
means orthodoxy, but rather heresy, that was present at the beginning. Christianity was first established in the 
form of Marcionism, probably imported from the West and certainly not much later than the year 150” (28-29). 
 
59 Epiphanius argued in his medicine chest that the heretics’ augmentation of the scriptural canon (via addenda 
and excision) bespeaks a deeper epistemological orientation. The fifty-first heresy of his Panarion, for example, is 
termed the Alogi (or those who are dumb, literally Ἄ-λογοι), on account of their rejection of the Gospel of John 
and his Revelation—“as they do not accept the Word which John preaches” (Pan. 51.3.1 [Holl and Dummer, 2:250]). 
“Sectarians like these,” the bishop notes, “are confounded by the truth and accuracy of the sacred scriptures, 
especially by the agreement of the four Gospels” (Pan. 51.21.14 [Holl and Dummer, 2:280]). Their inability to 
comprehend the unity of Scripture reveals their underlying condition: “these people too have hated the sureness 
of the Gospel, since they are of the earth and angry with the heavens” (Pan. 51.1.3 [Holl and Dummer, 2:249]). 
Because the heretics adulterate the true teaching handed down by the apostles, they are progenitors of an 
alternative and distinctly human intellectual pedigree: “the truth properly resides at one time in Valentinus, at 
another in Marcion, at another in Cerinthus, then afterwards in Basilides…(Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III.2.1 [Contre les 
hérésies, Livres III, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Lous Doutreleau, SC 211 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974), 
3:2:26]).” Scripture, Irenaeus insisted, had laid out the principles of Christian belief and practice, and Christian 
identity was conceived as an act of adherence. Commitment to the comprehension provided by the apostolic 
succession of knowledge protected and perpetuated Christian truth and tradition: “True knowledge is [that which 
consists in] the doctrine of the apostles, and the ancient constitution of the Church throughout all the world, and 
the distinctive manifestation of the body of Christ according to the successions of the bishops, by which they have 
handed down that Church which exists in every place, and has come even unto us, being guarded and preserved 
without any forging of Scripture, by a very complete system of doctrine, and neither receiving addition nor 
[suffering] curtailment [in the truths which she believes]; and [it consists in] reading [the word of God] without 
falsification, and a lawful and diligent exposition in harmony with the Scriptures, both without danger and 
without blasphemy; and [above all, it consists in] the pre-eminent gift of love, which is more precious than 
knowledge, more glorious than prophecy, and which excels all the other gifts” [of God] (Adv. haer. IV.33.8 [Contre 
les hérésies, Livres IV, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau, SC 100 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965), 4:2:818-820]). By 
contrast, the heretics, Irenaeus submitted that, “that the truth was not delivered by means of written documents, 
but “vivam vocem” (Adv. haer. III.2.1 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 3:2:26]). Consequentially, the heretics 
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Christians could indulge their curiosity if properly defined and expressed. The regulation of 
pedagogical illumination fell to frater aliqui, “who as a teacher is bestowed with the grace of 
knowledge (gratia scientiae), someone consorting among the learned, someone who is curious 
like you and still seeking (aliqui tecum curiosus tamen quaerens).”60 I would argue that Tertullian’s 
failure to articulate the qualifications of these learned teachers attests the inherent 
treacherousness of sanctioning any space, no matter how sacred, storied, or apostolic, as a 
legitimate site of Christian inquiry. The distinction between instruction and destruction, the 
light and darkness of a still nascent Christian world, became decidedly murkier when 
Christians felt an obligation to seek answers to their questions.61  
While Tertullian acknowledged the permissibility of inquiries borne by curiosity 
(assuming they were directed to a trusted teacher and did not contest the rule of faith), he also 
indicated that inquiry, by its very design, was impossible to regulate and control. The 
approbation to learn in a particular environment (with, potentially, a particular teacher) was 
strategically qualified when Tertullian counseled a simpler solution: “in the end, it is better to 
be ignorant lest you will have come to know what you should not because you have (already) 
known what you should.62 ‘Faith,’ scripture tells the Christian, ‘has saved you’ (lit. makes your 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
conceptualized wisdom as untethered to tradition since, “they object to tradition, saying that they themselves are 
wiser not merely than the presbyters, but even than the apostles, because they have discovered the unadulterated 
truth” (Adv. haer. III.2.2 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 3:2:26-28]).  
 
60 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.2 (Refoulé, 107; altered from Greenslade). For a useful discussion of Tertullian’s attitude 
toward ecclesiastical authority and leadership, see Allen Brent, “Tertullian on the Role of the Bishop,” in Still and 
Wilhite, 165-185.  
 
61 Tertullian, Praescr. 12.4 (Refoulé, 105).  
 
62 This trope is also attested in John Chrysostom’s On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, where, as Richard Lim 
illustrates, the bishop exhorted those weaker-minded Christians not to engage with peoples who questioned and 
prodded the divine nature but simply to flee:  “Wherefore I exhort, flee from their madness” (Διὸ παραινῶ 
φεύγειν αὐτῶν τὴν μανίαν [Daniélou, 90]). For the text of De incomprehensibili natura Dei see Jean Chrysostome: Sur 
l’Incompréhensibilité de Dieu, ed. Ferdinand Cavallera, Jean Daniélou, and Robert Flaceliére (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 
1951], which is a reprint of Migne PG 48:701-812. See, also, Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 171-177, esp. 173. 
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salvation for you; Luke 18:42), not the practice of scripture…learning derives from curiosity 
and wins glory only from its zealous pursuit of scholarship. Let curiosity give place to faith, 
and glory to salvation.”63 Tertullian’s proposal that faith must supplant curiosity encapsulates 
the disjuncture he proposes between the constancy of belief and the precarious mutability and 
malleability of inquiry:64 the heretics’ “endless searching exhibits their hesitation/uncertainty 
(dubitationem suam ostendunt quamdiu quaerunt).”65 By casting learning as a predilection for 
epistemological fluidity, Tertullian combatted the encroaching domain of heretical inquiry by 
forswearing its value altogether. Fear of the effects (and associative connotations) of inquiry 
demanded cessation of all potentially disruptive practices and habits.   
Although the rejection of inquiry suited the project of an orthodox community of 
Christians determined to deny any philosophical pedigree, the task of refuting the heretics 
exposed the “double bind” of paideia.66 If, as Tertullian famously quipped, the philosophers 
                                                        
63 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.2-3 (Refoulé, 107; altered from Greenslade). The social contagion of the heresies most 
preoccupies the legalists of late antiquity, who denounce the individual heretic, whose impostures “weaken the 
concept of God,” but preserve his right to be a heretic unto himself. A law from August of 379 encapsulates, 
almost completely, the myriad dangers Tertullian ascribes to heretical factions: “All heresies are forbidden by 
both divine and imperial laws and shall forever cease. If any profane man by his punishable teachings should 
weaken the concept of God, he shall have the right to know such noxious doctrines only for himself but shall not 
reveal them to others to their hurt. If any person by a renewed death should corrupt bodies that have been 
redeemed by the venerable baptismal font, by taking away the effect of that ceremony which he repeats, he shall 
know such doctrines for himself alone, and he shall not ruin others by his nefarious teaching. All teachers and ministers 
alike of this perverse superstition shall abstain from the gathering places of a doctrine already condemned, 
whether they defame the name of bishop by the assumption of such priestly office, or, that which is almost the 
same, they belie religion with the appellation of priests, or also if they call themselves deacons, though they may 
not even be considered Christians” (CTh 16.5.5). The law, of course, permits individuals to remain heretics, even if 
the theological language wishes to render them extinct, only after they have served their soteriological function. 
Still, however, I am drawn to the parallel between the language of heresiology and the legal discourse of late 
antiquity. The existential incompatibility of heresy with sacral order infuses the laws of late antiquity with the 
ideological exclusivism of Christianity at the social level, though the laws, in their details, apply abstractly to the 
very notion of heresy. 
 
64 We saw this image invoked in Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium VII.13.3, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 1986), 280, where Odysseus’ difficulties with the sirens are deployed as a model of resistance.   
 
65 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.7 (Refoulé, 108; altered from Greenslade). 
 
66 On Christian efforts both to own and disown their claims to paideia, see Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late 
Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 35-70 and Richard Lim, 
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were “the patriarchs of the heretics” (patriarchis haereticorum), the rhetorical and philosophical 
training that empowered Christian authors to elaborate critiques of Greco-Roman culture and 
their heretical offspring simultaneously established an intellectual bond between them. The 
threat of a perceived cultural symmetry between these three classes of “professional” 
inquirers (philosophers, heretics, and heresiologists) threatened to collapse the carefully 
calibrated discourses of Christian pedagogy, authority, and ministry.67 Contesting the heretics, 
insofar as it fell to an ecclesiastical or learned class, threatened to endow the heresiologists 
with the specter of an elite or “set-apart status,” which always carried the taint of heresy.68 
Precisely because factionalization and fallacious exegesis belonged to a genealogy of a 
professionalized knowledge—“where was Marcion then, the ship-owner of Pontus, the student 
of Stoicism? Were was Valentinus then, the disciple of Plato”—the creation of a protective 
class of inquirers, the heresiologists, necessitated rhetorical and pastoral bulwarks against the 
onslaught of inquiry. 69 However much heresy was rationalized as an inevitable facet of the 
history of Christianity, its continued presence posed a twin dilemma for its opponents. On the 
one hand, the heretics, as Tertullian insisted in line after line of his treatise, embodied the 
desire to inquire assiduously. They were inquiry personified. And yet, on the other, their very 
existence demanded inquiry, research, and refutation. The presence of the heretics denied 
Tertullian’s imagined foreclosure. Widespread ignorance, despite Tertullian’s best hopes, was 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
“Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 151-172, and his Public Disputation, 
138-148. 
 
67 Tertullian, De Anima 3.1, ed. J.H. Waszink in Tertulliani Opera Pars II, CCSL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), 781-869, at 
785.  
 
68 Richard Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 168.  
 
69 Tertullian, Praescr. 30.1 (Refoulé, 126). Tertullian explicitly feared that any endorsement of the arts of discovery 




neither a plausible nor compelling strategic vision. As Augustine surmised two centuries later, 
“it is a big help for the heart of the believer to know what one should not believe, even if one 
cannot refute it with skillful argumentation.”70 How, then, did Christians manage these 
conflicting compulsions? How did they conceptualize and articulate their textual 
investigation, research, and discoveries?   
 
The Rhetorics of Heresiological Inquiry: Mastery 
 
Very near the start of his remarks on Mani and the Manichaeans, Epiphanius pauses 
briefly to justify his foray into the life and world of this well-known heretic. Emphasizing his 
willingness to toil anew over well-trodden ground in the name of truth, the bishop burdens 
himself with introducing his subject “from the very beginning.”71 He declares straight away 
that he has “been at pains to convey [the minutest facts of Mani’s family, most especially the 
means by which his master accrued his wealth] in full detail for your information, so that 
those who care to read this will not go uninformed even of the remote causes of every affair.”72 
The claim that the heresiologist can acquire and present complete knowledge of any one 
heretic and, indeed, survey the totality of the heretical world—“to omit nothing about the 
divisions, splits, differences and schisms which have arisen in the world” (ἵνα μή τι παραλείπω 
τῶν εἰς διαιρέσις τε και τομὰς καὶ εἰς διαστάσεις καὶ εἰς σχίσματα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ 
                                                        
70 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.51-3 in S. Aurelii Augustini Pars XIII, ed. R. Vander Plaetse and C. Beukers, CCSL 
46 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1969), 344. I have generally followed the translation of Heresies in Arianism and Other 
Heresies, ed. John E Rotelle and trans. Ronald J. Teske, The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21st 
Century, vol. I/18, (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 15-77. 
 
71 Epiphanius, Pan. 66.2.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:17). 
 




συμβεβηκότων)—undergirds the rhetorical integrity of his Panarion.73 The most salient 
articulation of the syllogistic structure of heresiological discourse comes not from the hand of 
any of the heresiologists, but from the fourth-century monastic writer, John Cassian. Having 
spent seemingly endless pages systematically describing the causes and effects of human vice, 
Cassian defends his protracted discussion with an appeal to comprehension. The resulting 
formulation is not only a succinct encapsulation of the pedagogical and diagnostic principles 
of theological anthropology and asceticism, but an apt summary of the substructures of 
heresiological inquiry. John writes: “Let this not strike anyone as superfluous or irksome. For 
unless the different kinds of wounds have been explained and the origins and causes of the 
diseases have been investigated, the appropriate medical remedy will not be able to be 
administered to the sick and the means of maintaining perfect health will not be able to be 
passed on to the well.”74 In the case of heresiology and asceticism, the effectiveness of 
refutation and the endurance of self-mastery necessitate an exhaustive investigation of the 
causes, conditions, sources, and roots of the adversarial elements, passions, and parties. 
                                                        
73 Epiphanius, Pan. 70.15.6 (Holl and Dummer, 3:249). For parallel comments see also Pan. 8.7.4 25.14.4-5; 25.17.1-3; 
32.3.1; 48.15.1; 52.1.6; 60.2.1; 66.2.1-2; 69.42.1; 77.19.6; De Fide 12.5. Cf. Pan. 26.9.1-2. Andrew Jacobs, Remains of the 
Jews, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 44-55, offers an informative and sophisticated reading of the 
Panarion as a work built upon totalizing discourse. Though Jacobs’s emphasis is on the figure of the Jews, in 
particular the story of Joseph of Tiberias (embedded within the chapter on the Ebionites), his analysis, as he 
himself explains, pertains to the development of “a Christian ideology of knowledge and mastery”  (54). Building 
upon the work of Terry Eagelton’s Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), Jacobs stresses the naturalizing 
or self-evident hue of Epiphanius’ story (alongside the works of Eusebius of Caesarea and Cyril of Jerusalem). It is 
the very act of collecting, organizing, and wielding knowledge, a comprehensively conceived knowledge, that 
generates and sustains the authority of Jacobs’s fourth-century Christian authors.  
 
74 John Cassian, Institutes VII.XIII in Iohannis Cassiani De institutis coenobiorum et De octo principalium vitiorum remediis 
libri XII, ed. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 17 (Vienna: C. Geroldi Filium, 1888), 137; Boniface Ramsey, trans., John 
Cassian: The Institutes (New York: Newman Press, 2000), 175. The value of knowledge about the passions derives 
from the fact that its transmitters, the elders, had wrestled with the very same passions; they taught from 
experience. Moreover, the passage emphasizes that insight into the techniques by which the passions are 
subdued belongs only to some, “those who are toiling and striving to attain the summit of perfection” (VII.XIII, 
Ramsey, 175). Again, we see a parallel with heresiological discourse: the task of researching and refuting the 
heretics rightfully falls to those learned ecclesiastics who undertake the task precisely so that others can be 
spared the experience. And, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Tertullian’s fears of heretical contamination 
similarly hierarchizes the openness of Christian education by delimiting certain fields and methods of inquiry.  
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Insofar as diagnosis necessarily precedes prescription, the successful administration of the 
heresiological balm is predicated on an incisive examination of the underlying and 
overarching conditions of the disease of heresy. The genre’s utility turns on its conferral of an 
effective theological cure. And the success of this textual curative is explicitly bound to its 
scope of inquiry and grasp of knowledge.  
The language of each of Epiphanius’ eighty sectarian sections not only emphasizes, as 
we saw in chapter two, the medicinal annihilation of his poisonous foes, but it reiterates the 
exhaustive scope and unequivocal tone of his refutation. To accomplish his task, to “make 
these shocking disclosures for the readers’ correction,” Epiphanius stresses his exhaustive 
investigation in which the results serve both to champion his journey and to overwhelm his 
readers.75 Having slain Ptolemy and his followers, he uses the triumphant occasion to 
announce his text’s insatiable ambition to discover all the heresies in the world: 
Since I have achieved your disgrace through the things I have said, I am going 
over the imposture of the others—calling on God as the aid of my meager 
ability— so that I may discover the hypothesis/supposition of every people (παρ᾽ 
ἑκάστῳ ἔθνει), which they have [all] wickedly invented, and make a spectacle of 
it.76  
 
Epiphanius uncovers the full spectrum of the “nations” heretical world, presenting his object 
of study, tellingly, in the language of ἔθνη (“nations”): the task is functionally analogous to the 
geographical and ethnographic treatises of Pliny, Appian, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus, Herodotus, 
Tacitus, and Pomponius Mela, which uncover the diversity of the known world and translate 
its significance through the language of cultural hierarchization, ideological dominance, and 
                                                        
75 Epiphanius, Pan. 48.15.3 (Holl and Dummer, 2:240). Having incorporated the diverse, though related, musings of 
the heretics, the text equalizes their erroneous suppositions with disdain and mockery.  
 




foreign exoticism.77 His remarks about the Tascodrugians, also known as the Montanists or 
Phrygians, epitomize the authorial compulsion with which he conceptualizes his task: “I 
promised to withhold nothing about any sect I know, but to disclose what I have learned by 
word of mouth, and from treatises, documents, and persons who truly confirmed my notion…I 
give all the facts, as I said, with accuracy, about each sect.”78 Richard Flower has recently 
argued that the content and form of heresiological literature function jointly as an 
overwhelming display of knowledge wherein amassment and its exhibition augment claims of 
authority, even as it reveals a remarkable degree of scholastic dependence and intensifies the 
genre’s authorial claims.79 The incessant beating of the drum of mastery only raises the textual 
stakes: the heresiologist crafts his rhetorical structure and thus lives by its implications.  And 
in the case of the Pneumatomachi it is sufficiently demonstrative that Epiphanius’ 
commentary on the forty-eighth heresy simply gestures toward the enormous bounty of texts 
that reside at his ready rather than cite them explicitly and exhaustively.80  
                                                        
77 See, for instance, François Hartog’s The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History, 
trans. Janet Lloyd (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 209-259, which calls attention to the rhetoric of 
otherness—inversion, comparison, analogy, translation, naming, classifying, describing, etc.—as the technical 
strategy of ethnographic analysis.  My emphasis, following Woolf’s Tales of the Barbarians, 32-58, has been to 
consider the ethnographic paradigms by which the heretics are classified. This chapter seeks to investigate the 
textual, rhetorical, and philosophical implications of organizing knowledge, and to emphasize how easily the 
ideological grip on the world fades as the realities of human diversity and textual limitations mount.  
 
78 Epiphanius, Pan. 48.15.1-3 (Holl and Dummer, 2:240). 
 
79 On authority in the Panarion see, Richard Flower, “Genealogies of Unbelief: Epiphanius of Salamis and 
Heresiological Authority” in Unclassical Traditions. Volume II: Perspectives from East and West in Late Antiquity, ed. by 
Christopher Kelly, Richard Flower and Michael Stuart Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 
70-87. It is important to note, however, that authority is referenced and described in ambiguous, largely abstract 
terms. Its referent remains unelaborated. This chapter argues that the abstract notion of authority ascribed quite 
generally to the heresiologists underemphasizes the nuance and qualifications evident in their texts.  
 
80 Even though he insists that his referential excisions reflect a desire to keep his remarks taut and orderly (lest he 
should “burden the readers,” Pan.74.14.1, however superficially false the suggestion, Epiphanius performs his self-
described mastery of the relevant material against the seventy-fourth heresy as he reins it in. In other words, to 
the extent that the excisions are performed they are hardly omissions at all. 
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Hippolytus and Irenaeus also tout their respective mastery over the heretical realm, 
accentuating not only the detail and precision of their refutations, but also the effort with 
which they have applied themselves to expose the heresies. At the very outset of Book I of his 
Adversus Haereses, Irenaeus stresses the clarity and concision of his descriptions of the heresies, 
while a few chapters later he trumpets the countervailing “orthodox” parlance of apostolicity 
and doctrinal pedigree.81 Irenaeus cleverly transfigures the language of the gospels into an 
heresiological maxim by condensing the genre’s investigatory polemic and its pedagogical 
aspirations into a lone citation from scripture: “For nothing is covered that will not be revealed, and 
nothing hidden that will not be known.”82 Plenary exposure—its acquisition and transmission—
becomes the overarching theme of Irenaeus’ tractate, as its full title, “Exposé and Overthrow of 
What is Falsely Called Knowledge” (Ἐλέγχου καὶ ἀνατροπῆς τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως), 
conveys.83 Irenaeus, in fact, pinpoints inexact comprehension of the heretics’ doctrines—the 
remedy for which he is eager to supply—as the essential misstep of earlier effort to trammel 
the theological divergences of the Valentinians: 
It is necessary, however, that he who flies to turn back/convert to them to know 
accurately rules or arguments. For it is not possible for anyone, who does not 
know the disease of those who are not well, to cure those who are sick. This was 
the reason that my predecessors—much superior men to myself, too—had been 
unable, however, to refute sufficiently (satis potuerunt contradicere) the 
Valentinians, because they were ignorant of these men’s rules; which we have 
with all diligence transmitted to you in the first book in which we have also 
shown that their doctrine is a recapitulation of all the heretics. For which 
reason also, in the second, we have had, as in a mirror, a sight of their complete 
destruction (totius eversionis). For they who oppose these men (the Valentinians) 
by the right method, do thereby oppose all who are of an evil mind; and they 
                                                        
81 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.10 (Contre les hérésies, Livres I, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 264 
[Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1979], 1:2:154-166).  
 
82 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.Pr. 2.53-55 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1:2:24), citing Matthew 10:26.  
 
83 Eusebius of Caesarea, Historia Ecclesiastica, V.VII.1, ed. and trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classical Library 153 




who overthrow them, do in fact overthrow every kind of heresy (evertunt omnem 
haeresim).84 
 
Having endeavored to relate more or less descriptively the particularities of the heretics 
(“with all diligence/care”) in Book I, Irenaeus turns in Book II to the task of refutation proper, 
wherein he contests the implications of Gnostic cosmologies and the layers of divine 
workmanship, as he also reaffirms the omnipotence of God as the lone creator and governing 
force of the universe.85 When he explicitly and systematically adds the weight of Scripture to 
his tractate in Book III, he emphasizes that commitment to the full expository cycle of 
heresiology—description, refutation, and scriptural ballast—ensures its effectiveness: 
“Therefore, recall what we said in the first two books; and if you add to the following, you will 
have from us a most complete refutation of all the heresies, and you will resist them 
confidently and more insistently.”86 In framing his protracted work as an effort to “furnish you 
[the reader] with the complete work of the exposure and refutation of knowledge, falsely so-
called,” Irenaeus does more than simply make exposure and refutation analytic corollaries of 
one another; he renders heresy a phenomenon that is situational and particularistic yet 
governed by a universal nucleus of error.87 Writing heresiology serves not only to denounce 
the errors of the heretics, whatever the specific nature of their fallacious opinions, it also 
                                                        
84 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV.Pr.2.11-25 (Rousseau, 4:2:382-4). Similar themes are stressed at I.10.3.49-92 (Rousseau and 
Doutreleau, 1:2:160-166).  
 
85 On the singularity of God’s intellect and God’s creative power in Irenaeus, see Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 27-73. Richard Norris, “The Transcendence and Freedom of God: 
Irenaeus, The Greek Tradition and Gnosticism,” in Schoedel and Wilken, 87-100, emphasizes how in Book II the 
“question of God” is the substantive grounds of contestation (89).   
 
86 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. Pr. III.20-23 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 3:2:18).  
 
87 For a different but related elaboration of heretical plurality into singularity, see Joan E. Taylor, “The 
Phenomenon of Early Jewish-Christianity: Reality or Scholarly Invention?” Vigiliae Christianae 44 (1990): 313-334. 
And for a broader argument about “discursive unity” in early heresiological argumentation see Karen L. King, 
“Social and Theological Effects of Heresiological Discourse,” in Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. Eduard 
Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 28-49. 
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devises an essential ontology and history of heresy that can encompass it fully and 
irrefutably.88  
 The universal applicability and potency of Irenaeus’ refutation derives in large 
measure from his fabrication of a shared heretical ontology and disposition. The Valentinians, 
Simonians, Marcionites, Marcosians, Ebionites, Encratites, Barbeliotes, Ophites, Cainites, 
Nicolaitans, followers of Ptolemaeus, Colorbasus, Menander, Saturninus, and Basilides, 
Carpocrates, Cerinthus, and Cerdo, all share a self-determined sense of epistemological 
superiority and pride.89 From the perspective of the heresiologist, they excise, supplement, 
deny, misinterpret, and augment Scripture at will; they perform exotic and base rituals; and 
they opine fanciful doctrines, all of which derive from their belief that they exclusively hold an 
intimate knowledge of divine truth.90 “Truth,” as Tertullian mocks heretical reasoning, “was 
                                                        
88 Hippolytus commences Book V of his Refutatio with an overview of the Naasseni, which argues that their 
divisions evidence unity; it is his aim to prove that the Naasseni simply repackage the opinions of the Gnostics. He 
explains: “In the remainder [of our work], the opportunity invites us to approach the treatment of our proposed 
subjects, and to begin from those who have presumed to celebrate a serpent, the originator of the error [under 
discussion], through certain expressions devised by the energy of his own [ingenuity]. The priests, then, and 
champions of the system have been first those who have been called Naaseni, being so denominated from the 
Hebrew language, for the serpent is called naas. Subsequently, however, they have styled themselves Gnostics, 
alleging that they alone have sounded the depths of knowledge. Now, from the system of these [speculators], 
many, detaching parts, have constructed a heresy which, though with several subdivisions, is essentially one, and 
they explain precisely the same [tenets]; though conveyed under the guise of different opinions, as the following 
discussion, according to its progresses, will prove” (Ref. V.6.3-4 [Marcovich, 141-3]). I have followed the 
translation from ANF.  
 
89 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.25-30 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:252-322) calls attention the epistemological arrogance 
of the heretical thinking.  
 
90 “‘Seek and you shall find,’ [the heretics] constantly remind us. The quality of their faith can be determined from 
the type of their conduct. Discipline is an index to doctrine” (Tertullian, Praescr. 43.2 [Refoulé, 150]). As an 
outgrowth of theological rationalization and exegetical processes, heretical customs and habits likewise illustrate 
Epiphanius’ continual struggle to define knowledge and isolate human hubris. In his treatment of Simon Magus, 
the bishop reports that the father of Christian heresy instituted a series of μυστήρια, which entailed offering to 
the Father a mixture of dirt, semen, and menstrual emissions. In the eyes of the Simonians, “these are mysteries 
of life and the fullest knowledge” (γνώσεώς <τε> τῆς τελειοτάτης) (Epiphanius, Pan. 21.4.2 [Holl, 1:243]).90 “But for 
anyone,” immediately corrects the bishop, “to whom God has given understanding, knowledge is above all else, a 
matter of regarding [these mysteries] as abomination instead, and death rather than life” (Epiphanius, Pan. 21.4.2 
[Holl, 1:243]): “Whoever arises to acquire for himself knowledge from God, it is possible, then, above all else to 
regard [these mysteries] as brutal conduct instead, and as death rather than life. Anyone for whom it is possible to 
have acquired knowledge from God, is to regard these mysteries as brutal conduct instead, and to regard death as 
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waiting for some Marcionite or a Valentinian to set her free” (Aliquos Marcionitas et 
Valentinianos liberanda veritas expectabat).91 It was the shared hubris of the heretics that 
permitted them to efface with ease and eloquence the traditions of Jesus, and to be classified, 
however paradoxically, as a homogeneous amalgam. Indeed, the rhetorical crux of 
heresiological literature transposed the heretics’ diversity into an expression of utter 
uniformity of purpose, effect, and origin.92 Irenaeus, as he articulates Christianity’s Rule of 
Truth, announces the sweeping potentiality of his treatise: 
Since, therefore, the exposé and refutation of all the heretical sects is different 
and multiform, and since we have resolved to give an answer to every one 
according to its own standards, we have deemed it necessary first of all to give 
an account of their source and root, in order that you may know their most 
sublime Profundity, and understand the tree from which such fruits come 
forth.93 
 
In divulging the theological and ritualistic particularities of various heretical parties, Irenaeus 
identifies for his readers the analytical tool, what I have called an ethnographic paradigm, by 
which the heresies could be arranged, organized, and situated for refutation. As we saw in 
chapter one, the commonality he and other heresiologists imputed to the heretical world 
stems, in large part, from the perpetuation of a genealogical narrative of successive heresies, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
life” (Pan. 21.4.1-2 [Holl, 1:243]). The causative or generative process by which customs emerge as salient 
manifestations of errant and hubristic theological principles roots an orthodox reorientation in first principles of 
truth. The heretical preoccupation with fantastical “principalities and authorities” within “various heavens” 
condemns this higher cosmological ordering to the exuberance of the human mind (Pan. 21.4.3 [Holl, 1:243]). 
Decried both because they supplant the singularity of the Godhead and because they elevate the human mind 
beyond its means, these opinions denature, in Epiphanius’ reasoning, the truth of Scripture, the life-giving force 
of the Lord, and the transcendent divinity itself (Pan. 21.4.3-4, 5.5-6 [Holl, 1:243, 244]). The Gnostics (Pan. 26) and 
Valesians (Pan. 58) represent two of the more compelling and illustrative examples of the relationship between 
heretical thought and heretical practice.  
 
91 Tertullian, Praescr. 29.2 (Refoulé, 125). 
 
92 As I argued in chapter one, this is a central component of Epiphanius’ periodized history of heresy; following 
the book of Jubilees, heresy emerges as a deviation (the drifting mindset of unbridled reason) from the natural 
and unified state of human existence (Pan. 3.4-5).  
 




the origins of which begins with Simon Magus.94 As the history of heresy explained the lineage 
of theological and epistemological hubris, its investigators underscored the potency of their 
rhetorical response in terms of a broad but unified effort of textual containment. Irenaeus’ 
knowledge of the Valentinians, like Hippolytus’ study of the Naasseni, imposed and enacted a 
systematic refutation that was applicable to “every kind of heresy.”95 As Irenaeus himself 
succinctly puts it, “since we have disproved the followers of Valentinus the entire crowd of 
heretics is refuted.”96 The world of heresy was elaborated and constructed by the earliest 
generation of heresiologists to facilitate quite simply and straightforwardly their complete 
mastery of it. But, as we shall see, as the heretical plurality swelled numerically and 
geographically, the techniques of heretical commonality slowly cracked under the pressure of 
the conceptual and practical demands of the genre’s all-encompassing ethnographic outlook.  
Hippolytus similarly commences his Refutatio with an unwavering commitment to a 
plenary investigation, exposition, and refutation of the heresies. He first concentrates his 
analysis, as we saw in chapter one, upon the heretics’ intellectual forbearers, the Greek 
philosophers. The relationship between these intellectual kin necessitates and thus justifies 
the expansive scope and dogged exposition of his ensuing inquiry: “One must not dismiss any 
(Οὐδένα) tale/speech/story/fable (μῦθον)” of these philosophers, since the madness of the 
heresies twists and contorts even the most banal of philosophical doctrines.97 The failure of 
                                                        
94 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.7.1; Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.23; Epiphanius, Pan. 21; Philaster, Diversarum haeresion liber XXIX, I; 
Augustine, De Haeresibus I; Theodoret, Haer. I.1. See also Karlmann Beyschlag, Simon Magus und die Christliche Gnosis 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1974) and Alberto Ferreiro, Simon Magus in Patristic, Medieval and Early Modern Traditions 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005), 1-146.  
 
95 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV. Pr.2.24-5 (Rousseau, 4:2:384) and Hippolytus, Ref. V.6.4 (Marcovich, 141) each ascribe the 
same singularity to the heretical plurality.   
 
96 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.31.1-2 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:324). 
 
97 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 1.1 (Marcovich, 54; altered from ANF). 
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adumbration is doubly destructive both because it enables the heretics to escape scrutiny (a 
sin of omission, anachronism notwithstanding) and it is an entirely preventable dereliction of 
duty. The theological gravity of the heresies is exacerbated by the failure, on the part of 
Christian leaders, to apprehend their aggregation of philosophical resources (and thus to 
understand the intellectual material by which the heretics fashion themselves). Hippolytus, 
indeed, summons the motivation for his divine commission from an abiding fear of omission. 
Precisely because dismissing knowledge imperils his readership, Hippolytus announces his 
desire to chronicle in full the heresies and their intellectual kinsmen, the philosophers, 
astrologers, diviners, arithmeticians, magicians, Brahmans, Druids, and Chaldaeans.98 Thus, the 
starting point and underlying proposition of Hippolytus’ investigation is its presentation of 
everything known of the world of philosophy, astrology, and foreign wisdom: “…we have 
chosen to leave behind nothing of the doctrines belonging to the nations (προῃρήμεθα μηδὲν 
τῶν παρ᾽ ἔθνεσι δογμάτων καταλιπεῖν) on account of the gossipy villainies of the heretics.”99  
                                                        
98 For Hippolytus on the Greek philosophers, see Ref. Prooemium I.23 (Marcovich 54-86); for Brahmans, see Ref. I.24 
(Marcovich, 86-88); for Druids, see Ref. I.25 (Marcovich, 88); for Chaldeans, see Ref. IV.1-8 (Marcovich, 92-101); for 
arithmeticians, see Ref. IV.14-15 (Marcovich, 105-110); for diviners, see Ref. IV.35-37 (Marcovich, 123-125); for 
magicians, see Ref. IV.28-34 (Marcovich, 115-123); for Persians and Babylonians, see Ref. IV.43 (Marcovich, 127-
129); and for Egyptians, see Ref. IV.43-44 (Marcovich, 127-130). 
 
99 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.7.4 (Marcovich, 99; altered from ANF). The substance of this formulation is repeated at 
IX.31.2, “πᾶσι τε ἀνθρώποις ἐφοδιον έν Βίῳ <οὐ> μικρὸν καταλιπόντες” (Marcovich, 378). For the rhetoric of lack 
of omission (and the positively phrased totality of comprehension) see Ref. Prooemium 5 (οὐδεν σιωπήσομεν); 
IV.5.6 (οὐδὲ τοῦτο παραλείψομεν); IV.6.1 (οὐδὲ τοῦτοn παραλείψομεν); IV.42.2 (πρὸς τὸ μὴ καταλιπεῖν); IV.45.1 
(νομίζω μηδεμίαν δόξαν...παραλελοιπέναι); IV.51.1 (δοκεῖ μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλιπεῖν); V.28.1 (μηδένα τε καταλιπεῖν 
ἀνέ/λε<γ>κτον); VI.6.1 (οὐδε μίαν ἀνέλεγκτον καταλείψω); VII.27.7 (Ἵνα δὲ μηδὲν...παραλείπωμεν); VII.31.8 
(νομίζω μηθέν <ἀνέλεγκτον> καταλελεῖφθαι); VII.38.6 (μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀνέλεγκτον); IX.6.1 (μηθέν γε 
ἀνεξέλεγκτον καταλιποῦσι); IX.17.3 (μηδὲ ταῦτα παρελείπομεν); IX.17.3 (τά τε πρό ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐσιωπήσαμεν); Χ.30.5 
(μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλιπόντες); IX.17.3 (ἱνα διὰ πάντων ὦμεν πεπορεθμένοι μηδέν <τε> ἀνεκδιήγητον καταλείπωμεν); 
IX.31.1 (μηδέν τε ἀπολελοιπέναι...ἀναπόδεικτον); IX.31.2 (διὰ πάντων οὗν <τούτων> διαδραμόντες καὶ μετὰ 




Immersed in the world of philosophical and heretical opinions, Hippolytus embraces 
the labor of his work if it ensures a clearer and fuller revelation of the prized secrets of the 
heretics:  
Since, however, reason compels us to enter into the vast depth of narrative, we 
did not consider being silent, but (in) exposing the doctrines of all these 
[groups] in detail, we shall keep nothing hidden. Now it seems necessary, even if 
the inquiry will become longer, not to resist labor; for we shall not leave behind 
a small cure for human life against error, when all are made to behold openly, 
the secret rites of these men, and the secret orgies which, as their 
controllers/regulators, they impart to the initiated alone.100  
 
And because the seriousness of heretical error—the soteriological or existential threat (“for 
human life!”) posed by the heretics—countenances a comprehensive refutation and its 
necessary descriptive antecedent, Hippolytus finds himself energized and enraptured even as 
he “labor[s] with entirety of body and soul (πάσῃ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι ἐργαζόμενοι).”101 His 
intellectual procession is an act of intellectual empowerment and performance. When 
Hippolytus near the very end of his Refutation of all the Heretics, introduces the chronology of 
Genesis 10 to reassert the antiquity of the Christians, he bypasses a full enumeration of the rise 
of seventy-two nations of Genesis 11.102 Having provided a full list of the nations in other 
books, Hippolytus digresses to explain that he is driven to tedious tasks by a desire to acquire 
and reveal knowledge: “in keeping with our manner, we wanted to display to those who love to 
learn the affection which we have for the divinity, and the indubitable knowledge concerning 
                                                        
100 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 5.27 (Marcovich, 55; altered from ANF). The language of secrecy is a recurrent 
theme of the Refutatio. For the cognates of κρύπτω see I.24.2; V.7.1; VI.9.5, 6, 7; X.12.1; for ἄρρητος (and cognates) 
see Prooemium 1, 2, 5; IV.28.6, 34.1, 42.2; V.7.1, 7.4, 7.19, 7.22, 7.34, 8.5, 8.7, 8.9, 8.26, 8.27, 8.40, 9.1, 12.1, 17.13, 24.1; 
VI.6.1, 38.2, 40.2, 41.4, 44.3, 46.1, 46.4, 49.5, 50.1; VII.27.4, 25.4, 26.1; IX.15.2, 17.1; X.5.1. On secrecy in the Panarion 
see: 21.6.2; 24.5.4, 5.5; 25.2.5; 27.2.4, 6.9; 30.3.8, 5.7, 9.5; 31.10.13, 21.4; 35.1.7; 40.1.6; 49.3.1; 61.7.4; 66.3.6; 71.1.3; 
73.38.2. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.2.2, 5.6, 7.2, 9.3, 11.3, 16.3, 18.1, 20.2; II.2.4, 4.2, 14.1, 18.6, 21.2; III.5.1, 14.1,15.2. 
 
101 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 6.39 (Marcovich, 55; altered from ANF). 
 




the truth, which through toil we have acquired.”103 In a sense, Hippolytus simply cannot 
restrain himself. The will to perform, affixed to his textual labor, emphasizes anew the 
knowledge he has already provided.  
The labor and pain expended by the heresiologists to discern even the most minute of 
details emerge as emblems of honor and the fulfillment of their commission: “the endeavor is, 
then, full of toil and requiring much inquiry. We shall not, however, be lacking (in exertion); 
for afterwards it will bring joy” (Ἔστι μὲν οὖν πόνου μεστὸν τὸ ἐπιχειρούμενον καὶ πολλῆς 
δεόμενον ἱστορίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνδεήσομεν· ὕστερον γὰρ εὐφρανεῖ).104 To cement his textual 
achievement, Hippolytus analogizes his accomplishment to four images of victory: the athlete 
who secures the champion’s crown, the captain who successfully navigates the rough seas, the 
prophets whose predictions are realized, and the shepherd who tends his flock and reaps its 
fruit thereafter.105 Hippolytus’ polemical project thus describes its will to victory as it realizes 
its expository triumph over against the enemy of error.106 Textual labor, in short, demonstrates 
theological and intellectual triumph. Epiphanius similarly contends that the crown of victory 
follows those who have demonstrated willingness to travail and battle: “for to receive the 
crown afterwards and continue happy with the crown, the contestant must first engage in the 
contest, and the toil and other struggles of the contest. Not that the crown comes last; it is 
                                                        
103 Hippolytus, Ref. X.30.5 (Marcovich, 406; altered from ANF). 
 
104 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 10.59-60 (Marcovich, 56; altered from ANF). 
 
105 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 10.59-64 (Marcovich, 56). Epiphanius imagines himself as a field laborer in his 
opening remarks against the Secundians, though the imagery signals toil rather than triumph (Pan. 32.1.1 [Holl, 
1:438]). And the image of the crown (στεφάνου at Proo. 10.61) is repeated at 9.17.4. 
 
106 On the relationship between ethnography and triumph see Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 76-80 and Michael McCormick, Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, 




there before the bout but is awarded afterwards, for the joy and gladness of him who has 
worked for it.”107  
Theodoret of Cyrrus conveys the orthodox triumph over heresy with reference to a 
series of territorial liberations.108 The Prologue of Book II of his Compendium proudly proclaims 
(of far older heresies) that “cities and rural areas” alike were emancipated from the tares “of 
Simon, Menander, Cleobius, Dositheus, Gortheus, Adrianus, Satornilus, Basilides, Isidore, 
Carpocrates, Epiphanes, and others.”109 He further specifies the geographical contours of 
heretical liberation in Book III: “The East was totally freed from the Montanists, and the 
Novatians, and the Quartodecimans and also Egypt and Libya were freed, and the West was 
liberated from these. Only a small portion of Asia and Pontus still have their tares.”110 And 
although the work of the heresiologists remains ongoing, the metaphorical images of crowned 
victory and the territorial retreat of certain heretical parties indicate orthodoxy’s exultant 
                                                        
107 Epiphanius, Pan. 80.11.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:495). 
 
108 In stressing the metaphor of geography throughout, I have not sought to ignore the evidence of the very real 
geography of heresy. Much as Walter Bauer’s pioneering work on heresy organized its investigation of orthodoxy 
and heresy, first, by location (Edessa, Egypt, Greece, Asia Minor, and Rome), the geographical particularities and 
diffusion of ecclesiastical and theological contestation has weighed heavily on the field. On geography in 
Epiphanius, including charts of geographical situation of the named heresies, see Young Kim, “Epiphanius of 
Cyprus and the Geography of Heresy,” in Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices, ed. H.A. Drake 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 235-251. See also, Thomas Robinson, The Bauer Thesis Examined: The Geography of 
Heresy in the Early Christian Church (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1988). On Priscillianism in Gaul and Spain, see Burrus, 
The Making of a Heretics. On the geographical variation of the responses to Priscillian see 79-101. On Africa and the 
Donatists, see: R. A. Markus, “Christianity and Dissent in Roman North Africa: Changing Perspectives in Recent 
Work” in Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest, ed. Derek Baker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 21-36; 
Brent Shaw, “African Christianity: Disputes, Definitions and ‘Donatists,’” in Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religious 
Movements: Discipline and Dissent, ed. Malcolm R. Greenshields and Thomas A. Robinson (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen, 1992), 5-34; Brent Shaw, Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North 
Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952); François Decret, Aspects du Manichéisme dans l’Afrique romaine: les controverses 
de Fortunatus, Faustus et Felix avec saint Augustin (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, 1970); François Decret, 
L’Afrique manichéene (IVe-Ve siècles): étude historique et doctrinale, 2 vols. (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, 
1978); James Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995); Claude Lepelley, Aspects de l’Afrique romaine: les cites, la vie rurale, le Christianisme (Bari: Edipuglia, 2001). 
 
109 Theodoret, Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium II. Prologue (Patrologia Graeca 83: 336-556, ed. J.P. Migne, 
[Migne, 388A-B]).  
 
110 Theodoret, Haer. III.6 (Migne, 409A). 
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incursion into the rhetorical and geographical worlds of heresy. Heresiology is a triumph of 
both words and deeds.  
In combating heresy with the language and evidence of triumph (rhetoric and reality), 
the heresiologists devise all manner of exposition and theorization to concretize their 
supreme achievement. Their acquisition of heretical knowledge—and their willingness to 
launch themselves into the murky and dangerous waters of heresy—legitimizes their 
reputation as the true apostolics of their particular historical moments. As an agent of the 
Godhead, Hippolytus is tasked to persevere against the enemies of God in order “to make for 
[his] divine benefactor a worthy return.”111 In casting his treatise as preparation and assurance 
of the inevitability of Christ’s return, Hippolytus conceives heresiology as an indispensible and 
obligatory component of the Christianization of the world and its future consummation in the 
image and will of Christ. As he finds himself mired in the tiring domain of the Elchasaites (in 
Book IX), Hippolytus longs to steady the trajectory of his inquiry: “I shall move on to a 
demonstration of the doctrine (λόγου) of truth, lest…we, piously pushing forward toward the 
kingdom’s crown and believing the truth, be disoriented.”112 It is telling that the image of the 
athlete’s crown (στεφᾶνος at Proo. 10.61) now signals the ultimate triumph of the impending 
kingdom of God. Victory over the heretics is but a small step toward the larger eschatological 
victory that is yet to come. And while Hippolytus will shortly counteract the disruptive 
potency of “contests against all the heretics” (ἀγῶνα τοῦ κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων) with appeal to 
the fixity of doctrinal truth, he is acutely aware of the power of the heretics to confound and 
                                                        
111 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 6.39-40 (Marcovich, 55; altered from ANF). On millennial expectations and God’s 
control over evolution of creation see Enrico Norelli, “Paix, justice, intégrité de la creation: Irénée de Lyon et ses 
adversaires” Irénikon 64.1 (1991): 5-43, esp. 40. 
 




bewilder.113 As their texts become lasting and authoritative codifications of falsity, the authors 
of heresiology perceive their paradoxical contribution to the stabilization of the heretical 
world.  In their reflections on the peril of textual permanence and exposure, the heresiologists 
try to contain the damage of a textual endeavor whose very purpose is a necessary 
contradiction. The proposition is to devise rhetorical maneuvers to constrain the effects of 
discovery, while also fortifying the theological intention and intellectual vigor of the 
heresiologists themselves.   
 
The Rhetorics of Heresiology: Danger and Fear 
 
But even within the recurrent emphasis on masterful, comprehensive knowledge, there 
is an acknowledgment of the latent effects of knowing and writing the heretics. While the 
allure of discovery and the indispensability of information drive the heresiological inquiry, the 
repulsion and fear of potentially uncontrollable and deeply ruinous knowledge injects a strain 
of caution, hesitancy, and deliberation into the investigatory process. During his prolonged 
discussion of the Gnostics, Epiphanius offers the most salient and succinct articulation of the 
dissociative underpinnings of heresiological writing: 
And I am afraid that I may be revealing the whole of this potent poison, like the 
face of some serpent’s basilisk, to the harm of the readers, rather than to their 
correction. Truly it pollutes the ears—the blasphemous assembly of great 
audacity, the gathering and the interpretation of its dirt, the mucky perversity 
of the scummy obscenity.114  
 
                                                        
113 Hippolytus, Ref. IX.17.4 (Marcovich, 363; altered from ANF). 
 




Epiphanius’ remarks qualify the manifestly advantageous consequences and implications of 
representing the heretics in texts. Precisely because the heresiologists’ explication and 
identification of the heretics vivify their theological opinions and ritualistic practices, the 
rhetorical hesitancy of the Panarion captures the tension between heresiology as a conceptual 
endeavor oriented around creative destruction and the apprehension that heresiology, 
instead, facilitates and fortifies destructive creation(s).115 Caught between the compulsion to 
identify the particularities of their opponents’ positions and the fear that doing so emboldened 
these very same teachers, the heresiologists frequently embraced the tension as an illustration 
of their intellectual proficiency and skill. Insofar as incomplete disclosure and insubstantial 
comprehension undercut heresiology’s potency, as Irenaeus and Hippolytus had warned, 
plenary investigation and precise identification were the requisite and indisputable 
significations of the genre’s theological triumph.116 Only a truly comprehensive and meticulous 
analysis of heresy could awaken such an alarming fear. And the fear of memorializing and 
nourishing the pernicious teachings of the heretics—the corollaries of assiduous research—not 
only accentuated heresiology’s intellectual and rhetorical fixations, but it also attested the 
authorial labor and achievement.117 
                                                        
115 In Epiphanius see, Pan. 9.5.1, 26.3.5, 9.1, 14.4, 17.1; 27.4.5; 29.2.1; 50.1.9; 66.43.5-6; 76.7.7; De Fide 1.4; and 
Theodoret, Haer. I. Preface; II. Preface; IV.3.  
 
116 On destruction and demolition in Epiphanius, see Pan. 14.3.1; 25.7.3; 27.8.4.4; 31.29.4, 30.1, 33.2; 37.8.10; 40.4.1; 
41.3.5; 42.10.5; 44.4.2; 63.68.1; in Theodoret see Haer. I.Preface, I.26; Hippolytus, Ref. V.13.1; VI.8.4, 16.6. 
 
117 For an incisive discussion of the effects of erasure and memorializing the immemorial in late antiquity, see 
Charles W. Hendrick Jr, History and Silence: Purge and Rehabilitation of Memory in Late Antiquity (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2000), 89-130. Though the subject is damnatio memoriae (attack or repression of memory), specifically 
with regard to Virius Nicomachus Flavianus, it holds great potential for conceptualizing the textualization of the 
heresies. The abolition of memory is not about full erasure, instead, it aimed to create “gestures that served to 
dishonor the record of the person and so, in an oblique way, to confirm memory” (93). The heresies, too, are 
never fully erased, however much the heresiologists boast, both because it was conceptually impossible (for 
reasons we shall see later in this chapter) and because they were not supposed to be erased. Insofar as they were 
divinely foretold and served a specific theological and soteriological purpose, they were markers or defining 
moments in the history of Christianity. Perhaps the fear constantly invoked by the heresiologists is a relative of 
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Given the theological and institutional ramifications of heretical discourse, a timbre of 
ambivalent caution was a seemingly straightforward technique by which to impose intellectual 
distance between writer and object.118 The vacillations of the heresiologists acknowledge and 
preemptively avert the jarring impact of enumerating heretical opinions and practices. While 
the anodyne language of wavering obligation and fear may well have functioned as rhetorical 
inoculation, a repudiation of the supposition that their work would effectively though 
unintentionally serve the interests of the heretics,119 the concomitant allure and danger posed 
by the heretics buoyed the heresiologists’ self-styled rhetoric of unimpeachable expertise and 
onerous self-sacrifice. The language of full-fledged engagement is precisely the strategic 
disposition Epiphanius heralds as he concludes his remarks on the Gnostic sect: “So here too…I 
have not avoided the subject, but have shown what this one of the sects which came my way is 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the dissumulation Hedrick discusses with respect to the damnatio: the heresiologies, like the trope of damnatio, is 
a masquerade, an affective conjunction between fear of the known and fear of the unknown. By that, I mean the 
heresiological texts illustrate how the language of fear of exposure enables exposure. The remnant left behind by 
the Damnatio is equally testified by the heresiologists, especially Theodoret who repeatedly invokes the “dead” 
heresies (Haer. II.11 (Migne, 397B-C), Haer. III.6 (Migne, 409A), most of which were unknown “to the majority of 
people” (Migne, 397B).  
 
118 The genre also propounds a barrier between author and reader. Although Tertullian advocated a wholesale 
withdrawal from debate and dialogue with the heretics, he did permit, if vaguely, those who desired to a Christian 
education to attach themselves to qualified pedagogues or to journey to the great centers of apostolicity. If 
heresiology functioned to broaden the availability of knowledge of the diversifying and regenerative problem of 
heresy—to be employed by the local teachers Tertullian had recommended—its progenitors imagined a privileged 
barrier between those who sought the knowledge and those who compiled it. The heresiologists’ insistence that 
Christians, writ large, disengage from interaction and discussion with the heretics limited its production and 
ensured its precise and controlled development. The burden of writing heresiology fell to those with the proper 
intellectual fortitude and skill, as the letters of Acacius and Paul (to Epiphanius) and Quodvultdeus (to Augustine) 
illustrate. The material these texts compiled, as its authors and requesters imply, was too immense and too 
hazardous for just any Christian to bear, even a highly educated Christian.118 In fashioning a textual style that 
reflected and reinterpreted aspects of ethnographic writing, the heresiologists positioned themselves as the 
noble, learned, and exclusive emissaries of this highly dangerous and impactful web of knowledge. To the extent 
that the Epiphanius and Augustine were celebrated simply by agreeing to write heresiologies, the attending labor 
denoted that the discipline was the province of a lone few. In revealing the errors of the heresies and in denying 
them their desired secrecy, the heresiologists bore an inquiry that prioritized and demonstrated dedication to the 
needs of the larger Christian community. The dutiful veneer that pervades the heresiological project further 
differentiated the relative position of the author, reader, and textual object.   
 
119 In case the ensuing and protracted refutations of the heretics were not sufficiently compelling to prove 




like. And I could speak plainly of it because of things which I did not do—heaven forbid!—but 
which <I knew> by learning them in exact detail from persons who were trying to convert me 
to this and did not succeed.”120 As a reflection either of genuine angst or mere rhetorical 
opportunism, the emphases on danger, fear, and reluctance served, in point of fact, to 
accentuate the investigative reach of the heresiologists’ palliative. The hazardous potential of 
textualizing the heresies becomes a self-aggrandizing restatement of the heresiologists’ 
determination to expose fully and assiduously. Only by plumbing the deepest recesses of 
heretical opinions and practicies do the heresiologies come to acquire their jointly destructive 
and constructive knowledge. Precisely because the danger of these texts was a collateral but 
necessary function of their expansive and plenary inquiry, their destructive force actually 
illustrated and compounded the genre’s procedural successes. Manifested danger revealed 
scholastic progress. Insofar as masterful comprehension actualized and magnified fear of the 
heretics, the genre built its effectiveness by championing heresy’s danger.121  
In negotiating their roles as defenders of the Church and as ethnographers and 
surveyors of the Christian οἰκουμένη, the heresiologists embellished a textual tradition 
designed to edify, nurture, and heal. On account of their dogged investigatory skills, they 
fashioned the tools by which Christians could identify the diverse array of heretics throughout 
the Roman Empire. And although the danger of over-intellectualization and the fear of 
                                                        
120 Epiphanius, Pan. 26.18.1-2 (Holl, 1:298). 
 
121 On detection and the heretics, see Pan. 25.5.4; 26.3.2; 29.9.1, 23.2; 31.9.4, 33.2; 36.6.8; 37.1.1; 41.2.1; 42.15.2; 43.1.6, 
2.1, 2.7; 44.2.4; 46.14.4; Hippolytus, Ref. IX.13.6; X.5.1.  While thinking heretically seems to have been permissible in 
some unregulatable sense—a law from the latter half of the fourth century proclaims that, “if any profane man by 
his punishable teachings should weaken the concept of God, he shall have the right to know such noxious 
doctrines only for himself but shall not reveal them to other to their hurt” (CTh 16.5.5)—it remained firmly illegal to 
publicize heretical inclinations in any way, shape, or form. Later laws closed this rather glaring loophole. See, 
Laurette Barnard, “The Criminalization of Heresy in the Later Roman Empire: A Sociopolitical Device?” The Journal 
of Legal History 16 (1995): 121-146; and Caroline Humfress, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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excessive research remained ingrained within the edifice of heresiology, the rhetoric of 
humility, service, and toil functioned to counteract the offending scholastic connotations. And 
as much as the reticent tone of heresiology presaged the unintended consequences of its 
discoveries and the fear of heretical legitimation, it ultimately prioritized another more 
triumphant set of possibilities: the precision and heft of heresiology would enable/empower 
Christians across the Mediterranean to pursue and defeat the heretics around them. Instead of 
fearing knowledge of the heretics, the Panarion compelled its readers to contemplate their lives 
as mired in the filth of heresy: “for perhaps, if I reveal this pitfall, like the ‘pit of destruction,’ 
to the wise, I shall arouse fear and horror in them, so that they will not only avoid this crooked 
serpent and basilisk…but stone it too, so that it will not even dare to approach anyone.”122 
Alongside each sect’s coda, in which Epiphanius celebrated his achievement, he articulated a 
hope that the remedy provided by his Panarion would function as an offensive enabler—a call 
to arms, so to speak—against the heretics.123 Arraying the symptoms of heresy’s disease in the 
language of peril, contagion, and terror served, however conjecturally, to transform the 
rhetorical world of the Panarion into the lived (and ideally more livable) world of the fourth 
century. The two-fold ethnographic project of the heresiology—the description/contestation 
of the heretics’ worldviews and the delineation/refutation of their customs, habits, and 
opinions—extrapolated the lived conditions of Christian dissension from the abstract 
theorization of their genesis and perpetuation. Epiphanius’ rhetorical posture declared and 
amplified his dutiful role as pedagogue, caretaker, and catalyst of Christianity’s growth and 
safety. His task was to make the abstract musings of the heretics an intolerable condition of 
                                                        
122 Epiphanius, Pan. 26.3.9 (Holl, 1:280). 
 
123 See, for example, Epiphanius, Pan. 26.18.4-5; 32.7.7-9; 34.22.2 (Holl, 1:299; 447; Holl and Dummer, 2:38).   
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the quotidian Christian experience. By this metric, the fear of knowing heresy paled in 
comparison to the fear of ignorance of living in or alongside it.  
 
Conclusion: Ending Dialogue and Chasing Heresy 
 
 
 “A sound and safe and religious and truth-loving mind,” Irenaeus posited, “...will 
readily apply itself to the things God placed within the power of men and granted to our 
knowledge. It will make progress in them because by daily exercise it will make easy for itself 
the acquisition of knowledge.”124 Although entirety of scriptures preaches “clearly and 
unambiguously—so they can equally be heard by all,” owing to the power to apprehend 
bestowed upon humanity by God, the rampant dissension among Christians over customs, 
exegesis, and doctrine depict the struggle for Christian and human unity.125 Lamenting that 
Scripture induces men to overindulge their curiosities to adduce the definitive causes of 
natural phenomena and to test the truths of scripture (Matthew 10:29 and 10:30 serve as his 
prime examples), Irenaeus repeatedly emphasizes the limits of human rationality and its 
capacity to comprehend the fullness of God and his created order. He bemoans the fact that 
the heretics’ eagerness to rationalize every facet of the natural world propels him to “extol 
[their] own mind[s] above the greatness of the Creator.”126 By deluding themselves into 
                                                        
124 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.27.1 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:264). 
 
125 According to Irenaeus, apprehension of the divine creation is realized through human observation and 
scripture: the things of God/knowledge of God are “the things that come under our eyes and are expressed in the 
Sacred Scriptures clearly and unambiguously by the words themselves” (II.27.1 [Rousseau and Doutreleau. 
2:2:264]). Here I have followed AN 
 




conceptualizing wisdom and knowledge as the product of inquiry, they collapse the 
fundamental distinction between humanity and divinity.127  
For Irenaeus, the acquisition of knowledge has become a game of sorts,128 which 
engenders dangerous and unsettling repercussions:  
These [heretics], while seeking to explain the scriptures and parables, introduce 
another, great God above the God who is Creator of the world. Thus, they do not 
solve the difficulties. How can they? Rather, they attach a greater difficulty to a 
smaller one and so tie a knot that cannot be untied. They make a collection of 
foolish discourse that might come to this knowledge, [namely], to know that the 
Lord indeed came to the baptism of the truth at the age of thirty, but without 
learning this (i.e., the meaning of baptism), they impiously scorn the very God 
who is the Creator and who sent the Lord for the salvation of humankind.129  
 
Irenaeus fears the supra-textual deities and the ensuing denaturation of plenary and 
transcendent divine wisdom not simply it disrupts the epistemological hierarchy of the 
human-divine bond, but also because it undercuts the mystery of divinity and the divine 
creation. When the inquirer believes that “the more that he occupies himself with questions of 
this sort, and the more he thinks that he thinks that he has found more than others,” he 
substitutes his own understanding of the created world in place of the transcendent will of the 
divine.130 Irenaeus, as with Tertullian, frames the entire exercise of investigating scriptural and 
exegetical truth as emblematic of the misplaced inclination, endemic to the human condition, 
                                                        
127 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.26.3-4; 27.1-3 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:260-268). 
 
128 On the association between play and games and the dialecticians, see Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 27.2 (First 
Theological Oration) in Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 27-31 (Discours Théologiques) ed. Paul Gallay and Maurice Jourjon. 
SC 250  (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978), 72-74. 
 
129 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.10.2 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:88). 
 
130 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.26.3 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:262). I shall return to the parallel I see between 
knowledge of the divine and knowledge of the heretics in chapter five. Richard Lim, however, in his Public 
Disputation, 149-181, flags the relationship between curiosity and disputation in the late fourth and early fifth 
centuries (his analysis pertains mostly to the work of the Cappadocian fathers and John Chrysostom). For 
Chrysostom, an ideology of mystification about the divine presence imposed stringent inquisitional limitations. 
Investigating the divine being (or essence) served as the test case for an overindulgent inquiry. The solution or 




to seek uselessly. For both authors, an assiduously inquisitive mentality invariably contests the 
upper boundaries of human knowledge.131 And to ask or interpret ad infinitum is to become a 
heretic.132  
But while debates over the legitimacy of inquiry signified an appreciation of the 
dangers of certain types of knowledge and methods of inquiry, the heresiologists’ rhetorical 
oscillation between hesitation and mastery, fear and triumph, humility and exaltation 
assumed the capacity to undertake and complete the task. Insofar as the question of should 
heresiology be written feeds into assertions about what heresiology contains, and how its 
authors created it, the rhetoric of heresiology reflected issues of pastoral responsibility, 
dialogical legitimation, heretical (and philosophical) association, and authorial achievement. 
The fears of the heresiologists considered not knowledge of too little, but knowledge of too 
much. It was not the fear of failure, but the fear of success that oriented and informed the 
rhetorical posturing of heresiological inquiry. It is to this very problem—the relationship 
between ethnographic writing and textual comprehension and closure—that I turn to in the 
next two chapters.  
 
                                                        
131 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.26.3; 27.1; 28.3-9 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:260-2; 264-6; 268-292). 
 
132 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.27.1-2 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:264-6). 
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Chapter IV: Known Unknowns: Ethnographical Limits and the Peril of Discovery 
 
 
We need topographers to give us exact descriptions of the places where they have been. 
But because they have this advantage over us, that they have seen the Holy Land, they 
claim the additional privilege of telling us news about all the rest of the world. I would 
have everyone write about what he knows and no more than he knows, not only on this, 
but on all other subjects. One man may have some special knowledge at first-hand about 
the character of a river or a spring, who otherwise knows only what everyone else knows. 
Yet to give currency to this shred of information, he will undertake to write on the whole 
science of physics. From this fault may great troubles spring. 
 
 
-Michel de Montaigne1 
 
 
In this chapter, I explore the conceptual and discursive ruminations of the 
heresiologists as they struggle to survey and manage the ever-expanding heretical world.2 
Instead of reading these works as attestations of theological, ecclesiastical, and scholastic 
authority garnered through the workings of rhetorical totalization, I approach them as 
                                                        
1 Michel de Montaigne, “On Cannibals,” in Essays, trans. J.M. Cohen (New York: Penguin, 1993), 108. 
 
2 On the discursivity of heresy and heresiology, see Alain Le Boulleuc, La notion d’hérésie dans la literature grecque IIe-
IIIe siècles, 2 vols. (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985); Averil Cameron, “The Violence of Orthodoxy,” in Heresy and 
Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008): 102-114; 
eadem, “How to Read Heresiology,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 33.3 (2003): 471-492; Karen L. King, 
“Which Early Christianity?” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David 
G. Hunter, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 66-84; Robert M. Royalty, Jr., The Origin of Heresy: A History of 
Discourse in Second Temple Judaism and Early Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2013; Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The 
Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Andrew Jacobs, Remains of the 
Jews: The Holy Land and Christian Empire in Late Antiquity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 44-55; Virginia 
Burrus, The Making of a Heretic: Gender, Authority, and the Priscillianist Controversy (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), especially the introduction of which sets the terms of her discussion of heresy and orthodoxy; David 
Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 
5-18; and Jörg Ulrich, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, and David Brakke, eds., Invention, Rewriting, Usurpation: Discursive 
Fights over Religious Traditions in Antiquity (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), esp. 191-261. Finally, though it is 
not about heresy per se, Averil Cameron’s Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Early Christian 
Discourse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) is an invaluable resources about the textual and 
rhetorical techniques by which generations of early Christian authors developed, constructed, contemplated, and 
demarcated the history, theology, practice, and politics of Christianity. In many ways, Cameron’s work 
inaugurated the flood of attention scholars have devoted to discourse and rhetoric in early Christianity. 
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expressions of an ethnographic disposition, which captures a Christian world mired in the 
epistemological, theological, and textual dilemma of heresy’s sustained growth. The totalizing 
veneer of heresiological exposition signals not simply imperial controls, but it encapsulates 
the fundamental unknowability of heresy in all its guises. Like ancient ethnographic writers 
who were caught in the clutches of a rhetoric of expansion that admitted its own inadequacies, 
the heresiologists’ invocations of mastery and hegemony or discovery and conquest do not, in 
fact, evidence intellectual or theological triumph; they reveal the epistemological deficiencies 
of classification, which foreground the struggles embedded within the quest for heresiological 
knowledge and tools of textual closure.3 In fashioning a discourse of territorial expansion and 
cultural exportation, the heresiological discovery of new peoples and places reveals the gaps 
within, as much as it evidences and concretizes, ethnographic ambitions of mastery, control, 
and conquest.  
The limits of heresiology as a genre persist as they produce philosophical rumination 
and introspection about the ability of authors to see, comprehend, and regulate the world 
around them, and as they entrench the finitude of intellectual ambition and the textual 
incompletions of polemical ethnography. Rather than dismiss the rhetorical posturing of these 
moments of authorial angst, I contend these moments cement the conceptual parallel between 
heresiology and ethnography. The point is not that the heresiologists were authorial failures 
of skill and intellect, but rather that they reflect upon their ignorance and the limits of their 
                                                        
3 The very same concern attends literature about Rome’s rise and geographical and cultural expansion. And, as we 
shall see later in this very chapter, the issues of containment and mapping are problematic elements of the 
ideology of triumph.  On this last point see the incisive observations of Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and Non-
Romans,” in The Romans, ed. Andrea Giardina, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 342-369; Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, trans. Hélène Leclerc (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); and Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 55-61. The problem persists throughout Western history as ancient texts themselves create intellectual 
disruption, as is clearly demonstrated in the excellent study of Anthony Grafton, April Shelford, and Nancy Siraisi, 




texts in decidedly ethnographic terms evoking the explorations of geographers, 
chorographers, and travelers across the centuries and Mediterranean. Above all else, the 
reflections of the heresiologists are not simply stylistic or rhetorical; they are reflections on 
the ability of authors to describe and control in texts the world around them, the disjuncture 
between the human and divine conditions, and the potential of ethnographic excursion. 
Heresiological texts exhibit not a discourse of an orthodox Christian tradition over against 
heresy, but a process in which the possibility of knowing is debated alongside knowing the 
truth of Christianity and studying the heretical opinions. The rhetorical hesitation registered 
by Epiphanius, Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Irenaeus—the fear that explaining heresy will 
spawn heresy—belies the overriding impulse to reveal the fruits of their armchair 
ethnography, the spectacle of unfurling the mass of data they have compiled. Bracketed by an 
appeal to expose, on the one hand, and to combat and cure, on the other, writings that study 
and refute the doctrines of the heretics and their disciples present an epistemological 
negotiation of ethnography and polemic, wherein discovering the secrets and mysteries of the 
heretics reflects the equivocal desire to know the world that is Christian and the firm desire to 
expand the Christian world. 
Even as the heresiologists paraded and proclaimed their comprehension of an inferior 
intellectual contagion they concurrently endeavored to regulate and regularize the 
phenomenon of heresy within an increasingly expansive Christian world. While they 
promoted and performed their toil for the sake of Christians throughout the world, the results 
of which demonstrated their textual mastery, the lingering intractability of the heresies 
muddles the claims of victory. In the second half of this chapter, I explore the self-conscious 
qualifications Epiphanis appends to his ethnographic foray. Careful evaluation of the full 
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rhetorical scope of the heresiologies reveals less an unvarnished conquest than it does a 
nuanced and, indeed, tenuous grasp of the burgeoning cast of heretical characters. Attending 
the discursive comprehension and subjugation of the heresiologists is, as we shall see, an 
admission of the textual and conceptual limitations of heresiology itself. As the form and 
content of the genre garner the heresiologists’ scrutiny, fault lines of ethnographic 
representation and imposition readily emerge and harden. The heresiologists do not simply 
register (or feign) their nervousness about the protracted exposition and, by implication, 
promotion of heretical doctrine, they advance a far more striking realization: their texts are as 
much chasms of Christian knowledge as they are instantiations of it.  
 
Ethnographic Effects: Discovery, Comprehension, and the Unknowable 
 
In forging territorial models of their surroundings, ancient geographical writers, as 
Claude Nicolet has argued, used the auspices of science and exactitude to represent and thus 
create the world in their own political and ideological terms.4 Geographical and ethnographic 
discourse created a hierarchy of lands, peoples, and societies in which the world and its 
contents were not only rationalized and ordered but moralized and appraised.5 The intellectual 
mapping of cultures by means of discovery magnified the world’s diversity, wonderment, and 
mystery:  
Like all sciences, it moves cumulatively: all sorts of progress, some empirical 
and others theoretical, slowly create a body of knowledge, more or less 
imperfect and more or less accepted by society. But concerning geography, the 
                                                        
4 Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, 1-84. 
 
5 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans,” 342-369; Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical 
Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1-168; and Elizabeth Rawson, “Geography and 
Ethnography,” in her Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (London: Duckworth, 1985), 250-266.  
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frontier between the known and the unknown is first of all traced on a territory, 
in a space: the world is still a partly unexplored piece of land. Whence the 
fundamental notions, according to the concepts of that time, of the known and 
unknown world, of the inhabited or inhabitable earth. Geography—knowledge 
and representation of the earth—is still at the stage of voyages and discoveries: 
“inaccessible” spaces still remain. As for what is known, or rather surveyed, the 
first stage of understanding passes through different descriptive methods: such 
and such a thing in such and such a location, before or after such and such a 
thing—which is little else than an imaginary voyage.6 
 
Whereas geography mapped lands, ethnography mapped peoples: the two, taken together, 
organized the spatial and human contents of the world at large. Ancient travelogues (and 
travel writing more broadly) served as imaginative tools through which reality was projected 
into the written world.7 In traversing and translating foreign and domestic environments, 
ancient authors described the world—and thus create a world—as they saw it, wished it, and 
even feared it to be. Ethnography, like geography, negotiates the push and pull, the 
exhilaration and fear of discovery and new knowledge. To trace this paradox of ethnography, I 
begin with a discussion of the Chorography of Pomponius Mela. Written in the first century, 
shortly after the death of Augustus Caesar, Mela’s Chorography is a circumnavigation (or 
periplus, as I explained in the introduction) of the known world: it takes its readers on a tour of 
the world, accentuating “anthropological curiosities, natural phenomena, supernatural 
phenomena, and the lay of the land.”8 And although Mela used his literary map to display his 
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7 On travel in antiquity, see Peter Whitfield, Travel: A Literary History (Oxford: Bodleian, 2011) 1-38; Duane W. Roller, 
Through the Pillars of Herakles: Greco-Roman Exploration of the Atlantic; and Mark Handley, Dying on Foreign Shores: 
Travel and Mobility in the Late-Antique West (Portsmouth, RI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2011); Lionel Casson, 
Travel in the Ancient World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); James S. Romm, The Edges of the Earth 
in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Maria Pretzler, 
“Turning Travel into Text: Pausanias at Work,” Greece & Rome 51.2 (2004): 199-216; James Redfield, “Herodotus the 
Tourist,” Classical Philology 80.2 (1985): 97-118; Colin Adams and Ray Laurence, eds., Travel and Geography in the 
Roman Empire (New York: Routledge, 2001); and Philip A. Harland, ed., Travel and Religion in Antiquity (Waterloo, ON: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011). 
 




ethnographical, mythological, and geographical knowledge, he also discovers, as his text 
progresses, the impassible and unknowable facets of the natural world. How does one describe 
and absorb the unknown?  
To ponder the effects of prolonged exposure to the most foreign of circumstances and 
customs is, as Pomponius Mela’s Chorography demonstrates, an obvious opportunity to erect 
distance and thus difference between the imperial center, Rome (in Mela’s case), and the 
peoples and places of the periphery.9 By emphasizing certain habitual and moral distinctions 
between geographical regions and peoples, Mela, like Polybius, Augustus, Pliny, Strabo, 
Tacitus, among others, blankets the imperial world in a ranked system of cultural classification 
and writes the world through the language and perspective of Rome.10 As his Chorography or 
                                                        
9 For more on Pomponius Mela, see the “Introduction” to F.E. Romer, Pomponius Mela’s Description of the World, 1-32. 
Alain Silberman, Pomponius Mela: Chorographie (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1998); Kai Brodersen, Pomponius Mela: 
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see James S. Romm, The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction (Princeton: Princeton 
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Ralph W. Mathisen and Danuta Shanzer, eds., Romans, Barbarians, and the Transformation of the Roman World: Cultural 
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romaines face aux barbares au ive siècle ap. J.-C. (Paris: De Boccard, 1998); John E. Coleman and Clark A. Walz, eds., 
Greeks and Barbarians: Essays on the Interactions between Greeks and Non-Greeks in Antiquity and the Consequences for 
Eurocentrism (Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 1997); Yves Albert Dauge, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de 
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Literary Construct” in Pausanias: Travel and Memory in Roman Greece, ed. Susan E. Alcock, John F. Cherry, and Jas’ 
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Barbarians in Roman Art (Stroud: Sutton, 2000); Simon Goldhill, ed., Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the 
Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Erich S. Gruen, 
Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Erich S. Gruen, ed., Cultural Identity in 
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culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Irad Malkin, ed., Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity 
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Description of the World commences, Pomponius Mela binds the substantive focus of his 
inquiry—the study of ethnographic and geographic diversity—to the burdens of authorship 
and personal expenditure:  
A description of the known world is what I set out to give, a difficult task and 
one hardly suited to eloquence, since it consists chiefly in names of peoples and 
places and in their fairly puzzling arrangement. To trace this arrangement 
completely is a time-consuming, rather than a welcome, subject, but 
nevertheless a very worthwhile thing to consider and understand. It repays the 
effort of those who give it attention—at least by the very act of contemplating 
it, if not by the richness of this supplicant’s natural talent.11 
 
When Mela signals straight away the labyrinth of the world’s diversity, his bemoaning the 
drudgery involved in understanding it only underscores his ambition to comprehend this 
globalized heterogeneity fully. To that end, his foray into topographical and geographical 
detail begins by defining the shape of the world and demarcating the three major contents—
Asia, Europe, and Africa—by territory and waterways. Broadly identifying the scope of his 
inquiry, Mela next ventures “to describe [our world’s] coastlines and regions with greater 
precision.”12 As he maps the various regions of the world, Mela juxtaposes his routinized tour 
of rivers, oceans, and lands with brief but quintessential ethnographical details. The emphasis 
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Alois Schlachter and Friedrich Gisinger, Der Globus, seine Entstehung und Verwendung in der Antike (Leipzig/Berlin: 
B.G. Teubner, 1927); Andreas Alföldi, Die monarchische Repräsentation im romischen Kaiserreiche (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchges, 1970); Pascal Arnaud, “L’image du globe dans le monde romain: Science, Iconographie, 
Symbolique,” Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome 96.1 (1984): 53-116; Sorcha Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture: Art 
and Empire in the Natural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 36-39; Nicolet, Space, Geography, and 
Politics in the Early Roman Empire, 85-94, and N.J.E Austin and N.B. Rankov, Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence 




on microcosm—at the expense of macroscopic unity—reflects chorography’s preoccupation 
with, what we might call, synchronic geography of the minutiae. Because “the goal of regional 
cartography (χωρογραφικὸν),” according to the second-century Greek geographer Claudius 
Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy), “is an impression of a part, as when one makes an image of just an ear 
or an eye,” it dwells on the particularity without devising an overarching coherence for the 
whole of the world.13 Regional cartography “sets out individual localities, each one 
independently and by itself, registering practically everything down to the least thing therein 
(for example, harbors, towns, districts, branches of principal rivers, and so on),” but does not 
“show the known world as a single and continuous entity, its nature and how it is situated.”14 
The chorographical effect, then, is to present a loose confederation of particularized data, 
which follows a narrative journey, even if the narrative itself reveals disparate, unaligned, and 
contradictory details. Despite its thematic congruity, the genre lacks conceptual systematicity.  
In Book III, for instance, having moved to a discussion of the lands off the coast of 
northern Europe, Pomponius arrives at the isle of Britain. The island, he report, is a fertile and 
generous habitat for sheep, though its terrain is less suitable for human needs. The land does 
maintain people, “but they all are uncivilized” (sed sunt inculti omnes).15 Removed, as they are, 
from the umbrella of civilization, the Britons lack knowledge of “other kinds of wealth, being 
                                                        
13 Ptolemy, Geographia. 1.1.17-19 in Claudii Ptolemaei Geographia, ed. C.F.A. Nobbe (1843-1854; repr., Hildesheim: G. 
Olms, 1966), 3. For the translation see, Ptolemy’s Geography: An Annotated Translation of the Theoretical Chapters, trans. 
J. Lennart Berggren and Alexander Jones (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 57. “World cartography 
(γεωγραγἰα) is an imitation through drawing of the entire known part of the world together with things that are, 
broadly speaking, connected with it” (Geog. 1.1.1 [Nobbe, 3]). 
 
14 Ptolemy, Geo. I.1.5-11 (Nobbe, 3 [Berggren and Jones, 57]). 
 




wealthy only in sheep and land.”16 Like many a foreign peoples, they are a population defined 
by a “strong desire to rule and a strong drive to expand their holdings.”17 Despite Mela’s less 
than avid affinity for the Britons, their incivility and ignorance served a critical function 
within the Roman imperial project of conquest and domination.18 The ever-growing sphere, 
both literal and metaphorical, of Roman occupation has made the dispositional nature of these 
northern Islanders firmly known and readily comprehensible. Mela explains:    
Next, as to what kind of place Britain is and what kind of people it produces, 
information that is more certain and better established will be stated. The 
reason is that—lo and behold!—the greatest princeps is opening the long-closed 
island, and as conqueror of previously unsubdued and previously unknown 
peoples (nec indomitarum modo ante se verum ignotarum quoque gentium victor), the 
princeps brings with them the proof of his own accomplishments, since he will 
reveal in his triumph as much as he has laid claim to in war.19 
 
The fact that the Britons had been brought into the known realm—that is, fully exposed as a 
people—tightened the pronouncement of the historian Polybius, who had written his Histories 
to demonstrate the means by which Rome had succeeded “in subjecting nearly the whole 
inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history.”20 The incivility and 
                                                        
16 Mela, Chor. III.51 (Silberman, 82). See the complementary description of the Britons in Tacitus’ Agricola 21. For 
Roman techniques of ethnographic translation (in the context of the Britons in particular) see Emma Dench, 
Romulus’ Asylum, 82-87 and Katherine Clarke, “An Island Nation: Re-Reading Tacitus’ Agricola,” Journal of Roman 
Studies 91 (2001): 94-102. 
 
17 Mela, Chor. III.52 (Silberman, 82). 
 
18 S.T. James, “‘Romanization’ and the Peoples of Britain,” in Italy and the West: Comparative Issues in Romanization, 
ed. Simon Keay and Nicola Terrenato (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2001), 187-209.  
 
19 Mela, Chor. III.49. (Silberman, 81). 
 
20 Polybius, The Histories I.1.5, ed. and trans. W.R. Paton, Loeb Classical Library 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1922), 4. The same ideology begins the Res Gestae Divi Augusti, ed. and trans. Frederick W. Shipley, 
Loeb Classical Library 152 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924): “Below is a copy of the acts of the 
deified Augustus by which he placed the whole world under the sovereignty of the Roman people (quibus orbem 
terrarum imperio populi Romani). For an analysis of this “introductory” remark and the larger thematic importance 
of the ideology of subjection (of the inhabited world) within Augustus’ Res Gestae, see Nicolet, Space, Geography, and 
Politics in the Early Roman Empire, 15-27. Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History: Hellenistic Constructions of 
the Roman World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) has ascribed a sense of natural order and divine will to Polybius’ 
political theory, owing perhaps to the influence of Stoicism. Just as the ordering of texts was the domain of the 
  
199 
ignorance of the Britons—and their Irish neighbors, it should be added—no longer remained 
objects of speculation and feared enemies of the imagination. Their cultural leanings had been 
specified and fixed. As Rome expanded its frontiers, the monstrous peoples of the North, the 
British and Irish, and those from the south, in and around the Nile, ethnographic writing 
served to stabilize the cultural periphery in texts.21 Textual recollections of exploration 
purported to identify and, in fact, tame the once unknown and savage. Increased knowledge of 
the Britons demystified their savagery, and inaugurated, so Mela tells his readers, a process of 
triumphal civilizing.22 A report from Book 6 of Pliny’s Natural History, though it omits any hints 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
writer, “that of the world belonged to fate” (126). On the ethnic and cultural connections between the οἰκουμένη, 
Judaism, Rome, and Greece, see Kevin Osterloh, “The Reinvention of Judean Collective Identity in a Hellenistic 
World Contending with Rome” (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2007). The Judean reinvention of 
communal identity was fundamentally in emulation of “the elite-constructed image of the Roman body politic” 
(32). To make his argument Osterloh offers a detailed reading of I & II Maccabees and The Histories of Polybius (and 
to a lesser extent the work of Cato). Judean elites were explicitly engaged in a process of transforming the nature 
of virtue from the Greek aretē to the distinctly Roman virtus and fides (manly courage, martial valor, diligent 
loyalty, based on trustworthiness and honesty). Osterloh sees the negotiation of the tension between 
Rome/Romanness and Greece/Greekness, centered around the shifting category of aretē/virtue, which 
simultaneously implicated a second dichotomy: the “display of extreme patriotism, loyalty, and self-sacrifice of 
the individual to/for the commonwealth versus a hedonistic ‘barbarizing’ individualism, cowardice, treachery, 
and weakness of ‘the Greeks’” (36). 
 
21 In the Natural History, as Trevor Murphy demonstrates, Pliny emphasizes not only the ever-increasing influence 
of the Roman Empire (Aelius Gallus, for instance, brought military force to the South of Arabia, whereas Augustus 
“only had a glimpse of Arabia” (Pliny, Natural History VI.XXXII.160, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical 
Library 352 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942], 458). Pliny further lists a series of towns, previously 
unknown, that were destroyed by Gallus. Murphy explains the import: “In case of these towns [Negrana, Nestus, 
Nesca, Magusus, Caminacus, Labaetia, Bariba, and Caripeta], we learn of their presence in the world only after the 
Natural History tells us they no longer exist—their destruction is the necessary precondition of our being 
informed. That such complete information should be available to the Natural History is a consequence of the 
spread of Roman authority, which has opened up the orbis terrarum to expeditions such as that of Aelius Gallus. 
The reader can go anywhere he likes, and the encyclopedia’s intent is to show him what it will look like when he 
gets there” (130). See also, Gian Biago Conte, Genres and Readers: Lucretius, Love Elegy, Pliny’s Encyclopedia, trans. 
Glenn W. Most (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 
 
22 Cf. Greg Woolf, “Ethnography and Empire,” in Tales of the Barbarians, 59-88, who argues that, “Roman 
expansion…did not set an imperial vision at the heart of ethnographic writing. At best it gave a new importance 
to some interpretive issues already present in earlier histories and geographies cast on a grand scale” (78). 
Woolf’s argument rests on partitioning the historical impact of empire as a facilitator ethnographic writing from 
the rhetorical quest (and difficulty) to map and control the world in texts. Woolf is certainly right to note that 
empire did not magically create a New World; the real (i.e. felt) impact of imperial expansion on ethnographic 
writing is a question very much open to debate. Woolf, to seize a particularly telling example, notes that failure to 
know in imperial ethnographers was not evidence of inability to know. He writes, “scattered references to Keltoi, 
Tartessians, Tyrrhenians, and even Romans can be collected from fifth- and fourth-century texts. If they were 
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of Hellenization or Romanization in the uncivilized island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), similarly 
captures the enduring power of discovery: “Ceylon, under the name of the Land of the 
Counterlanders, was long considered to be another world; but the epoch and the achievements 
of Alexander the Great supplied clear proof of its being an island.”23 By communicating the 
intellectual fruits of geographical expansion, ethnography widened the center’s powerful hold 
over the rest of the world.24 As the center moved from Greece to Rome and then to the 
Christian Church, each stage of cross-cultural expansion reified peoples at the periphery, both 
geographically and theologically, through rampant translation, transplantation, and 
appropriation. Ethnography proved an essential element of the ideological process by which 
cross-cultural inquiry became determined by the transcendent aspirations of the reigning 
power.25  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
marginalized within historical writing it was not because they were either unknown or unknowable. It was simply 
that the great narratives of Greek and Roman imperial histories had not yet touched them” (66). My argument is 
that heresy represents a fundamentally new ethnographic problem precisely because it obviates territorial 
demarcations. The known world is no longer separable from the unknown world. I shall draw out this argument 
more fully in the next section of this chapter. At the same time, however, it is important to emphasize that 
Woolf’s proposition too readily ignores the salience of rhetorical claims for empire. The ways in which 
ethnographic writing represents and creates a world of its own certainly evidences the genre’s dispositional 
structures. The fact that the narratives had yet to reach an already known people attenuates the imperial edifice 
of the text’s rhetorical domain. The rhetorical limits and reach of ethnographic discovery present an important 
conceptual problem of writing and producing texts. Woolf undervalues the ways in which ethnography—both in 
its ancient and modern guises—constantly disrupts the security of the senses and the representative capacity of 
writing.   
 
23 Pliny, Natural History VI.XXIV.81 (Rackham, 398); See Ernst Badian, “Alexander the Great and the Unity of 
Mankind,” Historia 7 (1958): 425-444; On collection in Pliny see the excellent study of Sorcha Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue 
of Culture: Art and Empire in the Natural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. 17-40 and 75-101; 
Aude Doody, Pliny’s Encyclopedia: The Reception of the Natural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 1-39; and Trevor Murphy, Pliny The Elder’s Natural History: The Empire in the Encyclopedia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 105-108. On Ceylon in particular see, C.G. Starr, “The Roman Emperor and the King of 
Ceylon” Classical Philology 51 (1956): 27-30. In late antiquity, Cylon again emerges as a land of mystery. 
 
24 See Richard Alston, “Conquest by Text: Juvenal and Plutarch on Egypt,” in Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial 
Perspectives, ed. Jane Webster and Nicolas Cooper (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1996), 99-109; and 
Catherine Edwards, “Incorporating the Alien: The Art of Conquest,” in Rome the Cosmopolis, ed. Catherine Edwards 
and Greg Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47-62. 
25 For more perspectives on acculturation and dominance, see the full collection of essays in Jane Webster and 
Nicolas Cooper, eds., Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives. The art historical and archaeological perspective 




The Journey of Heresiology 
 
Jeremy Schott has persuasively argued that the ethnographic and philosophical 
proficiency of Christian apologetic literature functioned in tandem with other textual ventures 
such as universal history as a tool of social control and categorization.26 For Schott, Greek and 
Roman philosophers of the early empire wielded the fruits of cross-cultural exchange (and 
exploitation) as demonstrations and validation of a broader universal philosophy that 
strengthened the cultural asymmetry between Greek and Roman philosophical tradition and 
knowledge, on the one hand, and the peripheral intellectual pursuits of non-Greeks and non-
Romans, on the other. In this way, barbarian wisdom was made valuable by Greek 
interpretation.27 Ethnography—which Schott reads as method of intellectual collection, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Marcel Bénabou, La résistance africaine à la Romanisation (Paris: F. 
Maspero, 1976). 
 
26 Jeremy Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 166. It is worth noting here the corresponding interests of the sixth-century Christian 
Topography by the monk Cosmas, known often as Cosmas Indicopleustes (literally the Indian traveler or voyager). 
Cosmas not only claims to survey the entire earth more completely and thoroughly than his pagan predecessors, 
he frames his endeavor as an opportunity to refute Greek and Roman models of cosmography, geography, and 
ethnogenesis and to articulate a Christian theorization of the world and its contents following Scripture 
(supplemented with his own first-hand observations). Cosmas’ articulation of the terms of Christian ethnographic 
(among other analytical pursuits) discourse is both intellectually constructive and destructive: that is, the text 
binds its analysis of the surrounding world to a two-fold project of refutation and (positive) enumeration. 
Christian world making, in other words, did not exist in a vacuum. It reacted and adapted to competing 
vernaculars and theories of the world’s creation, diversity, and particularities.  
 
27 Schott’s first chapter, “Philosophers, Apologists, and Empire,” 15-51, discusses the historical, ethnographic, and 
geographical propensities of philosophical rumination and the tension between so-called “ethnic histories” (of 
Hecataeus of Abdera, Manetho, Philo of Byblos, Artapanus, Eupolemus, and Josephus) and the desired 
synchronicity of an overarching “historico-ethnographic” narrative, as evidenced most pronouncedly by the 
Historical Library of Diodorus Siculus. Ethnographic details and cultural particularity held profound philosophical 
resonance precisely because they held the potential to structure a unified philosophical system out of a seemingly 
diverse mess of plurality. As much as the philosophical juxtaposition of cross-cultural wisdom, served to 
destabilize rigid categories of identity (the closeness of Egyptian and Greek traditions, for instance), barbarian 
wisdom ultimately became an occasion to assert and champion the univocity of the universalizing Greek 
vernacular. The allegorical exegesis of the Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Cornutus), and the 
metaphysical interpretative strategies of the Platonists (Plutarch and Numenius of Apamea) lessened cultural 
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discovery, and appropriation—served to schematize the diversity of the world into a single 
system of philosophical order. Following the philosophical, ethnographic, and geographic 
musings of various Greek authors, Christian apologists similarly articulated a transcendent or 
ecumenical system of thought as it qualified and dismantled the dichotomy between Greeks 
and barbarians.28 In their appeal to the metaphorical and literal vernacular of geography and 
ethnography, Christian apologetical authors positioned themselves at the conjunction of a new 
homologous knowledge (in contrast to the ethnic plurality of paganism) of overreaching 
incorporation. The production of this Christian intellectual pedigree, built upon a recasting of 
the Greek philosophical tradition, supplied the means by which knowledge and thus control 
were facilitated and amassed. Schott explains that the notional boundaries of Christian 
discourse produced layers of comprehension and difference: 
Terms like Christianismos, Hellenismos, ethne, gentes, and nationes, as well as a host 
of heresiological appellatives, served as signifiers in a science of local and global 
control. Working within such a system of knowledge, bishops and imperial 
officials living well inside the borders of Roman territory could find themselves 
on the frontier between Christians and others. The discourse of apologetics 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
distinction by positing the vernacular of Greek philosophical traditions as the new (singular) medium of 
interpretation. This reading strategy, in effect, transposed the conquest of territory into a realm of intellectual 
culture and books: “the ecumenical drive of late ancient philosophers was suspended within an in contact with 
the political conditions of its possibility. By reading barbarian texts in Greek and interpreting them for a Greek 
readership (emphasis Schott), these philosophers were engaged in a process of intellectual despoliation 
homologous to the Roman conquest of peoples and territory” (27). For more on this process of Hellenizing ethnic 
histories and universalizing tendencies, see Daniel Richter, “Plutarch on Isis and Osiris: Text, Cult, and Cultural 
Appropriation,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 131  (2001): 191-216; Raoul Mortley, The Idea of 
Universal History from Hellenistic Philosophy to Early Christian Historiography (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1996); 
Arnaldo Momigliano, “The Origins of Universal History,” in On Pagans, Jews, and Christians (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1987), 31-57; Rebecca Preston, “Roman Questions, Greek Answers: Plutarch and the Construction 
of Identity,” in Being Greek Under Rome, ed. Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 86-119; 
Thomas Schmidt, “Plutarch’s Timeless Barbarians and the Age of Trajan,” in Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek 
Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan, ed. Philip Stadler and Luc Van der Stockt (Louvain: Louven 
University Press, 2002), 57-71; Richard Alston, “Conquest by Text: Juvenal and Plutarch on Egypt,” 99-109.   
 




provided a system of knowledge that structured contact between Christians and 
the ethne.29  
 
Just as apologetics erected and refined the terms and expanse of imperial domination and 
comprehension, heresiologies, as I have noted in the previous sections of this chapter, 
embrace the same maneuvers and rhetoric of ethnographic writing and representation. As 
complementary and parallel sites of ethnographic investigation, apologetics and heresiology 
frame the range of their knowledge as evidence of intellectual depth, skill, and intellectual 
jurisdiction.  
Having painstakingly enumerated his Panarion, Epiphanius of Salamis’s concluding 
remarks transpose his survey of the eighty heresies into a theological postscript concerning 
the exclusive truth of the catholic church. As this ecumenical epilogue, entitled De Fide, 
commences, the bishop recollects his experience writing the Panarion to brandish his 
accomplishments and to attest the intellectual pedigree of his inquiry. Imagining the 
classification of the heretics as an act of prolonged and treacherous discovery, De Fide solidifies 
the ethnographic perspective of heresiology by casting the text’s production in the symbolic 
language of travel and return: 
We have discussed the various, multiform, and much divided teachings of the 
crooked counsels of our opponents, have distinguished them by species and 
genus and, by God’s power, have exposed them as stale and worthless. We have 
sailed across the shoreless sea of the blasphemies of each sect, with great 
difficulty crossed the ocean of their shameful, repulsive mysteries, (2) given the 
solutions to their <hosts> of problems, and passed their wickedness by. And we 
have approached calm lands of the truth, after negotiating every rough place, 
enduring every squall, foaming, and tossing of billows, (3) and, as it were, seeing 
                                                        
29 Jeremy Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity, 169. See also Clifford Ando, “Pagan 





the swell of the sea, and its whirlpools, its shallows none too small, and its place 
full of dangerous beasts, and experiencing them through words.30   
 
The taxonomic endeavor of the heresiologist, here explicitly articulated as a system of natural 
classification ordered by genus and species, is conceived as an ethnographic excursion of 
theological exigency and immense toil. Travel, as the metaphor of textual production, begets 
an intellectual and spiritual exhaustion that is the expected consequence of an ethnographic 
effort to stabilize the structure and content of the Christian world. Having sailed across the sea 
of heresy and contended with “the perils of the deep,” Epiphanius and his travel companions 
(his readers and the Catholic Church, more broadly) “recover from all our fear, distress, and 
illness, as we inhale the mainland breezes with the utmost relief, as we have come to safety 
and won our way to the calm harbor.”31  
The consequence of this theological journey, despite all its uncertainty and injury, is to 
cherish the safe refuge of orthodoxy. When Epiphanius reconnects with the orthodoxy 
symbolized in the city of Jerusalem—the journey into darkness has led inexorably to “the holy 
Jerusalem and Christ’s virgin and bride, the firm foundation and rock, our holy mother”—he 
immediately relishes the restorative power of the Lord’s sanctuary, both for its physical and 
spiritual sustenance: “for we have always been in need of him and in every part of these Sects, 
                                                        
30 Epiphanius, De Fide 1.1-3 (Epiphanius, Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 37 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985], 
3:496). Translation from Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis, 2 vols., NHS 35–36 [Leiden: Brill, 
1987, 1994]. The phrase “by species and genus” (πρὸς εἶδος καὶ γένος), as Phillip de Lacy, “Plato and the Method of 
the Arts,” in The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan, ed. Luitpold Wallach 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 123-32, has noted, originates in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who 
hierarchize knowledge via division. Galen, too, as both Lyman and Flowers have observed utilized this paradigm 
of division to organize his medical knowledge. “On a number of occasions he described his scientific descriptions 
as having been structured ‘by genus and species,’ and, according to his own catalogue of his impressive literary 
oeuvre, he even wrote a book entitled, The meanings of the terms ‘genus’ and ‘species’ and the terms used with them” 
(Flowers, 79). See also Rebecca Flemming, Galen and the Making of Roman Women: Gender, Nature, and Authority from 
Celsus to Galen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
31 Epiphanius, De Fide 1.5, 1.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497). 
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in our continual encounters with their obscurities.”32 As the theological embodiment of holy 
Jerusalem, orthodoxy blossoms into a vivid metropolis, the wonder and glory of which are 
made manifest to the faithful and concealed from the unbelievers.33 Although the settled 
comforts of Jerusalem rehabilitate the exhausted voyager, the travel itself remained an 
endeavor emblazoned in his mind; its disruptive capacity did not end with Epiphanius’ 
metaphorical expedition. Just as Epiphanius, the wearied traveler, rightly celebrates his 
textual triumph and safe return, De Fide fully exposes and enumerates the illusory controls of 
heresiology’s ethnographic aspirations. If, as James Clifford has argued, dislocation engenders 
inquiry—“‘Theory’ is a product of displacement, comparison, a certain distance. To theorize, 
one leaves home”—the voyage into the violent waters of heresy quite naturally begets 
reflection about the destabilizing effects of exploration.34 
While the language of rhetorical mastery substantiates certain authorial pretensions of 
the heresiologists, geographers, and ethnographers, it also unmasks the more profound 
conceptual perplexity of ethnographic writing and research. To the extent that Christian 
heresiology is reflexively identified as a site of ecclesiastical (or theological) authority and 
imperial control, the genre’s proponents, in point of fact, usefully complicate this outlook by 
                                                        
32 Epiphanius, De Fide 2.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497). 
 
33 Epiphanius, De Fide, 2.9 (Holl and Dummer, 3:498). 
 
34 James Clifford, “Notes on Travel and Theory,” Inscriptions 5 (1989), 177. On the philosophical, ritualistic, and 
epistemological evolutions of theoria, see the excellent study of Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in 
Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Theoria, 
Nightingale explains, began as a journey (undertaken by the theoros) to witness spectacles, momentous events, 
and sacred objects. The journey or theoria, which incorporated the totality of the experience from the journey 
away, the sacred viewing, and return home, emphasized the effects of seeing ritual and sacredness. During the 
classical era, philosophical inquiry, led by Plato, began to model itself in the image of the theoria: the philosophers 
engaged in activity that enabled them to journey into the universe, the gods, and world around them and see 
truths. For my purposes, Nightingale’s most useful analysis (63-68) falls in what she calls the domain of “theoria as 
cultural practice,” specifically a “journey to foreign lands to see the world” (40, 63). In seeing the world, the 
theoros acquires knowledge and wisdom. Theoria could be, as Herodotus so persistently illustrates, a fundamentally 
ethnographic experience.  
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drawing out the internal tensions and constraints within the rhetorical edifice of totalization. 
This analytical strain, I argue, permeates the suppositional fabric of ancient ethnography itself. 
Even as ethnography erected structures of transcendent knowledge, which defined the 
periphery in terms of the center and elaborated new interpretive mechanisms of knowledge, it 
also communicated in categorical language the underlying limitations of authorial projects of 
universalizing scope. In emphasizing the ways in which ancient ethnographic texts ponder and 
articulate the constraints of writing and knowing about peoples, I am proposing to reevaluate 
the ideological implications of ethnographic writing. As both a mode of writing and manner of 
thinking, ethnography exists at the intellectual conjunction of ambition and constraint: how 
much can we know? The ethnographic disposition, as I outlined in the Introduction, is 
oriented around dissociative binaries: triumph and failure, on the one hand, and control and 
disruption, on the other. Ancient ethnographers define the problem of textual comprehension 
and representation not through a distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, as much of 
contemporary anthropological discourse does, but through the rhetorical and conceptual 
impression that the myriad diversity of the world is unquantifiable, truly unknowable, and 
outside the realm of textual capacity.35 I call this the epistemological paradox of ethnography, 
whereby the campaign for maximal knowledge not only amplifies the deep, pervasive 
cleavages within the textual conceit of ethnographic writing, but also exposes the authorial 
inability to manage this newfound cultural, ethnic, and religious data. The discoveries of 
                                                        
35 On contemporary ethnography and the tension between objective and subjective analysis, see Clifford Geertz, 
Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Loring Danforth, The Death 
Rituals of Rural Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Bronislaw Malinowski, A Diary in the Strict Sense 
of the Term (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Self-Fashioning: Conrad 
and Malinowski,” in Reconstructing Individualism, ed. T.C. Heller (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 140-
162; James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986); Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977); Vincent Crapanazno, Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Kevin 
Dwyer, Moroccan Dialogues: Anthropology in Question (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); J.-P. Dumont, 
The Headman and I: Ambiguity and Ambivalence in the Fieldworking Experience (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).  
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voyages, both real and imagined, do not simply produce invaluable knowledge, they become 
lasting evidence of the struggle, past, present, and future, to fix control over a diverse and 
diversifying world. Insofar as the world is simply beyond the command and control of texts, 
ethnography perpetuates the textual bind of this epistemological hole.  
The epistemological and textual rifts of ethnography begin with the seemingly benign 
relationship between discovery and knowledge: the amassing of knowledge, as much as it is a 
consequence of imperial ambition, necessitates structural mechanisms (ethnographic 
paradigms, in this case) to array it.36 Increased knowledge of the world—in other words, an 
enlarged οἰκουμένη (the known world)—introduces more human diversity into the 
ethnographic equation. Additional knowledge not only begets further lines of inquiry, it 
demands ways to incorporate this newly acquired information into existing models and/or the 
development of new configurations to counteract the disruptive potential of unregulated data. 
Ancient ethnographic texts, despite their effort to comprehend and systematize the world 
around them, reveal quite explicitly an enervated control over the classificatory effects of 
their inquiries. Indeed, to return to my opening example, as his Chorography unfolds, the world 
Mela describes slowly exposes the fault lines in his seemingly expert grasp of its contents and 
contours.37  
                                                        
36 This is the argument that Greg Woolf advances in Chapter II, “Explaining the Barbarians,” of his Tales of the 
Barbarians. Ethnographic knowledge, in essence, requires explanatory and organizational models. See also, 
Elizabeth Rawson, “Geography and Ethnography,” in her Intellectual Life in the Late Republic (London: Duckworth, 
1985), 250-266. 
 
37 This motif of textual fracture within Mela’s Chorography is expertly traced by Rhiannon Evans, “Ethnography’s 
Freak Show: The Grotesques at the Edges of the Roman Earth,” Ramus 28.1 (1999): 54-73. While I draw heavily upon 
Evans’ analysis, I have chosen to emphasize the impact of textual instability within the broader context of the 
ancient ethnographic disposition. Ian Wood, “‘The Ends of the Earth’: The Bible, Bibles, and the Other in Early 
Medieval Europe,” in The Calling of the Nations: Exegesis, Ethnography, and Empire in a Biblical-Historic Present (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2011), 200-216, discusses the place of missionizing in a Christian geography of the 
world and its outer limits. With attention to Bede and Adam of Bremen, Wood analyzes not only the differing 
functions of missionary history (the former used it to perpetuate a sacred history, while the latter appealed to it 
to emphasize ecclesiastical/jurisdictional power), but the starkly divergent “readings” of the ends of the earth. 
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It is in the Chorography’s Africa, a site of profound cultural and anthropological tension, 
that the textual constraints of ethnographic analysis emerge most emphatically. Africa, so 
Mela informs his readers, was highly fertile, yet largely uninhabited.38 He reports that it was, 
“inhabited by people socialized according to our custom,” while in the interior of the 
continent “the scarcely human and rather brutish Goat-Pans, Blemyes, Gamphasantes, and 
Satyrs possess, rather than inhabit, the land. They roam freely everywhere, with no houses and 
no fixed abode.”39 The Romanized north of the country, which bears the marks of Roman 
civilization, slowly recedes as readers make their way inland (to the southern and western 
parts of the continent). The nomadic peoples of the interior are known for their “rather 
uncouth way of life.”40 The people “beyond the desert” are further marked off from the norms 
of the Roman gaze.41 The Trogodytae (cave-dwellers) “own no resources, and rather than 
speak, they make a high-pitched sound. They creep around deep in caves and are nurtured by 
serpents.”42 The Augliae worship the spirits of the dead (the Manes, in the Roman vernacular), 
while the Gamphasantes forswear clothing and weapons. And, as Pomponius rounds out his 
description of the peoples of Africa, he introduces the most extreme illustrations of the 
periphery: “the Blemyes lack heads; their face is on their chest. The Satyrs have nothing 
human except their superficial appearance. The form of the Goat-Pans is celebrated in their 
name. So much for Africa.”43  
                                                        
38 Mela, Chor. I.21 (Silberman, 7). 
 
39 Mela, Chor. I.33, I.23 (Silberman, 10, 8). 
 
40 Mela, Chor. I.42 (Silberman, 13). 
 
41 Mela, Chor. I.43 (Silberman, 13). 
 
42 Mela, Chor. 1.44 (Silberman, 13). 
 
43 Mela, Chor. 1.48 (Silberman, 14). 
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As the inverse of the norms that defined Roman culture, the African tribes become 
spectacles of the grotesque and monstrous.44 Their inhumanity, which blurred the distinction 
between the categories of human/animal and male/female, enabled Mela to construct an 
anthropological counterpart—a domain of oddity and contravention—to the normative weight 
of Roman cultural values.45 As Rhiannon Evans describes it, “as the least well-known part of the 
known world, Africa’s interior functions especially well as a stage for playing out fears about 
the unexplored reaches of the third continent. It is the Counterworld in Our World, the mirror 
of the oikoumene.”46 But by constructing this realm of inversion in such jarringly oppositional 
terms, Pomponius Mela inaugurates the first of a series of cracks in the structural integrity of 
ethnographic investigation. Africa became an ethnographic paradox precisely because these 
“freaks” of nature, in consuming (and yet repelling) the ethnographic gaze, unhinged the 
simplicity and coherence of Roman taxonomic discourse. The chaos and disorder of the world 
itself was codified in Mela’s text, as he, too, struggled to contain his subversive discoveries. 
                                                        
44 For Roman attitudes toward the monstrous and grotesque, see Carlin A. Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient 
Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Barton’s analysis draws from a 
variety of disciplines, including anthropology, psychoanalysis, art history, literary criticism, queer studies. Two of 
the more useful theoretical reflections on the grotesque come from Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. 
Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968) and Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: 
Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
 
45 Inhumanity, most often represented by the practice of cannibalism, is a pervasive theme of ethnographic 
literature. See Philip A. Harland, “‘These people are…Men Eaters’: Banquets of the Anti-Associations and 
Perceptions of Minority Cultural Group,” in Identity and Interaction in the Ancient Mediterranean: Jews, Christians and 
Others. Essays in Honour of Stephen G. Wilson, ed. Zeba Crook and Philip A. Harland (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 
2007), 56-75; James Rives, “Human Sacrifice among Pagans and Christians,” Journal of Roman Studies 85 (1995): 65-
85; Andrew McGowan, “Eating People: Accusations of Cannibalism against Christians in the Second Century,” 
Journal of Early Christian Studies 2 (1994): 413-442. Accusations of human sacrifice and cannibalism also surfaced 
against the Jews. See, Louis H. Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993), 123-176; E.J. Bickerman, “Ritual Murder and the Worship of an Ass,” in Studies in Jewish and Christian History: 
A New Edition in English including The God of the Maccabees, vol. 1, ed. Amram Tropper (Boston: Brill, 2007), 497-527; 
Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997). 
 
46 Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show,” 60. 
  
210 
While the uncivilized were dispersed throughout the world in Gaul, Britain, Ireland, 
Scythia, and India, the monstrous peoples of the Chorography had been confined to the plains of 
inland Africa. In narrowing the territorial scope of his fascinations and projected imaginings, 
Pomponius encloses or at the very least seeks to manage the temptation and insatiability of 
the ethnographic gaze. To limit the geographical scope of the abnormality is a ploy to control 
the disruptive potential of knowledge born of reckless fascination. But Africa endured as a 
fixture of the ethnographic gaze insofar as it remained beyond the bounds of absolute 
understanding. Indeed, for all the talk of inhumanity, Africa itself, Pomponius reports, 
remained unknowingly imprecise:  
Moreover, nothing noteworthy meets those who follow the shores eastward. 
Everything is a wasteland, defined by desolate mountains, and more a riverbank 
than an oceanfront. After that, there is a huge tract without inhabitants. For 
quite a long time it was uncertain whether there was sea beyond and whether 
the earth had a periphery, or whether, with the seawaters eliminated, Africa 
extended without end.47  
 
Strabo’s description of Africa in his Geography similarly emphasizes the mystery of its interior 
regions: “since several deserts intervene, we do not know all these regions. Similarly the 
regions above Ammon and the oases as far as Aethiopia are likewise unknown. Neither can we 
tell the boundaries either of Aethiopia or of Libya, nor yet accurately even those of the country 
next to Aegypt, much less of that which borders on the Ocean”48 And when Pliny, having 
already described countless peoples and places throughout Africa, ventures into the desolate 
recesses of the country, the ethnographic imagination is awakened: 
The rest of the country is uninhabited. Then come regions that are purely 
imaginary: towards the west are the Nigroi, whose king is said to have only one 
eye, in his forehead; the Wild-beast-eaters, who live chiefly on the flesh of 
                                                        
47 Mela, Chor. III.89 (Silberman, 91-2). 
 
48 Strabo, Geography 17.3.23, ed. and trans. Horace Leonard Jones, Loeb Classical Library 267 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1932), 208.  
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panthers and lions; the Eatalls who devour everything; the Man-eaters, whose 
diet is human flesh; the Dog-milkers who have dogs’ heads; the Artabatitae, who 
have four legs, and rove about like wild animals; and then the Hesperioi, the 
Perosi and the people we have mentioned as inhabiting the border of 
Mauretania.49 
 
Ignorance prompts the imagination, which creates culture and peoplehood in order to 
complete the (imperial) ethnographic map. The desire for totality breeds imaginative 
speculation. The opportunity to mold and define that which was previously unknown 
understandably holds great ideological potential. Geographic, ethnographic, and encyclopedic 
contemplation serves the interest of imperial domination. But lurking beneath the comforts of 
creation reside the unanticipated knots not only of error, but also of theoretical misjudgment. 
Ethnography, as I am arguing here, lulls its proponents into a false sense of authorial security, 
which slowly reveals itself as the known world in texts enlarges to include less reconcilable 
knowledge.  
Complicating this seemingly straightforward cycle by which discovery begets 
knowledge and knowledge facilitates certain rhetorical postures, is an increasingly vivid sense 
that knowledge of the world beyond Rome is, in fact, as likely to disrupt the imperial controls 
of texts as to support them. Ethnography’s reach for the unknown, though it fed the appetite 
for discovery and identification, ultimately elevated the tricky necessities of textual borders. 
The periphery holds the very real potential, as Mela’s text so pronouncedly illustrates, to mire 
the authorial comprehension of the known world in a muddle of epistemological and 
rhetorical imbalance. The puzzle that comprises the contours of the universe—with its various 
borders, coasts, interiors, inhabitants, climates, and topographies—is exacerbated at the very 
                                                        
49 Pliny, Natural History VI.XXXV.195 (H. Rackham, 482). 
  
212 
start of the treatise when Pomponius outlines his narrative plan. Describing the shape of the 
whole world, he reflects briefly on its grand divisions: 
In the same way, the earth also is divided from east to west into two halves, 
which they term hemispheres, and it is differentiated by five horizontal zones. 
Heat makes the middle zone unlivable, and cold does so to the outermost 
seasons, but not at the same time. The Antichthones inhabit one [zone], we the 
other. The chorography of the former zone is unknown because of the heat of 
the intervening expanse, and the chorography of the latter is now to be 
described.50 
 
Mela, by necessity, jettisons any consideration of this unknowable zone in an effort “to impose 
limits on the known world, to package the oikoumene in a readable and therefore knowable 
form.”51 But, as Evans, has rightly stressed, “the hermetic seal of this bounded region is rent 
twice in Mela’s commentary.”52 The radical disjuncture between the two worlds, the one firmly 
knowable (the οἰκουμένη) and the other altogether concealed, slowly recedes as the existence 
of an alternative hemisphere becomes too enticing and, indeed, useful to resist. Mela first 
marshals it to explain the otherwise inscrutable flooding of the Nile.53 And when this anti-
world arises again in Book III, the reference only exacerbates its enigmatic character: 
“Taprobane (Sri Lanksa) is said to be either a very large island or the first part of the second 
world, but because it is inhabited, and because no one reportedly has circumnavigated it, the 
                                                        
50 Mela, Chor. I.3 (Silberman, 2). 
 
51 Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show,” 68. 
 
52 Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show,” 68.  
 
53 See also Pliny V.IX.51 (H. Rackham, 256): “The sources from which the Nile rises have not been ascertained, 
proceeding as it does through scorching deserts for an enormously long distance and only having been explored 
by unarmed investigators, without the wars that have discovered all other countries.” While the sources of the 
Nile elude Pliny’s comprehension, he not only fails to resort to Mela’s enigmatic counterworld in order to propose 
an explanation, he links conquest to discovery. Indeed, it is conquest that makes all the other countries known! 
The puzzlement produced by the causes and effects of the Nile extend back into the text of Herodotus, who 




latter interpretation is as good as true.”54 The intrusion of the counterworld into the realm of 
the inhabited world irrevocably disturbs the neatly delimited structure of the upper 
hemisphere. If, in fact, the anti-world explains the natural laws of οἰκουμένη, the two regions 
are fundamentally inseparable domains. To the extent that the lower hemisphere remains 
unexplored, its explanatory potential remains elusive, while its force of disruption is firmly 
fixed. Mela has created an immensely powerful yet powerfully unknowable force of exposition. 
The imperial ambition of the Roman world is now defined by the struggle to constrain and 
comprehend the permeating counterworld. The distinction between the known world and the 
unknown world has been obviated.   
While Mela may tell us little about the real geographical features of the ancient Roman 
world, his journey through the terrain of the known world reveals the conjoined peril and 
opportunity of imagined ethnography.55 Like the hybrid peoples of inner Africa, the world as a 
mass of particularities and complexity defies tidy classification and disrupts the conjunction of 
imperial affectation and textual manipulation. As Evans lucidly summarizes the matter: 
For the Roman geographer, there is a tension between the attempts to close 
down, secure, and contain the world in text, and the intrusion of the so-called 
‘outlandish’—the world outside those limits is always creeping in. This text 
emphasizes the disorientation of the Roman onlooker faced with the zones of 
the world which remain unseen, unmapped, and, more unnervingly, 
unmappable—we can perhaps imagine them as blanks in Agrippa’s map of 
imperial domination. What Mela’s world shows is a fear of boundaries 
dissolving, structures slipping and the Other World seeping into Our World.56 
                                                        
54 Mela, III.70 (Silberman, 87). 
 
55 Much of the work on Mela has focused on his failures, omissions, and devotion to the oddities of the world. The 
appraisals are not altogether kind. See G Georg Wissowa, “Die Abfassungszeit der Chorographia des Pomponius 
Mela,” Hermes 51 (1916): 89-96; F.R.D. Goodyear, “Technical Writing,” in the Cambridge History of Classical Literature 
II, eds. E.J. Kenney and W.V. Clausen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 2: 667-673; James Romm, The 
Edges of the Earth, 150; William H. Stahl, Roman Science: Origins, Development and Influence to the Later Middle Ages 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), 69. 
 





As much as discovering the previously unknown bolstered the triumphalist posture of Roman 
cultural and military might, it denoted the conceptual problem of a world of seemingly 
unknowable in scope, detail, and design. Ideological desires became conceptual impossibilities 
(and conceptual impossibilities accentuated practical possibilities), transforming the supposed 
power of ethnography into a self-deceiving trap of exalted fascination. The ethnographic 
orientation was not exclusively defined by its capacity to interpret and control, but by an 
equally profound disquietude about the capacity of authors and texts to identify and delimit 
fully the peoples and contours of the natural world. The Chorography captures, as I have 
argued, Mela’s inability to control the unpredictability of ethnographic investigation and 
knowledge acquisition. As a reflection of the scholastic trappings of an ideology driven by an 
unyielding fascination with the unknown and grotesque, the unyielding desire to accrue more 
knowledge (and organize the world accordingly) reveals the conceptually unsettled 
foundations of ancient ethnographic writing.57 
 
The Ethnographic Bind of Heresiology 
 
As I have argued from the very beginning of this work, the task of writing peoples, in its 
Greek, Roman, and Jewish iterations (from Homer and Philo to Celsus and Ammianus) is also 
the elemental enterprise of Christian heresiology. And, as I shall detail below, this 
                                                        
57 See also Carey’s, “The Problem of Totality,” Journal of the History of Collections 12.1 (2000): 1-13. Much like the 
heresiologists who “feared” the effects of exhaustive exposure of the heretics, Pliny, too, as a compiler and 
cataloguer of the natural world, fears the results of plenary inclusion. Pliny’s timidity stems from the fact that 
encyclopedic narratives necessarily include both the best and worst of the world. For Pliny, the requirement to 
include knowledge of luxuria, the great “perversion of reason (ratio) and Nature,” disrupts his stabilized taxonomy 
of civilization (Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 76). “The problem of totality,” is that it is both a manifestly 
fraudulent aspiration and deeply destructive one. These two poles of classification, as I have argued, are 




ethnographic parallel between Christians and their intellectual predecessors existed both at 
the level of macroscopic theorization and microscopic detail. I have labored to identify the 
intellectual correlation between ethnography and heresiology as each schematized and 
conceptualized human difference, questioned the merits of social discourse, and demonstrated 
rhetorical command over their objects and objectives. But having outlined the epistemological 
gymnastics underlying ethnography’s drive to explore and explain—the inability to stabilize 
the world—I have only casually gestured at the parallel concerns within heresiology’s 
conceptual framework. In this section, I wish to delineate the specific ways in which the 
textual apprehensions of heresiology mirror Pomponius Mela’s own quandaries of 
ethnographic fascination. And although the ethnographic structure of heresiology is cast in 
the language of biblical design (or, we might say, determined by the binding authority of 
Scripture), the tension between severe delimitation of form and content, on the one hand, and 
expansive and all-encompassing knowledge, on the other, disturbs the simplicity of Scripture’s 
ethnographic perspective. When, in his concluding paean to the holy Catholic Church, 
Epiphanius revisits his text’s organizational paradigm—an allegorical reading of the Song of 
Songs—he offers a detailed account of its broader ethnographic implications.58 In an effort to 
inventory the sectarian realm and emphasize the unification of its Catholic opposition, the 
bishop brings the weight of Scripture’s infallible precision to organize the analytical scope of 
the Panarion’s flood of knowledge. And though Epiphanius prizes his investigative skills and 
techniques, his Panarion delimits heresy not by phenomenological or observational data but by 
                                                        
58 Epiphanius, De Fide 6.1-13.7 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501-14). The majority of De Fide, in fact, is devoted to 
enumerating the additional sects of the world. As I discuss below, Epiphanius himself is acutely aware of the 
problem the scriptural dictum of Song of Songs 6:8 has created. He puts his best rhetorical spin on the conceptual 
problem—one which Pliny also contemplated, without, of course, the force of Scripture—but the effect remains in 
place: the world of heresy is incalculable.  
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textual fiat. Reiterating, first, the textual precedent, the bishop then considers its broader 
ramifications for his ethnography: 
‘There are threescore queens, and fourscore concubines, and maidens without 
number, but one is my dove, my perfect one’ (Song of Songs 6:8)—adding the two 
‘my’s.’ For she is his ‘dove’ and his ‘perfect one,’ since the others are said to be 
and are not, while she herself is named twice. He did not say, ‘They are my 
eighty concubines,’ of the others. He awarded the queens their honorable 
connection with him through the glorious name; but he declared that the 
concubines have no connection with him at all. When I note their numbers I am 
obliged to investigate the passage by the anagogical method of spiritual 
interpretation, so as not to pass them by. I am not speaking of trivialities, but 
truly comparing words with their true spiritual senses, by means of the true 
scriptures. For <it is plain> that the number written of each thing in scripture is 
unalterable (ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς γεγραμμένος ἀπαράβατός ἐστιν 
ὑποθέσεως), neither can that which is set in number be useless, nor can it be 
measured in scripture for no effect.59  
 
As a textual restraint upon the ethnographic gaze, Scripture’s power of foreclosure attests 
heresiology’s new fixation: numbering the heretics.60 In contrast to early heresiological 
treatises of Hippolytus and Irenaeus, which contemplated the philosophical and astrological 
borrowings of the heretics in fairly haphazard structural narratives, the genre now becomes a 
systematic catalogue of heretical parties.61 Heresiology is no longer a matter of qualitative 
                                                        
59 Epiphanius, De Fide 3.2-5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:498-9). ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς γεγραμμένος ἀπαράβατός ἐστιν 
ὑποθέσεως καὶ οὔτε δύναται τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ κατατεταγμένον ἕωλόν τι εἶναι οὔτε εἰς ἀργότητα ἐν τῇ γραφῇ 
ἐπιμετρεῖσθαι <δῆλον>. Not only are the numbers of Scripture unerring, precision provides a means by which his 
inquiry can be foreclosed. What is interesting to note is that Epiphanius eschews any opinion that holds 
Scripture’s enumerations to be without value and utility. Scriptural numbers reflect an unerring specificity of 
purpose, which cannot be dismissed or tampered with. The number eighty is fixed. It is also worth noting that the 
text of Song of Songs invited considerable ethnic (or racial) analysis among early Christian authors. In Symbolic 
Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature, Gay Byron discusses Origen’s interpretation of the 
Canticle of Canticles and its racialization of virtue and vice (the relationship between blackness and sin), 72-74; 
109-115. On this point, see also Aaron Johnson, “The Blackness of Ethiopians: Classical Ethnography and Eusebius’s 
Commentary on the Psalms,” Harvard Theological Review 99.2 (2006), 165-186, esp. 170-172. 
 
60 This is an important facet of my argument in chapter five, where I discuss the relationship between 
ethnography, editing, and listing. Augustine’s De Haeresibus is the primary focal point there because the bishop 
performs his editing of sources and knowledge for the benefit of his readers. His text is no mere compilation, as 
many have seen fit to suggest. It is a much more complicated effort to grapple with the problem of ethnographic 
problems of investigative distance. 
 
61 On the evolution of heresiology, see Brent Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in Vandals, Romans and Berbers, 
ed. A.H. Merrills  (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 227-258; J. Rebecca Lyman, “Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in 
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identification alone; it has become a repository of quantification. The very fact that 
heresiology now fastidiously tallies heretical parties confirms the radically widened 
topography of the Christian world. Systematicity now orients heresiology.  
Sorcha Carey’s work on Pliny’s Natural History identifies a parallel (and antecedent) 
scholastic effort to catalogue the impossible, but she contends that Pliny’s battle with the 
infinite actually functions to secure his claims of totality.62 Writing of the incalculable number 
of sculptures in Rhodes, Olympia, Delphi, and Athens, Pliny asks: “what mortal could recount 
them all, or what value can be felt in such information? Still it may give pleasure just to allude 
to the most remarkable and to name the artists of celebrity, thought it would be impossible to 
enumerate the total number of works of each inasmuch as Lysippus is said to have executed 
1500 works of art.”63 The impossibility of the task elevates Pliny’s performance; his struggles 
evince his exceptional genius: “he can do the impossible—count the uncountable and more 
besides.”64 As Carey argues, the evidence of omission reflects Pliny’s judicious editorial hand, 
and it insulates him from the charge of failure. The very need to edit brandishes his credibility 
as a man after the entirety:   
If elsewhere his aim to describe the entire world necessitated omitting certain 
things, then here too, Pliny impresses us with his skill at juggling irreconcilable 
opposites. The material for discussion is endless, and yet Pliny is still able to 
dazzle us with an array of facts and figures—the thousands of statues in a range 
of Greek cities; the hundreds of statues made by Lysippus alone. A consummate 
master of his material, equally at home with infinity and totality, Pliny artfully 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Orthodoxy, Christianity, History, eds. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano (Rome: École Française de 
Rome, 2000), 149-161; Aline Pourkier, L’hérésiologie chez Épiphane de Salamie (Paris: Beauchesne, 1992), 19-75. 
 
62 Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 22.  
 
63 Pliny, Natural History XXXIV.XVII.36-37, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 394 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1952), 154. 
 
64 Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 21. 
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presents his omissions as an expression of authorial concern for both his 
reader’s pleasure and the quality of the knowledge he includes in his work.65  
 
In much the same way, a diverse world holds the potential to be decoded and fathomed. 
Textual and geographical exploration proves an invaluable means by which authors accrued 
rhetorical ballast. Like Pomponius Mela, who used the counterworld to explain the natural 
laws of the known world, Epiphanius ventured into the world of the youths not only to 
magnify the grandiloquence of the lone truth housed within the Church, but, more tellingly, to 
confirm the verisimilitude of Song of Songs 6:8.  
The eighty concubines the Panarion names and refutes denote only a small portion of 
the total volume of known heresies. In an acknowledgement of his text’s necessary limits, the 
bishop rightfully wonders, “who can count the variety of this world?”66 There are, in fact, 
“young girls without number,” which denote “the further philosophies all over the world.”67 
Forty-four Greek philosophies are added to the Panarion’s tally, 68 along with the seventy-two 
“repulsive philosophies of the Indian nation” (only the gymnosophists, Brahmans, Pseudo-
brahmans, corpse-eaters, practitioners of obscenity, “and those who are past feeling” are 
named).69 Media and Ethiopia are each reputed to have six distinct sects. Epiphanius further 
                                                        
65 Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 22.  
 
66 Epiphanius, De Fide 9.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504). 
 
67 Epiphanius, De Fide 9.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504). 
 
68 Thales of Miletus, Anaximander of Miletus, Anaximenes of Miletus, Anaxagoras of Clazomene, Archelaus the 
naturalist, Socrates the ethicist, Pherecydes, Pythagoras of Samos, Xenophanes from Colophon, Parmenides the 
Elean, Zeno of Elea, Melissus the Samian, Leucippus the Milesian, Democritus of Abdera, Metrodorus of Chios, 
Protagoras of Abdera, Diogenes of Smyrna, Pyrrho of Elis, Empedocles of Argigentum, Heraclitus of Ephesus, 
Prodicus, Plato the Athenian, Aristippus of Cyrene, Theodorus, the atheist, Hegesias of Cyrene, Antisthenes the 
Athenian, Diogenes the Cynic, Crates of Thebes in Boeotia, Arcesilaus, Carneades, Aristotle the Macedonian (or 
Thracian), Theophrastus of Ephesus, Strato of Lampsacus, Praxiphanes of Rhodes, Critolaus of Phasela, Zeno of 
Citieum, Cleanthes, Persaeus, Chrysippus of Soli, Diogenes of Babylon, Panaetius of Rhodes, Posidonius of 
Apamaea, Athenodorus of Tarsus, and Epicurus of Athens.  
 
69 Epiphanius, De Fide 10.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497). 
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reports that in Parthia, Elamitis, Caspia, Germany, and Sarmatia and among the Persians, 
Dauni, Zickchi, Amazons, Lazi, Iberians, Bosporenes, Geli, Chinese, “there are any number of 
different laws, philosophies and sects and a countless throng of varieties.”70 Acknowledging 
the plenitude of cultic mysteries and rites among the Greeks, Egyptians, Persians, Babylonians, 
and Indians, the bishop pays them inconsistent attention (their priestly attendants are 
described only briefly as well) as he resigns himself to the opinion that “these people are 
hopelessly lost.”71 Epiphanius’ scholastic pursuits serve as a testimony to his skills as an 
ethnographic compiler and, in turn, herald his textual achievement. His myriad additions to 
the heretical pantheon illustrate his active engagement with and knowledge of the world 
beyond the eighty; it draws attention to his relentless push to consume and reveal as much 
knowledge as he can muster.  
Irenaeus, already in the second century, had signaled the practical limits of attention: 
“In the present book, we shall build up (our own system) as far as we are able and as time will 
                                                        
70 Epiphanius, De Fide 10.3. (Holl and Dummer, 3:497). 
 
71 Epiphanius, De Fide, 11.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497). Fully embracing his role as armchair ethnographer, 
Epiphanius flaunts a few of the odder, more wondrous, customs known to exist, while also dismissing many, 
notably the disgust of the Indian sects, as unnecessary and unworthy of his time.71 He reports, for instance, that 
“Chinese men stay at home and weave, and anoint themselves and do womanly things in readiness for their 
wives,” while “the women cut their hair short, wear men’s underclothing, and do all the field labor” (De Fide 
10.4). Epiphanius glosses the inversion by describing the Chinese men’s work as womanly (and their subservience 
to their wives), which, of course, presumes certain counterfactual gendered norms among his readers. Despite 
offering virtually no details about the habits of the Chinese (or any of the “nations” listed in Epilogue), save the 
inclusion of this lone cultural reversal—depriving us of the opportunity to study women’s transference from or 
balancing of two spheres of life, the domestic and the labor, perhaps paralleling Herodotus’ description of the 
Amazonian occupation of two seemingly polarized spheres, war and marriage—the bishop’s interest in cultural 
oddity signals a strategy of delimiting Christian virtue, its moral, pietistic, marital, disposition by, in a sense, 
mocking and cataloguing its opposites. The reversal of gender roles among the Chinese follows the Herodotean 
and Melaean techniques of difference and inversion, whereby the author translates or converts cultural or ethnic 
differences as anti-sameness. See Francois Hartog, The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the 
Writing of History, trans. Janet Lloyd (Berkeley: University of California Press), 212-224. Epiphanius glosses the 
inversion by describing the Chinese men’s work as womanly (and their subservience to their wives), which, of 
course, presumes certain counterfactual gendered norms among his readers. The same language applies to the 
Valesians, who impose the injunction of Matthew 5:29-30 literally, and castrate themselves to avoid self-offense. 
See Pan. 58.3.1 for the gender-bending proclivities of the Valesians (Holl and Dummer, 2:359-60). 
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permit, and we shall overthrow their entire system by main principles.”72 To rectify the 
deficiencies of their ethnographic totality, the heresiologists rationalize a dichotomy between 
practical impossibilities and necessities and conceptual impossibility: they insist upon the 
latter and deny any sense of the former. Hippolytus, in his discussion of the Gnostics, explains 
his decision to omit information about the Gnostics as a matter of intentional excision: “there 
are, however, among the Gnostics diversities of opinion; but we have decided that it would not 
be worthwhile to enumerate the silly doctrines of these heresies, inasmuch as they are (too) 
numerous and devoid of reason, and full of blasphemy.”73 The sheer madness and total 
irrationality of the heretics compels Hippolytus to wield his ethnographic knowledge steadily 
and selectively. As the ethnographer of heresy, Hippolytus is the theological filter for his 
readers, which endows him, as I noted earlier in this chapter, with the prerogative to edit.  
Epiphanius, similarly, uses omissions to demonstrate his role as shepherd of his 
readers. As the augmentative exhibition of his wide-ranging knowledge builds, the bishop 
formulates his excisions as a necessary predicate of limited time and space. When the bishop 
revisits the philosophical and theological topography of the Christian world in De Fide, he 
concedes the impossibility of a comprehensive investigation by citing Hebrews 11:32: “And 
‘what shall I say? For this time will fail me if I tell” of the countless differences in people’s 
various practices, as well as in their virtue and in their vice.”74 Although Epiphanius openly 
                                                        
72 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.Preface (Contre les hérésies, Livres II, ed. and trans. Rousseau and Doutreleau, SC 294, 2:2:24). 
Irenaeus is already here gesturing toward the limitations of time. We shall return to his important idea in the 
very next section of this chapter. Translation by Dominic J. Unger, et al. in St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against the Heresies, 
Book 2. ACW 65 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992, 2012, 2012).  
 
73 Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium VII.26.2, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), 319. On 
omission in Epiphanius see Pan.8.7.4 (εἰς τὸ μὴ τὸ πᾶν αὐτῶν παρασιωπῆσαι); 26.9.1; 27.4.5; 32.3.1 (Epiphanius, ed. 
Karl Holl, GCS 25 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1915], 1:193, 285, 305, 441). I have followed the translation in ANF.  
 




confesses his text’s insufficiency of scope, he crafts his concession around a fundamental 
distinction between textual constraints of practicality and textual barriers of conceptuality. He 
recasts the limitations of his heresiological venture as a justifiable redaction of the facts. But 
the excision of data reflects a conscious choice, not an underlying failure of intellectual 
capacity: “But again, I omit the names of many other mysteries, heresiarchs and fomenters of 
schism whose leaders are called Magusaeans by the Persians but prophets by the Egyptians, 
and who preside over their shrines and temples.”75 The Panarion, despite its omissions, is not a 
product of ignorance, but of remarkable judgment and restraint. Its precise delineation 
communicates the bishop’s firm grasp of an increasingly erratic and evolving heretical 
domain. The scope of Epiphanius’ heresiological investigation, the bishop skillfully implies, 
suffers not from a lack of knowledge; instead, it is the fear of incompletion that curbs its 
grandeur.  
While one could read—and, indeed, the heresiologists did read—excisions as evidence of 
totality (the former, as I noted earlier assumes the latter), the menace of the heresies derived 
from the fact that they denatured the boundaries of the known world. The profound 
ethnographic paradox of heresy was that it made the known world unknown. Strategic 
ignorance could, theoretically, contain the counterworld of Mela, even though he himself 
proved unable to avoid “being there.”76 For the heresiologists, however, there was no escaping 
heresy’s (and, indeed, Christianity’s) bowdlerization of geographical difference. Any one 
heresy might exist in only one region or territory, but heresy, as theological and ethnographic 
                                                        
75 Epiphanius, De Fide 12.5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497). 
 
76 See Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives, 1-24. 
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category, existed everywhere. 77 The ethnographic logic of the Panarion unveils the dangers of 
Christian universalism.78 The rhetorical universalism of heresiology, epitomized in the famous 
remark from Chapter 10, Book I of Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses, depicted a world without 
theological borders or difference.79 But the eradication of theological borders creates the 
conceptual conditions by which heretical intransigence transformed the singular world of 
knowable Christian orthodoxy into a singularity within which was an unknowable mess of 
heretics.80 Writing of Roman humanitas (humanity or the state of civilization), Paul Veyne has 
argued that the Romans well knew that they were not the lone civilized state within the vast 
reaches of the world. Civilization was, in his formulation, a question of discovery not 
                                                        
77 The Jews represent a similar problem insofar as they have spread themselves out across the Empire, but there 
was no sense that the Jews were reproducing sectarian parties at a profoundly disturbing rate. A relevant parallel 
can be found in René S. Bloch, “Geography without Territory: Tacitus’ Digression on the Jews and Its Ethnographic 
Context,” in Internationales Josephus-Kolloquium Aarhus 1999, ed. Jürgen U. Kalms (Münster: Lit, 2000), 38-54; and 
Rhiannon Evans, “Geography without People: Mapping in Pliny’s Historia Naturalis Books 3-6,” Ramus 34.1 (2005): 
47-74. 
 
78 Epiphanius, De Fide 2.6, 3.1, 6.1, 6.6, 6.8, 14.1-4, 21.1, 24.3, 25.1-2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497-8, 498, 501, 502, 502, 
514-5, 521, 525, 525-6). 
 
79 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.10.2 (Contre les hérésies, Livres I, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 264 
[Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1979], 1:2:158-160): “The Church, as we have said before, though disseminated throughout 
the whole world, carefully guards this preaching and this faith which she has received, as if she dwelt in one 
house. She likewise believes these things as if she had but one soul and one and the same heart; she preaches, 
teaches, and hands them down harmoniously, as if she possessed one mouth. For, though the languages 
throughout the world are dissimilar, nevertheless the meaning of the tradition is one and the same. To explain, 
the churches which have been founded in Germany do not believe or hand down anything else; neither do those 
founded in Spain or Gaul or Libya or in the central regions of the world. But just as the sun, God’s creation, is one 
and the same throughout the world, so too the light, the preaching of Truth, shines everywhere and enlightens all 
men who wish to come to the knowledge of the Truth. Neither will any of those who preside in the churches, 
though exceedingly eloquent, say anything else (for no one is above the Master); nor will a poor speaker subtract 
from the tradition. For, since the faith is one and the same, neither he who can discourse at length about it adds 
to it, nor he who can say only a little subtracts from it.” 
 
80 On the theological and ethnic tension within the early Christian emphasis on universalism, see Denise Kimber 
Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity, esp. 78-84, 138-165, and her “Race and Universalism 
in Early Christianity,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 10.4 (2002): 429-468. On Universalism in Paul, a good place 
with which to start, see Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997) and Caroline Johnson Hodge, “If Sons, Then Heirs: A Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in the 
Letters of Paul (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). The tension also exists between indigenous 
particularity and the sweep of imperialism. On that point, see Andrew Erskine, Troy: Between Greece and Rome: Local 
Tradition and Imperial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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invention; one found its qualities among foreigners and within nature itself.81 Thus, despite the 
fact that Romans repeatedly claimed, “that they held sway over the entire the world” and that 
they had incorporated the domain of the Greeks into their own empire (since “the Greeks had 
long been telling them that the whole inhabited earth had fallen under their domination”), 
their totalized vision was admittedly fragmentary.82 They had dominated only the “known 
world” (the οἰκουμένη), which was defined in strictly favorable terms. Rome, and Greece 
before her, had struggled to map the world through an ethnocentric paradigm that narrowed 
it to comport with tendentious interests and military conquests.83 At certain textual moments, 
as we saw with Pomponius Mela, the scope of ethnographic knowledge suddenly broadened 
beyond the tailored borders of the known world.  
For the heresiologists, the ethnographic dilemma was not just a fear of the unknown in 
the periphery, but a fear of the disruptive proximity of unknowable sectarianism. The 
endlessly unknowable had been cemented within the very confines of the voluminous 
οἰκουμένη; the territorial and theological fluidity of the heretics unraveled the fixity of the 
very concept of the known world. A law from 389 C.E. against the Manichaeans, issued by 
Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius (to Albinus, prefect of the city of Rome), attests the 
unsettling effects of heresy in the language of geographical unity: “if any person whatever 
should disturb the world (mundus) under the name of Manichaeans, they shall indeed be 
expelled from the whole world (orbis terrarum) but especially from this city (Rome), under 
                                                        
81 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas : Romans and Non-Romans,” 344. 
 
82 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans,” 345. See also P. A. Brunt, “Laus Imperii,” in P. D. A. Garnsey 
and C. R. Whittaker, eds., Imperialism in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 159-192, 
esp. 168–72.  
 
83 On the Romanocentric depiction of the world (and the efforts to unify the world through focalized reading and 
textual production), see C. Nicolet, Space, Geography and Politics in the Early Roman Empire; Katherine Clarke, Between 
Geography and History, 22-76; Katherine Clarke, “In Search of the Author of Strabo’s Geography,” Journal of Roman 
Studies 87 (1997): 92-110; S. Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 32-40. 
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threat of judgment.”84 The heretics, put simply, fostered ethnographic and geographic 
regression. The world that had once been known was now filled with the unknown. The 
language of transcendence and universality confronted the realities of delimited control. This 
(wishful) ideology of universalism, in tandem with the diffusion of heresy throughout the 
Mediterranean, demolished the strategy of ethnographic isolation. The infinitude of the 
heretics ensured that the desire for a totalized οἰκουμένη was indefinite and forever 
unobtainable. If the Church was to act as the guarantor of a eminent theological civilization—
in the way that Rome had conceived itself as the new protector of civilized values (succeeding 
Greece)—absolute knowledge (and total control) of its demesne was the sine qua non of the 
heresiologists’ argument for orthodoxy.85 The heretics had ensured that Christian 
scholasticism—and the rationale of orthodoxy—failed before it had even begun.  
Epiphanius’ scriptural prooftext, instead of strengthening the text’s force of closure, 
rends completely the totalizing framework. The verse decrees the infinitude of heresy: “How 
many other sects have not grown up among the Greeks after the four most famous ones which 
we have mentioned—and further, after those sects and the ones after them, how many 
individuals and ideas keep arising of themselves, with seeming youth, in accordance with the 
opinion of each?”86 In upending the heresiologists’ measures of control—scriptural authority, 
diligent research, divine intervention, and rhetorical bombast—Scripture codifies the 
insurmountable propagation of heresy. Epiphanius’ attempt to enclose the heretics in a precise 
and bounded system of ethnographic classification, hewing to the governance of Scripture, 
                                                        
84 Codex Theodosianus 16.5.18 in The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmodian Constitutions, trans. Clyde Pharr 
(Union, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2001). On the broader juridical tension between orthodoxy and heresy, see 
Caroline Humfress, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity, 243-268. 
 
85 Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 50-52. 
 
86 Epiphanius, De Fide 9.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504). 
  
225 
exposes the breaches within the conceptual fabric of the endeavor itself. The discursive effort 
to obtain textual comprehension over against the heretics evinces a highly unstable and 
indefinite grip on the depths of a rapidly evolving, expansive Christian milieu. As a 
phenomenological category with names aplenty, the malleability and variability of heresy 
agitates the steady course of ethnographic inquiry.87 Epiphanius himself struggles to naturalize 
the seeming infinitude of the heretical parties—and, in fact, recasts the problem in terms of 
the unified orthodoxy versus the diversified plurality of heresy—and, by extension, to 
diminish the explicit impossibility of a complete textual catalogue. He writes: 
And so, as I have said, the sects I have listed in succession are eighty concubines. 
But no one need be surprised (θαυμαζέτω) if each of them has been called by 
different names in every country (ἄλλοις ὀνόμασιν ἑκάστη τούτων κικλήσκεται 
ἐν ἑκάστῃ χώρᾳ). What is more, we must observe that each sect in turn has 
frequently divided into many parts on its own and taken different names. This is 
no surprise; it is the way things are (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ οὕτως). But I find eighty-one in 
all—one [more than eighty] because of the one who is different from them all, 
but is the only one allotted to the bridegroom whom he has acknowledge by 
such a name as ‘one is my dove,’ and again, ‘my perfect one.’ In other words all 
the concubines are low-born and of no particular harmlessness, purity and 
gentleness.88 
 
Epiphanius, here, addresses the essential abnormality of the heretics, which differentiates 
them, as far as I can discern, from every other known ethnographic or geographic object. The 
heretics presented a double challenge to their “orthodox” opponents: not only did they 
articulate alternative modes of being Christian—with distinct rituals, texts, interpretive 
strategies, cosmologies, and histories—but they also endlessly adapted and altered their 
alternative Christianities. In other words, they destabilized by means of both the specificity of 
their message and in their very being. In the most basic sense, the heresy’s ontological 
elusivity thwarted Epiphanius’—and all of the heresiologists’—scholastic dexterity. In contrast 
                                                        
87 Epiphanius, De Fide 9.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504). 
 
88 Epiphanius, De Fide 6.4-6 (Holl and Dummer, 3:502). 
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to the Roman and Greek ethnographers who had struggled to describe a world at once—and 
still—beyond complete comprehension, the heresiologists labored to define a sprawling 
miasma of theological variation that was mutating before their very eyes.89 There was no 
conceptual way to define out an infinitely vast and forever evolving counterworld of heresy. 
By virtue of the fact that his conceptual ruminations were fastened to any ethnographic object 
that lacked any conditions of enclosure, his rhetorical braggadocio was a Sisyphean gesture. 
Despite the fact that his list of named “youths without number,” proves Scripture’s veracity as 
the determinant of the natural order of things, it functionally lacerates the foundations of 
heresiological containment. Even though the path of heresy is shown to follow the letter of 
Scripture, the proof is an altogether irreconcilable discovery.  
The magnitude of the heretical expansion was formulated by an ideological system in 
which the indomitable desire to expose the heretics marked its rhetorical trajectory. But 
lurking beneath the florid veneer of textual domination was the binding paradox of 
ethnographic obsession. Writing of Roman fixations and fascinations, the historian Carlin 
Barton has identified the destructive hold of that which simultaneously allures and repels.90 In 
orienting her remarks around the spectacle of the monstrous, Barton emphasizes the 
fundamental disjuncture between fascination and regulation: 
It was a great temptation to be fascinated. It was hard to resist, impossible to 
defeat, because it was born of longing and frustration and loss. The unsightly, 
the unspeakable—the obscaenus, deformis, the turpis, teater, foedus, immundus—
                                                        
89 Adaptation is an important technique within Theodoret’s Compendium of Heretical Fables. Helen Sillett has treated 
the largely unstudied Discernment of Lies and Truth in her essay, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Theodoret of Cyrus’ 
Compendium of Heresies,” in Orthodoxy, Christianity, History, ed. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano 
(Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000), 261-273. See my criticism of Sillett’s argument in chapter two. Augustine, 
too, as I discuss in the next chapter emphasizes the agility of heresiology. It is not static tome, but an adaptive 
repository of ever-growing knowledge of the heretical world. Adaptation, of course, is a reflection of changing 
circumstances.  
 




were things which confounded one. They should be hidden; their sightings 
should be expiated. At the same time they were monstra…things which spoke a 
mysterious language calling for decipherment. They carried a message, however 
unclear. The ambiguous, the paradoxical, the puzzling, the obscure and difficult 
to categorize—in short, the monster—was the great and fatal temptation. As 
Plutarch’s Mestrius Florus points out in the Quaestiones conviviales, ‘the man who 
demands to see the logic of each and every thing destroys the wonder in all 
things’…Fascination, he realizes is not compatible with ‘the logic of things’….To 
subject something which is uncommon, anomalous, monstrous, to a sensus 
communis, to subject it to a physics, to ‘naturalize’ the ‘unnatural,’ to give the 
absurd a species—in short, to interpret—is to wrest control of, to break the spell 
and fascination of, the monsters.91    
 
Bound by a litany of textual challenges, each new head of this ever-growing hydra of heresy 
concretizes a pervasive threat to intellectual and ethnographic solidity and mettle.92 The cycle 
of discovery and decipherment is, on the one hand, the ceaseless power of ethnographic 
inquiry and, on the other, its conceptual ruination. While proclaiming new knowledge of 
peoples across the world fills the crevices in the ethnographic mainframe—shoring up the 
center’s hold over the periphery—codified exposure holds the potential, as in the case of 
heresiology and ethnography more broadly, to create new lacunae within the very same 
                                                        
91 Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster, 101-2. Consider this gem from the Panarion 
27.4.5-5.1 (concerning the Carpocratians), which quite nicely illustrates the rhetorical bind of Barton’s argument 
and the disruptive force of monstrosity that pervades Mela’s Chorography: “Again, I am afraid to say what sorts of 
actions, or I might uncover a trench like a hidden sewer, and some might think that I am causing the blast of foul 
odor. Still, since I am constrained by the truth to disclose what goes on among the deluded, I am going to make 
myself speak—with some delicacy and yet without overstepping the bounds of the truth. The plain fact is that 
these people perform every unspeakable, unlawful thing, which is not right even to say, and every kind of 
homosexual union and carnal intercourse with women, with every member of the body—and that they perform 
magic, sorcery and idolatry and say that this is the discharge of their obligations in the body, so that they will not 
be charged any more or required to do anything else, and for this reason the soul will not be turned back after its 
departure and go on to another incarnation and transmigration. Their literature is such that the intelligent 
reader will be astounded and shocked, and doubt that human beings can do such things—not only civilized people 
like ourselves, but even those who <live with>wild beasts and bestial, brutish men, and all but venture to behave 
like dogs and swine.” 
 
92 On heresy as hydra, see Hippolytus, Ref. V.11.1 (Marcovich, 173) and John Cassian, On the Incarnation I.1 in 
Iohannis Cassiani De institutis coenobiorum et De octo principalium vitiorum remediis libri XII; De incarnatione domini contra 
Nestorium libri VII, ed. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 17 (Vienna: C. Geroldi Filium, 1888), 237: “Thus also heresies in the 
churches bear some likeness to that hydra which the poets’ imagination invented; for they too hiss against us 
with deadly tongues; and they too cast forth their deadly poison, and spring up again when their heads are cut 
off” (ita ergo etiam haereses in ecclesiis illius quam poetarum commenta finxerunt hydrae similitudinem gerunt. 




ethnographic edifice. Not only do the customs and habits of the heretics firmly disorient the 
supposed norms of orthodox Christianity, they also envelop the entire history of the Church, 
past, present, and future, in a cloud of epistemological incertitude, fear, and impossibility.93 As 
much as discovery begets knowledge, and knowledge buttresses existing models of human 
diversity (and/or engenders new ethnographic models), there comes a recognition point at 
which the accrued information becomes too abundant, diverse, and fantastical for the 
authorial intellect and textual field to hold firm. Organizing the infinite renders ethnography a 
task of monstrous absurdity. By proving the firm grip of Scriptural precepts, Epiphanius 
endorses a model of heresy that is, by its very conclusions, uncontrollably vast and beyond 
reach of textual and human comprehension. Epiphanius’ destructively crafty reading of Song 
of Songs, while purporting to contain the world of heresy, in fact infinitely multiplied its 
dominion. And it was not just that the some heresies remained unknown, obscure, or 
altogether unknowable; certain heresies had yet to come into existence. The history of heresy 
had yet to run its course, and its generative vacillations eluded textual efforts to encase it 
within a system of systematic precision.94 The impulse to perform knowledge of the heretics 
usefully essentializes the bind of ancient ethnographic discourse. The heresiologists fear 
revealing too much before their readers and yet they persistently strive to demonstrate the 
fruits of their labor. But their laborious productions are themselves deficient illustrations of 
the heretical world “out there.” In that sense, heresiology only strengthens the inherent 
structural insufficiencies of the ethnographic project.   
                                                        
93 This is especially clear in Augustine’s De Haeresibus Epilogus 1.1-17; 2.24-27 (in S. Aurelii Augustini Pars XIII, ed. R. 
Vander Plaetse and C. Beukers, CCSL 46 [Brepols: Turnhout, 1969], 343).  
 
94 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.55-57 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344). 
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Writing of his own ambivalence as the author of an unsettling yet necessary treatise, 
Epiphanius divulges the restraints of his performance while alluding to multiplicity of possible 
constructions:  
In any case may I, and all the <body> of the holy catholic church, and all the 
readers of this book, remain unharmed by such a suggestion of the devil and his 
mischief! For if I were to start <in> again on the other things they say and do—
which are like these and as numerous, and still more grave and <worse>--and if, 
for a curative drug, I should also wish to match a remedy, like an antidote, with 
each thing they say, I would make a heavy task of composing this treatise.95 
 
Even if he had more time—or the wherewithal to begin anew—the epistemological and 
conceptual fissures remain firmly embedded within the very nucleus of the genre. Precisely 
because there is no escaping, as it were, the endless iterations of heretical generation, the 
genre is a failure of ambition and imagination. Its inabilities were its essence. Indeed, when the 
bishop tries to defend his text’s unbridled potentiality for exhaustive comprehension, he only 
underscores the scriptural strictures undergirding its production:  
But if I were to describe the woman ecstatics in Memphis <and> Heliopolis who 
bewitch themselves with drums and flutes, and the dancing girls, and the 
performers at the triennial festival—and the woman at Bathys and in the temple 
of Menuthis who have abandoned shame and womanliness—to what burdens for 
the tongue, or what a long composition I could commit myself, by adding the 
countless number [of these] to the number I have already given! for even if I 
were to take on the enormous task [of recounting all the sectarian offshoots 
within offshoots] I would leave our comprehension of these things incomplete, 
since scripture says that there are ‘young women without number.’96 
 
While there is, in the end, no escaping the parameters of Scripture, the infinitude of the 
heretics attests the overarching textual paradox of ethnographic inquiry. In the extreme case 
of heresy, its ethnographic objectification evolves into a vicious cycle of intellectual pursuit, 
which was conditioned to futility.  The very quandary of heresy’s malleable persistence upsets 
                                                        
95 Epiphanius, Pan. 26.17.1-3 (Holl, 1:297; altered from Williams). 
 
96 Song of Songs 6:8; Epiphanius, De Fide 12.1-2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:511-12). 
  
230 
the hyper-structured balance of ethnographic analysis: the diversity of the world is not, so it 
seems, subject to intellectual regulation, born of careful research and investigation, but 
illustrative of the inherent restraints of the human condition.  
With ever a watchful eye upon his steering proof-text, Epiphanius’ theoretical and 
practical concession—the two have seemingly become a single problem—concretizes his 
equivocation. But even though exhaustive discovery is finally revealed to be a scholastic and 
ethnographic mirage, the bishop concludes his epilogue with a reminder that these sects, 
despite their innumerability, are youths. They are bound by a certain shared disruptive 
disposition and theological disorientation, which perhaps renders them less indistinct than 
appears:  
And so, at the close of the entire work, I have said that those who are ‘young’ in 
their own way, to suit their own tastes, are ‘without number’ (Song of Songs 
6:8)—by no means for good, to practice the various forms of wisdom, judgment, 
courage, prudence and righteousness. Others of these act ‘young’ more 
arbitrarily, and perversely <estrange> themselves from truth, in numbers there 
is no way in counting. But the one dove herself, the holy virgin, confesses that 
God is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, a perfect Father, a perfect Son, 
and a perfect Holy Spirit.97  
 
While Epiphanius expects heretical plurality, difference, and mutation, the binary between the 
plurality of heresy and the singularity of orthodoxy obviates the need for textual perfection. 
The heretics, he implies, can be refuted with reference to the condition they represent as the 
embodied contradistinction of the ever-stable Church of Christ. Their impurity conditions 
their immateriality. If, as his Proem proposed, heresy follows a particular genealogy of error, 
which begins with Peleg and Serug, the impossible numbers are but more symptoms of an 
already diagnosed disease. The rhetorical escape hatch—the way around the problem of 
ethnographic peril—is to remind readers that heresies are a plurality of sameness. They are all 
                                                        
97 Epiphanius, De Fide 13.9 (Holl and Dummer, 3:514). 
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manifestations of the same hubristic condition. Their outward difference is superficial, while 
their inward ontology is the same.  
 
Conclusion: Knowability in Heresiological Discourse 
 
  
Near the start of the second Proem of his Panarion—before the bishop unfurls his epic 
tale of the history of sectarianism—Epiphanius invoked the Lord and Holy Spirit, in a gesture 
explicitly reminiscent of the Greek authors’ invocation of a Muse, to strengthen his inadequate 
and feeble mind as it undertook a systematic treatment of the heretics.98 In making his plea to 
the Christian God, Epiphanius posits an essential distinction between the knowable and 
unknowable capacity of the human mind. He writes about the limits of his investigation in 
terms of temporality and eternality, humanity and divinity, apophaticism and catophaticism:  
To a person reading a work on any question the aim <of the treatise> ought to be 
<clear>—the discoveries which training enables my small mind to grasp lie in 
the temporal realm, and I certainly do not promise <to impart the knowledge> 
of everything in the world (πἁντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κὀσμῳ). There are things which 
cannot be uttered, and things which can. There are things untold (ἀμύθητά), 
beyond counting (ἐν ἀριθμῷ μή καθιστάμενα), inaccessible so far as man is 
concerned, and known only to the Lord of all. But we are dealing with variance 
of opinions and kinds of knowledge, with faith in God and unbelief, with sects, 
and with heretical human opinion which misguided persons have been sowing 
in the world from man’s formation on earth till our own day, the eleventh year 
of the reigns of Valentinian and Valens and the seventh of Gratian’s [375 C.E.].99 
 
While the dichotomy Epiphanius posits is fairly cogent—knowable and utterable things (φατά) 
belong to the human mind and the temporal realm, while unknowable and unutterable 
(ἄφατα) are the province of God alone—the details of these epistemological categories are left 
unspecified and unelaborated, save his immediate suggestion that the sectarian/heretical 
                                                        
98 Epiphanius, Pan. Pro. II.1.3-5 (Holl, 1:169). 
 
99 Epiphanius, Pan. Pro. II.2.1-3 (Holl, 1:170). 
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problem of his treatise belongs to the temporal realm. These are heretical human opinions 
(κακοδόξου γνώμης ἀνθρωπείας), which have been sowed by misguided persons 
(πεπλανημένων ἀνδῶν). Although Epiphanius forthrightly acknowledges the limitations of his 
investigation—what we might call the known unknowns of divine matters—he is clear that the 
heretics fall well within the category of known knowns, seeing as they follow distinctly human 
pedigree. Indeed, Epiphanius’ insistence that those things which are beyond counting remain 
squarely outside the human realm of cognizance suggests a hazier trajectory for thinking 
about his ability to comprehend the world of heresy. His own textual ruminations, as I have 
suggested throughout this chapter, expressly problematize the simple dichotomy between the 
kinds of knowledge he supposes at the outset. 
Defined though it is by the words of scripture, Epiphanius’ numerical ordering of the 
heretics emanates equally from his own exhaustive yet mindfully incomplete knowledge of the 
world of heresy:  
I mean that I have composed a description and refutation of <eighty> sects, and 
at the same time, as far as my human frailty permitted, revealed what goes on in 
each. For this is the end of my full account of the origins and causes of the 
eighty sects I have been told of, and whose number and names I know, and the 
formularies, proof-texts and positions of some of them.100  
 
Because heresiology was an attempt, above all else, to manage the unmanageable, its rigid 
codification identifies a complex matrix of epistemological and compositional failure. By 
wading into the water of heretical infinitude, Epiphanius succumbs to the very same error 
that, as Barton noted, marks the absurdity of Plutarch’s interlocutor: how does one seek to 
impose order over that which allures us precisely because of its illogic, dissimilarity, and 
                                                        




disruptiveness.101 The formula of Song of Songs 6:8, the infinite perpetuity of heresy, provokes 
an even more fundamental question: what, in essence, are the heresies? By that I mean, the 
heresiological investigation ascribes certain theological, ritualistic, genealogical, 
philosophical, and exegetical qualities to  “heretical being,” but the pedigree of the heretics is 
shrouded in liminality. Although heresiological discourse coalesced the entirety of the 
heretical “race” by means of an underlying epistemological arrogance, the heresiologists 
propounded divergent explanations of heresy’s origins and ascendancy. The vast differences 
between the heretical parties further reinforced the fact that the each sect was, despite being a 
member of a common genus, a unique species. But what is the relationship between the 
heretical genus and the created world? Are the heretics natural or unnatural phenomena? Are 
they divine or human? Predictable or random? Logical or illogical? Knowable or unknowable? 
What is their ontological core? How do they display the created world? How do they disrupt it? 
The ethnographic orientation of heresiology thrusts heresy into two interdependent domains 
of epistemological consequence: heresy reflects both the laws of the natural world and the 
operations of the supernatural order. To that end, heresy’s ontological fluctuation between the 
world of men and the world of God explains its simultaneously controllable and yet elusive 
existence. It is, in one sense, discoverable and traceable, and, in another, beyond the bounds of 
the human mind. Its uncontrollability is a reflection of its essential duality. And while one 
solution to the problem of the heretics’ dualistic ontology is to naturalize them within the 
cosmological and theological inner workings of divine creation, the implications are, in fact, 
gravely problematic for the Christian project of ethnographic mapping, theological expansion, 
and ideological triumph.  
                                                        
101 Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans, 101-2.  
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“But if the inhabitants were mute, perhaps the earth itself would speak to me. Over and 
above the marvels which had enchanted me along the river, perhaps it would answer 
my prayer and let me into the secret of its virginity. Where exactly does that virginity 
lie, behind the confusion of appearances which are all and yet nothing? I can pick out 
certain scenes and separate them from the rest; is it this tree, this flower? They might 
well be elsewhere. Is it also a delusion that the whole should fill me with rapture, while 
each part of it, taken separately, escapes me? If I have to accept it as being real, I want 
at least to grasp it in its entirety, down to its last constituent element.  
 
 
- Claude Lévi-Strauss1 
 
 
In positing a conceptual and discursive consonance between ethnographic writing in 
the ancient world and the genre of heresiology, I have drawn particular attention to the 
problem of heresiological comprehension and closure. The previous chapter demonstrated 
that Epiphanius himself contemplated the boundless depths of the heretical world precisely as 
he navigated efforts to circumvent this entrenched predicament. My point was not that the 
Panarion failed to enact or realize its full-scale plan, but rather that its author actively pondered 
the problem of heretical profusion in terms of textual and authorial abilities tro translate the 
world into words. In this chapter I wish to explore the application and internalization of 
ethnographic writing, using Augustine’s long-neglected De Haeresibus as my primary example.2 
                                                        
1 I have followed the text of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Weightman and Doreen Weightman 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 333. 
 
2 I have followed the Latin text of Augustine, De Haeresibus in S. Aurelii Augustini Pars XIII, ed. R. Vander Plaetse and 
C. Beukers, CCSL 46 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1969), 286-345. In addition, I have more or less adhered to the translation 
of Heresies in Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E Rotelle and trans. Ronald J. Teske, The Works of St. Augustine: A 
Translation for the 21st Century, vol. I/18, (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 15-77. The general attitude 
towards Augustine’s text, which I will discuss below in some detail, is fairly lackluster. His De Haeresibus is 
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Though Augustine’s text eschews any sort of ethnographic overlay—it lacks a master narrative 
of macroscopic design—the text reveals and foregrounds the process of translating 
ethnographic information into pertinent, tactile knowledge. In terms of both its form and 
content, Augustine’s De Haeresibus, as a distillation of the heresiological genre into a ready-to-
use handbook, illustrates not only the dogged difficulties of controlling the written word (by 
way of armchair ethnographic research), but also a perceptive authorial and ethnographic 
hesitation. The process of honing the heresiological enterprise induces Augustine to ask a 
series of pointed questions about the authorial capacity to research, write, and comprehend.  
This chapter will proceed along two interrelated avenues. First, I will widen the scope 
of my inquiry to discuss the sources and methods that Augustine, Epiphanius and Theodoret 
deployed to manage the constraints of ordering and obtaining knowledge, including inter-
                                                                                                                                                                                  
described as a mundane compendium of various sources, offering little in the way of original exposition. The text 
lacks, so its critics argue, any of Augustine’s impressive intellectual talents; instead, it presents itself as a stark 
and unoriginal amalgamation of sources. When scholars do cite it, they tend to use it as a comparative source or 
gloss rather than as a subject worthy of inquiry in its own right. By my reckoning there is not a single essay in the 
entire history of the journal Augustinian Studies devoted to De Haeresibus; a rather remarkable feat, I would argue. 
The judgment of Brent D. Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in Vandals, Romans and Berbers, ed. A.H. Merrills  
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 227-258, seems to linger. I shall return to his essay later in this chapter. Even G. 
Bardy’s classic essay on Augustine’s sources, “Le ‘De haeresibus’ et ses sources,” in Miscellanea Agostiniana: Testi e 
Studi, vol. 2, ed. G. Morin and A. Casamassaeds (Rome: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1931), 397–416, very much 
assumes the text’s recapitulative nature. The text is studied for its sources, not for any sort of substantive 
contribution to the genre of heresiology. The judgment that the text as catalogue lacks originality is unfounded 
because it glosses over the immensely fraught process of heresiological compilation as well as ignores Augustine’s 
introductory and conclusionary remarks. There are some notable exceptions, which treat the text as worthy of 
studying for its own value (not as mere source or gloss in Augustine’s larger oeuvre): Liguori G. Müller, The De 
Haeresibus of Saint Augustine: Translation, with Introduction and Commentary (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1956); Francesca Tasca, “‘Ecce Panis Haereticorum:’ Diversità allmentari ed identità religiose nel 
‘De haeresibus’ di Agostino,” Augustinianum 50.1 (2010): 233-253; Robert Dodaro, “‘Omnes haeretici negant 
Christum in carne uenisse’ (Aug., serm. 183.9.13): Augustine on the Incarnation as Criterion for Orthodoxy,” 
Augustinian Studies 38:1 (2007): 163-174; Judith McClure, “Handbooks against Heresy in the West, From the Late 
Fourth to the Late Sixth Centuries,” Journal of Theological Studies 30 (1979): 186-197; and Gian Ackermans, “Einige 
rechtliche und theologische Fragen zu den Abeloitae in Augustins De Haresibus,” in Augustine, Manichaeism and 
other Gnosticism: Studies for Johannes van Oort at Sixty, ed. Jacob Albert van den Berg, Annemaré Kotzé, Tobias 
Nicklas, and Madeleine Scopello (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 123-138. Though Tasca’s essay falls into the category of 
glossed analysis—it uses De Haeresibus to consider more fully Augustine’s Sermon 183—it should be singled out if 
only because it is one of the few serious attempts to grapple with, however briefly, the remarkable prologue of 
the text.  
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textual dialogue, citation, and editing.3 The heresiologists harnessed the power of libraries, 
informants, experience, theological deference, divine intervention, and ethnographic 
theorization to keep their catalogues current and thus useful.4 To the extent that the success 
and viability of the genre was dependent upon continuously updating its content, it 
necessarily remained in a constant state of flux. While fixity of content was an elusive though 
pursued ideal, the persistent editing of heresiology was harnessed as evidence of the genre’s 
adaptability and strength. The genre did not lie dormant; it evolved with the times. In the 
second part of this chapter, precisely because there is a cyclical relationship between fissures 
within the genre’s conceptual framework and textual efforts to minimize these breaks—editing 
solves certain problems but creates new ones—I explore Augustine’s text as it performs, 
organizes, and explores the depths of its knowledge. In this section, I will argue that 
Augustine’s heresiological handbook evidences the process by which he adapted and updated 
the genre (the text is, as we shall see, an act of performative editing by which I mean that 
Augustine explains his editorial decisions explicitly as he writes his own text), while also 
pessimistically opining about the relationship between heresiological textuality and heretical 
reality. In asking how the world of heresy was translated into a specific textual form, I contend 
that the underlying logic of Augustine’s intellectual mapping is a quintessentially 
ethnographic construction. Augustine’s reflections about his work are not simply stylistic or 
                                                        
3 I did discuss, briefly, in chapter three the implied effects of editing: that is, editing fit comfortably within the 
ideological perspective of totality and fully enumerated knowledge. Here, I am less interested in the language of 
totality than I am in demonstrating the relationship between textual construction, authorial subjectivity, and 
compiled knowledge.  
 
4 If one subscribes to the notion that heresiology was, at some level, an attempt to situate and/or place the 
heretics within the Christian world, the heresiologists’ dependence upon divine intercession need not be read as a 
superfluous trope. If the heretics were the temporal manifestation of a demonic lineage, as Theodoret most 
explicitly proposed, it follows that God himself possesses the capacity to enhance human understanding. If the 
lineage of the heretics is more than just human—if it holds a tinge of supernatural ontology—the heresiologists 
require divine support and knowledge.  
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rhetorical; they are deeply unsettling questions about the ability of authors to describe and 
control in texts the world around them, to manage the disruptive potential of ethnographic 
excursion, and explain the problems of human unity and difference. In the latter instance, 
Augustine meditates, quite unsettlingly, on the inherent problem of words, language, and 
authorial subjectivity.5  
  
Corrective Counting: Armchair Ethnography in Heresiology 
 
The use of sources and the process of editing the heresies (by numerical accretion and 
by definitional exclusion) evidenced most explicitly, thoroughly, and forcefully by Augustine 
of Hippo, intertwine textual production and scholastic forbearance.6 The heresiologist 
undertakes his overt textual augmentations, erasures, and emphases to validate and perform 
                                                        
5 Augustine clearly falls into Roland Barthes’ description of the writer (and not the author). See Roland Barthes, 
“Authors and Writers,” in A Barthes Reader, ed. Susan Sontag (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 185-193. Augustine 
“posits a goal (to give evidence, to explain, to instruct) of which language is merely a means; for him language 
supports a praxis, it does not constitute one” (187). He is not actively writing the language of Christian 
ethnography, save in his effort to translate the disjunctive and discursive texts of Philaster and Epiphanius—
sweeping ethnographies of heresy—into a digestible and updated form. But Augustine’s text, I would argue, aptly 
follows the ethnographic assumptions of the heresiological genre. And, critically, the text holds the same textual 
timidities and fissures as the more protracted investigations. The move to condense and distill heresiological 
knowledge pinpoints the discursive feedback loop of heresiological investigation and production. His text is 
trying to remain active in the world. It is trying to be relevant.  
 
6 The bibliography on Augustine is massive, though a few works are worth distinguishing. Peter Brown’s 
bibliography, Augustine of Hippo, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) remains indispensible, as 
is James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: A New Biography (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005). Another useful biographical 
sketch can be found in Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies, 3rd ed. (Norwich: Canterbury 
Press, 2002). The recently published (and immense!) A Companion to Augustine, ed. Mark Vessey (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2012) is an invaluable resource for all things Augustinian. Though Paula Fredriksen’s Augustine and the 
Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism (New York: Doubleday, 2008) is concerned primarily with the Jewish 
aspects of Augustine’s theology and exegesis, she nonetheless offers a thorough account of his life and 
environment, 3-210. For a wider view of Augustine’s world, see Peter Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of 
Augustine (London: Faber & Faber, 1972); Brent D. Shaw, Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the 
Age of Augustine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Carol Harrison’s Augustine: Christian Truth and 
Fractured Humanity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Finally, Andrea Nightingale’s recent work, Once Out 
of Nature: Augustine on Time and the Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), distills Augustine’s thought 
on “matter” and “the body” into a coherent account of Augustine’s larger anthropology.  
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his knowledge and to cement his genre’s vitality and utility; after all, no one needs an obsolete 
heresiology! To the degree that Augustine introduces new heresies, eliminates some—he 
excludes all the Jewish sects found in the Anacephalaeosis of “Pseudo”-Epiphanius and in 
Philaster’s Diversorum hereseon liber—and modifies still others, he is honing the genre to rise to 
the challenge of an ever-diversifying heretical environment.7 By editing, citing, and 
referencing sources, the heresiologists improve their genre and reinforce its scholastic 
potency and relevancy. Inter-textual culling, above all else, is a solution to the problem of 
heresiological profusion and discordance. In peppering their treatises with myriad references 
to sources and reflecting upon their assiduous research, the heresiologists construct their 
textual labor with a substructure of labored scholasticism.  
At the outset of the second Proem of the Panarion, Epiphanius reports concisely, if 
vaguely, on the sources he has culled and the methodological techniques he has employed in 
writing his textual curative. Much like Diodorus Siculus who heralds “that enthusiasm for the 
work which enables every man to bring to completion the task which seems impossible,” “a 
fondness for study (φιλομαθἰας)” undergirds Epiphanius’ exposition.8 Epiphanius’ 
promulgation of a scholarly urge is a fitting rejoinder to the request “of beauty-loving persons 
(ἐξ ἀνδρῶν φιλοκάλων; i.e. scholars) who urged my weakness on at various times and in 
various ways, and practically forced me to get at it.”9 The request from the presbyters Acacius 
and Paul, which asked Epiphanius to share his knowledge of and teachings on the heretics, 
                                                        
7 Later in this chapter I will discuss the specific inclusions and exclusions Augustine made with respect to his 
predecessors and contemporaries—Epiphanius, Philaster, Pseudo-Jerome, and Eusebius. At the outset, however, it 
is necessary to identify one major difference. Augustine omits any reference to Jewish or pagan/philosophical 
heresies. He includes only those heretical groups that fashion themselves as “Christians.”  
 
8 Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 1.4.2, ed. and trans. C.H. Oldfather, Loeb Classical Library 279, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 19. 
 
9 Epiphanius, Pan. Pro. II.2.4, II.2.5 (Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl, GCS 25 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1915], 1:170). Translation 
from Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis, 2 vols., NHS 35–36 [Leiden: Brill, 1987, 1994]. 
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serves both to test the bishop’s intellectual skill (the underlying supposition of their request: it 
takes a remarkable mind to complete a work of heresiology), and to validate his expertise 
(after all, they beseech Epiphanius, as I noted in the previous chapter).10 In writing his tome, he 
consulted an array of scholarly works, most notably Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses, and cited the 
writings of his opponents at length.11 Hearsay and the occasional first-hand observation (“I 
happened on some with my own ears and eyes”) likewise complement his self-professed 
bookishness.12 While the next section of this chapter shall detail the specific manner in which 
                                                        
10 For the Letter of Acacius and Paul see Epiphanius, Pan. 1.1-13 (Holl, 1:153-4). 
 
11 Augustine, it should be noted, quotes from the Anacephalaeoses of Epiphanius once in each of his discussions of 
the (two sects of) Origenists (De Haeresibus 52.3-5 and 53.1-4 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 310]) and twice in his 
discussion of the Sabellians (De Haeresibus 51.19-20, 33-34 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 308]). He also cites 
Philaster during his description of the Sabellians (De Haeresibus 51.31-35 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 309]). 
Theodoret quotes Irenaeus once (Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium I.5 in Patrologia Graeca 83: 336-556, ed. J.P. 
Migne, 352D) and Clement once as well (Haer. I.6; Migne, 353A-B). In each case, however, the citation is fairly 
terse. Epiphanius is the only heresiologist, as far as I can tell, who marshals his literary predecessors and 
opponents at great length. There is no parallel within the heresiological corpus on the order of Epiphanius’ 
appropriations from Irenaeus, Marcellus, George of Laodicea, Basil of Ancyra, Melitius, Ancoratus, Proclus, 
Methodius, Origen, Marcion, Turbo, Athanasius, and Aetius. For a heresiologist, his use of sources is 
unprecedented and, in the late antique world, unrepeated. The method and rise of patristic citation is a matter 
that has recently garnered some much-needed attention: see Mark Vessey, “The Forging of Orthodoxy in Latin 
Christian Literature: A Case Study,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 4 (1996): 495–513; Éric Rebillard, “A New Style 
of Argument in Christian Polemic: Augustine and the Use of Patristic Citation,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 8.4 
(2000): 559-578. 
 
12 Epiphanius, Pan. Prooemium II.2.5 (Holl, 1:170). See also his introduction to the Sethian sect: “I think I may have 
met with this sect in Egypt too—I do not precisely recall the country in which I met them. And I found out some 
things about it by inquiry in an actual encounter, but have learned other things from treatises” (Pan. 39.1.2 
[Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 31 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1980), 2:72]). Much like the deft 
deployment of sources, polemical and evidentiary testimony alike, the heresiologist occasionally augments the 
accounts of sources with his firsthand, experiential knowledge. A jolt to bolster his credibility and strengthen his 
hand, Epiphanius, in his reportage on the Gnostics, quips that, “I happened on this sect myself, beloved, and was 
actually taught these things in person, out of the mouths of the people who really undertook them” (Pan. 26.17.4 
[Holl, 1:297]). The rarity with which eyewitness testimony is invoked—by the heresiologist himself or by a 
source—is hardly dispositive insofar as ancient ethnography was primarily a venture undertaken with written 
sources. Even as ideologically driven, polemically constructed treatises, heresiology’s evidentiary bona fides serve 
to demonstrate and enhance its mastery of the material at hand. Much emphasis, especially with respect to 
Augustine’s De Haeresibus, is placed on the collection and distillation of relevant material. Theodoret, also, 
trumpets his usage of sources and signals his genre’s dependence upon his intellectual antecedents and 
contemporaries. Heresiology does not exist in a vacuum of tradition. It is a work of compilation and construction. 
See the diagram of heresiological interdependence in Gérard Vallée, A Study in Anti-Gnostic Polemic: Irenaeus, 
Hippolytus, and Epiphanius (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981), 6. Glenn Melvin Cope’s 
unpublished dissertation, “An Analysis of the Heresiological Method of Theodoret of Cyrus in the ‘Haereticarum 
fabularum compendium” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1990) ventures into a fairly detailed 
discussion of Theodoret’s sources—contesting, for example, Vallée’s claim that Theodoret was unaware of the 
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Augustine’s De Haeresibus conspicuously elaborated and performed the collection, 
augmentation, and emendation of heresiological knowledge, the genre itself, even before 
Augustine, fundamentally operated as a literary palimpsest, which amassed its capacity to 
know and refute in relationship to textual antecedents.13 Epiphanius’ extended citations from 
Irenaeus on the Valentinian and Marcosian heresies, together with oblique textual allusions to 
a predecessor, functioned jointly as the interpolation of his own work within a distinct 
(textual) discursive genealogy of heresiology.  
While Hippolytus’s lost Syntagma and Irenaeus’ Contra Omnes Haereses served as the 
principal sources for the Panarion, there is evidence to suggest, based upon Epiphanius’ few 
explicit references and an analysis of textual parallels, that he consulted a number of other 
works, including Eusebius of Caesarea’s Ecclesiastical History, his Chronicle and Praeparatio 
Evangelica, the Apostolic Constitutions, an unnamed work of Clement of Alexandria, Philaster of 
Brescia’s Diversarum Haereseon, and the spurious thirtieth chapter of Tertullian’s Praescriptio 
Haereticorum, known as the work of Pseudo-Tertullian.14 The earlier heresiologies by Irenaeus 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Panarion, in which he posits that the Theodoret’s ambiguous references and citations reflect his methodological 
(and theological) interest. His Compendium is less an exhaustive survey of the heresiological world than an 
opportunity to turn the “classical” corruptions of the heretics into a tractate detailing orthodox opinion. 
 
13 I wonder to what extent the inter-textual knowledge of the heresiologists was unique in early Christian literary 
circles. By which I mean that the genre’s design and longevity were dependent upon an evolving tradition, both 
in relation to authors and authorial objects. Heresiology as a textual form was written in dialogue with its textual 
antecedents. Of course, others Christian literary forms evidenced inter-textual dialogue (adverus and apologetic 
literature come to mind), but heresiology evolved into a tradition that was defined by its collation and collection. 
For a useful parallel see the work of Ann M. Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern 
Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), esp. 11-24 and 174-229. 
 
14 Richard Adelbert Lipsius, Zur Quellengeschichte des Epiphanios (Wien: W. Braumüller, 1865) offers the most 
systematic review of Epiphanius’ sources. Aline Pourkier, L’hérésiologie chez Épiphane de Salamie (Paris: Beauchesne, 
1992), 53-75, surveys the literature more briefly (though, he juxtaposes the knowledge of the various sources 
throughout his work). It remains inconclusive whether the bishop knew any of Justin’s work (his lost Syntagma, 
the Dialogue with Trypho, and his Apologies) or the Elenchos of Hippolytus. Pourkier, 93-117, offers a systematic 
comparison between the works of Hippolytus and Epiphanius. On Justin’s reference to his lost work, Against All the 
Schools of Thought That Have Arisen (The Syntagma), see his First Apology 26. For the Greek text and a French 
translation, see Justin: Apologie pour les chrétiens, ed. and trans. Charles Munier, SC 507 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 
2006), 198-202. For more on Justin and heresiology, see David Brakke, The Gnostics, 105-111; Alain Le Boulluec, La 
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and Hippolytus offered structural and organizational models—augmented as we saw in chapter 
two by the bishop’s proof-texts from Galatians, Colossians, and Song of Songs—for Epiphanius’ 
historical-geographical-genealogical master narrative. In addition, a far greater variety of 
texts—some heresiological, others not—provided substantive data about the various sectarian 
groups he contested.15 Composed over layers of heresiological tradition (in consultation with 
an array of available texts), Epiphanius subsumes, rejects, and edits the works of his forebears 
and contemporaries to suit his own theological, stylistic, and rhetorical needs. It is a text that 
assimilates its data within a structural edifice of ethnographic theorization.  
Epiphanius balanced his need for evidentiary corroboration—his textual dependency—
against his own claims of authorial mastery and control. His text is no mere compilation or 
catalogue, but instead, it is a highly ordered and unprecedentedly structured ethnographic 
categorization, at once macroscopically theorized and microscopically constructed. His text 
segues from his overarching master narrative into the nitty-gritty of lived heresy. What 
Epiphanius actually produced, however, was a polemical dialogue—or rather, a series of 
dialogues—between Christianity’s unity and diversity, which was modulated through 
Epiphanius’ narrative structure “with the help of other people’s words, created and distributed 
specifically as the words of others.”16 The Panarion’s polyvocality, the marshaling of “orthodox” 
sources alongside the presentation of quotations from the heretics’ themselves—is harmonized 
via Epiphanius’ biblical prooftext and ethnographic model. His universalizing genealogy is 
corroborated and realized through the words of his Christian brethren and heretical foes alike. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
notion d’hérésie dans la literature grecque IIe-IIIe siècles, vol. 1. (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985), 36-91; and Daniel 
Boyarin, “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism,” Church History 70.3 (2001): 427-461, especially 438ff. 
 
15 See the brief remarks of Frank Williams, trans. The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: Book I (Sects 1-46) (Boston: 
Brill, 2009), xxv-xxvii. 
 
16 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984), 188. 
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Bakhtin draws a pertinent parallel in his analysis of the dialogical relationship between the 
authorial voice and his sources. “A scholarly article,” writes Bakhtin: 
where various authors’ utterances on a given question are cited, some for 
refutation and others for confirmation and supplementation—is one instance of 
a dialogic interrelationship among directly signifying discourses within the 
limits of a single context. The relationships of agreement/disagreement, 
affirmation/supplementation, question/answer, etc., are purely dialogic 
relationships, although not of course between words, sentences, or other 
elements of a single utterance, but between whole utterances. In dramatic 
dialogue or a dramaticized dialogue introduced into the author’s context, these 
relationships link together represented, objectified utterances and therefore are 
themselves objects.17 
  
The incorporation and expression of various forms of textual disposition erects the contours of 
heresiology’s textual dialogue. In letting the heretics, on occasion, speak for themselves, 
Epiphanius illustrates the simplicity of his endeavor: exposure is sufficient to demonstrate his 
victory. But the genre’s singular authorial position is, in fact, a push-and-pull between 
appropriation and separation. Epiphanius’ usage of extended quotations from the heretics 
themselves, not only valorizes his own investigative efforts—“to show all studious persons 
who are in search of truths of faith that I do not accuse people without reason, but do my best 
to base what I say on reliable evidence”—it also enables him to insist on the radical disjuncture 
between his own voice and those of his opponents.18 With passages from Ptolemy, Marcion, 
Origen (from his commentary on the first Psalm), Arius, Marcellus, Basil of Ancyra, George of 
Laodicea, Acacius, Melitius, Aetius, the Gnostic texts Ascents of James and the Travels of Peter, a 
Gospel According to the Hebrews, and the Book of Elkasai, Epiphanius, more than any other late 
                                                        
17 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 156. 
 




antique heresiologist, turns the heretics’ own writings against them.19 As Irenaeus succinctly 
put it, “indeed, the very manifestation of their doctrine is a victory against them.”20 The 
heresiological voice, above all else, hinges on its ability to navigate the heretical world via an 
authenticated and appropriated knowledge: “a given work can be the product of a collective 
effort, it can be created by the successive efforts of generations, and so forth—but in all cases 
we hear in it a unified creative will, a definite position, to which it is possible to react 
dialogically.”21 
Theodoret, who acknowledges at the start of his treatise his personal debt to Justin, 
Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, “Eusebius the Palestian and [Eusebius] the Phoenician,” 
                                                        
19 Epiphanius, Pan. 31.5.1-6.10; 32.4.4-5.6; 33.3.1-7.10; 42.1-78; 64.6.1-7.4, 12.1-16.7; 66.6.1-6.11, 25.3-31.8; 69.7.2-8.5; 
72.2.1-3.5; 73.2.1-22.8; 76.11.1-12.37. In acknowledging his Panarion’s literary dependence upon the writings of 
Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Clement and others earlier Christian writers, Epiphanius underscores the continuity and 
tension within the textual tradition of heretical refutation. Heresiology, in its later iterations, bore the mark of a 
genre in tension with itself. Authors not only edited their texts numerically, they considered the structural 
mechanisms by which the undertaking could be limited, including scriptural strictures and efforts to define in 
precise terms the meaning of heresy. As I explained in chapter one, the Panarion assumed as its modus operandi a 
heresiological style that was oriented around an orthodox curative for the disease of heresy. J. Rebecca Lyman, 
“Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in Orthodoxy, Christianity, History, eds. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and Antonella 
Romano (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000), 149-161, has argued that Epiphanius’ choice of therapeutic 
rhetoric signifies a paradigmatic shift in the heresiological worldview. By the fourth-century, she contends that 
the genre, “reflects a particular social and spiritual assertion of theological authority,” in which Epiphanius 
wields the stable, calm, unyielding power of orthodoxy as the cure to the now internal (i.e. ecclesiastical) error of 
heresy (154). The move away from “philosophical competition which highlighted opposing arguments or 
intellectual genealogies,” toward a model of “natural history and medical handbook for the identification, cure, 
and prevention of error in the church,” demonstrates the Panarion’s prioritization of veridical obedience (to 
orthodoxy) over the discovery of truth (vis-à-vis the heretics) (154). Because the Panarion is not an investigation 
of truth per se, but an attempt to excise and demolish untruths from within the church, delimited now by creedal 
(i.e. Nicene) norms, Lyman distinguishes heresiological obedience from an interest in persuasion: the latter 
applied to the second-century world of Irenaeus with its diffusion of churches and the problem of choice, while 
the former now engulfs the singular orthodox. On the difference from Irenaeus, Lyman writes, “the individual 
needed therefore to be protected from wrong choice (hairesis) by being convinced of true teaching about the 
nature of God or armed with arguments in order to meet the challenged of multiple teachers” (156). Having 
conceded the reality of endemic Christian heresy, most notably with Origen and Apollinarius, Epiphanius is 
“unable to exclude them by a separate genealogy…instead [he] identified their intellectual and spiritual weakness 
which led to the illness within the church” (155). 
 
20 Sive adversus eos victoria est sententiae eorum manifestation; Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.31.3. (Contre les hérésies, Livres I, ed. 
and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 264 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1979], 1:2:388). Translation by 
Dominic J. Unger, et al. in St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against the Heresies, Book 1. ACW 55 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
1992). 
 




Adamantius, Rhodon, Titus, Diodore, and George, concludes his discussion of a number of the 
heresies—by my count there are seventeen unmistakable instances—with generalized 
references to alternative sources of refutation.22 In the fourth chapter of Book III, for example, 
“Concerning Novatus,” his brief narrative about the rise of the Novatians (or Cathari as they 
were also known) ends with a brief addendum: “Cornelius wrote many letters against this 
heresy, and Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria [wrote] many, also many other of the bishops at 
that time [wrote].”23 He mentions Origen on nine occasions, Irenaeus on nine as well, Clement 
six times, Dionysius of Alexandria five, and Eusebius of Emesa at three junctures.24 And while 
these references to sources skew toward the chronologically earlier heresies—those tackled by 
Justin, Origen, and Clement—a sparse handful of the (later) contemporary heresies—the 
Meletians, and the Messalians (the Euchites and Enthusiasts)—find themselves the recipients 
of these referential coda.25 Furthermore, Theodoret does invoke and cite the testimony of 
                                                        
22 Theodoret, Haer. Praef. (Migne, 340A). He also notes a personal familiarity with the heretical practices of a 
ninety-year-old man, who, following as a devotee of Marcion, reports that he rose “at dawn, washed his own face 
with a larger amount of spittle, and having been asked the reason for this said that he did not want to be indebted 
to the Demiurge, by receiving water from the things created by that one. But those who were present asked: how 
ca you eat, or drink, or dress, or sleep, or discharge the mysteries that you believe? Answering from absurdity, he 
said that he did that because it was not possible to live nor to celebrate the mysteries any other way. That mad 
man confessed, against his will, that he held that nothing was called good of itself, but all the good things are 
derived from the things made by the Demiurge” (Haer. I.24 [Migne, 376B-C]). 
 
23 Theodoret, Haer. III.5 (Migne, 408C). 
 
24 Theodoret, Haer. Pref. (Migne, 340A): Certainly I have collected, at the same time, the myths out of the ancient 
teachings of the Church, of Justin, the philosopher and martyr, and Irenaeus, the Celtic nations’ cultivator and 
illuminator, and Clement, whose [work] is called Stromata, and Origen, and both Eusebius the Palestinian and 
[Eusebius] the Phoenician, and Adamantius, and Rhodon, and Titus, and Diodore and George and of others who 
armed tongues against falsehoods” (Migne, 340A). Theodoret’s sources: for Origen: Haer. Preface (340A), I.2 (345D), 
I.4 (349C), I.19 (369C), I.21 (372B), I.25 (377A), II.2 (389A), II.7 (393B), III.1 (401C). For Irenaeus: Haer. Preface (340A), 
I.2 (345D), I.4 (349C), I.5 (352D), I.19 (369C), I.23 (372C), I.25 (377A), II.2 (389A), III.1 (401C). For Hippolytus: I.25 
(377A), II.5 (392B), III.1 (401C). For Clement: Haer. Preface (340A), I.4 (349C), I.6 (353A-B), I.19 (369C), I.21 (372B), 
III.1 (401C). For Justin: Haer. I.2 (345C), I.25 (377A), II.2 (389A). For Eusebius of Emesa: Haer. Preface (XXX), I.25 
(377A), I.26 (381B). And for Dionysius of Alexandria: II.3 (389C), II.8 (393C), II.9 (396C), III.5 (408C), III.6 (408D). For a 
full list see Cope, “An Analysis of the Heresiological Method of Theodoret,” 361-370.  
 




Irenaeus and Clement, the former in the case of Carpocrates and the latter with respect to 
Prodicus, as unimpeachable witnesses to the authentic teachings of the heretics.26 He follows 
closely Eusebius of Caesarea’s account of Simon Magus, without citing it or even alluding to it, 
and augments his description with details from Clement.27 Theodoret never explicates his 
rationale for the inclusion of general references, beyond conceiving his text as a compendium 
or summary (rather than as a florilegium of heresiological citations) to alternative 
refutations.28 Insofar as Theodoret’s descriptions appear to be curt, banal, and largely 
mundane rehearsals of well-tread material, the descriptions of the heresies are but a means to 
his end: They stand as the necessary corollary for the larger aim of his project, its theology of 
orthodoxy, thematically ordered in the second half of his treatise.  
Theodoret fashions the first four books of his Compendium as a polemically descriptive 
account of the heresies: “for I have not undertaken to refute them for the present.”29 As a 
process of collecting, collating, and concisely summarizing the “scattered compositions” of his 
textual antecedents, Theodoret plies his heresiological trade as an editor. He indicts and lauds 
the failures and successes of his Christian colleagues (just as he denounces the errors of his 
religious opponents), at turns excising sources and embellishing the data of others, in the 
arbitration of heresy and the heretical legacy. But the specific content of the heresies 
                                                        
26 Theodoret, Haer. I.4 (Migne, 352D); Haer. I.4 (Migne, 353A-B). 
 
27 Cope’s dissertation, “An Analysis of the Heresiological Method of Theodoret of Cyrus in the ‘Haereticarum 
fabularum compendium,” 68-73, ventures into a fairly detailed discussion of Theodoret’s sources—contesting, for 
example, Vallée’s claim that Theodoret was unaware of the Panarion, in which he posits that the Theodoret’s 
ambiguous references and citations reflect his methodological (and theological) interest. His Compendium is less 
an exhaustive survey of the heresiological world than an opportunity to turn the “classical” corruptions of the 
heretics into a tractate detailing orthodox opinion. 
 
28 Perhaps his unspecific references would have been well known to his readers or, perhaps, he is simply 
summarizing. I presume that the inclusion of oblique references serve as a justification for his brief, if not 
altogether cursory, attention to the heresies themselves. 
 
29 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 340B). 
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constitutes only one frontier of the genre’s full-frontal polemic, as instances of heretical 
anonymity and vapid description (i.e. devoid of real content) evidence. The heresiologies 
refine their project’s mastery and command of the Christian world with the mere decision to 
include or exclude the heresies. In attempting to define or even grasp the contents of the 
heretical world both positively and negatively, they adjudicate the legitimacy and determine, 
in a wickedly ironic sense, which heresies will live and which will die.  
The various techniques by which Epiphanius refashioned the problem of heresy, as his 
textual medium translates a Christian phenomenon into a universal history (or narrows a 
universal history into a distinctly Christian vernacular), instantiate a self-corrective process in 
which this discursive genealogy of writing heresy turns in on itself to innovate, reassess, adapt, 
and redeploy its resources, style, structure, and substance.30 The textual interplay, implicit and 
explicit, positive or negative, between Tertullian, Epiphanius, Augustine, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, 
and Theodoret unfolds as the incorporation of this literary body into a mutually reliant, 
adaptive, and ever-expanding traditio haereticorum. The process of editing intertwines textual 
production and epistemological capacities of texts themselves and the heresiologists. The 
heresiologists, indeed, undertake their overt textual augmentations and erasures to perform 
the expansiveness of their knowledge. Augmentation is a sign of textual progression and 
advancement, even as it illumines omissions, errors, and shortcomings. The betterment of the 
                                                        
30 This argument, moreover, is not absent from Epiphanius’ text. Consider his remarks following a lengthy citation 
of Methodius on Origen’s fallacious theological opinions: “This is the selection of consecutive passages which I 
have made from Methodius, or Eubulius’, comments on Origen and the heresy which, with sophistical imposture, 
Origen puts forward in his treatise on resurrection. I believe that my quotation of these passages here will take 
care of his silly teachings, and refute this destruction of men’s hope for life with a malignant growth which has 
been taken from pagan superstition and plastered over. For many other things—surely even as many more—were 
also said in his follow-up of the subject by Methodius, a learned man and a hard fighter for the truth. But since I 
have promised to say a few things in its refutation about every sect—there are not a few of them—I am satisfied 
with quoting Methodius’ work [only] this far. And I, of my poverty, shall add a few more comments of my own on 
Origen’s nonsense and conclude the contest with him, awarding the prize to God who gives us the victory and, in 
his lovingkindness, adorns his church at all times…” (Pan.64.63.1-4 [Holl and Dummer, 2:500]). 
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genre, from the heresiologsts’ perspective, reinforces its comprehensive foundations. The 
tradition of heresiology is building itself and amassing its potency as it strives to foreclose the 
contours of its theological object. The culling of heresiological resources (and the “data” 
contained therein) simultaneously dichotomizes the heresies by transferring through textual 
exclusion (invalidity) or inclusion (legitimacy) only certain heresies into the vernacular and 
discourse of the Christian world. The persistent updating, both the casting aside and seeming 
resurrection, of the sources defines heretical legitimacy, even if the legacy of the heresies is 
expressly contained or entirely extinct. Later heresiology strives to compile an accurate 
record: to get the facts straight, as it were, by correct counting. The veracity of heresiology’s 
data reinforces the genre’s utility and authority as a traditional font of Christian learning.  
There is, however, one corollary to this corrective endeavor, which I alluded to in 
chapter four. As these texts race to know their objects, their authors are likewise mired in a 
quest in which they struggle to digest and apprehend the value of their endeavor, its 
feasibility, and the limits of their function as servants of Christ. In their position as pastoral 
caretakers, the heresiologists managed the information at their disposal with a dual mandate: 
reveal and restrict. Indeed, even as Epiphanius valiantly attempted to prove his dexterity with 
pronouncements about his diligent scholasticism, references to sources, and overflowing 
admiration for his heresiological predecessors, the fear of overexposing the heretics remained 
a looming concern. While heresiology served to protect its readers from the disease of heresy 
by means of identificatory and curative knowledge, the bishop of Salamis, like Hippolytus, 
Tertullian, and Theodoret, ensures his audience’s protection by consciously restricting the 
flow of heretical information: “and so as not to do more harm than good by making their 
proof-texts public, I am going to omit most of them—otherwise I would cite all their wicked 
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sayings and go through them here.”31 Having canvassed the heretical topography, the 
heresiologists fashioned their textual redactions as legitimate outgrowths of their authorial 
obligations. In distilling the heretics down to their essence and sparing their readers the most 
corruptive, blasphemous minutiae, the heresiologists provided their readers the instruments 
by which they could comprehend and combat the heretics without compromising their texts’ 
overarching efficacy.  
Maneuvers to restrict the reception of heretical knowledge signal a breach in 
totalization of heretical knowledge only at the level of text’s reception and absorption. And 
although certain knowledge about the heretics was withheld from readers, the knowledge 
itself was neither concealed nor unknown; it had been dutifully collected, processed, and 
interpreted by the heresiologists. When Theodoret revisits the findings of the first book of his 
Compendium, he frames his excisions as comported in a way that still serves his readers:  
What off-shoots the most bitter root of Simon sprouted forth and what 
destructive fruits these [heretics] produced, we clearly demonstrated in the first 
book, abbreviating the extent of the fables as far as it was possible, and being 
terrified to mention the greatest of [their] blasphemies, but indeed handing 
over to silence both the most impure and the most loathsome [matters] of 
[their] most polluted works. For we believed that we would offend our readers if 
we taught these things to the unlearned; for neither did the people who were 
completely enslaved to luxuries take the things dared by those heretics into 
their thoughts.32  
 
While Theodoret unrepentantly emphasizes the cautionary measures he has taken to restrict 
the most nefarious of heretical details, his editorial hand operates from a position of 
intellectual strength. 33 His excisions reflect the stages of the heresiological construction. 
                                                        
31 Epiphanius, Pan. 26.9.1 (Holl, 1:285). 
 
32 Theodoret, Haer. II, Prologue (Migne, 384A-B’ altered from Cope). 
 
33 During his discussion of Eunomius and Aetius, Theodoret omits a report of a certain heretical rite, which he 
describes as an abomination. It is sufficient, he informs his readers, to know that such an abomination exists, but 
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Although the preparatory labor of the investigative process is encyclopedic, its textual 
manifestation has been calculatingly delimited. In order to erect theological safeguards, 
Epiphanius and Theodoret had elected to curtail the scope of their treatises. Heresiological 
redaction was framed as a deliberative act of dutiful protection that preserved the vaunted 
rhetorical posturing of heresiological literature. The protective responsibility that 
necessitated the redaction of heresiology presumed the expertise and labor of its progenitors. 
Since the texts’ omissions were, in fact, commissions, the heresiologists’ reputation as tireless 
investigators remained fixed to the supposition that editing followed expertise. Paradoxically, 
totality—the quest to be exhaustive—necessitated brevity.34 If the whole world is to be 
surveyed, it must be condensed. The acknowledged limits of heresiology were a reflection of 
authorial judgment and choice. It was not lack of knowledge that defined down the scope of 
Theodoret’s inquiry, but a defensive inclination to maximize potency and minimize peril. 
Authorial excisions distill the difficulties of heresiological knowledge into a principled stand of 
intellectual legitimacy that sustains its comprehensive aspirations.  
 
Distilling Ethnography: Listing Heretics in Text 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to remain ignorant of its nature. “And they speak of another thing [which is] dared by them, which I do not dare 
to commit to writing. For it is enough that only the report of the abomination may defile the reason” (Haer IV.3 
[Migne, 420D]). 
 
34 The same logic undergirds Pliny’s balancing of obligations of totality with the practicalities of brevity. See Pliny, 
Natural History III.V.42, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 352 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1942), 32; XIV.1.1, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 370 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1945), 186; XXII.I.1, ed. and trans. W.H.S. Jones, Loeb Classical Library 392 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1951), 294; XXXIV.XVII.35-6, XIX.49, 52; XXXV.I.2, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Loeb 
Classical Library 394 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 154, 162-4, 164-6; 260; XXXVII.XII-XIV.50-
54, ed. and trans. D.E. Eichholz, Loeb Classical Library 419 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 200-
204 for the means by which excision concretizes mastery. For a thoughtful scholarly analysis on this very point, 
see Sorcha Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture: Art and Empire in the Natural History (New York: Oxford University 




The earliest treatises on the heretics, by Hippolytus, Irenaeus, and Tertullian, aimed 
their polemics principally against “Gnostic” formulations of cosmology and Christology and 
Marcionite hermeneutics and theology.35 In this first stage of heresiology’s development, 
authors stressed the principles of tradition and apostolicity as the measures of theological 
truth, ecclesiastical authority, and pedagogical legitimacy. As the heresiologists attacked their 
enemies they simultaneously propounded their own doctrines of ecclesiology, cosmology, 
anthropology, epistemology, and Christology; negative attacks conditioned positive 
theological reflection and elaboration.36 When Epiphanius composed his Panarion in the late 
fourth century, after nearly a century and a half of the genre’s general dormancy, the text’s 
discursive lens, while continuing to channel the heresiological language established by 
Irenaeus and Hippolytus, defined its inquiry of heresy through the language of medicine and a 
specificity scope; the Panarion’s rhetoric explicitly embraced the language of enumeration.37 
Because this second stage of heresiology reported a massive increase in the sheer volume of 
heresies, it began to produce lists. As catalogues of heretical names, the works of the later 
                                                        
35 See, for instance, David Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010); Gérard Vallée, A Study in Anti-Gnostic Polemic: Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Epiphanius 
(Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981), 1-62; Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 110-217; Michael A. Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a 
Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 54-212; Einar Thomassen, “Orthodoxy and Heresy 
in Second-Century Rome,” Harvard Theological Review 97.3 (2004): 241-256; Antti Marjanen and Petri Luomanen, 
eds., A Companion to Second-Century Christian “Heretics” (Boston: Brill, 2005); and Alain LeBoulluec, La notion d’hérésie 
dans la literature grecque IIe-IIIe siècles, 2 vol. (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985). 
 
36 This is most clearly illustrated in the Panarion’s concluding section, De Fide, a celebration of the Church as God’s 
one dove of Song of Songs and, more systematically, in the concluding section of Theodoret’s bipartite 
heresiological treatise, which explicitly casts an ordered knowledge of the heretics alongside a similarly ordered 
knowledge of orthodox opinion.  
 




heresiologists, Epiphanius, Philaster of Brescia, Augustine, and Theodoret signified a new 
rubric of circumscribed identification and exposition.38  
Brent Shaw summarizes the tactical and stylistic developments of later heresiology as 
signifying a move away from protracted investigation toward ease of identification: “Rather 
than the extensive and detailed theological treatise, therefore, it is the ‘heresy list’ that is the 
characteristic document of this second age…The lists were meant to provide quick ‘identity 
profiles’ by which interested believers could recognize any one of the variegated host of 
enemies that the orthodox faced.”39 In describing Augustine’s Book of Heresies (Liber de 
haeresibus) Shaw further emphasizes its lack of ingenuity. As an assemblage of sources—a work 
of editing rather than erudition—the text is, in Shaw’s estimation, “a turgid list that lacks the 
verve and genius of the author, and which betrays on every page that it is not much more than 
a re-canned work quickly put together from other existing sources.”40 Though we might 
temper Shaw’s general characterization of later heresiological, and Augustine in particular, his 
remarks do importantly foreground the development of heretical listing.41 But unlike Shaw, 
who associates the banality of heresiology with its practice of devising lists, I contend that the 
list as a form captures the centrality and paradox of heresiological exactitude and the rhetoric 
of containment. Augustine’s De Haeresibus is surely a list—or perhaps more accurately a 
                                                        
38 J. Rebecca Lyman, “Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in Elm, Rebillard, and Romano, 149-161, makes this point 
expressly. 
 
39 Brent Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in Vandals, Romans and Berbers, ed. A.H. Merrills  (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2004), 233.  
 
40 Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in A.H. Merrills, 238.  
 
41 However one judges the literary and intellectual qualities of heresiology’s “listing tradition” (Shaw, 239), it is 
important to consider—as Shaw does—the ways in which the list’s content was altered and modified. Shaw 
suggests that the form of the list—its literary clarity and adaptability—eased the reception of Augustine’s 
modifications (about the Circumcellions). That is, in hewing to the character of an externally produced genre 
(from Epiphanius, Philaster, and the Indiculus) Augustine can update the list without, so it seems, any sense of 




catalogue—and it falls within the tradition of the ancient handbook.42 At the same time, the 
move from ethnography to list—to condensation of ethnographic knowledge—does not 
simplify the task of the heresiologist; in point of fact, it magnifies the genre’s conceptual plan 
to map the whole of the heretical world. The desired finitude and exactitude of catalogues of 
the heretics—the so-called controlling force of textualized knowledge—entangles the 
heresiologists in the vicissitudes of a world whose very scope and shape render it a complex 
and elusive object of inquiry. As the investigation of the heretical world is forever evading the 
gaze of the heresiologists, the process of inventorying the heretics exposes the genre’s 
weakness. The heresiologists are enveloped by a world that demands unceasing attention, and 
yet that very attention—the ethnographic gaze of the heresiologists—forces these authors to 
reflect on the conceptual and practical impediments to the completion of their task.  
If writing can be “a locational sorting device,” lists commemorate, memorialize, 
enumerate, account, and order through classification.43 A list arranges peoples, things, or 
                                                        
42 On Greek and Roman handbooks, see William Harris Stahl, Roman Science: Origins, Development, and Influence to the 
Later Middle Ages (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962). See also idem, “The Systematic Handbook in 
Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages,” Latomus 23.2 (1964): 311-21; George A. Kennedy, “The Earliest Rhetorical 
Handbooks,” The American Journal of Philology 80.2 (1959): 169-178; Judith McClure, “Handbooks against Heresy in 
the West;” Stanley Wilcox, “The Scope of Early Rhetorical Handbooks,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 53 
(1942): 121-155; and Terry Papillon, “Isocrates’ techne and Rhetorical Pedagogy,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 25 
(1995): 149-163. 
 
43 Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 103-4. William 
Gass, “And,” in Voicelust: Eight Contemporary Fiction Writers on Style, ed. Allen Wier and Don Hendrie Jr. (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 101-125, describes three organizing principles of lists (while implying that 
there are still more he leaves untreated): (1) the natural organization of lists flows from the circumstances or 
memories of the moment (the police inventory of your pockets, for example); (2) external principles such as 
“numerically, alphabetically, astrologically, regimentally, hermeneutically” devised organization; (3) organization 
imposed by the material itself, such as a book’s table of contents or “when the library’s catalog shelves the books 
and commands their connection,” (117). For more on lists see the essays in Lucie Doležalová, ed, The Charm of the 
List: From the Sumerians to Computerised Data Processing (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009); 
Robert E. Belknap, The List: The Uses and Pleasures of Cataloguing (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Francis 
Spufford, Cabbages and Kings: The Chatto and Windus Books of Literary Lists (London: Catto and Windus, 1989), 1-23; 
and Stephen Barney, “Chaucer’s Lists,” in The Wisdom of Poetry: Essays in Early English Literature in Honor of Morton W. 
Bloomfield, ed. Larry Dean Benson and Siegfried Wenzel (Kalamazoo, MI: Western Michigan University Press, 1982), 




concepts by “defining a ‘semantic field,’ since it includes some items and excludes others.”44 
The list presents information through an organized system or principle, by which readers 
locate and retrieve data readily (the reference function) or grasp meaning through the fact of 
arrangement (a specific impression).45 The nonliterary list, governed by its utilitarian or 
pragmatic function, presents information in a practically ordered form. The literary list, which 
may contain “an inner logic of form” and leave it unexpressed, unfolds at the whims and 
imaginings of its authors.46 It induces us to speculate about its possible significance and 
hypothesize its organizing principle (it is less a search for specific knowledge than an 
opportunity to devise meaning and purpose).47 The literary list, unmoored from obligations of 
formalism, declared meaning, and exactitude, holds the potential to fashion and refashion 
                                                        
44 Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, 103. 
 
45 Belknap, The List, 3. Ivan M. Havel, “Time in Lists and Lists in Time,” in Doležalová, identifies six typical 
characteristics of lists: (1) artificiality (they are constructed); (2) significance (they hold meaning); (3) “the existence 
of a carrier” (its medium of transmission) (4) ordering; (5) dynamics (the features of adaptability), which includes 
six sub-types: insertion, deletion, modification, sorting, combining, and splitting; and (6) accessibility of its items 
based on enumeration or naming, content, or position (10).    
  
46 Lists were fostered, in Jack Goody’s analysis, by the economic, institutional (or bureaucratic) needs of the 
earliest literate societies. Scribal activities and literary exploration or “play,” pushed the governmental, 
cosmological, zoological, botanical, religious, and lexical usages of the form. The binarism originally proposed by 
Jack Goody and Ian Watt, “The Consequences of Literacy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 5.3 (1963): 304-
345 between alphabetic literacy, as embodied in ancient Greek civilization, and all other societies, both literate 
and not (later expanded and slightly modified in Goody’s The Domestication of the Savage Mind), posits that the 
advent of writing marks a radical cognitive change within social formations (and their institutional structures). 
Though Goody concedes that formalized tables and/or lists were not consequences solely of the social or cultural 
introduction of writing, he is nonetheless adamant that, “the shift from utterance to text led to significant 
developments of a sort that might be loosely referred to as a change in consciousness and which in part arose 
from the great extension of formal operations of a graphic kind” (Goody, Domestication, 75). Goody and his 
scholarly progeny have come under fierce criticism for perpetuating, it is claimed, a variant of the ethnocentric 
divide posited between primitive and civilized; that is, Goody and Watt’s binary of orality/literacy became, in the 
words of Masao Miyoshi, Off Center: Power and Culture Relations Between Japan and the Unites States (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994),  “a new shelter for ethnocentricity” (51). And while the presence of lists, in their 
administrative, lexical, and event capacity, may well speak to evolutions in writing, lists in the ancient world also 
evidence a deeply oral tradition. Perhaps the most famous ancient list is Homer’s catalogue of the ships in his 
Iliad. Without taking sides in questions about Homeric authorship and the poem’s redaction into a written text, 
the performative quality of the list remains potent and undeniable. See, now, Benjamin Sammons, The Art and 
Rhetoric of the Homeric Catalogue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
 
47 This fits within Belknap’s, The List, 18-20, observation about the power of the author who compiles her list. 




itself as it unfolds. The dual nature of the list, wherein it holds contents and the contents hold 
the list together, attenuates the fixity of the list by eliding form and function.48 Because “the 
list is simultaneously the sum of its parts and the individual parts themselves,”49 the 
association between terms imbues the list’s members with an additional meaning or legitimacy 
only the whole list can supply. 
The eighty-eight heresies of Augustine’s De Haeresibus exist as a measure of both 
distinction and unification, and their collapse into a single documents identifies the twin foci 
of the field of inquiry: “By accretion, the separate units cohere to fulfill some function as a 
combined whole, and by discontinuity the individuality of each unit is maintained as a 
particular instance, a particular attribute, a particular object or person.”50 The particularities 
of each sectarian group evidence the microscopic accretions of heresiological knowledge, 
while the structural edifice itself, born of collation and collection, defines the macroscopic 
field of inquiry: the fashioning of an ordered world of Christianity. Writing in his The Order of 
Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Michel Foucault describes the historical process of 
“a general science of order” (mathesis) an “arrangement of identities and differences into 
ordered tables” (taxanomiaI).51 The configuration of knowledge developed its own scientific 
discourse, which questions not only “the origin of knowledge” but its very power to 
                                                        
48 If a list is, as Francis Spufford, Cabbages and Kings, has suggested, “only a name for something completely 
determined by what is put in it, like a paragraph,” form follows content (7). And yet, in organizing and defining 
categories and classes of information, the function of a list is expressly bound to its blurring of its textual form 
and textual content. I would argue that there is a false dichotomy, then, between the form and function of the list.  
 
49 Belknap, The List, 15. 
 
50 Belknap, The List, 15. 
 
51 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 71- 72. 




systematize the natural world:52 “the sciences always carry within themselves the project, 
however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world; they are always directed, 
too, towards the discovery of simple elements and their progressive combination; and at their 
centre they form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a system contemporary with 
itself.”53  The plan to organize in texts the heresies of the world assumes the language of 
scientific exactitude, constructed by a professional class. If, as Belknap has phrased it, “the list 
form is the predominant mode of organizing data relevant to human functioning in the 
world,” Augustine’s determination to list the heretics bespeaks an effort to manage the 
content of Christianity’s world;54 it is a text that aspires to aid and orient the Christian self 
within a world of enemies and temptations. To the extent that the augmentative adaptability 
of listing governs the general structure of later iterations of heresiological literature, it 
complements the genre’s persistent claims of ever-improving comprehension. The history of 
heresiology evidences the compositional process by which the genre’s authors refined and 
expanded its polemical trajectory. Textual additions and subtractions hold the capacity not 
only to solidify a list’s utilitarian force by expanding its inventory, but also to destabilize its 
                                                        
52 Foucault, The Order of Things, 73. 
 
53 Foucault, 71-76, at 74. While his analysis traces the discontinuity of thought between intellectual cultures of the 
16th and 17th centuries, Foucault’s analysis points toward the natural inclination toward the organization of 
knowledge. His description of a rigorous scientific project of rethinking knowledge and in precise mathematical 
and philosophical terms, points to a universal method of analysis (56-57). When he writes that, “taxonomia…treats 
of identities and differences; it is the science of articulations and classifications; it is the knowledge of 
beings…taxanomia establishes the table of visible differences” (74), he signals, I think, the broader, and less 
historically contingent, production of sciences of organization. In the Classical Age, they take on a schematized 
hew of tabulation and calculation, while in earlier cultural moments theories of temporality, ethnogenesis, and 
mythography provide the same structures of naturalized order.   
  
54 Belknap, The List, 8. The stages by which the list is conceived, constructed, and honed reflect the stakes and 
possibilities attending the ordered transmission of knowledge. But even as the pragmatic list signals its 
potentiality to expand by incorporating and accumulating additional content, it denotes its purview by editing 
and excising. But as the list fluctuates between the obligations of its content and the capaciousness of its form, it 




comprehension by emphasizing its inconstancy and adaptability; incompletion undercuts 
authority.55 However much the rhetoric of a progressive “scientific” truth—the expression of 
heresiology’s methodical enhancement—attempts to foreclose a field of knowledge, the push 
toward a textual conclusion, as the inter-textual workings of heresiology so aptly signal, 
discloses the partial accumulations and ruptures within the author’s presentation of 
                                                        
55 See János M. Bak, “Lists in the Service of Legitimation in Central European Sources,” in Doležalová, 34-45. One 
particular function of the list, the attestation of inheritance and transmission, is predicated upon the precision of 
the agents or terms of its succession.55 Chains of tradition, biological lineages, and genealogies of knowledge may 
possess and present degrees of mutability, and therein lies their danger. They are susceptibility to manipulation 
even if their terms are impossible to alter. Indeed, precisely because biological and political successions carry 
such immense ideological, theological, and political opportunity and potential, they emerge as sites of immense 
complication, contestation, and inexactitude. On political effects of the list, see Kenneth Sisam, “Anglo-Saxon 
Royal Genealogies,” Proceedings of the British Academy 39 (1953): 287-348. The problematic nature of listing—the 
ability to introduce error—is explicitly considered by Epiphanius at the outset of the Panarion. As a precursor to 
the full-fledged enumeration of the Christian heresies, Epiphanius comments in the second Proem of his Panarion 
on the requisite exactitude of a particular list. In the midst of his presentation of the age of Judaism in the 
Panarion, Epiphanius acclaims the correction of a mistake within a genealogical list. His readers, he reflects, “must 
feel relieved at once, at having regained the wording which, because of an ambiguity, certain ignorant persons 
have removed from the text with the intent of improving it” (Pan. 8.8.1 [Holl, 1:194]). In his elaboration of the 
Jewish sect (before detailing its seven individual groupings), Epiphanius narrates a condensed biblical history of 
the Jews: he explains their origin, the united monarchy under David and Solomon, the separation between Judah 
and Israel, the exile into Babylon, and the return under Ezra. He digresses, however, in his list of the Jewish kings 
to address and dispel a genealogical error, one that upends the infallibility to scripture. In fact, the error of one 
list—the succession of the kings of Judah and Israel—triggers the more damaging error a second list, the 
genealogy of Christ (Pan. 8.7.7-10 [Holl, 1:193-4]). When Epiphanius resumes his treatment of Judaism, after he 
interrupted his initial discussion with a discussion of the Hellenistic philosophies, the Israel’s genealogy picks up 
with Nashon, whose descendants are tracked down to Rehoboam, David’s grandson. The ensuing narrative—a 
greatest hits of Israel’s biblical history—offers another list: a catalogue of the twenty seven (counted as twenty 
two) books of Scripture (Pan. 8.6.1-4 [Holl, 194-5]). The generations up until Christ, as enumerated by the 
evangelist Matthew, follow three divisions of fourteen: from Abraham to David, David until the captivity, and 
from the captivity until Christ (Matthew 1:1-17; Epiphanius, Pan. 8.8.2 [Holl, 1:194]). Epiphanius fears that a 
deviation from this tripartite division against the text of Matthew functions to enervate the infallibility of 
scripture. The two generations of Jeconiah, which Epiphanius places in the third sequence (he ends the second 
and begins the third for Matthew), have been inexactly collapsed into one (Epiphanius, Pan. 8.8.2-3 [Holl, 1:194-5]): 
“By removing the one name as though for scholarship’s sake (ὡς κατὰ φιλοκαλίαν) certain persons ignorantly 
made the promise (which is implied in the text) come short of its purpose with regard to the total of the fourteen 
names, and destroyed the regularity of the arrangement (καὶ τὸ πολύπειρον τῆς σχέσεως ἠφάνισαν; Epiphanius, 
Pan. 8.8.4 [Holl, 1:195]).” As the precise and rightful sequence of Christ’s genealogical list reasserts an imperative 
theological contention, Epiphanius’ corrective actually embellishes as quashes the problematic flexibility of the 
list. In trying, however, to concretize the list’s successive lineage by parsing and fixing an ambiguity of Scripture, 
the language of scholastic investigation, properly executed by the hands of the bishop, ultimately ensures the 




comprehensive knowledge.56 To try and order knowledge of the heretics is, as Augustine 
discovers, to trace an illusion of infinite varieties.    
In late 427, Quodvultdeus, a deacon at Carthage and later the city’s bishop, wrote 
Augustine, requesting his pedagogical guidance.57 The deacon inquired if the bishop of Hippo 
might compose a treatise that instructs “both the learned and the uneducated, for those with 
leisure and for those who are busy,” how to function in a world overrun by heresy:58 
I, therefore, beseech Your Goodness to deign to explain, from the time that the 
Christian religion received the name of the heritage it promised, what heresies 
existed and now exist, what errors they introduced and now introduce, what 
they have held and now hold in opposition to the Catholic Church concerning 
the faith, the Trinity, baptism, penance, Christ as man, Christ as God, the 
resurrection, the Old and New Testaments, and absolutely every point on which 
they disagree with the truth.59 
                                                        
56 This, of course, is the opposite effect of the famous problem/condemnation of writing and memory as described 
by Plato (via Socrates) in the Phaedrus 274b-279c, ed. and trans. Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library 36 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), 560-579. 
 
57 Qudovultdeus is a somewhat enigmatic figure. The summary from Thomas Macy Finn, trans., Quodvultdeus of 
Carthage: The Creedal Homilies (New York: Newman Press, 2004), 1-3, illustrates the rather meager knowledge about 
him. On the problems of his identity and, more complexly, his scholarly output, see the introduction from René 
Braun, Livre des promesses det des prédictions de Dieu, Sources Chrétiennes 101 (Paris: Les Éditions Du Cerf, 1964), 10-
113. His works are collected in Opera Quodvultdeo Carthaginiensi Episcopo tribute, ed. R. Braun, CCSL 60 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1976) and in Livres des promesses et des prédictions de Dieu, ed. R. Braun, SC 101-102 (Paris: Les Éditions Du 
Cerf, 1964). See also the introduction of Daniel Van Slyke, Quodvultdeus of Carthage: The Apocalyptic Theology of a 
Roman African in Exile (Strathfield, New South Wales: St. Paul’s Publications, 2003). Victor Vitensis reports in his 
fifth-century work, The History of the Vandal Persecution, that Quodvultdeus was the bishop of the city of Carthage. 
On the invasion and Quodvultdeus, see J.H. Humphrey, “Vandal and Byzantine Carthage: Some New Archaelogical 
Evidence,” in New Light on Ancient Carthage, ed. John Griffiths Pedley (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1980), 85-120. 
 
58 Quodvultdeus, Epistula 221.3.42-43 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 274). Augustine’s role as respondent and/or 
teacher in his dialogues with fellow Christian (via letter writing and textual attack/defense) has received 
significant treatment from scholars. The degree to which Augustine’s correspondences and relationships with his 
interlocutors should be described as fiercely dogmatic or more conciliatory remains hotly contest: see Karl-
Heinrich Lütcke, Auctoritas bei Augustin (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1968); Catherine Conybeare, “Spaces between 
Letters: Augustine’s Correspondence with Women,” in Voices in Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle Ages, ed. 
Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 55–72; Mark 
Vessey, “Women of Letters? Response to Catherine Conybeare,” in Olson and Kerby-Fulton, 73–96; Gillian Clark, 
“Can We Talk? Augustine and the Possibility of Dialogue” in The End of Dialogue in Antiquity, ed. Simon Goldhill 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 117–34; and Jennifer Ebbeler, Disciplining Christians: Correction and 
Community in Augustine’s Letters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
 





The shift toward listing in the second stage of heresiological literature emanates from the 
desire to impose order upon an unruly, chaotic field of inquiry; the move seeks to naturalize 
the scope and contents of this evolving branch of learning.60 Conceding that the task has been 
undertaken previously, by Augustine himself no less, Quodvultdeus stipulated a particular 
point of differentiation: “I ask that you briefly, succinctly, and summarily set forth the 
opinions of each heresy and add what the Catholic Church holds in opposition to them, in a 
single handbook, as it were, drawn from all of them, to the extent that it suffices for 
instruction.”61 Those seeking fuller answers could scour “the extensive and magnificent 
volumes” of Augustine and the other heresiologists;62 above all else, it was brevity that the 
deacon desired.  
While Quodvultdeus impressed his correspondent by revealing “that [his] brilliant 
mind both thirsts for the truth about so many things and insists upon brevity out of fear of a 
surfeit,”63 Augustine initially protested, proposing instead that Quodvultdeus consult the work 
of Philaster of Brescia or undertake a Latin translation of Epiphanius’ treatise.64 And while 
Quodvultdeus acknowledged that the works of Philaster and Epiphanius had “escaped [his] 
notice,” he refused to withdraw his request.65 He pointedly suggests Augustine that the works 
                                                        
60 Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 62-63, 
186-191; Foucault, The Order of Things, 50-58, 125-162. The latter section on classifying investigates the structures 
of knowledge in the Classical episteme (17th C.), wherein observation (as the most essential of the senses) 
functions, with certain limitations, as the domain of natural history.  
 
61 Quodvultdeus, Epistula 221.3.34-38 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 274). On handbooks of heresy see J. McClure, 
“Handbooks Against Heresy in the West, from the Late Fourth to the Late Sixth Centuries.” 
 
62 Quodvultdeus, Epistula 221.3.40 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 274). 
 
63 Augustine, De Haeresibus Praefatio 4.47-49 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 287). 
 
64 Augustine, Epistula 222 2.8-32 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 276-7). 
 
65 Quodvultdeus, Epistula 223.2.17 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 278. 
  
259 
of Epiphanius and Philaster would fail the test of brevity, and he further conjectured that each 
of them had suffered from an insufficiently expansive scope and a deficiency of persistence: “I 
still do not think that they have observed such care and diligence that they added responses 
and included the practices contrary to each and every opinion.”66 In arguing that the previous 
generation of heresiologists had failed to assiduously array the total output of the heresies, 
Quodvultdeus pressed Augustine to become the genre’s foremost expert and ply his intellect to 
produce an exhaustive report. The need to protect the feeble from the onslaught of the 
heresies, so it seems, ultimately persuaded Augustine to undertake the task requested of him.67 
For, as he admitted, “we cannot, after all, abandon such people in their troubles, for they are 
not only our tenants, but—what is more—our brothers and come under our care in the love of 
Christ.”68  
Acutely aware of the heresiological resources at his disposal, having suggested some to 
his interlocutor, Augustine composed his De haeresibus in consultation with four heresiological 
sources: the condensed summation of Epiphanius’ Panarion, the Anacephalaeoses or 
Recapitulations (now thought to belong to the pen of a different author, called Pseudo-
Epiphanius69); Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History; Philaster of Brescia’s The Book of Diverse Heresies 
(Diversarum haeresion liber); and, most likely, Pseudo-Jerome’s Catalogue of Heresies (Indiculus de 
                                                        
66 Quodvultdeus, Epistula 223.2.18-21 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 278-9).  
 
67 The threat is aptly summarized in James J. O’Donnell’s essay, “The Authority of Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 
22 (1991): 7-35: “One need only read Augustine’s De Haeresibus, the catalogue he compiled late in life (based on a 
Greek source) (sic) of all the heresies known to him to get a sense of how fragile and threatened was his sense of 
church unity: so many ways to go wrong, such fine points leading to such disastrous error” (26 n.7). 
 
68 Augustine, Epistula 224.3.41-44 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 281). His death in 430 would prevent him from 
completing the second part of his heresiological project: a discussion of what makes one a heretic. He gestures at 
this plan toward the end of the preface of De haeresibus: “The first part of this work will be about the heresies 
which arose against the teaching of Christ after his coming and ascension, insofar as we could get knowledge of 
them. But in the second part there will be a discussion of what makes one a heretic” (Praefatio 7.108-113).  
 




haeresibus).70 He openly admitted and discussed his reliance upon three of these works, 
mentioning Epiphanius by name on twenty-six occasions, Philaster on nine, and Eusebius on 
four.71 At times mimicking his textual antecedents and at times correcting or supplementing 
their presentation, Augustine dutifully enumerated eighty-eight heresies.72 Although 
Epiphanius’ heresiology supplied nearly sixty-five percent of the data for Augustine’s treatise, 
the Panarion was not an immutable precedent; it was subject to augmentation, 
supplementation, wholesale rejection, and reinterpretation: 
In listing (in commemorandis) the heretics, I have not followed his manner, but 
his order, for I have from other sources added some things that he did not have, 
and I have omitted some things that he did have. Hence, I have explained some 
                                                        
70 He knows Rufinus’ Latin translation of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History and the two additional books Rufinus 
composed about later eras (down to 395): De Haeresibus 83.19-21 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 337). See the 
“Introduction,” in Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle and Ronald J. Teske (Brooklyn: New City Press, 
1995), 17. Despite what Augustine acknowledges in his Confessions (Augustine, Confessiones I.XIV.23.1-11 in  
[Confessionum Libri XII, ed. Martin Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 [Brepols: Turnhout, 1990]], 12-13), his 
Greek seems to have been sufficiently dexterous to enable him to consult what he thought was Epiphanius’ 
Panarion, but was, in fact, simply the summarization or recapitulations of each book. As Bonner notes, however, St. 
Augustine of Hippo: “it must however be admitted that Augustine’s translation is a very laboured and literal one, 
the work of the man who relies much on the dictionary, rather than one to whom the original language is a living 
reality (395). On Augustine’s general ignorance of Greek authors (in their original language), see Josef Lössl, 
“Augustine in Byzantium,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 51 (2000): 267-295. In certain occasions, he simply 
translated these Anacephalaeosis into Latin and added it to his treatise (De Haeresibus XLII and XLIII [Vander Plaetse 
and Beukers, -311]). On the question of Pseudo-Jerome, see Teske’s “Introduction,” in Rotelle, n.22 and G. Bardy, 
“L’Indiculus de haeresibus du pseudo-Jérôme,” Revue des sciences religieuses 19 (1929): 385-405. For the dating of the 
Indiculus de Haeresibus see also Brent D. Shaw, “Bad Boys: Circumcellions and Fictive Violence,” in H.A. Drake, 182 
n9. The text of the Indiculus is found in Patrologiae Latinae Tomus 81, ed. J.P. Migne, 636-644. It is also worth 
nothing that Augustine displays familiarity with the works of Irenaeus of Lyons in his treatise Against Julian, an 
Unfinished Work (at 4.72 and 4.73). For the Latin text, see PL 44:641-874 at 774, 775. For an English translation, see 
Augustine, Against Julian, trans. Matthew A. Schumacher, Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, vol. 35 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1957).  
 
71 For more on Augustine and his sources see G. Bardy, “Le ‘De haeresibus’ et ses sources,” 397–416. On Augustine’s 
relationship to his Christian predecessors, more broadly (that is, beyond De haeresibus in particular), see the 
survey of Mark Edwards, “Augustine and His Christian Predecessors,” in A Companion to Augustine, ed. Mark Vessey 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2012), 215-226 and Antoon A.R. Bastiaensen, “Augustin et ses predecesseurs latins 
chretiens,” in Augustiniana traiectina: Comunications présentées au Colloque international d’Utrecht, ed. Jan den Boeft 
and Johannes van Oort (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987), 25–57. 
 
72 Chapters 1-57 of De Haeresibus are largely dependent upon the Anacephalaeosis (chapters 42 and 43 are exact 
translations), though other sources are plied for additional information. Chapters 58-80 are heresies found in 
Philaster’s work. His total of eighty-eight is eight more than Epiphanius’ total and sixty-eight less than Philaster, 
who lists twenty-eight heresies before Christ and one hundred-twenty-eight after. On Augustine, citation, 




points more fully than he, and I have also explained others more briefly, and in 
some cases I kept to the same brevity governing everything according to the 
demands of the plan I had in mind.73 
 
With his ambition to supersede Epiphanius’ textual constraints—“for, you will see how much 
the work produced by the above-mentioned bishop falls short in comparison to the work you 
want me to produce”—Augustine, parroting Quodvultdeus’ registered dissatisfaction, 
rationalized his editorial alterations as textual enhancements.74 Having “incorporate[ed] fifty-
seven [heresies] from Epiphanius’ work into my own” and twenty-three from Philaster, 
Augustine proffered eight additions of his own: Luciferians, 75 Jovinianists,76 Arabian heretics,77 
Helvidians,78 Paternians,79 Tertullianists, Abeloim, and Pelagians.80 Augustine’s streamlining of 
                                                        
73 Augustine, De Haeresibus 57.21-26 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 326). The parallel notion of Augustinian 
authority is important, as chronicled by Robert B. Eno, “Doctrinal Authority in Saint Augustine,” Augustinian 
Studies12 (1981): 133–72 and Mark Vessey, “Opus imperfectum: Augustine and his readers, 426–435 A.D.,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 52 (1998): 264–85. 
 
74 Augustine, De Haeresibus Praefatio 6.91-93 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 288). Augustine shelves Epiphanius’ 
twenty pre-Christian heresies, considering only the sixty of the Christian era. He excludes three sects, the 
Lucianists (number twenty-three), the Marcellians (number fifty-two), and the Colydrians (number seventy-nine), 
which Epiphanius had explained. In addition to three outright omissions, Augustine differentiates and combines 
two other heretical clans. He combines the Tatians and Encratites (despite the fact that though Epiphanius 
“call[ed] the Encratites schismatics from Tatian”) into one heresy, insisting, instead, that the Tatians “are also 
called Encratites” (De Haresibus 25.1, 8-9 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 301]). He also differentiates the Artotyrites 
from the Pepuzians. From Philaster, Augustine adds twenty-three sects to his editions of Epiphanius, which, at 
that point in De Haeresibus, gave him a running total of eighty. 
 
75 Augustine’s knowledge of the Luciferians, he tells us, comes from “a certain author, whose work does not bear 
his name” (De Haeresibus 81.4-5, [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 336]). The subsequent citation about the 
inheritance and nature of the soul corresponds exactly to the words of the Indiculus de haeresbius 38 (Migne, 642), 
now ascribed to Pseudo-Jerome. Owing to the exactitude of the citation, Bardy, “Le ‘De haeresibus’ et ses sources,” 
408-411, argued that Augustine consulted and cited the Indiculus itself. Given the lack of affirmative evidence, 
Müller, The De Haeresibus of Saint Augustine, 28, posited that Augustine and the Indiculus could well have shared the 
same source. Firm attestation, he insists, is impossible to prove.  
 
76 While Augustine reports that he gleaned knowledge of the Jovinianists in the same anonymous author of De 
Haeresibus 81 (see the parallel at Indiculus 35 (Migne, 641) he tells us that, unlike the Luciferians of whom he 
appears to have been wholly ignorant, he already possessed knowledge of the Jovinianists (quos iam noueram; De 
Haeresibus 82.16-17, [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 337]).  
 
77 Knowledge of the Arabian heretics comes from Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History VI.XXXVII, ed. and trans. Jeffrey 
Henderson, Loeb Classical Library 265 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 90.  
 
78 His knowledge of Helvidus, the followers of whom were called Antidicomarties, came, so it seems, from Jerome’s 
work, Adversus Helvidium de Mariae virginitate perpetua (PL 23, ed. J.P. Migne, 193-216). The name caused some 
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the genre’s form—to maximize its utility—consolidates all the divergences in the source 
material into an authoritative whole of his own creation. 
Augustine’s text attests the transformative process by which various full-fledged 
ethnographies have been condensed into an expressly useful guidebook. This codification of a 
heretical catalogue de-emphasizes the generative and organizational structure of 
ethnographic theorization and, instead, hones in on the microscopic data of heretical being. 
Writing about ancient Jewish identity—as measured by appearance and name—in the Greco-
Roman world, Shaye Cohen asked in his The Beginnings of Jewishness, “how, then, did you know a 
Jew in antiquity when you saw one?”81 While Cohen insisted on the impossibility of Jewish 
identification in the ancient world (based on phenomenological factors), we might do well to 
think of Augustine’s De Haeresibus as an attempt to render the heretics known by virtue of the 
senses: how, then, did you know a heretic in antiquity when you saw or heard one? While 
many of Augustine’s designated heretics are distinguished by opinion—cosmological,82 
theodicean,83 Christological,84 Trinitarian,85 angelologic,86 demonologic,87 etc.—the heretics are 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
confusion for Augustine since Epiphanius identified a sect of the Antidicomarites at Pan. 78.1.3 (Holl and Dummer, 
3:452) though, as Augustine noted, the Panarion did not mention their association with Helvidus. Augustine 
appears to have combined the two acunts of the Antidicomarites, Epiphanius’ earlier group and Jerome’s later 
sect (only the latter of which were the followers of Helvidus). On the specifics of the problem see, G. Bardy, “Le ‘De 
haeresibus’ et ses sources,” 411 and Teske, “Introduction,” in Rotelle, 19, 23 n29, 76 n218, 219.  
 
79 On the possible sources of the Paternians, see Augustine’s Answer to Julian V.7.26, which quotes Julian of Eclanum 
on the Paternians. See Mathijs Lamberigts, “A Short Note on the Paterniani,” Révue des Études Augustiniennes 31 
(1985): 270-4. 
 
80 When describing the Abeloim and Pelagians, Augustine mentions the fact that the former reside “in our 
countryside,” while the latter “began in our time;” Augustine, De Haeresibus 87.26-29; 88.1.1-4 (Vander Plaetse and 
Beukers, 339, 340).  
 
81 Shaye J.D. Cohen, Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, and Uncertainties (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001), 67. 
 
82 On Cosmology: De Haeresibus 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 11; 13; 15; 19; 20; 77 (existence of innumerable worlds). 
 




distilled into observable customs and habits. Among the descriptive markers Augustine 
ascribed to the heretics were alimentary matters,88 sexual behavior and marriage,89 dress (or 
lack thereof),90 attitude towards women,91 idolatry,92 the Jewish Law,93 ritualistic conduct, 94 and 
bodily practices.95 The unnamed sixty-eighth heresy, for instance, consists of those “who 
always walk with bare feet,” following strictly God’s diktat at Exodus 3:5.96 The Valesians 
(number thirty-seven) “castrate themselves and their guests,” while the Cataphrygians and 
Pepuzians (twenty-six and twenty-seven, respectively) “are reported to have gruesome 
sacraments (sacramenta funesta), for they are said to confect their eucharist from the blood of a 
year-old infant while they squeeze from tiny punctures all over its body; they mix it with 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
84 On Christology: De Haeresibus 8; 10; 14; 21; 49; 51; 52; 60; 80. 
 
85 On the Trinity: De Haeresibus 36; 46.16; 49; 52; 54; 74. 
 
86 On Angels: De Haeresibus 8; 39. 
 
87 On Demons: De Haeresibus 24; 85. 
 
88 On Food: De Haeresibus 5; 24; 27 (baby blood bread); 28 (also blood bread); 46.5-6, 9; 53; 62; 64; 70.2 (shuns meat as 
unclean); 71 (refuse to eat with outsiders); 75 (water not made by God); 82 (fasting and abstinence from certain 
foods is of no benefit). Francesca Tasca, “‘Ecce Panis Haereticorum:’ Augustinianum 50.1, 251-3, suggests that 
dietary practices and rituals can reveal religious and referential universes. Diet, in other words, can illuminate 
any entire sectarian theorization of the world and the human place within it.  
 
89 On Marriage and Sex: De Haeresibus 1; 5; 25; 26; 38 (no second marriages); 49 (rejection of marriage); 46.13; 47; 82 
(no value in marriage); 87 (no intercourse with wives; adoption of children). 
 
90 On Dress: De Haeresibus 31(naked); 58 (walks with bare feet). 
 
91 On Women: De Haeresibus 27; 56; 84(hostile to the virginity of Mary).  
 
92 On Idolatry: De Haeresibus 1; 7.  
 
93 On the Jewish Law (relationship to, both positive and negative): De Haeresibus 7; 8; 9; 10; 18; 21. 
 
94 On Rituals: De Haeresibus 16; 17; 26; 27 (make bread from blood of infant); 28 (sacrificial offerings of bread and 
cheese); 38 (purity); 46.9, 17; 53; 57; 64; 69.5.  
 
95 On Bodily Practices: De Haeresibus 37 (castration); 42 (do unspeakable things to their bodies); 69.4 
(circumcellions). 
 




wheat and make bread from it” (miscentes eum farinae, panemque inde facientes).97 The “truth” of 
these pronouncements is less interesting to me than their articulation as the (outré) traits, par 
excellence, of the heretics. In moving away from the tomes of Epiphanius and Philaster and 
embracing the structure of the abbreviated Anacephalaeoses, Augustine ventures to define the 
heretics by means of a distinguishing opinion and/or practice. And although the heretics, like 
the Jews of the second Temple Period, may well have blended seamlessly into their environs, 
Augustine at least sought to make the task of identification less difficult. He supplied 
Quodvultdeus with a refined ethnographic handbook. The seemingly panoptic knowledge of 
Augustine was now the province of yearning Christian minds.  
Paring down the heretics into essentials—to distill groups or movements into singular 
ideas or habits—was no mindless or artless task. In agreeing to undertake Quodvultdeus’ 
request to produce a streamlined heresiological handbook, Augustine reflects on the difficulty 
of abridgment, not the difficulty of the overarching subject: at the outset of the project, it is 
form and not content that concerns the bishop. He asks himself, “whether I ought now to 
begin this work and send you a part of it so that you might see that its difficulty is greater in 
proportion to the brevity with which you want me to carry it out.”98 Augustine’s acquiescence 
reflects, I would argue, his own scholastic and pastoral determination. He undertakes the task 
both because it was asked of him and, more importantly, because he could do it to a degree as 
of yet unseen. That is, as he firmly declared of his investigation, “I want even more” (quanto 
magis quod ego).99 But in wanting more—in attacking, as it were, the domain of the heretics—
Augustine would come to a very different realization: it was content as much as form that 
                                                        
97 Augustine, De Haeresibus 37; 26.11-15 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 306, 302). 
 
98 Augustine, Epistula 224.1.5-7 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 280). 
 
99 Augustine, De Haeresibus Praefatio 6.93 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 288). 
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entangled his heresiological ambition. In the process of constructing this polemical list, 
Augustine acknowledges his specialized knowledge of the circumstances, practices, and 
opinions of the heretics, while he also concedes his restricted perception of the heretical 
world. His desire for comprehension was undercut by his incapacities as an author, which 
could not circumvent his limitations as a mere human.  
 
Writing and Traversing Heresy: The Limits of Knowledge and Experience 
 
Augustine’s valedictory remarks in De Haeresibus depict a man pondering the 
epistemological conditions, both as a matter of process and result, governing his attempt to 
write about the heretics in a systematic manner. While Augustine had expressed some 
hesitations during his exchange with Quodvultdeus, he seized his closing remarks of the 
treatise both to ponder and concede the multifaceted limitations of the heresiologists’ 
knowledge of the world he so tireless had mined.100 He knows or, perhaps more accurately, he 
discovers in the very process of writing the constraints of his work as an armchair 
ethnographer. He is, I shall argue, confronting the ethnographer’s tenuous understanding of 
the world and peoples he studies. Like ethnographers who examined their authorial hand in 
producing their ethnographies, Augustine interrogated his active and passive participation in 
perpetuating the ethnographic traditio haereticorum.101 He articulated his knowledge of the 
                                                        
100 For a fairly comprehensive treatment of Augustine’s theory of linguistic (or verbal) epistemology see Marcia L. 
Colish, The Mirror of Language: A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
1983), 7-54. Colish argues that Augustine theorizes that the revealed wisdom of Christ enables humankind to 
possess a redeemed speech: “the key to the linguistic epistemology which he posits is Christ, whom he sees as the 
verbal and actual reconciliation of God and man” (25).  
 
101 By contemporary ethnographic examination (or more accurately, self-examination) I mean the process by 
which anthropologists and sociologists, in reaction, perhaps, to the post-modern turn, reflected upon their own, 
irreversible ideological interpretation of fieldwork and research. Unlike, earlier anthropologists of the late 
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heretics in both positive and negative terms. On the one hand, there was a real, tangible, 
articulable knowledge of heresy: the eighty-eight heresies have customs, habits, and opinions 
that could be and were described in writing. Like Hippolytus, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Philaster, 
and Epiphanius before him, Augustine knew the heretics via the writings of his fellow 
Christians and from his own experience.102 To write heresiology was to merge scholastic 
knowledge with phenomenological and experiential familiarity. On the other hand, scholastic 
lacunae gestured at the more unsettling problem of brining heresy and his heresiology to a 
close. This unknowable aspect of the heretics necessitated explanation. Augustine, as I see it, 
offers three rationalizations to account for this epistemological chasm. The first, I have already 
discussed briefly, namely the problem of inter-textual collection, comparison, and archiving. 
Second, there was the conceptual problem of abundant and persistent heretical 
metamorphosis, which disrupted a neat binary between types of articulable knowledge. And 
third, Augustine’s authorial position erected a fundamental distance between himself as 
ethnographer and his object of study.  
The exchange between Quodvultdeus and Augustine framed De Haeresibus as a text of 
explicitly utilitarian orientation. An occasion for Augustine to unveil his investigative mettle, 
his text, as I have argued above, transformed heresiological dissonance into a uniform, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century, who claimed simply to report the facts about a given peoples and 
place, recent ethnographers have apprehended (if not abandoned) the fallacious dangers embedded in such 
claims. Writing an ethnography was neither a passive nor dispassionate activity: it was invariably marked by the 
style, voice, biases, and interests of its author. The most prominent examples of this newfound discourse include: 
James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986); Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. 30th Anniversary ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985); George E. Marcus and Dick Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts,” Annual Review 
of Anthropology 11 (1982): 25-89; and Jonathan Boyarin, ed., The Ethnography of Reading (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992). 
 
102 I shall return to the issue of Augustine’s personal involvement with the Manicheans as well as his ecclesiastical 
and theological dealings with Donatus and Pelagius.  
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compendious, and comprehensive handbook. In combing through various resources to capture 
the fullest portrait of heretical plurality, he jettisoned some findings, refined others, and 
ignored still more. But editing, collating, and collecting could only supply Augustine a partial 
knowledge:    
You see how many heresies we have mentioned, and we still have not fulfilled 
your request. How could I mention all ‘the heresies which have arisen,’ to use 
your words, ‘from the time the Christian religion received the name of the 
inheritance promised it,’ since I could not get knowledge of all of them (qui 
omnes nosse non potui)? I think that the reason is that no one of those whose 
writings I have read has recorded them all. At times I found in one author 
heresies that I did not find in another. I have listed more than they did, because 
I have gathered heresies from all of them, though I did not find all of them in 
each author. Moreover, I added those which I myself recall, but could not find in 
any of those authors. Hence, I am right in believing that I could not record all 
the heresies, both because I do not see that any of them whom I have read have 
recorded them all.103 
 
Complete knowledge of the heretics nonetheless leaves the extreme difficulty, as Epiphanius 
discussed previously and Augustine reflects upon here, of transferring his knowledge into 
textual form: “who can fail to see the amount of work and the number of books this request 
would demand?”104 Incorporating the works of his predecessors, Philaster, Epiphanius, and 
Eusebius into his authoritative account only exacerbates his failure to include every relevant 
text.105 As Augustine goes on to explain, “I have heard that the saintly Jerome has written 
                                                        
103 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 1.1-14 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343). 
 
104 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.43-44 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344). 
 
105 Augustine similarly tries to transfer the manifest shortcomings of his heresiological handbook to the heretics, 
whose failure to comprehend their own divergences and abundance of error seemingly acquits Augustine’s 
failure: “those who compose empty tales that are long and complicated, are so full of many false teachings that 
they themselves could not count them or could do so only with great difficulty” (De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.38-41 
[Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344]). The deflection of culpability, however, is left unelaborated, even if it 
implicitly distinguishes institutions of singularity from modes of multiplicity.105 For Augustine, the heretics’ 
inability to keep track of their own errors and numbers renders them inscrutable to outsider assessment. How, 
Augustine essentially asks, could I know them in all their multiplicity, if they fail to know their own variety! The 
observation, perhaps, frees him from the burden of comprehension; for when the contours of heresy are beyond 




something on heresies, but we could not find his work in our library and we do not know 
where to get it.”106 But even if Quodvulteus were to discover Jerome’s work on this trickiest of 
topics (a text, it seems, that was unknown to Augustine), his understanding might have 
increased only marginally. Indeed, owing to Augustine’s constancy of thought, Jerome’s text 
had failed even out of Augustine’s sight: “I do not think that even he, although a very learned 
man, could track down all the heresies” (quamvis nec ipsum, licet hominem doctissimum, omnes 
haereses arbitrer indagare potuisse).107 If ever Ecclesiastes 12:12 could capture Augustine’s 
predicament, here was its heresiological moment: “Of making books there is no end!”108 
In an essay entitled “And,” which begins as an examination of this all-too-familiar 
conjunction and morphs into a consideration of literary organizing principles, the novelist 
William Gass writes of terminological chains that, “every addition implies that somewhere 
there’s a sum.”109 Enumeration not only implies conclusion and completion, it assumes the 
stability of its terms: “you can’t add one number to another—8 to 4—if the 8 has disappeared 
by the time the 4 has come round to be counted.”110 And if “a list is able to fill a gap in our 
knowledge” and can negotiate a way to achieve its desired end, what of a list with no end?111 
What are we to make of a list whose components are always changing? Precisely by casting his 
text as the most recent and thorough iteration of the heresiological genre, Augustine 
transposed an inquiry about the process of textual collation into one about its telos: where and 
                                                        
106 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.18-20 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343). 
 
107 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.24-27 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343). 
 
108 FaciendI plures libros nullus est finis in the Vulgate.  
 
109 William Gass, “And,” in Wier and Hendrie Jr., 108. 
 
110 Gass, “And,” in Wier and Hendrie, 108. 
 




how does heresiology end? Not only had study and research failed to create a fully mapped 
portrait of the heretical world, it gestured toward Augustine’s more unsettling conclusion: 
“even if I did perhaps record all of them, which I do not think is the case, I certainly do not 
know that these are all of them. Hence, that which you want me to put down in my writing I 
cannot even grasp with my mind, for I cannot know them all (non saltem potest me cognoscente 
comprehendi quia omnia scire non possum).112 Knowledge of the heretics was not simply a matter 
of exhaustive labor: it may very well have been, as Augustine himself suggests, beyond the 
very bounds of human reason. To the extent that Augustine has shed his original fears—how to 
distill the heretics into a brief catalogue—he apprehended a new set of textual and 
epistemological problems in the course of writing. For him, the (rhetorical) fear of knowing 
the heretics too well or too completely—in essence, the fear of becoming a heretic or a 
heretical apologist—has been recast as a problem of never being able to really know the 
heresies.113 Inasmuch as Epiphanius had mused about heretical infinitude in his De Fide, he only 
gestured at the source and problematical nature of this quandary.114 Augustine confronted 
(and ultimately rationalized) the problem directly. He realizes, in language far less sanguine 
                                                        
112 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 1.14-17 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343). 
 
113 Near the very end of his valedictory to the church, having recapped the trajectory of the preceding Panarion, 
Epiphanius interrupted his remarks to request a fair appraisal from his readers (De Fide 19.1-20.5 [Holl and 
Dummer, 520-1). In turning to the church in his concluding remarks, the bishop reiterates his theological dogma. 
The church, as the one dove of Song and Songs 6:8, “confesses that God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, 
a perfect Father, a perfect Son, and a perfect Holy Spirit” (De Fide 14.1 [Holl and Dummer, 514]). The everlasting 
and unified Trinity is the source of all creation. In contrast, however, stands the highly imperfect Epiphanius: 
“This is the faith, the process of our salvation. This is the stay of the truth; this is Christ’s virgin and harmless 
dove. This is life, hope and the assurance of immortality. But I beg all you readers to pardon my mediocrity and 
the feebleness of my very limited mind—torpid and all as it is from a heavy dose of the sects’ poison, like the mind 
of a man vomiting and nauseated—for the expressions I have been brought to use in referring to certain persons 
<with harshness> or severity or calling them “offenders,” “scum,” “dupes” or “frauds.” Though I do not readily 
make fun of anyone, I have had to dispose of them with expressions like these to dispel certain persons’ notions. 
Otherwise they might think that, since I have publicly disclosed the things the sects say and do, I have some 
measure of agreement with the heresy of each” (De Fide 19.1-3 [Holl and Dummer, 3:520]). 
 
114 The problem of collection and counting are most explicitly addressed, though not altogether substantively, at 




than Epiphanius, the impossibility of his genre’s potency. If earlier heresiology was marked by 
its digressive musings, the ordered succession of later heresiology enveloped the genre in a 
rhetorical edifice of entropic discovery and self-reflection. As Augustine reminds 
Quodvultdeus, his treatise is but a sampling of the heretical world, since “other heresies which 
are not mentioned in this book of ours can exist or come to exist” (possunt…vel esse vel fieri).115  
In denying the orthodox force of closure over against the heretics, Augustine’s embrace 
of an epistemological chasm within his heresiological writing solidified not authorial control 
and mastery, but rather an entrenched and irreversible authorial weakness.116 Irenaeus, two 
centuries earlier, had emphatically declared the human mind’s inability to apprehend the 
fullness of divine truth. While the mystery of creation existed to be discovered and 
rationalized, it, too, was beyond definitive explanation:   
We, however, precisely inasmuch as we are inferior to God’s Word and his Spirit, 
have need of a knowledge of his mysteries. It should be no surprise if, in matters 
spiritual and heavenly and such as need to be revealed, we experience this, 
because even matters that are at our feet—I mean, that are in this creation, and 
that we can touch and see that are with us—many of these matters escape our 
knowledge, and we leave these to God…What happens when we try to explain 
the reason for the rise of the Nile? We give many answers, perhaps plausible, 
perhaps not, but what actually is true, certain, and secure is in God’s keeping117 
 
Although the wonders of the natural world—the rising of the Nile, the migration patterns of 
birds, the ebb and flow of the tides, weather patterns, the stations of the moon, the elemental 
foundations of the earth galvanizes the heretics to inject—could be subjected to rational, 
                                                        
115 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.55-57 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344). 
 
116 This had the added benefit of undercutting the association both with heretical hubris and philosophical 
intellectualism. Here, Augustine’s seeming intellectual power ultimately uncovers a deeper humility and 
ignorance.   
 
117 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.28.2 (Contre les hérésies, Livres II, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 
294 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982], 2:2:270-272). I have followed the translation of Dominic J. Unger, et al. in St. 




scientific explanation, it was “God alone, who made them” and he alone “can declare their 
truth.”118 Insofar as human models of the observable phenomena of creation remained mere 
theory, the innate truths of the divinely ordered universe were shrouded in an aura of 
mystery, wonder, and epistemological transcendence. There were some matters, Irenaeus 
reasoned, that fall well within the purview of the human mind, while others belong solely to 
the realm of the divine. And although the natural world—the things before our eyes, in our 
hands, and at our feet—eluded precise understanding, it was, at least, subject to observable 
scrutiny and investigation. By contrast, the epistemological hubris epitomized by the heretics 
drove individuals to turn away from the observable phenomena of the physical world and 
instead speculate wildly about the invisible, super-celestial, and spiritual matter of the 
cosmos.119 As Hippolytus lamented, all those heretics who “name themselves Gnostics in this 
peculiar way…they alone have gulped down the marvelous knowledge of the perfect and 
good.”120  
For Irenaeus, the abiding mystery of creation produced humanity’s pedagogical 
dependence on God. To leave the lacunae of Scripture unanswered—how and from where God 
created matter, why he produced it, why some of his creations sinned against him and yet 
others preserved, what drives the nature of the sinner—was not, as the heretics surmised, 
injurious. “As long as we live in the form of this world,” Irenaeus explained, “we should leave 
perfect knowledge and such questions to God.”121 Because humanity conceded the limits of its 
                                                        
118 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.28.2 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:272).   
 
119 See W.C. van Unnik, “Theological Speculation and Its Limits,” in in Early Christian Literature and the Classical 
Intellectual Tradition, ed. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 33-44. 
 
120 Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium V. 23.3, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), 199; altered 
from ANF.  
 
121 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.28.8 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:290).  
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wisdom, it essentially bound itself to an incomplete temporal existence, “so that God should 
may always teach and man may always learn from God.”122 The promise of eternal glory in the 
kingdom of heaven preserved the acquisition of plenary knowledge. In the present, however, 
they must embrace, as Tertullian advocated in his De Praescriptione, a life of humility and even 
ignorance.123 By admonishing his readers to “preserve, the proper order of your knowledge, 
and do not, being ignorant of things genuinely good, seek to rise above God himself,” Irenaeus 
sought not simply to tame the hubristic heretical mentality, but to preserve the underlying 
mystery of Christian doctrine and salvation.124  
When Epiphanius, in his valediction to the catholic church, he signals his inability to 
articulate fully the nature and visage of the Christian God. His praise for God’s earthly 
institution cannot ultimately supplant the mystery of divine transcendence: 
As you go through the whole work, or even parts of it, pray for me and make 
request that God will give me a portion in the holy and only catholic and 
apostolic church and the true, life-giving and saving <faith>, and deliver me 
from every sect. And if, in my humanity, I cannot reach the full measure of the 
incomprehensible and ineffable Godhead, but am still pressed to offer its 
defense <and> compelled to speak for God in human terms, and have been led by 
daring [to do so], you yourselves, pardon me, for God does.125 
 
                                                        
122 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.28.3 (. Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:274). 
 
123 Now, there is no great conceit than to think that one is better and more perfect than he who created and 
formed us, and gave us the breath of life, and bestowed existence itself. And so it is better, as I have said, for one 
who knows nothing at all, not even one reason for anything created as to why it was created, to believe God and 
continue in his love, than by knowledge of this kind to be puffed up and fall away from love, which gives life to 
man. [It is better] not to go in search of knowledge about anything else than Jesus Christ the Son of God, who was 
crucified for us, than through subtle questions and hairsplitting to fall into impiety (Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.26.1 [ 
Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:258). 
 
124 See Richard Norris, “The Transcendence and Freedom of God: Irenaeus, the Greek Tradition and Gnosticism,” in 
Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, in Schoedel and Wilken, 87-100. 
 
125 Epiphanius, De Fide 80.3-4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:521). See Nightingale, Once Out of Nature, on the process of 




The juxtaposition here between the redemption from heresy (by way of faith) and the 
ineffability of God registers a fundamental distinction between the knowable and the 
unknowable. Knowledge of and in the world stands apart from the “knowledge” of the divine, 
insofar as the former is subject to human comprehension, discovery, and theorization, while 
the latter is not. Moreover, Epiphanius’ remarks allude to the very start of his Panarion, where 
he articulated the trajectory of his inquiry: 
There are things untold, beyond counting, inaccessible so far as man is 
concerned, and known only to the Lord of all. But we are dealing with variance 
of opinions and kinds of knowledge, with fait in God and unbelief, with sects, 
and with heretical human opinion which misguided persons have been sowing in 
the world from man’s formation on earth till our own day….126 
 
Just as the human condition very much enables him to comprehend and refute heretical 
opinion because it is human, his condition also prevents him from reaching complete 
comprehension of the Godhead.127 The unreachable chasm—the unknowability of God—
produced the space for faith in God.128 While Epiphanius insisted, as I explained in chapter four, 
                                                        
126 Epiphanius, Pro. II.2.2-3 (Holl, 1:170). 
 
127 The Gnostic school of thought (as we saw in chapter two) ventured into the world of the divine cosmos and 
ascertained a higher order of knowledge about the nature of the god of creation (Ialdabaoth) and the various 
aeons or, in David Brakke’s phrasing, “the corresponding unfolding of God into lower, mediating divine 
principles, the lowest of which does the work of creating the material universe” (The Gnostics, 59). The Gnostics 
agreed with Epiphanius and the catholic church about a fundamental principle of divine transcendence. There 
was a divine source, which the Gnostics termed the Invisible Spirit, that existed apart from human 
comprehension (even for the most spiritually inclined thinkers). The disagreement between the Gnostics and the 
heresiologists (Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Epiphanius) concerned the end point of this epistemological lacuna. What 
David Brakke ascribes to the Gnostics—“according to the Gnostics, the ultimate God—“the Father of entirety” or 
“the Invisible Spirit”—is unknowable and beyond description. One should not even think of the Invisible Spirit as 
divine because ‘it is superior to deity’ (Ap. John II 2.35-36)—could easily describe, at least conceptually, the 
“orthodox” attitude toward the Godhead.  
 
128 On faith as the space in which God and humanity bond, see, for example, Etienne Gibson, The Christian 
Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York: Octagon Books, 1983); Frederick E. Van Fleteren, “Authority and Reason, 
Faith and Understanding in the Thought of St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 4 (1973): 33-71; Norman Kretzmann, 
“Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds: Augustine’s Charter for Christian Philosophy,” in Christian Philosophy, ed. T.P. 
Flint (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 1-36; and Carol Harrison’s Augustine: Christian Truth 
and Fractured Humanity, 15-40. On divine transcendence in the early centuries of Christian thought, see William R. 
Schoedel, “Enclosing, Not Enclosed: The Early Christian Doctrine of God,” in Schoedel and Wilken, 75-86; the 
excellent study of Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Impassable God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (New York: Oxford 
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that these two kinds of knowledge, the temporal and the divine, were, in fact, radically distinct, 
the diverse profusion of the heretics tested and enervated the solidity of this epistemological 
disjuncture.129  
Like the human effort to comprehend the Godhead,130 Augustine recognized that an 
epistemological disjuncture overlaid his understanding of the heretics: “Even if I knew all of 
them, I still am not able to do what your letters hold, ‘that we state entirely all those things on 
which the heretics dissented from the truth.’ Far less can I do, since I am not able to know all 
of them.”131 In bemoaning the gap in his knowledge, Augustine defines his relationship to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
University Press, 2004); Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 149-181; and Joseph C. McLelland, God the Anonymous: A 
Study in Alexandrian Philosophical Theology (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1976). 
 
129 Looming over the entire edifice of heresiological discourse was the assumption that any effort to comprehend 
the specifics of any one or all the heresies—the process of classifying these sectarian groups—presupposed a 
foundational understanding of heresy itself: “there are, in fact, heretics who are opposed to the rule of faith on 
single doctrines or on just a few more, such as the Macedonians or the Photinians and whatever others of this sort 
there may be” (De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.34-37 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344]). Not yet satisfied with the 
various shortcomings (both practical and conceptual) already enumerated within the text, Augustine investigates 
one final constraint: a definitional puzzle. Each species of heresy, though differentiated by particular habits, 
practices, theological doctrines, scriptural addenda or excisions, cosmological theories, etc. belonged, so the 
heresiologists assumed, to the same genus. Augustine, however, forthrightly confesses and confronts the 
millstone that is the nature of heresy itself. See the essays of Gerald Bonner, “Dic Christi Veritas Ubi Nunc Habitas: 
Ideas of Schism and Heresy in the Post-Nicene Age,” in The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique 
Thought and Culture in Honor of R.A. Markus, ed. William E. Klingshirn and Mark Vessey (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999), 63-79 and Robert Dodaro, “Omnes haeretici negant Christum in carne uenisse (Aug., serm. 
183.9.13),” Augustinian Studies 38.1 (2007): 163-174. Each attempts to parse Augustine’s definitions of heresy and 
schism. And while both essays make use of De Haeresibus, neither discusses the text extensively.  
 
130 Writing in the Confessions of his own effort to describe and “confess” his life before God, Augustine bemoans his 
lack of time to produce an ordered and comprehensive account of himself and his place within the divine creation: 
“And if I have the capacity to proclaim this in an ordered narrative, yet the drops of time are too precious for me. 
For a long time past I have been burning to meditate in your law and confess to you what I know if it and what lies 
beyond my powers—the first elements granted by your illumination and the remaining areas of darkness in my 
understanding—until weakness swallowed up by strength. I am reluctant to expend on any other subject those 
hours which I find free of the necessities for restoring the body, of intellectual work, and of the service which we 
owe to people or that which we render to them when under no obligation” (Augustine, Confessionum Libri XII, 
11.II.2.1-11 ed. Martin Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 [Brepols: Turnhout, 1990], 194; Augustine, Confessions, 
trans. Henry Chadwick [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 222).  
 
131 While the term apophatic has a particular theological resonance typically associated with theorizations of the 
Godhead, it has utility for my argument insofar as it explicitly juxtaposes the divine being (the divine ontology) 
with the heretical essence and its demonic lineage. A recent edition to the massive literature on the subject, 
Henny Fiskå Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), sheds some useful light on the subject by situating the discourse of negative theology in Christianity 
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heretics as one of perpetual inadequacy. The limitations Augustine discovers in his own 
writing and cognition reflect a deeper awareness of the limitations of language and thought: 
“there always remains an opaque residuum of inexpressibility when a man tries to signify 
verbally his internal states of being. In the face of the ineffable mystery of God, human 
language labors under crushing limitations.”132 What Colish ascribes to Augustine’s self-
interrogation in the Confessions likewise applies to his outward interrogation of the heretics. If 
the task of the heresiologist was to expose the secrecy of the heretics—“but (in) exposing the 
doctrines of all these [groups] in detail, we shall keep nothing hidden…when all are made to 
behold openly, the secret rites of these men, and the secret orgies which, as their controllers, 
they impart to the initiated alone”—herein lay the most unsettling of all conclusions for him: 
the heretics, like God himself, could never be known in full.133 Although the Incarnation had 
bestowed humankind with a redeemed speech, which functioned as a “mirror through which 
men may know God in this life by faith,” Augustine’s newly forged Christian eloquence could 
not circumvent the epistemological constrains of his human condition.134  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
at the hands of Clement of Alexandria. See also the excellent study by Charles M. Stang, Apophasis and 
Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Charles W. 
Hendrick Jr.’s remarks in his History and Silence: Purge and Rehabilitation of Memory in Late Antiquity (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2000), have an undeniable relevance here: “Silence, because it is imagined as outside of 
representation, is frequently associated with truth. Silence can be misinterpreted, may even be intended to 
mislead, but can silence itself be a lie? Can what is not said be false? Because silence is not imagined to represent 
at all, it is normally not thought to be able to represent what is not. From a common perspective, silence can be 
regarded as the only appropriate response to truth. This idea is familiar in late antiquity in the literature of 
Neoplatonism and various mystic religions, particularly in the literature of apophatic (or negative) theology, as 
represented by such authors as Dionysius the Areopagite. The only appropriate representation of a 
transcendental truth, such as god, is to not represent it at all. God is what is above and beyond representation, 
what guarantees representation; attempts to bring god into the world of representation are perversions and 
diminishments of the divine, as, on a realist theory of language, representation is merely a dependent reflection 
of the real, a secondary and inadequate substitute for the truth of being. The divine remains outside of 
representation, and any attempt to represent it can only diminish it. God is the unnameable” (120-121). 
 
132 Colish, The Mirror of Language, 25. 
 
133 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 5.27 (Marcovich, 55; altered from ANF). 
 
134 Colish, The Mirror of Language, 26. 
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The heretics, like God himself, were shrouded in an essential mystery. Because, 
Augustine reasons, “it is very difficult to define,” heresy imposes, through its essential 
ambiguity, a treacherous burden on those who attempt to systematize:135 “we should, 
therefore, be cautious, when we try to count them all so that we do not omit some, though 
they are heresies, and include others, though they are not.”136 Augustine’s acknowledgment of 
gradations of heretical existence further complicates of task of plenary classification; the 
irregularity and uncertainty of heresiological mapping evolves out of the very lack of fixity of 
heresy itself. A coherent definition would at least guide the inevitably messy future of the 
genre and serve its didactic purpose: for to “inquire into what makes one a heretic so that, in 
avoiding that with the Lord’s help, we may avoid the poison of heresies, not only of those 
which we know, but also of those we do not know, whether they already actually exist or 
                                                        
135 Definitional discordance illuminated and qualified Augustine’s decision to include only twenty-three of 
Philaster’s one-hundred fifty-six heresies: “[Philaster] mentions others (heresies) as well, but I do not think that 
they should be called heretics” (De Haeresibus 80.8-9 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 336]). Whether it was flimsy or 
unreliable heretical descriptions or Philaster’s overzealous determination to herd a superabundance of heresies, 
Augustine’s deep ambivalence about his predecessors work reveals a fundamental oversight of the genre: the 
failure to ask, “what is our object?” Even before Augustine undertook his full-fledged editorialization of Philaster 
and Epiphanius, he framed the task, in his first response to Quodvultdeus, as a definitional problem: “[Philaster] 
listed twenty-eight of them (Jewish heresies) and one hundred and twenty-eight after the Lord’s coming. 
Epiphanius, the bishop of Cyprus, who was highly esteemed for his teaching of the Catholic faith, also wrote on 
this subject in Greek. He too gathered heresies from both periods and put together eighty. Although both of them 
intended to do what you ask of me, you see how widely they differ on the number of the sects during these times. 
That, of course, would not have happened if they had not disagreed about the definition of heresy. After all, one 
should not suppose that Epiphanius was ignorant of some heresies that Philaster knew, since Epiphanius was by 
far the more eminent scholar. One should, rather, say, that Philaster had missed many, if Epiphanius had fathered 
more and Philaster fewer. Of course, both did not have the same view on the question under discussion, namely, 
what heresy is” (Epistula 222.2.11-28 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 276-7]). In acknowledging at the outset that 
“not every error is a heresy; yet, since every heresy involves a defect, a heresy could only be a heresy by reason of 
some error,” Augustine sought to impose a baseline coherence upon his admittedly partial knowledge (De 
Haeresibus Praefatio 7.98-100 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 289]). In effect, the perpetual cycling of heresies in and 
out of existence condenses Epiphanius’ universal history into a problem of definitional uniformity. Augustine’s 
task was thus doubly undercut by terminological incoherence: the heretics were not simply growing and 
changing themselves, their so-called opponents had never had a coherent rubric by which to identity them!  
 
136 Augustine, Epistula 222 2.28-32 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 277). Bonner, Dic Christi Veritas Ubi Nunc Habitas, 
remarks of this passage: “this last observation was crucial: heresy can exist in the mind of the inquisitor rather 




merely could exist.”137 The heretics, like nature, evolve and evade simple detection and precise 
rationalization. While this constant metamorphosis induces corresponding speculations and 
hypotheses to order this development, the macroscopic theorization of heretical progenesis 
can only lead the heresiologist so far. But the construction of an overarching whole into which 
each part fits does not, however, provide descriptions and refutations of each new part: for these 
twin goals, the heresiologists rely upon methodical scholasticism and ethnographic 
experience. But even the microscopic collection of data reaches an epistemological 
culmination: human understanding of the heretics, like human comprehension of the laws of 
nature and God, remains forever partial and inexact.138 Augustine’s explication of this 
conceptual breach in the edifice of his heresiology signals his refined perception of the 
restricted epistemological reach of the ethnographic gaze and the ethnographic word.   
 
Crossing the Ethnographic Chasm? 
 
                                                        
137 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.58-62 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344-5).  
 
138 Precisely because humans “have known everyone externally” (extrinsecus unumquemque nosti), Tertullian 
distinguishes human and divine levels of comprehensions of individual orientation through his dichotomization 
of internalized and externalized perception or the categorical difference between the limitations of human sense 
perception and divine omnipotence (Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum 3.7 [Traité de la prescription contre les 
hérétiques, ed. R.F. Refoulé, SC 46 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1957), 91]; translation altered from Greenslade).  With 
passages IV Ezra 8:20; I Sam. 16:7; II Tim. 2:19; Matt. 15:13, he articulates the distinction between human and 
divine “sensory” perception: “you, as a human, have known everyone externally. You think as you see. You see, 
however, as far as you have eyes. But ‘the eyes of the Lord are high,’ scripture says, ‘Man gazes into the face, God 
observes upon the heart.’ And therefore ‘the Lord knows those who are his’ and ‘roots out the plant which he has 
not planted’” (Praescr. 3.7-8 [Refoulé, 91]). This rather obvious distinction between orders and magnitudes of 
knowledge, nonetheless, serves to articulate Tertullian’s theorization of human knowledge as superficial and 
incomplete. Heresiology was only a surface-level effort. Moreover, because, as the Cappadocians insisted (see 
Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity [Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995, 165-171) demonstrates, that “to know God one must first know his creation,” “scientific knowledge as a 
prerequisite (though not the only one) for speculation about the divine effectively curtailed” (Lim, 168). If, then, 
heresies had become a naturalized part of the created order, the heresiological project was a necessary step (a 
precondition) for the move toward a fuller knowledge of the divine. But its impossibility, as Augustine discovered, 
ultimately precluded any such progression. The natural world was too vast and too elusive to permit (ever?) the 




In Book III of his Confessions, Augustine recounts his eager embrace of the Ciceronian 
maxim, “not to study one particular sect but to live and seek and pursue and hold fast and 
strongly embrace wisdom itself, wherever found.”139 While he internalized Cicero’s diktat, he 
writes that he nonetheless turned away from the Hortensius, since it lacked mention of the 
name of Christ: “Any book which lacked this name, however well written or polished or true, 
could not entirely grip me (non me totum rapiebat). I therefore decided to give attention to the 
holy scriptures (scripturas sanctas) and to find out what they were like.”140 His devotion to the 
Bible, however, proved disappointing. What met him was a text he failed to comprehend; only 
from his ecclesiastical perch decades later did the book’s seeming lowliness reveal its 
“mountainous difficulty…and mysteries.” 141 Augustine’s failure to apprehend the profundity 
and immense potentiality of scripture, which stemmed from his judgment, paradoxically, that 
the bible lacked the “dignity of Cicero” (Tullianae dignitati),142 precipitated a prolonged period 
of Christian waywardness:  
My inflated conceit (tumor meus) shunned the Bible’s restraint, and my gaze 
never penetrated to its inwardness (et acies mea non penetrabat interiora eius). Yet 
the Bible was composed in such a way that as beginners mature, its meaning 
grows with them. I disdained to be a little beginner. Puffed up with pride, I 
considered myself a mature adult. That explains why I fell in with men proud of 
their slick talk, very earthly-minded and loquacious. In their mouths were the 
devil’s traps and a birdlime compounded of a mixture of the syllables of your 
name, and that of the Lord Jesus Christ, and that of the Paraclete, the Comforter, 
and the Holy Spirit. These names were never absent from their lips; but it was 
                                                        
139 Augustine, Confessiones III.IV.8.29-31 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 30; Chadwick, trans. 39); quod non illam aut 
illam sectam, sed ipsam quaecumque esset sapientiam ut diligerem et quaererem et assequerer et tenerem atque amplexarem 
fortiter. Translation from  
 
140 Augustine, Confessiones III.IV.8.36-V.9.2 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 30-31; Chadwick, trans., 40). 
 
141 Augustine, Confessiones III.V.9.3-4 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 31; Chadwick, trans., 40). 
 




no more than sound and noise in their tongue. Otherwise their heart was empty 
of truth.143 
 
His turn toward the teaching of the Manichees, which he describes in Books III, IV, and V of his 
Confessions as a period of wandering and separation from God, began as an effort to fill a 
theological void: he wondered, “where does evil come from? And is God confined within a 
corporeal form?”144 His misguided incursion into the customs and privations of the 
Manicheans, where he privileged the fruits of the earth, the stars, and his own sensuality, 
ended after his engagements with the esteemed Faustus. Augustine deemed the man, who was 
                                                        
143 Augustine, Confessiones III.V.9.7-VI.10.6 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 31; Chadwick, trans., 40). 
 
144 Augustine, Confessiones III.VII.12.3 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 33; Chadwick, trans. 43). On separation from 
God, see Confessiones 3.VI.11.44-45 Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 32). There is abundance of scholarship about 
Augustine and his Manichean part. The most recent and comprehensive treatment is Jason BeDuhn’s three-
volume effort (of which the first two have been published), Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, Volume 1: Conversion 
and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) and Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, 
Volume 2: Making a “Catholic” Self, 388-401 C.E. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). For other useful 
essays and discussions, see Johannes van Oort, “Young Augustine’s Knowledge of Manichaeism: An Analysis of 
Confessiones and Some Other Relevant Texts,” Vigiliae Christianae 62 (2008): 441-66; idem, “Manichaean Christians in 
Augustine’s Life and Work,” Church History and Religious Culture 90 (2010): 505-546; idem, “Augustine’s Manichaean 
Dilemma in Context,” Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011): 543-67; John Kevin Coyle, “Saint Augustine’s Manichaean 
Legacy,” Augustinian Studies 34 (2003): 1-22 [Reprinted in Coyle 2009: 307-328]. On Augustine’s texts related to 
Manichaeism, see The Manichean Debate, ed. Boniface Ramsey and trans. Ronald J. Teske, The Works of Saint 
Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, vol. I/19 (Hyde Park, NY: City Press, 2006), which includes, The 
Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of Life; The Two Souls; A Debate with Fortunatus, a Manichean; Answer to 
Adimantus, a Disciple of Mani; Answer to the Letter of Mani known as The Foundation; Answer to Felix, a Manichean; The 
Nature of the Good; and Answer to Secundius, a Manichean. Volume I/20, ed. Boniface Ramsey and trans. Roland Teske 
contains Augustine’s Answer to Faustus, a Manichean (Hyde Park: NY: City Press, 2007). By way of ideational 
comparison, see Iain. Gardner and Samuel N.C. Lieu, Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). For other useful analyses on Augustine and Manichaeism, see Elizabeth A. Clark, “Vitiated 
Seeds and Holy Vessels: Augustine’s Manichean Past,” in Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism, ed. Karen L. King 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 367-401 and Paula Fredriksen’s “Response to ‘Vitiated Seeds and Holy Vessels: 
Augustine’s Manichean Past’ by Elizabeth A. Clark,” in the same volume, 402-409; John Kevin Coyle, “Part Four: 
Manichaeism and Augustine of Hippo” in Manichaeism and Its Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 209-306; Ludwig Koenen, 
“Augustine and Manichaeism in Light of the Cologne Mani Codex,” Illinois Classical Studies 3 (1978): 154-195; 
François Decret, Aspects du manichéisme dans l’Afrique romaine: Les controverses de Fortunatus, Faustus et Felxis avec 
saint Augustin (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1970); Kam-Lun Edwin Lee, Augustine, Manichaeism, and the Good (New 
York: Lang, 1999); Jacob Albert van den Berg, Annemaré Kotzé, Tobias Nicklas, and Madeleine Scopello, eds., 
Augustine, Manichaeism and other Gnosticism: Studies for Johannes van Oort at Sixty (Leiden: Brill, 2011), especially, 363-





praised as the intellectual luminary of the Manichean, to be a largely ignorant thinker.145 
Though Augustine’s personal ties to the Manicheans do not arise explicitly in De Haeresibus or 
in his letters with Quodvultdeus, the latter does contain, as Johannes van Oort has noted, an 
inquiry about a certain Theodosius, “by whom some Manichees were revealed” (per quem 
Manichaei nonnulli sunt proditi) in Carthage.146 Augustine’s preoccupation with the Manicheans—
it is by far the lengthiest entry in the text, comprising a full sixth of its total content—quite 
naturally stems both from his intimate familiarity with the heresy and from the fact that it 
persistently distressed the Christian communities in North Africa.147  
In his descriptions of the Tertullianists (86), Abeloim/Abelians (87) and Pelagians (88), 
Augustine, again, emphasizes their contemporaneity and/or his personal experience with 
them.148 He avers, for example, that the Tertullianists were “gradually dying out toward our 
                                                        
145 Though Faustus was an elegant speaker—“when he came, I found him gracious and pleasant with words. He 
said things they [Manichees] usually say, but put it much more agreeably” (Confess. V.VI.10.7-9 [Skutella and Lucas 
Verheijen, 61; Chadwick, trans. 77]) —he lacked, according to Augustine, a broad education in the “liberal arts” 
(liberalium disciplinarum; Confess. V.VII.11.38): “after he had clearly showed his lack of training in liberal arts in 
which I had supposed him to be highly qualified, I began to lose all hope that he would be able to analyse and 
resolve the difficulties which disturbed me…In consequence, the enthusiasm I had for the writings of Mani was 
diminished, and I felt even greater despair of learning from their other teachers after having consulted on the 
many points which disturbed me the man who was particularly distinguished” (Confess. V.VII.12-13 [Skutella and 
Lucas Verheijen, 63; Chadwick, trans. 79]). 
 
146 Augustine, Epistula 222.3.43-44 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 277); De Haeresibus 46.9 (Vander Plaetse and 
Beukers, 314-5) further emphasizes the current infestation of Manicheans within the African Christian 
community.  
 
147 Johannes van Ort, “Mani and Manichaeism in Augustine’s De haeresibus. An Analaysis of haer. 46.1,” in Studia 
Manichaica: IV. Internationaler Kongress zum Manichäismus, ed. Ronald E. Emmerick, Werner Sundermann, and Peter 
Zieme (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), 451-463. Van Ort’s essay parses only the first paragraph of Augustine’s 
remarks on the Manicheans, which relays his name and place of teaching. 
 
148 On Augustine’s characterization of and relationship to the Abeloim see, Gian Ackermans, “Einige rechtliche und 
theologische Fragen zu den Abeloitae in Augustins De Haresibus,” in Jacob Albert van den Berg, Annemaré Kotzé, 
Tobias Nicklas, and Madeleine Scopello, 123-138. For the sheer magnitude of works Augustine wrote against 
specific errors, doctrines, and sects (including Skeptics, Donatists, Manicheans, Priscillianists, Pagans) as well as 
face-to-face debates (with Donatists, Manicheans, and Arians), see Caroline Humfress, “Controversialist: 
Augustine in Combat,” in Companion to Augustine, ed. Mark Vessey, 324-325. On Augustine as controversialist and 
authority, see the four essays in Augustinian Studies 38 (2007): 163-216; Peter Iver Kaufman, Church, Book, and Bishop: 
Conflict and Authority in Early Latin Christianity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 75-101. For Augustine and the 
Donatists, see the classic work of W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North Africa 
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time” (usque ad nostrum tempus paulatim deficientes),149 though upon his last visit to the city of 
Carthage, “they were completely gone (consumpti sunt).”150 And while Augustine’s personal 
familiarity with certain heretics and his diligent research of others supplied his text with 
authorities of scope and skill, the bishop nonetheless knew that, despite his thoroughgoing 
effort, his task remained fragmentary and imperfect. Whereas Epiphanius had mused about 
heretical infinitude by way of biblical allegory, Augustine articulated a simple yet 
unmistakably ethnographic cognizance of the constraints of his position as a foreign author. As 
he recounted his plan to apprehend the full-range of heretical parties, opinions, and practices, 
he parlayed the undeniable achievement of his De Haeresibus—here is the most accurate, 
systematic, and dutifully researched account yet of the heretics—into a manifestation of his a 
priori failure as an ethnographic author: “Nor can any heresy be so readily known to any 
outsider as [it is] by its own members; hence, I acknowledge that I have not stated and have 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 227-274; Ivonne Tholen, Die Donatisten in den Predigten Augustinus: 
Kommunikationeslinien des Bischops von Hippo mit seinen Predigthören (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010); Erika Hermanowicz, 
Possidius of Calama: A Study of the North African Episcopate in the Age of Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008); Allan Fitzgerald, “When Augustine Was Priest,” Augustinian Studies 40.1 (2009): 37-48; Rémi Crespin, 
Ministère et Sainteté. Pastorale du clergé et solution de la crise donatiste dans la vie et la doctrine de saint Augustin (Paris: 
Études Augustiniennes, 1965); J.E. Merdinger, Rome and the African Church at the Time of Augustine (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997); and Maureen A. Tilley, The Bible in Christian North Africa: The Donatist World (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997). For Augustine and the Pelagians, see Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo: Life and 
Controversies, 312-393; idem, “Augustine and Pelagianism,” Augustinian Studies 24 (1993): 27-47; Nello Cipriani, “La 
morale pelagiana e la retorica,” Augustinianum 31.2 (1991): 309–27; James Wetzel, “Snares of Truth: Augustine on 
Free Will and Predestination,” in Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert Dodaro and 
George Lawless (New York: Routledge, 2002), 121–41; Paula Fredriksen, “Beyond the Body/Soul Dichotomy: 
Augustine on Paul against the Manichees and the Pelagians,” Recherches augustiniennes 23 (1988): 87–114; Otto 
Wermelinger, Rom und Pelagius: Die theologische Positionen der römischen Bischöfe im pelagianischen Streit in den Jahren 
411–432 (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1975); Mathijs Lambergits, “Julian of Eclanum and Augustine on the Origin of the 
Soul,” Augustiana 46 (1996): 243-260; and Michael R. Rackett, “What’s Wrong with Pelagianism: Augustine and 
Jerome on the Dangers of Pelagius and His Followers,” Augustinian Studies 33 (2002): 223-37. For Augustine and the 
Arians, see William A.Sumruld, Augustine and the Arians (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1994). 
 
149 Augustine, De Haeresibus 86.2-3 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 338). 
 




not learned all the teachings of those heresies which I mentioned.”151 His authorial confession 
demonstrates his acutely ethnographic disposition. His text cannot erase the insurmountable 
distance between his authorial self and the object of his inquiry: the bishop is simply unable to 
infiltrate the world of heresy and describe it thickly. His authorial presence indicates his 
epistemological absence. The disjuncture he observes between the abundant heretics with all 
their microscopic particularities and his extrinsic authorial occupation remains forever 
severed by the conceptual fissure of the ethnographic gaze. The fact that Augustine’s accounts 
of the Manicheans, Tertullians, Pelagians, Donatists, and Priscillianists, those most recent of 
heresies, make up such a disproportionate volume of the text (in comparison to his other 
descriptions) only reinforces the ethnographic rift. His knowledge of the heretics, even when it 
appears altogether comprehensive, is but the tip of the iceberg.  The sheer volume of heretics, 
those known and unknown, present and future, imposes an impossible burden upon the 
heresiologist. While he is troubled by the implications of his incomplete knowledge, he refuses 
to falsify his ethnographic authority. Rather than deny his limitations as an ethnographer and 
compiler of heretical data, Augustine, in fact, incorporates these constraints into the rhetoric 
of his text.  
In his Triste Tropiques, a masterful, though admittedly abstruse, structuralist 
ethnography, travelogue, and philosophical meditation, Claude Lévi-Strauss vividly notes his 
own presence within his ethnographic narrative. Even as he laments the “extraordinary 
advantage” of earlier generations of anthropologists, who had “access to communities which 
had never been the object of serious investigation,” Lévi-Strauss builds the mystique of 
discovery and unveiling into his text  (or into his field work, to borrow Clifford Geertz’s 
                                                        
151 Nec ulli alieno ulla haeresis facile sic innotescit ut suis; unde nec earum quas commemoravi Omnia dogmata me dixisse vel 
didicisse profiteor; Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.41-43 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344). 
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phrase).152 The purpose of exploration is not to cover territorial breadth, rather it is to study 
“in depth: a fleeting episode, a fragment of landscape or a remark overheard may provide the 
only means of understanding and interpreting areas which would otherwise remain barren of 
meaning.”153 Lévi-Strauss, like many anthropologists before and after him, insists that the 
irreducible core of ethnography is self-conscious cultural interpretation and translation. And, 
so, when many pages later, he ventures deep into the jungles of Brazil to find and meet the 
Tupi-Kawahib, he relishes the opportunity to partake in the experience of the earliest 
travellers:  
I was about to relive the experience of the early travellers and, though it, that 
crucial moment in modern thought when, thanks to the great voyages of 
discovery, a human community which believed itself to be complete and in its 
final form suddenly learned, as if through the effect of a counter-revelation, 
that it was not alone, that it was part of a great whole, and that, in order to 
achieve self-knowledge, it must first of all contemplate its unrecognizable image 
in this mirror, of which a fragment, forgotten by centuries, was not about to 
cast, for me alone, its first and last reflection.154  
 
As an adventuring anthropologist, he cannot resist the thrill of a new, unprecedented 
discovery. And although he reminds himself in the very next paragraph of the great 
destruction wrought by European voyagers, such memories cannot completely dull the 
sensation of ethnographic transcendence.155  
                                                        
152 See Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 37. 
Even though he disavows, at times, thoughts of Brazil and South America, for which he had no strong inclination 
to study, as bound to notions of “exotic countries” that are “the exact opposite of ours,” (60) his journey to Rio 
only serves to cement a cultural and social distance: here he was, he tells us, entering the New World (73ff).  
 
153 Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, 48. 
 
154 Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, 326. 
 
155  On this point, see also Stephen Greenblatt’s Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: 




When Lévi-Strauss finally meets his Indians and ventures into their village, rather than 
apprehend the sublimity of “the ends of the earth,” he is overcome by a sense of loss and 
failure. Like Augustine and the heretics, there is a relational chasm of infinite depth and 
insurmountable nativity. The precise moment that Lévi-Strauss grasps the full weight of his 
remoteness and blindness is as arresting and as it is profound:  
However, although I had set off on the adventure with enthusiasm, it left me 
with a feeling of emptiness. I had wanted to reach the extreme limits of the 
savage; it might be thought that my wish had been granted, now that I found 
myself among these charming Indians whom no other white man had ever seen 
before and who might never see again. After an enchanting trip up-river, I had 
certainly found my savages. Alas! they were only too savage. Since their 
existence had only been revealed to me at the last moment, I was unable to 
devote to them the time that would have been essential to get to know them. 
The limited resources at my disposal, the state of physical exhaustion in which 
my companions and I now found ourselves—and which was to be made still 
worse by the fevers of the rainy season—allowed me no more than a short 
busman’s holiday instead of months of study. There they were, all ready to 
teach me their customs and beliefs, and I did not know their language. They 
were as close to me as a reflection in a mirror; I could touch them, but I could 
not understand them. I had been given, at one and the same time, my reward 
and my punishment.156 
 
Lévi-Strauss’ failure, his richly ironic and torturous punishment, derives from his lack of time, 
resources, and the untranslatability of language and experience. There was no way to know the 
Tupi-Kawahib under the conditions in which the anthropologist found himself. It his 
anthropological mindset that betrays his presence: “I had only to succeed in guessing what 
they were like for them to be deprived of their strangeness: in which case, I might just as well 
have stayed in my village.”157 To speculate about and ascribe meaning to the life of the Tupi-
Kawahib is to deny them their authenticity.  
                                                        
156 Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, 332-333. 
 




  While Augustine, unlike Lévi-Strauss, possessed the linguistic capacity to engage his 
opponents in debate,158 he is, like the anthropologist, keenly aware of the limitations of time, 
resources, and authorial presence. He lacks the time to acclimate himself fully to the 
particularities of the heretics; he lacks the resources, textual and otherwise, to produce a 
comprehensive heresiology; and, above all else, he lacks the identity necessary to know what it 
is heretics do, say, and believe. In standing apart from the heretics, Augustine gains only 
superficial knowledge; his foreignness, like Lévi-Strauss; forever precludes a plenary 
understanding. I am not suggesting that Augustine’s ruminations about his authorial 
constraints are as systematically rendered as those of Lévi-Strauss or, in fact, that they are 
dependent upon the formal barriers of language. I am, however, trying to draw a parallel 
between notions of ethnographic authorization that incorporate their own failings and 
limitations into their texts. There is no effort to bury the complexities of the natural and 
supernatural worlds; they are embraced as the consequences of the human condition. Both 
Augustine and Lévi-Strauss, despite their manifestly different attitudes and ideologies, wonder 
how they can successfully traverse the intellectual and cultural landscapes they seek to study.   
 
Conclusion: Constructing Lacunae 
 
Augustine’s abbreviated heresiology conceives heretical errata as more than historical 
or theological phenomena to be refuted in texts; heretics become ethnographic and thus 
textual dilemmas by virtue of their distinct identities. And even in the cases where orthodox 
                                                        
158 Humfress, “Controversialist: Augustine in Combat,” in Vessy (2012), 324-5. 
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authors include heresies they report to be extinct, 159 identity only in passing,160 or fail to name 
(and merely describe),161 the zeal to report comprehensively saturates the rhetoric of 
heresiological inquiry. But, as I have argued in this chapter (as well as in chapter four), the 
drive for textual comprehension construes the heresies not simply as problems of and by texts, 
but beyond them as well.162 While Augustine rests at eighty-eight heresies, Epiphanius had 
enumerated eighty, and Philaster had proposed one hundred-fifty six.163 The world of heresy 
was not a stable entity of irreducible parameters. 164 Beneath the veneer of infallibility, totality, 
unyielding investigation, exposure, and refutation, there is an equivocal awareness of the 
incompleteness and impossibility of the heresiologists’ project. In openly acknowledging the 
                                                        
159 Augustine’s Tertullianists, as I noted already, were reportedly extinct. Theodoret tells us, for instance, at Haer. 
III. Pro. (Migne, 401A). that the myths of certain heretics have been banished. In Haer. II.11 he claims that the 
Cerinthians, Ebionites, Theodotians, Elcesaites, Melchisedecians, Sabellians, Paulians, Marcionites, and Photians 
have been completely demolished; none of their kind remain.  
 
160 See Theodoret on Monoimus, Haer. I.18 (Migne, 369B). 
 
161 Augustine, De Haeresibus 71-80; all ten lack names.  
 
162 Gillian Clark gets at an essential component to the “problem” of textuality and discovery in Augustinian 
thought. In her essay, “Augustine and the World,” in The Early Christian Book, ed. William E. Klingshirn and Linda 
Safran (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 117-138, which is a study of his masterful 
City of God, Clark emphasizes the power of scripture to alleviate the disjuncture between divine transcendence and 
human apprehension. Scripture, thus, functions “as damage limitation” (132). As she explains, “so, according to 
Augustine, the world in which we live is shaped by a text. A text helps to heal the separation of fallen humans 
from God, and human history is to be interpreted by that text. Rome, city and empire, culture and religion, is a 
city of books. Its history, ancient and recent, is subject to interpretation by ‘our’ book, the Christian book, the one 
authoritative book that God has entrusted to mortal writers and readers…But the words of God must still be 
written and interpreted by mortals who are resident aliens, peregrine, in the earthly city of their time, and who 
share the local customs and culture” (133). Displaced from their rightful home in the heavenly realm, humanity’s 
presence in earthly cities is a time of alienation. A reclamation of sorts resides in the text of scripture, which 
binds the earthly city to the heavenly one. I would argue that De Haeresibus, though lacking the scale of City of God, 
functions precisely as a type of damage limitation, which tries to use textual knowledge to construct a sense of 
the heretical world out there. But because scripture does not center it, the text lacks interpretative grounding; its 
bases suffer from the same faults and failings.  
 
163 See Filastrii Episcopi Brixiensis Diversarum Hereseon Liber, ed. F. Heylen, CCSL 9 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1957), 207-324. 
 
164 This, too, is part of Clark’s argument. City of God or De Haeresibus is a “built environment, a textual city 
constructed of books” (133): neither can match the righteousness of scripture, which is “a coherent covering for 
the encampment of strangers and sojourners, the civitatis peregrina of God’s people for whom scripture is the 




elusive quality of the heretics and heretical knowledge, Augustine tries, instead, to theorize 
these fissures in his knowledge. The excessively possible—the hubristic diction of exposition 
and the language of endless discovery—has mutated into an explicit meditation on the 
possibility of the endeavor itself.165   
Heresiological authors sought, as we saw with Hippolytus, Epiphanius, and Theodoret 
in chapters one and two, to classify a seemingly chaotic world of unknowable disruption by 
anchoring heresy’s essential function to the divine narrative of sacred history. Ethnographic 
master narratives ordered the disruption, and centralized its remedy within the church. But 
while master narratives systematized the production and perpetuation of heretical diversity, 
                                                        
165 There is an important epistemological workaround, proposed most glaringly by Epiphanius (though it is a 
thematic emphasis also found in Hippolytus, Irenaeus, and Theodoret). The omissions, commissions, limitations, 
and errors of these texts become opportunities to retreat from the discourse of totality and mastery and, instead, 
humble before God (which filled in, the heresiologist hoped, the lacunae in his knowledge). The move toward 
humility is most clearly seen in Epiphanius’ description of the sixtieth heresy of his Panarion, the Angelics. It was a 
movement the bishop included, despite his utter bafflement over its genesis, name, and nature. In speculating 
about the origin of the sect’s name, he offers three possible explanation: (1) a geographical solution (“there is a 
land called Angelina”); (2) a theological possibility (the group took its name from the creators of the universe, the 
angels);  (3) a behavioral etymology (“they boasted of having the ranks of angels and leading particularly 
exemplary lives” (Pan. 60.1.2 [Holl and Dummer, 2:379]). To temper his authorial ignorance, Epiphanius styled his 
oblivion as a gesture of authenticity by reiterating the frailty of his mind for the challenges of his textual task. His 
remarks are worth citing in full: “But if you are reminded of something now, reader, you will harbor no suspicion 
to my discredit. I promised to report the roots and the nourishment of some sects, or some of the things they do, 
but just to mention others by name; but as the divine power has equipped and aided me, until this sect I have 
gone right through them all and left none unexplained, except this one. But perhaps it is because it was puffed up 
with pride for a short while and later came to an end, that I have no understanding of it. But I shall name it with 
the mere quick mention of its name as though as that of an untimely birth, pass its place [in the series] by, and 
embark on the investigation of the others. I likewise entreat the Lord of all to disclose himself to me, show my 
small mind what the sects do, and give it all the exact facts, enabling me to correct myself and my neighbors so 
that we may avoid what is evil, but gain a firm foundation, in God, in what is good, and absolutely true” 
(Epiphanius, Pan. 60.2.1-6 [Holl and Dummer, 2:379-80]). Here, confession follows his promise to name the heresies 
in full, even in cases where he lacks knowledge of their particulars. Beseeching the Deity to flesh out his words, 
Epiphanius cradles his frailty before God as a means of deafening his lacuna. He also, tellingly, blames the heresy 
itself for his ignorance. The brevity of their existence precluded his knowledge. If only the Angelics had endured, 
he would have harbored full knowledge of their error! Epiphanius’ wish for heretical longevity manifests, I think, 
the inability of the heresiologists to sublimate their enjoyment of the sport of tracking down and performing 
their “executions” of the heresies. Knowledge of the heresies owes itself to and depends upon the Holy Spirit to 
transmit the divine knowledge. The orthodox writers openly confess their dependence upon the knowledge of 
God (and patiently await its inspiring instruction), while the heretics, as I traced earlier, attempt to circumvent 
the epistemological disjuncture between human and divine. There is a sense, however, that despite the 





they did not (and could not) explain the particularities of each new generation of heresy.166 
Ethnographic paradigms did not constitute people; they organized them. Microscopic data, by 
contrast, described peoples, but did not theorize them. These twin pillars of the ethnographic 
project—the macroscopic theorization and the microscopic collection of data—were mutually 
reinforcing; the one supplied the lacunae for the other. Augustine, however, smashes the 
epistemological interdependence of this bipartite conceptualization. His “confusion of feeling” 
over the scope of his ethnographic project concludes that there is no coherent structure that 
can elucidate the world of heresy. 167 Augustine captures the paradox of Christian universalism: 
to claim to be an Ur-culture, as Christian authors routinely and emphatically asserted, is to 
defy the labile conditions of culture. Stephen Greenblatt’s comments about cultural formation 
and exportation in early modern Europe deduce the bind of early Christian expansion and 
comprehension: 
Cultures are inherently unstable, mediatory modes of fashioning experience. 
Only as a result of the social imposition of an imaginary order of exclusion—
through the operation of what in the discussion that follows I will call 
‘blockage’—can culture be invoked as a stable entity within which there are 
characteristic representations that are ordered, exported, accommodated. Such 
blockage occurs constantly—an infinite, unrestricted, undifferentiated 
                                                        
166 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, writing about the continuity of nature 
and the imposition of an ordered structure upon, notes the problematic assumption that continuity of structure 
can, in fact, order and describe the contents therein: “For if it were given to experience, in its uninterrupted 
momentum, or traverse, exactly, step by step, the great continuity comprising individuals, varieties, specices, 
genera, and classes, there would be no need to constitute a science; descriptive designations would attain to 
generality quite freely, and the language of things would be constituted as scientific discourse by its own 
spontaneous momentum. The identities of nature would be presented to the imagination as though spelled out 
letter by letter, and the spontaneous shift of words within their rhetorical space would reproduce, with perfect 
exactitude, the identity of beings with their increasing generality. Natural history would become useless, or 
rather it would already have been written by man’s everyday languge (147). The laws of nature do not constitute 
nature; they order it.  
 
167 Theodore S. De Bruyn, “Ambivalence within a ‘Totalizing Discourse’: Augustine’s Sermons on the Sack of 




circulation would lead to the collapse of cultural identity altogether—but it is 
never absolute.168  
 
Precisely because the world of heresy is an assorted mass, its very expansiveness, liminality, 
and mutation confound the ethnographic gaze. Heretics contest the fabric of Christian 
ecumenical culture by exposing its systematic ignorance of the world around it. Neither 
macroscopic analysis nor microscopic travel can circumvent the limitations of ethnography 
and ethnographic classification. Internal rhetoric of heresiological texts complicates at best 
and subverts at worst the triumphalist, expansive discourse of Christian orthodoxy. The 
heresies are not simply a disruption within sacred history; they challenge the very foundations 
of narration, comprehension, and human understanding of the world they have permeated. 
Insofar as Christian ethnography could never fully map and by extension unite the world it 
studied, the world given to Adam was perhaps not so easily governed, named, and ordered as 
Genesis had surmised. 
                                                        
168 Stephen Greenblatt, Wondrous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 121. He goes on to explain the process by which cultural formation is negotiated, contested, and produced: 
“the rhetoric of absolute blockage is everywhere in the discourse of early modern Europe, but the reality is more 
porous, more open, more unsettled than it first appears. Any element in the structure of a culture is potentially 
up for grabs. Any idea, however orthodox, can be challenged. Any representation can be circulated. And it is the 
character of this circulation—secret or open, rapid or sluggish, violently imposed or freely embraced, constrained 
by guilt and anxiety or experienced as pleasure—that regulates the accommodation, assimilation, and 
representation of the culture of the other. This representation is never quite synonymous with direct possession 
of a social reality which is always mobile and elusive, though the discourse of travel is saturated with the 








[The Greeks and the Romans] also wondered whether primitive humanity had lived in a 
state of ignorance or whether, to the contrary, it had not inherited true philosophy, later 
forgotten or altered: certain very ancient peoples (the Egyptians, Indians, Ethiopians, 
Chaldeans, and even the Jews) had preserved a very ancient wisdom and an ancient 
religion that may well merit study (which is what Apollonius of Tyana, Iamblichus, and a 
good many others did). Civilization was made not of inventions but of discoveries. And 
where did one discover something? Among foreigners, when they knew what we do not 









The very first words of Homer’s Odyssey signal straightaway its ethnographic interests: 
“Tell me, Muse, of the man of many ways, who was driven far journeys (μάλα πολλὰ πλάγχθη) 
after he had sacked Troy’s sacred citadel. Many were they whose cities he saw, whose minds he 
learned, many the pains he suffered in his spirit upon the sea, struggling for his own life and 
the homecoming of his companions.”2 Odysseus narrates his wondrous, harrowing journey to 
the Phaiakians as a series of remembrances in Books IX-XII.3 As it unfolds, the marvelous, 
exotic, and distant lands, peoples, and creatures emerge as emblems and harbingers of 
                                                        
1 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans,” in The Romans, ed. Andrea Giardina, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 344. 
 
2 Homer, The Odyssey I.1-5, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: Harper Collins, 1965), 27. For the Greek text, see 
Odyssey, 2 vols., ed. and trans. A.T. Murray, rev. George E. Dimock, Loeb Classical Library 104-5 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 1:2. On the Odyssey as ethnographic travelogue see Charles Fornara, The Nature of 
History, 12-13; Caroline Dougherty, The Raft of Odysseus: The Ethnographic Imagination of Homer’s Odyssey (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); François Hartog, Memories of Odysseus: Frontier Tales from Ancient Greece, trans. Janet 
Lloyd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); and Irad Malkin, The Returns of Odysseus: Colonization and 
Ethnicity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).  
 
3 Homer, The Odyssey IX-XII (Lattimore, 137-197 [Murray, 1:302-464. 2:2-34]). 
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tragedy, destruction, reclamation, and seduction.4 Just as exposure to the New World(s) of 
Odysseus’ travels captivate(s) the minds of his companions—freeing them of the obligation 
and/or desire to return homeward (think, for instance, of the enchantment of the lotus-
eaters5)—they also instill feelings of isolation and remoteness via the introduction of radically 
distinct norms and customs:  
From there we sailed on, grieved at heart, and we came to the land of the 
Cyclopes, an insolent and lawless folk, who, trusting in the immortal gods, plant 
nothing with their hands, nor plow; but all these things spring up for them 
without sowing or plowing, wheat, and barley, and vines, which bear the rich 
clusters of wine, and Zeus’s rain makes these grow for them. Neither assemblies 
for council have they, nor appointed laws, but they dwell on the peaks of 
mountains in hollow caves, and each one is lawgiver to his children and his 
wives, and they have no regard for one another.6  
 
Even when the dystopic, lawless world of the primitive Cyclopes, further embodied by the 
cannibalistic Laistrygonians, finds a less mendacious representative in Circe, the results are 
still a variation on a theme: though spared death by cannibalism, Circe’s spells, instead, quite 
literally denature the humanity of those so-called civilized companions of Odysseus. But the 
hazard of these new worlds is only one side of traveler’s experience. As the hospitality of the 
Phaiakians demonstrates—“clothing for our guest is stored away in the polished chest, and 
intricately wrought gold, and all those other gifts the Phaiakian men of counsel brought here 
to give him”—the vagaries of displacement hold the potential to lead one to utopia as much as 
                                                        
4 In his Works and Days, Hesiod warns the farmer of the dangers of ill-considered travel. It is a treacherous task to 
be undertaken only under the most precise of circumstances. It cannot be undertaken out of dalliance and 
curiosity, but most follow from careful planning and consideration. For, as Hesiod tells his listeners, “it is a 
terrible thing to die in the waves. So I am urging you that you should ponder deep in your heart all my advice…for 
it’s a terrible thing to meet with disaster at sea” (687-691). For the Greek text, see Theogony. Works and Days. 
Testimonia, ed. and trans. Glenn W. Most, Loeb Classical Library 57 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007). 142. 
 
5 Homer, The Odyssey IX.82-104 (Lattimore, 139-140 [Murray, 1:308]). 
 
6 Homer, The Odyssey IX.105-115 (Lattimore, 140 [Murray, 310]). Homer, of course, masterfully plays with 
perceptions of monstrosity, violence, and cultural superiority. The Cyclops Polyphemous is not the only one who 
cages and slaughters his guests: Odysseus himself, in Book XXII, shuts the suitors inside his palace and slaughters 
the lot of them.  Who, we are left to wonder, is the real monster of this epic?  
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they do to torment and upend convention.7 Discovery of the previously unknown remained as 
much a source of cultural triumphalism as a site of moral decay and destruction.  
In light of the mysteries and revelations of Odysseus’ displacement and travel, the 
cultural and geographical extremes arrayed within The Odyssey imbue ethnographic 
experience with simultaneously vivifying and destructive appetite for discovery, novelty, and 
wonderment. When almost two millennia later, Dante depicts Ulysses in his Inferno (in the 
seventh pouch of the eight circle; the area devoted to thieves and thievery), our Homeric hero, 
now encased within an eternal flame with Diomede, answers Virgil’s question about the 
circumstances of his death by completely recasting the trajectory of his personal odyssey: 
When I sailed away from Circe, who’d beguiled me to stay more than a year 
there, near Gaeta—before Aeneas gave that place a name—neither my fondness 
for my son nor pity for my old father nor the love I owed Penelope, which would 
have gladdened her was able to defeat in me the longing I had to gain 
experience of the world and of the vices and the worth of men…I saw as far as 
Spain, far as Morocco along both shores; I saw Sardinia and saw the other 
islands that sea bathes And I and my companions were already old and slow, 
when we approached the narrows where Hercules set up his boundary stones 
that men might heed and never reach beyond…‘Brothers,’ I said, ‘o you, who 
having crossed a hundred thousand dangers, reach the west, to this brief 
waking-time that still is left unto your senses, you must not deny experience of 
that which lies beyond the sun, and of the world that is unpeopled. Consider 
well the seed that gave you birth: you were not made to live your lives as brutes, 
but to be followers of worth and knowledge.’8 
 
But just as soon as his eyes gaze on this most majestic of lands, his transcendent gladness 
“soon turned to sorrow for out of that new land a whirlwind rose and hammered at our ship, 
against her bow…it lifted up the stern so that our plow plunged deep, as pleased an Other until 
the sea again closed—over us.”9 Odysseus, in privileging his uncontrollable yearning for 
                                                        
7 Homer, The Odyssey XIII.10-12 (Lattimore, 198 [Murray, 2:2]). 
 
8 Dante Alighieri, Inferno XXVI.90-120, ed. and trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York, Bantam Books, 1982), 242-5. 
 
9 Dante, Inferno XXVI.136-142 (Mandelbaum, 244-5). 
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knowledge above all else, reconceives the Homeric telling of his journey. He ventures into the 
world not to reunite with Penelope, but to reach the ends of the earth. He dies not as a warrior 
or king, nor for glory or fame, but as an itinerant and in the name of wisdom. His 
preoccupation with knowledge of the unknown and unpeopled lands reaches, the text implies, 
beyond the rightful parameters of the human experience; he desires a knowledge he cannot 
have. But while in Dante’s telling Ulysses’ travails on the open-sea explain his demise, they are 
not the cause of his eternal damnation (he is punished for the theft of Troy’s Palladium). 
Neither Dante nor Virgil challenges the valor, value, or veracity of his confession. The text 
permits his account to stand without authorial commentary. However much Ulysses’ 
epistemological and experiential hubris cuts short his life, he expresses no remorse for his 
choice. His geographical transgression overtook his identity. There was no circumventing the 
allure of the undiscovered.10  
Through expeditions of economic and military necessity (and the power of autopsy), 
the hearsay of witnesses, and careful research in the libraries of great Mediterranean cities, 
Greeks and Romans devised, as we have seen in the previous chapters, theories about laws of 
the natural world and the human diversity within it.11 The genesis of human difference was not 
only a facet of the natural world, but it was also, in the case of geographical or astrological 
determinism, conditioned by its working principles. Insofar as foreigners and nature both held 
promise as refuges of discovery and knowledge acquisition, as the quote from Paul Veyne 
demonstrates, they became parallel sites/sources of investigative and theoretical resolution. 
                                                        
10 This expression of exhilaration is not meaningfully dissimilar from Lévi-Strauss’ longing to see people 
untouched by human hands and unseen by human eyes, as I noted in chapter five. 
 
11 Those theories did not, as much as they tried to account for phenomenological differences, dispel the lingering 
“moral” problems of civilization. They merely heightened its acuity. To the extent that the concept of the 
uncivilized mind (vis-à-vis the corrosive urbanites of cities and civilizations) proved a valuable point of contrast, 
it invoked the language and laws of nature to parse the distinction. 
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There is an essential consonance between positing and deciphering the laws of the natural 
world and writing the history of human development and difference.12 The rationalization of 
the world through a single (we might say singular) ideological perspective draws upon both 
the mundane and eccentric alike to impose its vision of predictability and order. In The Raft of 
Odysseus, her ethnographic reading of Homer’s Odyssey, Carol Dougherty summarizes the 
shared impulse of ancient and modern ethnographers to venture outward and return home 
with stories and insights about foreign peoples and fantastical places:  
The culture studied, the ‘ethnos’ in ‘ethnography,’ was understood to be foreign, 
far away, and fantastic: Herodotus’ cannibalistic Scythians, Tacitus’ savage 
Britons, E.E. Evans-Pritchard traveled to Africa to study the Azande, and Claude 
Lévi-Strauss sailed overseas to capture the tribes of Brazil in his ethnographic 
masterpiece, Tristes tropiques. Thus the practice of ethnography has always been 
located at the margins of two worlds or systems of meaning; it decodes one 
culture and then recodes it for another.13 
 
Here, the clichéd maxim of rendering the strange familiar—translating in our terms, outré 
habits, customs, and ways of life—governs the ancient and modern ethnographic processes. 
But beyond the rather persistent refrain of identity formation, mimesis, and subversion as 
effects of cultural imperialism, conquest, and colonialism—not to be minimized or ignored, 
surely—lies another set of fraught concerns about ethnographic representation and language 
that I have discussed in relation to the world of Christian late antiquity and the heresiologists. 
I have argued that in the late antique world, defined by remarkable religious and political 
change, the preoccupation to organize and systematize the world writ large appends the 
refrain of Christianization (the aspiration, we might say, to unite the world under the mantle 
of Christianity) to the ethnographic endeavor. The world is not simply classified, but it is 
                                                        
12 See Daryn Lehoux, What Did the Romans Know? An Inquiry into Science and Worldmaking (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012) and Veyne, “Humanitas,” 342-352. 
 
13 Carol Dougherty, The Raft of Odysseus, 9-10.  
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Christianized. Nature and its laws and peoples are made to be compatible with the demands of 
Christian theology, polemic, and culture.  
For reasons both practical and methodological, I narrowed my focus in the above 
chapters to only one illustration of Christian ethnographic writing (and its corresponding 
implications) in late antiquity. But the collection of ethnographic data and the theorization of 
Christian and human difference extended far beyond the boundaries of heresiological 
literature. In writing about the world they inhabit, their relationship to it, and their 
interpretation of it, Christian writers infused various genres of writing, including letters, 
sermons, commentaries, travelogues, monastic handbooks, and hagiographies, with an 
awareness of macroscopic paradigms and microscopic description. To take full account of the 
pervasive presence of ethnography and ethnographic writing in the texts of Christian late 
antiquity, one would need to survey a wide-range of authors and forms. Epiphanius, indeed, 
already points toward a secondary avenue of ethnographic interest toward the conclusion of 
De Fide. Having labored to name the heretical-philosophical addenda to the eighty sects of his 
text’s body, he transitions to a discussion of the “the tenets of the faith of this only catholic 
church and harmless dove” which concludes with a description of its various members.14 There 
are priests, presbyters, deacons, sub-deacons, deaconesses, the order of readers, exorcists, 
translators, undertakers, laity, nuns, and monks, the latter of which garners the most 
attention.15 He describes, cursorily and incompletely, the habits and customs of the monks: 
where they live, what they wear, how they sleep, what they eat, and how they pray.16 While 
“the custom of hospitality, kindness, and almsgiving to all has been prescribed for all members 
                                                        
14 Epiphanius, De Fide 21.1, ed. Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 37 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985), 3:521. 
 
15 Epiphanius, De Fide 21.3-11 (Holl and Dummer, 3:521-522). 
 
16 Epiphanius, De Fide 23.2; 23.3, 23.6; 23.6; 22.7; 22.11; 23.8  (Holl and Dummer, 3:524, 523, 525). 
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of this holy catholic and apostolic church,” there is a plurality of Christian ways of living 
piously. In directing his readers toward an ethnography of the monks, Epiphanius harnesses 
the didactic value of laudatory auto-ethnography.17 Books I-IV of John Cassian’s Institutes 
further describes and moralizes the praxis of monks of particular geographical regions and 
traditions.18 To understand monastic piety, Cassian tells his readers at the outset of his treatise, 
one must understand their outward way of life.19 This focus on aspirational ethnography, 
whereby outward habits prepare and enable the inward turn toward God, symbolizes the 
transformative potential of praxis and habitualization: it is “edificatory ethnography, 
anthropology designed to improve,” which “arises almost entirely out of the development of a 
powerful expository style at once spare, assured, lapidary, and above all resolute: definite 
views, definitely expressed.”20 
In her description of hagiographical literature, Georgia Franks emphasizes its alluring 
potency: “such tales recounted the wonder-working and wisdom of distant monastics, for 
whom the desert became a stage for biblical spectacles. Christian audiences were drawn by 
these stories into another world, one shaped (and authenticated) by unceasing prayer, 
prophecy, healing, and exorcism.”21 Saints, like monks, appeared otherworldly. At once human 
                                                        
17 Epiphanius, De Fide 24.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:525). 
 
18 For the text, see Iohannis Cassiani De institutis coenobiorum et De octo principalium vitiorum remediis libri XII, ed. 
Michael Petschenig, CSEL 17 (Vienna: C. Geroldi Filium, 1888), 3-231. 
 
19 Cassian, The Institutes I.1: “De institutis ac regulis monasteriorum dicturi unde conpetentius donante deo quam 
ex ipso habitu monachorum sumemus exordium? quorum interiorem cultum consequenter tunc poterimus 
exponere, cum exteriorem ornatum sub oculorum depinxerimus obtutibus” (Petschenig, 8). 
 
20 Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 108. 
 
21 Georgia Frank, The Memory of the Eyes: Pilgrims to Living Saints in Christian Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000), 1-2. On the relationship between geography and pilgrimage in late antique Christianity, 
see Scott Fitzgerald Johnson, “Apostolic Geography: Origins and Continuity of Hagiographic Habit,” Dumbarton 
Oaks Papers 64 (2011): 5-25 and Blake Leyerle, “Landscape as Cartography in Early Christian Pilgrimage 
Narratives,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64 (1996): 119-143.  
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and divine, they straddled the worlds of the natural and divine. Indeed, their liminality only 
amplified their revered power to perform the seemingly impossible. Here were men and 
women whose very identities created alternative expressions of space: saintly geography.22 
Travel and pilgrimage literature—the Itinerarium Egeriae, Lausiac History, the Itinerarium 
Burdigalense, and the Topographia Christiana, to name but a few illustrative examples—is yet 
another reflection of a burgeoning Christian ethnographic disposition.23 The expansive gaze of 
Christian travelers, who described their world through their Christian eyes, infused their 
writings with ethnographical and geographical maps of piety: to travel in the world was to see 
and spread its Christianity everywhere. The Christian narrative of sacred history encompassed 
the elaboration, both macroscopically and microscopically, of holy topographies and hallowed 
ethnographies. Christian writers, as we have seen, did not wait for the world to become 
manifestly Christian; instead, they used their texts to make it Christian at its very core.  
From Homer, Herodotus, Pliny, and Tacitus, down to Epiphanius, Augustine, Cosmas, 
and Isidore, ancient ethnographical writing, in all its variations, transmits authorial ideology 
into textual form by means of representation. And while ancient ethnographic writings do not 
strictly conform to the modern ethnographic practice in its professed effort to avoid a 
discourse of essentialization (there were no rules in place to prevent certain types of 
interaction), these two “stages” or historical moments of writing peoples do reflect a parallel 
set of questions and textual negotiations. Indeed, ethnography is as much about the 
particularities of its content as it is about confronting the capacity of writing in the name of 
                                                        
22 See, for instance, Susan Weingarten, The Saint’s Saints: Hagiography and Geography in Jerome (Boston: Brill, 2005). 
 
23 For the relevant texts, see Itinerarium Egeriae in Itineraria et alia geographica, ed. P. Geyer and O. Cuntz, CCSL 175 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1965), 37-103; Palladius, Historia Lausiaca, ed. Cuthbert Butler. 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1904); Itinerarium Burdigalense in Geyer and Cuntz, 1-26; and La Topographie chrétienne, ed. and 
trans. Wanda Wolska-Conus, SC 141, 159, and 197 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1968, 1970, and 1973). 
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representation. The unforeseen and foreseen consequences of ethnographic writing envelop 
huge quantities of intellectual capital, which expose epistemological and textual limitations. 
Writing about the discourse of discovery and the New World, Stephen Greenblatt emphasizes 
the tension between “the idea of spreading their [Western religions’] representations while 
resisting the possibility of free movement of alternative symbolic systems.”24 The 
appropriation, moralization, and construction of cultures, at home and abroad, produced 
corresponding processes of textual representation and archival regulation. As Greenblatt 
explains of the early Modern situation: 
This representation is never quite synonymous with direct possession of a social 
reality which is always mobile and elusive, though the discourse of travel is 
saturated with the glittering promise of such possession and records 
extraordinary steps taken to secure it…European voyagers crate up artifacts 
that they have purchased or stolen or received as gifts, and they take 
unsuspecting or undefended natives captive, not only in order to serve as 
interpreters but in order to ship them back for display at home…What the 
spectators got for their money is the experience of wonder in the presence of 
the alien: they see and perhaps touch (or, we are told in the case of Caliban, 
smell) a fragment of a world elsewhere, a world of difference. But, of course, 
that world is not present; only a sliver of it, an anecdote in the form of a dead or 
dying captive, has crossed the immense distance. And, as the very name Indian 
suggests, even this sliver of otherness is not accessible to direct apprehension; 
the viewers carry with them to exhibits, as to the lands from which the exhibits 
have been seized, a powerful set of mediating conceptions by which they 
assimilate exotic representations to their own culture. These conceptions are at 
once agents and obstacles in the drive to possess a secure knowledge of the 
alien; they are bound up with the primal act of witnessing around which 
virtually the entire discourse of travel is constructed.25  
 
To the extent that the legacy of Christianity adumbrated and continues to inform the 
discourse of ethnography, the intellectual process by which these twin foci, Christian truth 
and human diversity, intersected belongs not to the middle ages, early Modern Europe, the 
                                                        
24 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 120. 
 
25 Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions, 121-2. 
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Renaissance, or with the writing of Herodotus, but to the age of Origen, Jerome, and Augustine. 
Late antiquity occupies surprisingly little attention in narratives about the formation and 
perpetuation of Christianized styles of travelogues, geographies, ethnographies, and universal 
histories.26  This was the era in which classical culture of Pliny, Tacitus, and Herodotus was 
facilitated through the precepts and principles of Christian scholasticism (and further refined 
in the middle ages). I would posit that the late antique biblicization of Herodotus and 
Herodotean styles of ethnographic writing, to formulate the transformation somewhat 
crudely, fundamentally transformed the landscape of ethnographic expressions and 
contemplations about the peoples of the world. Sir Walter Raleigh’s multi-volume The History of 
the World, for example, is teeming with references not only to Herodotus, Josephus, Berossos, 
Pliny, and Mela, but also to Augustine, Eusebius, Orosius, Origen, and Jerome.27 It is the 
negotiation and melding of these modalities of cultural representation, the incorporation of 
macroscopic theorization and microscopic description, that produced the language of 
Christian ethnographic writing.  
Initiated in late antiquity, refined in the middle ages, and fully enacted and expanded, 
we might say, during the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, Christian ethnographic 
discourse has cast a wide, if underacknowledged, shadow in the history of anthropology and 
uncritical ethnography. While my discussion of late antique ethnography analyzes one aspect 
                                                        
26 In his wonderful history of travel, Peter Whitfield, Travel: A Literary History (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 2011), 
moves, rather hurriedly, through the evidence from the classical age and testimony of the Christian pilgrimage 
tradition. Of a book of more than two hundred fifty pages, he devotes a mere thirty eight to the prehistory of 
travel. Perfunctory analysis of Christian pilgrimage literature insufficiently limns, I suggest, the depths of the 
intellectual legacy inaugurated by Christian ethnographic writing. A similar paucity of attention marks Margaret 
T. Hodgen’s immensely interesting Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964). 
 
27 Walter Raleigh, The History of the World (London: William Stansby, 1614). There are various printings of the work, 
including abridged editions. See also, Maurice Wiles, Archetypal Heresy: Arianism through the Centuries (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996).  
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of the Christian turn in writing about peoples (and has been limited to the first five hundred 
years of the first millennium C.E.), the effects of the Christianization of the writing peoples 
endure well into the present. Even a cursory glance at texts as wide-ranging as Bartolomé de 
Las Casas’ Apologetic Summary History of the People of These Indies, Jean-Frédéric Bernard and 
Bernard Picart’s Religious Ceremonies of the World, Euthymius Zigabenus’ Panoplia Dogmatica, and 
Samuel Purchas’ Purchas His Pilgrimage, or Relations of the World and the Religions observed in All 
Ages and Places Discovered, from the Creation unto This Present attests the permeation of the late 
antique ethnographic disposition.28 Not only does the effort to express the internal diversity of 
the Christian world continue unabated, but the totality of the human species becomes 
increasingly subjected to the intellectual and conceptual strictures of a Christian ethnographic 
tradition. It is telling, indeed, that Ephraim Pagitt’s massive seventeenth-century treatises 
were designed in expressly complementary terms: Christianographie, or the Description of the 
Multitude and Sundry Sorts of Christians in the World, Not Subject to the People and Heresiography; or, a 
Description of the Hereticks and Sectaries of These Latter Times.29 These distinct yet mutually 
reinforcing compendium juxtapose those who rightfully, though differently, belong to the 
world of Christianity with those who squarely remain outside its tradition and history. But 
even as the world massively grew in size to include the “New” and the periplus through the 
                                                        
28 The discourse of travel, discovery, exhibition, and classification that infused the writings of Christopher 
Columbus, Nehemiah Grew, Sebastian Muenster, François Deserpz, Michel de Montaigne, and Francis Bacon, was 
an outgrowth not only of heresiology but of ecclesiastical history, itineraries, and universal histories.  
 
29 Ephraim Pagitt, Christianographie, or The Description of the Multitude and Sundry Sorts of Christians in the World, Not 
Subject to the Pope. With their Unity, and How They Agree with the Protestants in the Principall Poynts of Difference between 
Them and the Church of Rome, 2nd ed. (London, 1640); and Heresiography, or a Description of the Hereticks and Sectaries of 
These Latter Times (London: 1645). Thomas Edwards’ considerably more famous heresiology Gangraena, published in 
1646 in London reads, in the Preface and throughout, as a text stuck out of time: “this present Treatise is not so 
much against any one errour and sect, as against all I have hard of, a Discovery of, and Directions against that 
many headed monstrous Hydra of Sectarism sprung up in these times” (Preface, A). He not only internalizes the 
rhetoric of ancient heresiology, but he appeals his forefathers by name (Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose,  to situate 
his own project.  
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Christian theological and geographical diversity grew ever more complex and less manageable, 
the history of Christianity remained as a fractured narrative of both its constructive and 
destructive elements.30 There was no escape from the dizzying profusion and diffusion of 
sectarian opinion. It had been irrevocably imprinted into the fabric of Christian history. 
                                                        
30 As Pagitt’s Christianographie so vividly demonstrates, there is no escaping the history of Christianity’s expansion; 
like Genesis, it is the sine qua non upon which the entire narrative of Christianity’s geographical profusion is 
built. To that end, he foregrounds his discussion of Christianity’s geographical diversity with an enumeration of 
the apostolic missions (and even manages to quote Irenaeus!): “in the ecclesiastical histories,” he tells his readers, 
“the countries and nations are named, in which and to whom they preached” (17). The ensuing schematization of 
the world categories by the Christians by geographical locus: there are those of Europe, Africa, and Asia, who are 
variously subject to the Pope of Rome, and Patriarchs of Constantinople, Moscow, Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, 
and Ethiopia. But it was not just that the apostles remained the exemplars of Christian expansion, but that 
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